Development as Freedom (48 page)

Fourth, an approach to justice and development that concentrates on substantive freedoms inescapably focuses on the agency and judgment of individuals; they cannot be seen merely as patients to whom benefits will be dispensed by the process of development. Responsible adults must be in charge of their own well-being; it is for them to decide how to use their capabilities. But the capabilities that a person does actually have (and not merely theoretically enjoys) depend on the nature of social arrangements, which can be crucial for individual freedoms. And there the state and the society cannot escape responsibility.

It is, for example, a shared responsibility of the society that the system of labor bondage, where prevalent, should end, and that bonded laborers should be free to accept employment elsewhere. It is also a social responsibility that economic policies should be geared to providing widespread employment opportunities on which the economic and social viability of people may crucially depend. But it is, ultimately, an individual responsibility to decide what use to make of the opportunities of employment and what work options to choose. Similarly, the denial of opportunities of basic education to a child, or of essential health care to the ill, is a failure of social responsibility, but the exact utilization of the educational attainments or of health achievements cannot but be a matter for the person herself to determine.

Also, the empowerment of women, through employment opportunities,
educational arrangements, property rights and so on, can give women more freedom to influence a variety of matters such as intrafamily division of health care, food and other commodities, and work arrangements as well as fertility rates, but the exercise of that enhanced freedom is ultimately a matter for the person herself. The fact that statistical predictions can often be plausibly made on the ways this freedom is likely to be used (for example, in predicting that female education and female employment opportunity would reduce fertility rates and the frequency of childbearing) does not negate the fact that it is the exercise of the women’s enhanced freedom that is being anticipated.

The perspective of freedom, on which this study has concentrated, must not be seen as being hostile to the large literature on social change that has enriched our understanding of the process for many centuries. While parts of the recent development literature have tended to concentrate very much on some limited indicators of development such as the growth of GNP per head, there is quite a long tradition against being imprisoned in that little box. There have indeed been many broader voices, including that of Aristotle, whose ideas are of course among the sources on which the present analysis draws (with his clear diagnosis in
Nicomachean Ethics:
“wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else”).
¹¹
It applies also to such pioneers of “modern” economics as William Petty, the author of
Political Arithmetick
(1691), who supplemented his innovation of national income accounting with motivating discussions on much broader concerns.
¹²

Indeed, the belief that the enhancement of freedom is ultimately an important motivating factor for assessing economic and social change is not at all new. Adam Smith was explicitly concerned with crucial human freedoms.
¹³
So was Karl Marx, in many of his writings, for example when he emphasized the importance of “replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances.”
¹⁴
The protection and enhancement of liberty supplemented John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian perspective very substantially, and so did his specific
outrage at the denial of substantive freedoms to women.
¹⁵
Friedrich Hayek has been emphatic in placing the achievement of economic progress within a very general formulation of liberties and freedoms, arguing: “Economic considerations are merely those by which we reconcile and adjust our different purposes, none of which, in the last resort, are economic (except those of the miser or the man for whom making money has become an end in itself).”
¹⁶

Several development economists have also emphasized the importance of freedom of choice as a criterion of development. For example, Peter Bauer, who has quite a record of “dissent” in development economics (including an insightful book called
Dissent on Development
) has argued powerfully for the following characterization of development:

W. A. Lewis also stated, in his famous opus
The Theory of Economic Growth
, that the objective of development is increasing “the range of human choice.” However, after making this motivational point, Lewis decided, ultimately, to concentrate his analysis simply on “the growth of output per head,” on the ground that this “gives man greater control over his environment and thereby increases his freedom.”
¹⁸
Certainly, other things given, an increase in output and income would expand the range of human choice—particularly over commodities purchased. But, as was discussed earlier, the range of substantive choice on valuable matters depends also on many other factors.

It is, in this context, important to ask whether there is really any substantial difference between development analysis that focuses (as Lewis and many others choose to do) on “the growth of output per head” (such as GNP per capita), and a more foundational
concentration on expanding human freedom. Since the two are related (as Lewis rightly points out), why are the two approaches to development—inescapably linked as they are—not substantively congruent? What difference can a focal concentration on freedom make?

The differences arise for two rather distinct reasons, related respectively to the “process aspect” and the “opportunity aspect” of freedom. First, since freedom is concerned with
processes of decision making
as well as
opportunities to achieve valued outcomes
, the domain of our interest cannot be confined only to the outcomes in the form of the promotion of high output or income, or the generation of high consumption (or other variables to which the concept of economic growth relates). Such processes as participation in political decisions and social choice cannot be seen as being—at best—among the
means
to development (through, say, their contribution to economic growth), but have to be understood as constitutive parts of the
ends
of development in themselves.

The second reason for the difference between “development as freedom” and the more conventional perspectives on development relates to contrasts within the
opportunity aspect
itself, rather than being related to the process aspect. In pursuing the view of development as freedom, we have to examine—in addition to the freedoms involved in political, social and economic processes—the extent to which people have the opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value. The levels of real income that people enjoy are important in giving them corresponding opportunities to purchase goods and services and to enjoy living standards that go with those purchases. But as some of the empirical investigations presented earlier in this book showed, income levels may often be inadequate guides to such important matters as the freedom to live long, or the ability to escape avoidable morbidity, or the opportunity to have worthwhile employment, or to live in peaceful and crime-free communities. These non-income variables point to opportunities that a person has excellent reasons to value and that are not strictly linked with economic prosperity.

Thus, both the
process
aspect and the
opportunity
aspect of freedom require us to go well beyond the traditional view of development in terms of “the growth of output per head.” There is also the
fundamental difference in perspective in valuing freedom
only for
the use that is to be made of that freedom, and valuing it
over and above
that. Hayek may have overstated his case (as he often did) when he insisted that “the importance of our being free to do a particular thing has nothing to do with the question of whether we or the majority are ever likely to make use of that possibility.”
¹⁹
But he was, I would argue, entirely right in distinguishing between (1) the
derivative
importance of freedom (dependent only on its actual use) and (2) the
intrinsic
importance of freedom (in making us free to choose something we may or may not actually choose).

Indeed, sometimes a person may have a very strong reason to have an option precisely for the purpose of rejecting it. For example, when Mahatma Gandhi
fasted
to make a political point against the Raj, he was not merely
starving
, he was rejecting the option of eating (for that is what fasting is). To be able to fast, Mohandas Gandhi had to have the option of eating (precisely to be able to reject it); a famine victim could not have made a similar political point.
²⁰

While I do not want to go down the purist route that Hayek chooses (in dissociating freedom from actual use altogether), I would emphasize that freedom has many aspects. The
process
aspect of freedom would have to be considered in addition to the
opportunity
aspect, and the opportunity aspect itself has to be viewed in terms of
intrinsic
as well as
derivative
importance. Furthermore, freedom to participate in public discussion and social interaction can also have a
constructive
role in the formation of values and ethics. Focusing on freedom does indeed make a difference.

I must also briefly discuss another relation which invites a comment, to wit, the relation between the literature on “human capital” and the focus in this work on “human capability” as an expression of freedom. In contemporary economic analysis the emphasis has, to a considerable extent, shifted from seeing capital accumulation in primarily physical terms to viewing it as a process in which the productive quality of human beings is integrally involved. For example, through education, learning, and skill formation, people can become
much more productive over time, and this contributes greatly to the process of economic expansion.
²¹
In recent studies of economic growth (often influenced by empirical readings of the experiences of Japan and the rest of East Asia as well as Europe and North America), there is a much greater emphasis on “human capital” than used to be the case not long ago.

How does this shift relate to the view of development—development as freedom—presented in this book? More particularly, what, we may ask, is the connection between “human capital” orientation and the emphasis on “human capability” with which this study has been much concerned? Both seem to place humanity at the center of attention, but do they have differences as well as some congruence? At the risk of some oversimplification, it can be said that the literature on human capital tends to concentrate on the agency of human beings in augmenting production possibilities. The perspective of human capability focuses, on the other hand, on the ability—the substantive freedom—of people to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have. The two perspectives cannot but be related, since both are concerned with the role of human beings, and in particular with the actual abilities that they achieve and acquire. But the yardstick of assessment concentrates on different achievements.

Given her personal characteristics, social background, economic circumstances and so on, a person has the ability to do (or be) certain things that she has reason to value. The reason for valuation can be
direct
(the functioning involved may directly enrich her life, such as being well-nourished or being healthy), or
indirect
(the functioning involved may contribute to further production, or command a price in the market). The human capital perspective can—in principle—be defined very broadly to cover both types of valuation, but it is typically defined—by convention—primarily in terms of indirect value: human qualities that can be employed as “capital” in
production
(in the way physical capital is). In this sense, the narrower view of the human capital approach fits into the more inclusive perspective of human capability, which can cover both direct and indirect consequences of human abilities.

Consider an example. If education makes a person more efficient in commodity production, then this is clearly an enhancement of
human capital. This can add to the value of production in the economy and also to the income of the person who has been educated. But even with the same level of income, a person may benefit from education—in reading, communicating, arguing, in being able to choose in a more informed way, in being taken more seriously by others and so on. The benefits of education, thus, exceed its role as human capital in commodity production. The broader human-capability perspective would note—and value—these additional roles as well. The two perspectives are, thus, closely related but distinct.

The significant transformation that has occurred in recent years in giving greater recognition to the role of “human capital” is helpful for understanding the relevance of the capability perspective. If a person can become more productive in making commodities through better education, better health and so on, it is not unnatural to expect that she can, through these means, also directly achieve more—and have the freedom to achieve more—in leading her life.