Einstein (46 page)

Robert Wood, Planck, and Einstein at a meeting of the German Physical Society, Berlin 1931, in honor of Michelson
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Illustration Credit 10.1
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Michelson, Einstein, and Millikan
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Illustration Credit 10.2
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Nevertheless, the occurrence left a very uncomfortable feeling. It was now definitely known that the National Socialist Party, which at that time was already one of the most powerful factors in the world, regarded Einstein as a leader of its opponents. All sorts of unpleasant surprises had to be expected.

Germany’s revolution from the Right made it evident to the small neighboring states that the time had come when Germany would break the bonds of the Versailles Treaty, if necessary by force. To any intelligent person acquainted with the lessons of history it was obvious that Germany would not stop with the eradication of the “injustice of Versailles,” but would take advantage of the opportunity to obtain something more for herself in order to realize her old dream of a “living space.” The war of 1914–18 had made it evident to the Belgians that the German politicians included Belgium within this living space. As early as 1933, at about the time that Einstein came to Belgium, this realization aroused a feeling of insecurity in many persons.

On the other hand, in Belgium as elsewhere at this time, especially among the youth, the view was firmly rooted that all wars are organized by the capitalist class to suppress the workers. Therefore every socially minded and progressive young person should refrain from supporting war in any way. But even then it was already evident to many Belgians that absolute opposition to every war would make the country an easy prey for its neighbors, who preached that war is the most important instrument of politics. Thus radically minded youth was faced by this problem: should the propaganda against military service and military preparedness be continued, thus rendering easier an invasion by warlike neighbors, or should one take part in the defense of the fatherland, thereby following a slogan that
had previously been regarded as a pretext of the exploiters in their fight against their own workers? A group of representatives of Belgian pacifist youth turned to Einstein for his opinion in this matter of conscience, since he was widely known as a radical champion of the movement against war and military service. As late as the spring of 1931 he had greeted with delight and affirmation a manifesto issued by American clergymen in which they announced that they would take no part in any future wars, even though their own government claimed that it was for the defense of their country. Einstein had written as follows, referring to this statement:

“It is a gratifying revelation of the temper of the American clergy that fifty-four per cent of those who answered the questionnaire should have indicated their purpose not to participate in any future war. Only such a radical position can be of help to the world, since the government of each nation is bound to present every war as a war of defense.”

But when the young Belgians turned to Einstein with the question whether they should refuse to co-operate if Belgium became involved in a war against its big neighbors, Einstein did not let himself be confused for a moment. From the very first he knew that he had to answer in such a way as to encourage the course of action that he considered advisable under the given circumstances. He did not allow himself to be confused by the vain idea of standing forth as one who sticks to his principles under all circumstances. Such a person would insist on his principles even though they should lead to actions and results with which he was not in sympathy. Einstein was aware that the purpose of principles in both public and private life is only to encourage actions that produce results which one would approve. Principles, however, are not to be considered as ends in themselves. He answered briefly and concisely: in this case everyone should fight as best he can for the freedom of his fatherland, Belgium.

This answer created a sensation at the time. Many persons even doubted its genuineness. Many said: “Surely a principle does not become false because in a single case it leads to consequences that are repugnant, as for instance in this case to a triumph of National Socialism.”

The people who expected that Einstein would stick to his principles without any consideration of the consequences did not understand the fundamentally positivistic, pragmatic character
of his thought. Basically he thought in politics just as he did in physics. When he actually came to grips with a concrete problem, the positivistic basis of his thinking became evident. He did not believe that principles have any meaning except their consequences, which we can test on the basis of our experiences. Occasionally, he liked to think about the emotional effect brought about by the wording of the principles. As a result his language in physics as well as in politics in some cases acquired a metaphysical touch. But this was only a more or less poetical way of speaking, which furnished a point of contact with human feeling.

Basically his position was always clear: he would never support principles because of their beautiful sound, if they led to consequences which he could not approve.

For this reason the attacks on Einstein by those who opposed war on principle were of the same character as those of some of his opponents in physics who attacked him with the reproach that he had first advanced the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light in the special relativity theory of 1905, and had then abandoned it in his theory of gravitation, since according to the latter the velocity with which light is propagated depends on the intensity of the gravitational field. Some of Einstein’s opponents accused him of being inconsistent and of trying to hide this inconsistency. This description, however, is somewhat misleading. The constancy of the velocity of light is true only under very specific conditions — namely, when strong gravitational fields are not present. By enumerating the restrictions under which a certain principle is valid, one is not being inconsistent, but only adding to our knowledge of the world.

The same is true of Einstein’s attitude to the question of military service. At that time I had no opportunity to discuss this matter personally with him, but soon after Einstein’s arrival in America the same question became acute there. The radical youth movement, as represented by the American Youth Congress, at first wanted to uphold the principle of absolute opposition to war, even in the case of a war of the democratic states against fascism, because such a war for them was in principle an imperialist war. Einstein, however, did not let himself be confused by such arguments, and saw that here as in Belgium these “opponents of war” were only working for the victory of the greatest military power. As a result they would achieve the very opposite of what they thought they were working for. Einstein thought that the principle of absolute non-participation
in war made sense only when a victory of the different powers did not lead to very different consequences for the population. In Europe after 1918 one might have said: It does not make much difference whether one is ruled by the French or the German Republic, by the United. States or Great Britain. This difference does not justify war. But this standpoint can no longer be maintained when there are states whose principles of government differ as radically from each other as do those of Nazi Germany from those of the states around it. Under these conditions no one can remain indifferent to who will be the victor. Just as the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light is valid only if no great differences of gravitational potential and therefore no great forces are present, so the principle of absolute refusal to perform military service is valid only when there are no extreme differences between the governmental principles of opposing states.

In U.S.A. opponents of military service such as Bertrand Russell and Archibald MacLeish drew the same consequences from the situation. Various metaphysically thinking authors characterized such men as “inconsistent” and wondered that logicians such as Russell could be so illogical. Einstein’s case, however, would already have shown them that consistency in a metaphysical sense — that is, to hold fast to the letter of a principle — is not consistency in a scientific sense which means to hold fast to the desirable consequences of a principle. Thus, because of his direct and honest thinking, Einstein once again became an object of attacks, even before he had actually departed from Europe, and this time the attacks came from “progressive” and “radical” circles.

At this time Einstein was most immediately concerned with the many hundreds and soon thousands of scholars and scientists, both young and old, who were expelled from their positions by the purge in Germany. English scientists tried to give the refugees some opportunity to continue their work under more favorable conditions. The great English physicist Rutherford put himself at the head of this movement and organized the Academic Assistance Council in London. At its first meeting Einstein was to be presented to the public as a symbol of the victims, and with his great prestige was to make an appeal for this cause. One can very well imagine that this was not very pleasant for Einstein. He did not like to appear publicly in any matter where he was personally involved. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the situation and the importance of the relief measures
induced him to go to London and deliver an address on the subject “Science and Liberty.” At the meeting he sat next to Lord Rutherford, who presided. Immediately after his introductory words Rutherford pointed to his neighbor with an energetic gesture and presented him proudly: “Ladies and gentlemen, my old friend and colleague Professor Einstein.”

Einstein spoke with great reserve. He tried to point out the need for relief measures, while avoiding all political attacks. Strong words were superfluous, the cause spoke for itself. Einstein said: “It cannot be my task to act as judge of the conduct of a nation which for many years has considered me as her son. Perhaps it is an idle task to judge in times when action counts.”

Soon after this meeting, which took place early in October 1933, Einstein was waiting at Southampton for a passenger vessel of moderate size that was coming from Antwerp and was to bring him to New York.

But before I describe Einstein’s new life in America, we will remain awhile yet in Europe to see the remarkable manner in which Einstein’s abstract theories were utilized by political and religious groups for their purposes.

To a physicist or mathematician who actually understands, or believes that he understands, Einstein’s theories, it must seem strange and frivolous when people whose understanding of this matter is much more limited argue whether his theory is a product of the Bolshevization of Europe or perhaps a stage in the development of Europe from liberalism to fascism; whether it is a support for religion in its fight against materialism or whether it helps to breed disbelief in everything that traditional religion teaches about the universe. The professional physicist will not find any trace of these ideas in Einstein’s theories. He believes that their validity depends only on the correctness of certain computations, and on whether certain delicate experiments are carried out with the necessary care. Consequently he must feel that these disputes over Einstein’s theories have been simply a result of ignorance and madness.

But whoever investigates the fate of other radically new theories about the universe — for example, the fate of the Copernican system, the Newtonian theory, the laws of energy — will find that all these theories led to discussions that from the standpoint of the physicist or mathematician appeared to be either superfluous or even foolish.

The transition from science to political ideology occurs by means of philosophy. The generalizations of science are expressed in philosophical language, in which terms such as “idealism,” “materialism,” “force,” “energy,” and others play a part. The same words also appear in the philosophical doctrines that tell men how to act in private as well as in political life. In this way the generalizations of science are gradually transformed into principles of moral and political philosophy.

On this point Viscount Samuel, a man who is conversant with
science, philosophy and politics, and who in addition has been connected with Einstein in a number of ways, said:

“Philosophy of some kind moves the nations. Every land resounds with the tramp of armies, behind the armies are the dictators and the parliaments, behind them are the political creeds — Communism, National Socialism, Fascism, Democracy — and behind the creeds are the philosophers — Marx, Engels, Hegel, Nietzsche, Sorel, Mill, and others.”

Philosophical systems like to make use of the newest scientific theories in order to have “exact” foundations. But the help that philosophy gets in this way does not lead to unambiguous results. One and the same scientific theory can be used to support different political creeds. Bertrand Russell gave a very good characterization of this ambiguity: