Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (64 page)

1.
B. H. Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
(London: Cassell’s, 1970), 316–17. For Alanbrooke’s comments on the travel delays, see the pertinent pages in his
War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke
, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001).

2.
Liddell Hart,
History
, 386. The actual math calculations from Liddell Hart’s figures would suggest that Doenitz possessed 204 operational submarines (out of a total of 366) by the end of 1942, but the difference is insignificant. Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz was of course the remarkable C in C of the German submarine arm, then the Kriegsmarine itself. There have been so many books written on this campaign over the past sixty years that it is difficult to know which ones to list. Readers might begin with Marc Milner’s fine summary,
Battle of the Atlantic
(Stroud, UK: Tempus, 2005), and take things from there, that is, from his brief bibliography on 265–67. The U.K. official history is S. W. Roskill,
The War at Sea, 1939–1945
, 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1954–61). The U.S. official history is S. E. Morison,
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II,
15 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–62), vols. 1 and 10 being those most relevant, because they are specifically on the Battle of the Atlantic.
Milner’s additional value is that he brings in the increasingly important role of the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force. There are useful Navy Records Society volumes by the late David Syrett and by Eric Grove and a great amount of further information in the many publications of the German Military History Research Office.

3.
The quote is from Roskill,
War at Sea
, 2:367.

4.
For the general strategic theory here, see John Winton,
Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade, 1890–1990
(London: Michael Joseph, 1983); S. W. Roskill,
The Strategy of Sea Power
(London: Collins, 1962); and Sir Julian Corbett,
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
(London: Collins, 1962).

5.
A.R. Millet and W. Murray,
Military Effectiveness
(Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989).

6.
The most available tables are in Roskill,
War at Sea,
vol. 3, part II, various appendices, where the naval war as a whole is summed up.

7.
The fall of France? Perhaps, but only for the French. Stalingrad? Perhaps, though the German army was advancing eastward again in the spring of 1943. Midway? But it marked the limit of Japan’s expansion in the Central Pacific, not the start of Nimitz’s great counteroffensive, which was well over a year away.

8.
There are lots of fine works on the critical months of the Battle of the Atlantic, including Roskill,
War at Sea;
Milner,
Battle of the Atlantic;
and Correlli Barnett,
Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991). But perhaps the most remarkable of them all is German historian (and former naval officer) Juergen Rohwer’s
The Critical Convoy Battles of 1943
(London: Ian Allen, 1977), a feat of historical reconstruction. Also very impressive: Martin Middlebrook,
Convoy
(London: William Morrow, 1986).

9.
Rohwer,
Critical Convoy Battles
, 55.

10.
Ibid., 211, for technical data on the U-boat types.

11.
Barnett,
Engage the Enemy
, 599.

12.
On this theme more generally, see D. Howse,
Radar at Sea: The Royal Navy in the Second World War
(London: Macmillan, 1993), an impeccable study; Sir Arthur Hezlet,
The Electron and Sea Power
(London: Stein and Day, 1976); and the excellent study (one of many by the same author) by G. Hartcup,
The Effect of Science on the Second World War
(Basingstoke: St. Martin’s, 2000), especially ch. 3–4.

13.
Rohwer,
Critical Convoy Battles
, 113.

14.
Ibid., 121.

15.
For Alanbrooke’s many concerns in this critical period, see his
War Diaries,
ca. 330–425.

16.
See, for example, Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton’s analysis in the final chapter of his book
Crisis Convoy: The Story of HX 231
(London: P. Davies, 1974), “Why Did the Germans Lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the
Spring of 1943?” which feints and ducks around that very question. Gretton is by no means the only author to do so, and he is someone who witnessed and played a major role in the turn of the tide.

17.
Roskill,
War at Sea,
vol. 2, map 38 (opposite p. 365).

18.
Milner,
Battle of the Atlantic,
127.

19.
See again Roskill’s
War at Sea,
vol. 2, ch. 5, and the scatter-map of the lost merchantmen of Convoy PQ 17, opposite p. 141.

20.
Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
600.

21.
Assessing the significance of HX 231’s contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic is something of a puzzle. Roskill, in
War at Sea,
vol. 2, does not mention it at all. Perhaps this is what prompted its escort commander, Peter Gretton, to write
Crisis Convoy,
a self-important work, though with some interesting tidbits on morale and training, plus details of what the merchantmen were carrying, the number of tankers, and so on. Milner,
Battle of the Atlantic,
gives this clash a mere sentence on p. 158, mentioning Doenitz’s disappointment that only six ships were lost from the convoy. R. Overy,
Why the Allies Won,
2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 2006), 69, writes, “Convoy HX 231 from Newfoundland fought its way through four days of gale-force winds against a pack of seventeen submarines. Four U-boats were sunk for almost no loss.” But Roskill’s fastidious compilation of German U-boat losses (Appendix J, p. 470) shows only two U-boats sunk in the North Atlantic in these days.

22.
Gretton, P.
Crisis Convoy: The Story of the HX 231
(London: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 157.

23.
Ibid., 173.

24.
The warships’ performances—and group photos of the remarkably young commanders of each vessel—are in Sir Peter Gretton’s
Convoy Escort Commander
(London: Cassell, 1964); the narrative is on 149–62.

25.
Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
610.

26.
For Doenitz’s political character, see P. Padfield,
Doenitz: The Last Fuehrer
(New York: Harper and Row, 1984). For his mid-May report to Hitler, see Liddell Hart,
History
, 389–90. For his assessment of the role of Allied airpower in blunting the attacks upon convoys HX 239 and SC 130, see Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
611.

27.
K. Doenitz,
Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), 326.

28.
Bomber Harris’s dismissive memo is recorded in M. E. Howard,
Grand Strategy
(London: HMSO, 1972), 4:21, while Doenitz’s sober assessment is reprinted in Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
611. The dismal story on the British side has been recently confirmed by the research of Duncan Redford in “Inter- and Intra-Service Rivalries in the Battle of the Atlantic,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
32, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 899–928. Gretton’s amazing claims about his personal air-sea cooperation experiences are in
his introduction to R. Seth,
The Fiercest Battle: The Story of North Atlantic Convoy ONS 5, 22nd April–7th May 1943
(London: Hutchinson, 1961), 14–15. Gretton also reports that the Liverpool Tactical School had “joint classes” for Royal Navy and Coastal Command officers, which would be quite remarkable.

29.
Also known, under another code name, as the Mark 24 mine. See “Mark 24 Mine,” Wikipedia,
http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_24_Mine
; Kathleen Williams, “See Fido Run: A Tale of the First Anti-U-boat Acoustic Torpedo,” paper presented at the U.S. Naval Academy Naval History Symposium, 2009.

30.
H. P. Willmott,
The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War
(London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 266–267.

31.
For illustrations of a depth charge crew at work, see Roskill,
War at Sea,
vol. 3, part I, opposite p. 257; on improved sonar, see Hartcup,
Effect of Science,
60–69.

32.
Hartcup,
Effect of Science,
72–74. There is a photo of a Hedgehog as illustration 9.

33.
G. Pawle,
The Secret War 1939–1945
(London: White Lion Press, 1956), ch. 12. However, as a fine corrective to the “British eccentrics” interpretation of how the war was won, see D. Edgerton,
Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War
(London: Allen Lane, 2011), and my discussion in “Reflections” at the end of this book.

34.
Rohwer,
Critical Convoy Battles,
198. Hartcup,
Effect of Science,
47–49, explains how it works.

35.
For the best, brief summary, see Hartcup,
Effect of Science,
24–31.

36.
Liddell Hart,
History,
389.

37.
E. G. Bowen,
Radar Days
(Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1987), ch. 9–12, explains the technology, and his role in the transfer to the Rad Lab. John Burchard’s
Q.E.D: M.I.T. in World War II
(New York: Wiley, 1948) observes that “the British achievement of the cavity magnetron was perhaps the most important single contribution to technical development of the first years of the war” (219). See also Howse,
Radar at Sea,
67–68, 156.

38.
There is a photo of a Leigh Light in Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
between 588 and 589. Earlier, on 258–59, he details the interminable delays. In general Barnett is very critical of the shortcomings of British industry and authorities to get the right weapons to the fronts. My own feeling is that the beleaguered island state performed rather well in the strained circumstances of total war, a view now much reinforced by Edgerton,
Britain’s War Machine
.

39.
Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
609. There is a balanced (actually, rather cool) assessment of Ultra’s contribution to the Allies’ overall victory in Hartcup,
Effect of Science,
ch. 5. Rohwer,
Critical Convoy Battles,
229–44, explains naval code breaking. The founding father of code-breaking history, David
Kahn, also is cautious about ascribing too much importance to Ultra or indeed other deciphering systems; see his “Intelligence in World War II: A Survey,”
Journal of Intelligence History
1, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 1–20.

40.
Herbert E. Werner,
Iron Coffins: A Personal Account of the German U-boat Battles of World War II
(London: Arthur Barker, 1969), is a grim and fascinating account, with rather wonderful illustrations, and possibly was the inspiration for the great movie
Das Boot
.

41.
Roskill,
War at Sea,
vol. 3, part 1, ch. 2–3; Morison,
History,
has a great spreadsheet map of the U-boat kills in the Bay of Biscay, 10:97. The glider bombs are discussed in Milner’s fine
Battle of the Atlantic,
193–94.

42.
On the Polish Mosquitos (and other nationalities in the squadrons), see Milner,
Battle of the Atlantic,
189.

43.
Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
606.

44.
Most of the more detailed accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic mention Walker’s role—how could they not?—but great data, including the quotation, can also be found at an individual website,
captainwalker.info/

45.
Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
605; more generally on operations research, see Hartcup,
Effect of Science,
ch. 6.

46.
Roskill,
War at Sea,
vol. 3, part 1, p. 395; and Morison,
History,
vol. 10, ch. 8.

47.
Werner,
Iron Coffins,
213, recounts he and fellow commanders received the orders to attack the D-Day craft “with the final objective of destroying enemy ships by ramming.” See also Morison,
History,
10:324–25, on the massive Allied naval and aerial screen (and the loss of
Pink
).

48.
This final period of the struggle is covered well in Roskill,
War at Sea,
vol. 3, parts 1 and 2, and in Barnett,
Engage the Enemy,
852–58; Milner,
Battle of the Atlantic,
ch. 9, shows how tough those later battles were.

49.
Willmott,
Great Crusade
, 273. Ellis,
Brute Force,
160–61, also makes a strong case for numbers and production ultimately being key.

1.
E. Bendiger,
The Fall of Fortresses
(New York: Putnam, 1980); quotes are from 219–21.

2.
Ibid., 236, 225.

3.
The literature here is vast. B. H. Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
(London: Cassell’s, 1970), ch. 23, and R. Overy,
Why the Allies Won
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), ch. 4, provide succinct single-chapter overviews. I found M. Hastings,
Bomber Command
(London: Michael Joseph, 1979) perhaps the single best volume, very critical but also discriminating. The four-volume British official history by C. Webster and N. Frankland,
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany
(London: HMSO, 1961), is a model of its kind.

4.
N. Longmate,
The Bombers: The RAF Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945
(London: Hutchinson, 1983), 298.

5.
W. Murray and A. R. Millett,
A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 317; also, more generally, see J. Terraine,
The Right of the Line
(London: Pen and Sword, 2010), which examines the RAF’s role in the European war from beginning to end.

6.
Overy,
Why the Allies Won,
147; Hastings,
Bomber Command,
318; Longmate,
The Bombers
.

7.
I. F. Clarke,
Voice Prophesying War 1763–1984
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).

8.
See A. Gollin,
No Longer an Island: Britain and the Wright Brothers 1902–1909
(London: Heinemann, 1984), especially the later chapters. For Amery’s 1904 contention, see Paul Kennedy,
Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945: Eight Studies
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 47.

9.
See Overy’s classic comparative analysis
The Air War 1939–1945
(London: Europa, 1980). There are fabulous photographs in R. Higham,
Air Power: A Concise History
(Yuma, KS: Sunflower Press, 1984).

10.
Compare, for example, the hugely critical accounts by Longmate in
The Bombers
and by Bendiger,
Fall of Fortresses,
with that by a staunch defender of RAF Bomber Command’s policies, Dudley Saward, in
Victory Denied: The Rise of Air Power and the Defeat of Germany 1920–1945
(London: Buchan and Enright, 1985). Saward is also the author of the authorized biography of Bomber Harris, whose own account,
Bomber Offensive
(London: Collins, 1947) was published very shortly after the war and well captures his own strong opinions.

11.
Quoted from Longmate,
The Bombers,
21–22, though the italics are mine.
Chapter 1
of Hastings’s
Bomber Command
has a fine, brief survey of the RAF between 1917 and 1940, and vol. 1 of Webster and Frankland’s
Strategic Air Offensive
is invaluable.

12.
On the theories of air warfare, see ch. 20 in E. M. Earle, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); on Trenchard, see Hastings,
Bomber Command,
ch. 1. Much of my analysis here derives from Tami Biddle,
Rhetoric and Reality: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

13.
Trenchard’s remarkable statement, and the equally remarkable replies of the chief of the Imperial General Staff and the First Sea Lord, are extensively quoted in Longmate,
The Bombers,
43–47.

14.
U. Bialer,
The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932–1939
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1980). The Baldwin quotation is in Hastings,
Bomber Command,
50.

15.
B. Collier,
The Defence of the United Kingdom
(London: HMSO, 1957), sets the larger scene, as does Overy,
Air War,
ch. 2.

16.
W. Murray,
Luftwaffe
(Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985), 43–61, is superb here.

17.
See Collier,
Defence,
and T. C. G. Jones,
The Battle of Britain
(London: Frank Cass, 2000).

18.
See Robert Wohl,
A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination 1908–1918
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

19.
Liddell Hart,
History,
91.

20.
For the best brief account, see G. Hartcup’s superb
The Effect of Science on the Second World War
(London: Macmillan, 2000), ch. 2–3.

21.
Quoted in B. Schwarz, “Black Saturday,”
Atlantic,
April 2008, 85, which is a review of Peter Stansky’s
The First Day of the Blitz
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).

22.
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
60, Table XI. The comparative aircraft production rates are in Overy,
Air War,
33.

23.
Murray,
Luftwaffe,
60, 10.

24.
Figures from Overy,
Air War,
150.

25.
Quotes from Liddell Hart,
History,
595–96; see also Webster and Frankland,
Strategic Air Offensive,
1:178.

26.
Webster and Frankland, ibid, 233

27.
A. Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy
(London: Penguin, 2006), 596–602, a brilliant, revisionist analysis.

28.
See Hastings,
Bomber Command,
246, for the damage statistics; see W. Murray,
Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1939–1945
(Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 1983), 169, for Speer and Hitler. Note that this is a different, slightly earlier book than Murray’s
Luftwaffe,
though it uses a lot of the same data.

29.
See Longmate,
The Bombers,
ch. 21, “The Biggest Chop Night Ever”; Hastings,
Bomber Command,
319, gives the Harris quotes, and on 320 quotes the official history.

30.
R. Weigley,
The American Way of Warfare: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); ch. 14 has his own comments on the USAAF aerial offensives.

31.
W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds.,
The Army Air Forces in World War II
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958), 7 vols., is revealing here: see vol. 2, ch. 9, Arthur B. Ferguson’s “The Casablanca Directive.”

32.
Bendiger,
Fall of Fortresses,
232–34. Bendiger’s language here is withering.

33.
These figures come from A. Furse,
Wilfrid Freeman: The Genius Behind Allied Survival and Air Supremacy 1939 to 1945
(Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Press, 1999), 234; they are slightly different in Liddell Hart,
History,
603.

34.
Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Forces,
2:702–3; the actual description is in chapter 20, “Pointblank,” by Arthur B. Ferguson.

35.
Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Forces,
2:706, 705.

36.
Karl Mendelssohn,
Science and Western Domination
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1976). The story has been developed in Daniel Headrick’s
Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

37.
A. Harvey-Bailey,
The Merlin in Perspective
(Derby, UK: Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, 1983), is very technical but also important in stressing the key role of Rolls-Royce’s managing director E. W. Hives after Royce’s death. See also H. Glancy,
Spitfire: The Biography
(London: Atlantic Books, 2006), ch. 1.

38.
Harvey-Bailey,
Merlin
.

39.
Glancy’s
Spitfire
is only the most obvious. See also Alfred Price’s
The Spitfire Story
(London: Arms and Armour, 1995) and Len Deighton’s remarkable
Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain
(London: Pimlico, 1996).

40.
The Story of the Spitfire,
DVD (Pegasus, 2001).

41.
Harvey-Bailey,
Merlin,
is excellent on the steady enhancement of the engine’s power. The equally impressive efforts by Packard engineers to mass-produce Merlin 61 engines in the U.S.A. is nicely covered in Herman Arthur,
Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II
(New York: Random House, 2012), 103-105.

42.
See Furse,
Wilfrid Freeman
.

43.
D. Birch,
Rolls-Royce and the Mustang
(Derby, UK: Rolls-Royce Historical Trust, 1987), 10; the photo of the original plane is on the same page.

44.
Furse,
Wilfrid Freeman,
226–29, presents remarkable detective work.

45.
Paul A. Ludwig,
P-51 Mustang: Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter
(Surrey, UK: Ian Allen, 2003), esp. ch. 5, on the resistance of Echols.

46.
Birch,
Rolls-Royce and the Mustang
reproduces Hitchcock’s letter in full on 37–39; see also 147–48. The quote by the official historians is in Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Services
, 4:217–18.

47.
Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Services
, 3:8.

48.
Lovett’s report, and Arnold’s response, are best covered in Ludwig,
P-51 Mustang
, 143–45, 148.

49.
For two of them, see Murray,
Luftwaffe,
and N. Frankland,
The Bombing Offensive Against Germany
(London: Faber, 1965).

50.
Furse,
Wilfrid Freeman,
234–35.

51.
See
www.cebudanderson.com/droptanks.html
—an unusual source (accessed May 2008), the memoir of Donald W. Marner, a U.S. mechanic serving a Mustang squadron based in Suffolk in 1944–45, whose chief task was to get his hands on enough of them from his RAF buddies. Bendiger
also mentions the American fliers’ gratitude for these quaint papier-mâché drop tanks. For confirmation of the immense significance of the drop tanks (especially the paper version) in the air war, see Ludwig,
P-51 Mustang,
168–70.

52.
Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Forces,
vol. 3, ch. 3, on “Big Week”; and Murray,
Luftwaffe,
223ff. Ludwig,
P-51 Mustang,
204, has comparative figures of P-38, P-47, and P-51 kill ratios. To some degree, then, as G. E. Cross points out, the P-47 Thunderbolts became overshadowed by the Mustangs, rather the way the Hurricanes were overshadowed by the Spitfires in the Battle of Britain, while in reality all four aircraft types played a vital role. See Cross’s
Jonah’s Feet Are Dry: The Experience of the 353rd Fighter Group During World War Two
(Ipswich, UK: Thunderbolt, 2001).

53.
Furse,
Wilfrid Freeman,
239–41.

54.
See Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Forces,
3:63, on air battles doing “more to defeat the Luftwaffe than did the destruction of the aircraft factories.” There is a vast German-language literature, perhaps best summarized in English in the seventh volume of the German official history: Horst Boog et al.,
The Strategic Air War in Europe, 1943–1944/45,
vol. 7 of
Germany and the Second World War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

55.
Overy,
Why the Allies Won,
152. The figures in the preceding paragraph come from Murray and Millett,
A War to Be Won,
324–25. The Kocke anecdote is from E. R. Hooton,
Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe
(London: Arms and Armour, 1997), 270–71, also with names of fellow aces killed at that time. (This is a fine, almost intimidating statistical analysis of the air war in Europe.)

56.
Frankland,
The Bombing Offensive,
86, offers a really crisp account of how the coming of the American long-range fighters redounded to the secondary advantage of Bomber Command.

57.
Murray and Millett,
A War to Be Won,
413. Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Forces,
vol. 3, is excellent throughout. See also W. Hays Parks, “ ‘Precision’ and ‘Area’ Bombing: Who Did Which and When?”
Journal of Strategic Studies
18, no. 1 (March 1995): 145–74. Also, personal communication of June 30, 2008, to author from Professor Tami Biddle, whose own writings (including
Rhetoric and Reality
) are compelling scholars into a serious reconsideration of the challenges Harris faced from mid-1942 onward.

58.
Hastings,
Bomber Command,
342–43.

59.
J. Scutts,
Mustang Aces of the Eighth Air Force
(Oxford: Osprey Military Series, 1994), 56–60, on the coming of the Me 262s.

60.
On the diminishing aviation fuel figures, see M. Cooper,
The German Air Force, 1933–1945: An Anatomy of Failure
(London: Jane’s, 1981), 348–49, 360.

61.
Hastings,
Bomber Command,
422–23.

62.
Saward,
Victory Denied;
Harris,
Bomber Offensive
.

63.
All these works have been cited above. It will be obvious how much I am indebted to the works of Hastings, Murray, Biddle, and Overy, and how much their conclusions make sense to me. See Hastings,
Bomber Command,
ch. 14–15; Murray,
Luftwaffe,
ch. 7–8; Biddle,
Rhetoric and Reality,
ch. 5 and conclusion; Overy,
Why the Allies Won,
149–63. But perhaps the prize goes to Webster and Frankland,
Strategic Air Offensive,
vol. 3, and Craven and Cate, eds.,
Army Air Forces,
vol. 3, passim, as models of scholarship, objectivity, and insight.

64.
The calculation about V-rocket costs versus aircraft figures is in Overy,
Why the Allies Won,
294. Hitler’s bizarre demands about the Messerschmitt Me 262 are neatly covered in D. Irving,
The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe: The Life of Luftwaffe Marshall Erhard Milch
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), ch. 21.