Disaster at Stalingrad: An Alternate History (17 page)

It was evident even in Moscow that the Red Army was unravelling on the Don despite the commitment of the new tank armies. NKVD reports made it brutally clear that things were going to go smash. The Red Army was demoralized and inept. It was also eating its own seed corn. Cadet regiments had been thrown into the battle only to be wiped out. One staff officer recalled:

So desperate had the situation become that Stalin issued what quickly became known as the ‘Not a Step Back’ (
Ni Shagu Nazad!
) Order No. 227. It was a brutal admission that the country’s back was up against the wall.

Hitler’s plan, codenamed Operation Gertrude, to ‘rearrange the constellation of political power in Ankara’ had fallen into place as July wore away. It had been helped along by the fortuitous death of Prime Minister Refik Saydam on 9 July. Although this was largely a figurehead position, the pro-German faction manoeuvred to fill his office with General Erkilet, a devoted supporter of Pan-Turkism. Next Foreign Minster Saracoglu was removed because his intransigence would invite German retribution and deny Turkey its share of the ‘spoils of war’. The greatest stumbling block remained the Turkish President himself. Finally, on the last day of the month, the plotters quietly removed Inönü and confined him in a coastal villa to ‘recover his health’.

The next day they put their signatures to a secret treaty with the Third Reich to enter the war and attack the Soviet Union.
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The plan, crafted jointly by the German and Turkish general staffs, to form the Muslim Red Army POWs interned in Turkey into auxiliary legions to help liberate their homelands immediately went into effect. There were enough Azeri Turks to form a small corps of several legions, and separate legions were formed of Crimean and Volga Tatars, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Tajiks from Central Asia, and Chechens, Ingush, and Dagestanis from the Caucasus. It was easy to equip them from the mountains of Soviet small arms and artillery captured in the great battles of encirclement in 1941. Almost to a man, the POWs had volunteered to fight. Good treatment by the Turks had allowed them to recover their health, and the relentless pan-Turanist and pan-Islamic propaganda applied by the Turkish government had whipped them up to a fever pitch of vengeance.

Heydrich was pleased with himself. He had used the Navy carefully to put him in charge of the cipher systems of the Wehrmacht. It had not been a next big step to induce Hitler to let him also take over military intelligence, the Abwehr. Add to that his control of the SS’s Sicherheitsdienst, and all the reins of intelligence and counterintelligence were in his hands.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, had been Heydrich’s commander and mentor when he was a naval cadet and junior officer. For a long time, though, Heydrich had suspected Canaris of being in contact with the British MI6. Indeed he was, for the express purpose of getting rid of Hitler, whom he despised for leading Germany to ruin. Heydrich had sniffed so close to the truth that the British had launched their failed assassination attempt against him partially to protect Canaris. Now Heydrich was in a position to do something about his suspicions. He confronted Canaris.

He was stunned when Canaris matter-of-factly admitted it. ‘Of course, I am in contact with the British. That’s my job, Reinhard. Better to deceive the enemy when you can actually communicate.’ He then went on to describe the contacts and the deception operations each was a part of. Of course, it was all a carefully prepared cover story. He had had the wit to plan ahead for the time when it might be needed. Thus the angel of death passed over him.
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Heydrich’s cozy arrangement with Dönitz had led to the great victories at sea. The Kriegsmarine was riding high. Now he would bring it down. To this Goring listened with great attention.

Heydrich could see the greed flicker in Goring’s eyes.

Heydrich’s role in turning the Enigma compromise to Germany’s advantage and his backing of Dönitz’s attack on the convoys had elevated his reputation with Hitler beyond even his fatherly affection. Hitler would deny him nothing. So Heydrich’s suggestion that half a million men be transferred from the Navy to the Luftwaffe, SS and Army was eagerly approved by Hitler. The Luftwaffe would profit most from an influx of high quality and technically adept personnel. The Army desperately needed combat replacements for the open, running sore of the Eastern Front. And, of course, the Navy was also a source of just the sort of racially pure and fit men the SS wanted.

Naval personnel were transferred as individuals, not as organized units as the Soviets were successfully doing with their naval personnel. Heydrich made sure that they would lose all connection with their former service. Dönitz threatened to resign, but swallowed his pride. The Führer knew best. It did not take him long to discover that the knife in his back had been stuck there with Heydrich’s clammy hand.
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As 6th Army stalled on the Don Bend after its exhausting victory, Army Group A had plunged south across the 300-mile Kuban towards the Black Sea coast and the passes through the Caucasus Mountains. The Kuban stretched between the Black and Caspian Seas and was bound on the north by the Don Steppe and the south by the forbidding ranges of the Caucasus. It had been settled as a marcher land against the wild tribes of the mountains by even more ferocious Cossacks.
³
The three German armies attacked on line with 17th Army crossing the Don and striking south along the Sea of Azov to move down the Black Sea coast. The 1st Panzer Army in the centre attacked towards Maikop and Armavir and 4th Panzer Army towards Pyatigorsk. Each of these last two objectives led to a major highway through the mountains. Across their path lay two major water obstacles, the Manych and Kuban Rivers, flowing east to west. Pyatigorsk in particular led to the Georgian Military Highway along which Allied aid from Persia flowed.

It was a race. The Germans were intent on encircling the Russians. The Russians were intent on not being encircled as they conducted a fighting retreat into the ideal defensive terrain of the mountains. In their drive south the 16th Motorized and 3rd Panzer Divisions of 4th Panzer Army swept up to the 400-mile-long Manych River. It was the last great physical barrier before the mountains were reached.

It had been made an even greater barrier by the hand of man. The river was essentially a series of dams and their reservoirs, often a mile wide. It was a thorny problem for the commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, General Hermann Breith. The banks of the narrowest parts of the reservoirs were strongly held by NKVD troops. Instead of attacking there, Breith’s infantry crossed in assault boats at the widest point, 2 miles across, just above a dam. The surprise was complete, and the Germans overran the dam to prevent its demolition. Within minutes the armoured columns of the division were crossing and heading south towards Asia.

The Turkish-German treaty of alliance may have been secret, but it did not take long for the British and the Soviets to discover its existence. Even if they had not, the sudden presence of hundreds of Wehrmacht officers and NCOs in Turkey, the transfer of an expeditionary corps, and the redeployment of the Turkish armies to the borders would have been a resounding tip-off.

For both of them the imminent entry of Turkey into the war might turn out to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. The British had stripped just about every unit they safely could from their 10th Army guarding Syria, Iraq and Persia and sent them off to shore up 8th Army on the Egyptian border. They arrived just in time barely to stave off Rommel’s attack in July. There would be precious little left to stop any Turkish thrust into 10th Army’s area of operations.

The Soviets had as much if not more to fear. This new threat meant that their forces between the Caucasus and the Turkish border would have to fight front and back. Now both the oilfields at Baku and the Persian Corridor route of supply from the Allies were in danger. With the greatest reluctance, Stalin released a few more armies from Stavka reserve to bolster the defences of the Transcaucasus Front that defended the Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia and Turkic Azerbaijan.

Things looked far more difficult from the perspective of the German advisory group in Ankara. Although captured French and Soviet weapons stocks had done much to modernize the Turkish Army as far as artillery and automatic weapons went, its logistics were, to put it kindly, primitive, consisting largely of pack animals in caravan trains and a very limited number of motor vehicles. Signals and communication remained grossly inadequate. The Turkish Air Force was simply in no condition to go up against the Russians. Goring was prevailed upon to scrape up a few Luftwaffe fighter units, pulling them from Norway now that the Allies had put a temporary halt to their convoys.

That meant that the German expeditionary corps, XLIV Corps (97th and 101st Jäger Divisions), commanded by General der Artillerie Maximilian de Angelis, would be operating on a shoestring. These divisions, however, had been organized and trained to operate under difficult conditions. They were taken from Army Group A. Field Marshal List had raised a bloody fit over the loss of these two specialized divisions at the end of July. He was more than mollified by their replacement with the even more specialized LV Mountain Corps (3rd and 5th Gebirgsjäger Divisions) which were being wasted as normal infantry in Army Group North around Leningrad. Now List would have four of the German Army’s seven mountain divisions; the rest remained locked in battle in the desolate reaches of Lappland. At the last minute Hitler confirmed the transfer of the three excellent mountain divisions of the Italian Alpini Corps.
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Chuikov handed over command of 64th Army to a replacement on 30 July. He had been relieved by the front commander, who summoned him to his headquarters in the city. Gordov told him, ‘The enemy has been pinned down in our defence positions, and he can now be wiped out with a single blow.’ Chuikov was astounded that the front commander could say such a thing after the drubbing the Germans had given them. Chuikov would write later, ‘I came to the conclusion that the Front Commander did not know the situation at the front. He took wishful thinking for reality, and did not realize that a new threat, a large-scale attack, was imminent.’ Gordov angrily dismissed his concerns and told him to write a report on his actions as army commander.

Wishful thinking was also afflicting the commander of the remnants of 62nd Army, who reported that his army was ‘firmly holding its defensive positions’ and, with 1st Tank and 21st Armies, ‘is completing the encirclement of the enemy’. It reminded Chuikov of the anecdote about the man who caught a bear. ’“Bring it over here,” someone said, “I can’t,” he replied. “It won’t let me.”’
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Two days later Chuikov was ordered by the Front Military Council personally to examine the situation south of Stalingrad and take whatever measures necessary. He found chaos. Divisions were retreating ahead of the oncoming Germans who had crossed the Don farther south. They had taken heavy losses. He took them under his command and ordered them to set up defensive lines north of the Aksay River.

Another division was arriving at two railway stations in the area. The Luftwaffe, as ever informed of ripe prey by its reconnaissance, attacked both stations just as the troops were unloading. Chuikov was walking to the buildings where his communications had been set up at the Chilekov Station when he saw three flights of aircraft coming towards him. ‘Suddenly there was the roar of explosions . . . I could see the carriages and the station buildings on fire, with raging flames rapidly leaping from one building to another.’ Chuikov thought to himself if only air cover had been provided to the stations, all this loss could have been avoided.
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He was out of touch with 64th Army headquarters for long periods inspecting, reorganizing, threatening, bringing hope to beaten men and getting soaked in frequent downpours. On one occasion his sudden arrival at a unit nearly cost him his life. He was wearing a British aid raincoat which a sentry recognized as foreign. And foreign to this man meant German. Chuikov missed death only by the barest of margins as he blurted out the response to the sentry’s challenge.

The Luftwaffe continued to torment any Soviet unit on the road. It so savagely strafed and bombed his 29th Rifle Division marching to set up positions along the Aksay River that it suffered more casualties than in the fighting west of the Don. Nevertheless, Chuikov was confirmed in command of these forces, the Southern Group, which he had already positioned along the Aksay.

On the 5th, the Germans attacked and drove a wedge over the river. Chuikov observed that they used the same battle drill as in the fighting west of the Don, ‘air attack, then artillery, then infantry, then tanks. They did not know any other order in which to attack.’ Chuikov determined to defeat this battle drill by an artillery strike on their assembly areas followed by an infantry attack. He fretted about taking these odds and ends of units into even a simple offensive operation. He had no tanks and no air support either, nor antitank weapons. He had to hit before the Germans could ferry their tanks across the river. He struck at daybreak. The artillery thundered down on the unsuspecting Germans who broke and fled back across the river. Their tanks never crossed, and he did not even have to employ his infantry.
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For the next ten days, the Germans again and again tried to cross the river in force. Chuikov threw them back each time, each time varying his tactics. He would counterattack at night or at dawn when the Luftwaffe could not be in the sky. His artillery ranged into the depth of the German positions disrupting their attempts to concentrate. Chuikov and his scratch force had shown that the Germans could be beaten.

Colonel General Andrei Yeremenko’s leg still had not recovered from the last of the three wounds he had suffered so far in the war. He was thankful that he was flying in one of these comfortable American Dakota transport aircraft rather than taking an overland route to Stalingrad. The
Vozhd
had just appointed him to command both fronts defending Stalingrad. The plane landed at the small airport on the outskirts of the city. Waiting for him was People’s Commissar Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Yeremenko braced himself. The Ukrainian commissar was a Politburo member and close to Stalin. Cold and ruthless as his master, he had executed the created famine in 1931-2 that starved to death up to ten million of his fellow Ukrainians on Stalin’s orders. He had also supervised the building of the Moscow subway in which thousands died. Dread preceded him, and fear followed in his wake. Yeremenko in contrast was an affable man who always had time for his subordinates. Somehow they would have to get along. On one thing they were in complete agreement. Stalin’s ‘Not one step back’ order would be ruthlessly enforced.

Even the rear was in panic. The port city of Astrakhan on the estuary of the Volga where it entered into the Caspian Sea was in fear after a German air raid. Astrakhan was a vital rail and water communications hub that fed supplies and reinforcements to Stalingrad. It was filled with terrified refugees and crated machinery from evacuated plants. Now huge, greasy clouds of black smoke poured from the burning oil storage tanks the Germans had hit.
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