Exodus From the Alamo: The Anatomy of the Last Stand Myth (54 page)

Conscripted into Santa Anna’s Army in 1835, Sergeant Felix Nunez, of Dúque’s assault column, described the frightful rate of fratricide, which existed from the beginning to the end of the attack, including inside the compound: “The soldiers in the moments of victory became entirely uncontrollable, and, owing to the darkness of the building [church] and the smoke of battle, fell to killing one another, not being able to distinguish friend from foe.”
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As much as the clash of multiple assault columns converging on the north wall at different angles, this high rate of fratricide resulted from the confused assault in the darkness and fragmentation of commands, which began outside and then continued unabated inside the Alamo. Enrique Esparza, for instance, described the utter confusion among the Mexican ranks inside the Alamo amid the blackness, when Santa Anna’s infantrymen “kept firing on the men who had defended the Alamo. For fully a quarter of an hour they kept firing upon them after all of the defenders had been slain.”
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Not only had three separate assault columns collided, and even fired into each other on hit flanks, but also rearward troops fired to take “a fearful toll of those in front.” In fact, the high rate of fratricide revealed that Mexican troops were more deadly to themselves than from the fire of all the defenders’ Long Rifles and cannon combined. With a gift for understatement, Sergeant Manuel Loranca described: “In the act of assault a confusion occurred, in which the Mexican troops opened fire on each other.”
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Widespread fratricide was so extensive that it had even determined the struggle’s outcome. Historian Alan C. Huffines emphasized how such intense friendly hit Colonel Cós’ column, that his men were forced to surge closer toward the west wall for protection before veering northward, to eventually unite with Dúque’s and later Romero’s columns at the north wall. In striking the lightly manned northwest corner, Cós’ redirected attack “almost certainly made the difference in the overall assault on the Alamo.”
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Overall, this massive “crush” from three assault columns at the north wall was considerable, because hundreds of attackers possessed relatively few scaling ladders. Both General Cós’ and Colonel Dúque’s attack columns possessed only ten ladders each, while Colonel Romero’s column had only six, and Colonel Morales’ column brought along only two ladders. Clearly, all four Mexican columns had attacked with far too few ladders, and even these were of a “poor” quality. Besides the accidental merger of three assault columns, this lack of foresight also ensured a pile up of a great mass of soldados at the north wall’s base: an ideal scenario for fratricide, with attackers from behind firing blindly ahead and into the mass in the confused darkness.
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Fratricide occurred almost as much inside the Alamo as outside. De la Pena described how even after the Mexicans swarmed inside the Alamo compound, “Behind these [foremost attackers] came others, who [now] fired their shots against friends and enemies alike, and in this way our losses were most grievous [indeed] one was as likely to die by a friendly hand as by an enemy’s [and this] confusion . . . was increasing the number of our victims [and in total] around fifty thousand cartridges had been used up.”
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However, generations of American and Texas historians have underestimated this high level of fratricide at the Alamo, assuming that the Mexican losses came from the combat prowess of fully alerted defenders in the fabled last stand. But in truth, garrison members were either asleep or in the process of being aroused when the Mexican struck and gained the north wall. And the exodus from the Alamo also meant that far fewer defenders were firing back in attempting to repel the attack.

Perhaps as much as tactical mishaps, the highest level of fratricide occurred because the average Mexican soldier was a poor marksman. Poverty ensured the lack of firearms and the absence of a firearm cultural and hunting tradition among most of Mexico’s civilian populace. Marksmanship training in the Mexican army was rare, especially for the new recruits and conscripts that made up such a large percentage of Santa Anna’s forces. Therefore, Mexican soldiers generally fired their muskets, which packed a tremendous kick, from the hip rather than the shoulder, ensuring not only inaccuracy but also a high rate of fratricide, especially in a night attack during their first engagement. Recent archeological findings of soldado remains from a south Texas battlefield during the Mexican-American War—by that time not much had changed in this regard—revealed bruising on the hips of Mexican troops, who fired the Brown Bess musket without aiming: an indication that this common, popular perception in 1836 Texas was not an unjustified stereotype.
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Indicating the lofty rate of fratricide, casualties were highest in Dúque’s column, which received the brunt of friendly fire losses. Huffines emphasized how: “Of all the Mexican units taking part in the assault on the Alamo, the activo Toluca Battalion chalked up the highest casualty rate of all” in the attack of the Alamo.
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According to General Filisola, the activo Toluca Battalion of Colonel Dúque’s column lost a total of 20 killed, and another 79 who fell wounded.
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Rather than the fire from defender firearms and artillery, most of Dúque’s column were shot down by their own comrades, because it had been their unit that led the assault, paying a high price for charging ahead of everyone else in the darkness. The former Toluca Battalion commander, Colonel Dúque, was very likely the victim of fratricide instead of artillery fire as alleged by de la Pena, when cut down in the “vicinity of the enemy parapets,” which indicated that he was too close to be hit by cannon fire. In the darkness, the Mexican troops, including Santa Anna’s 400-man reserve, failed to realize that Cós’ and Romero’s troops were before them. Therefore, in the confusion of combat, they fired toward the wall in the night, striking the backs of the foremost attackers. Perhaps like Houston, who very likely was hit by friendly fire in leading his attackers across the grassy meadow at San Jacinto, Colonel Dúque went down from a large-caliber musket ball from a Brown Bess and not a canister ball from an Alamo cannon. Walter Lord was indeed correct in his analysis of how the three attack “columns— merging from different directions—continued to fire blindly ahead, more often hitting friend than foe. And the men in the rear, unable to see, took a fearful toll of those in front.”
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Correctly reasoning how Santa Anna’s reserves committed more slaughter among the soldados than Texan bullets or cannonballs, Long wrote how the Zapadores and five reserve companies of light troops, to the sound of bugles blaring in the night, “ran toward the Alamo, the four hundred reserves blindly fired off their weapons [and] bullets raked the shoulders and heads of [Dúque’s] troops in front of them, mowing down more Mexican soldiers,” who never knew what hit them.
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Additionally, Mexican Army reports have revealed that the second largest number of casualties suffered on March 6 was in the San Luís Potosí Battalion. In this fine unit, two officers—First Lieutenant Irineo Guerrero and Second Lieutenant Antonio Carricante—and seven enlisted men were killed. Among the slain enlisted men were Sergeant Anastacio Velaquer, Grenadier Victoriano Perez, and two cazadores, Privates German Sánchez and Victoriano Tenerio. Charging forward behind the activo Toluca Battalion in Dúque’s attack column, the San Luís Potosí Battalion suffered a total of 37 wounded and nine killed.
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Especially for the activo Toluca Battalion, which was initially massed against the north wall, these high losses came primarily from friendly fire from rearward soldiers, especially Amat’s 400 reserves, who could not see anyone before them in the dark. Fatally stricken officers, like Captain José M. Macotela, might well have been hit from the rear. Indeed, most of the San Luís Potosí and the Toluca Battalion’s losses came from the fire of hundreds of Santa Anna’s reserves.
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But in truth, the relatively low number of Mexican casualties revealed a most feeble defense of the Alamo. As printed in the pages of the newspaper
El Mosquito Mexicano
, a Mexican Army surgeon, Jose Faustino Moro, wrote a letter to the publication that revealed the relatively few losses. He described how “an assault was given and there was more than two hundred wounded men as a result of that battle” on March 6, 1836.
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Additionally, an unsigned pamphlet written by a Mexican soldier who fought at the Alamo was reprinted in Mexico City’s leading newspaper,
El Mosquito Mexicano
on April 5, 1836. In this rare, anonymous account, the author emphasized how Mexican losses were surprisingly low, especially given the garrison’s relative strength in holding a fortified position defended by so much artillery. Most significant, he also wrote that Santa Anna’s Army had in fact suffered a loss of only two hundred men and officers wounded in the assault.
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Santa Anna estimated that the Alamo’s capture resulted in “costing us seventy dead and about three hundred wounded,” but this was a hasty conclusion.
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The general had merely estimated both the number of killed and wounded soldados in the first official report of the battle that was written at 8 a.m. on March 6. Therefore, a later, more careful tally of the wounded Mexican troops was not made by the time Santa Anna estimated that he had suffered about 300 wounded, which was too high of a figure.
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Santa Anna also overestimated the number of fatalities in his hasty morning report. In reality, and after a more precise count after more time passed, General Filisola counted a total of only 60 Mexican fatalities suffered at the Alamo.
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The overall lack of resistance from the fort can be seen in the case of the elite Sapper Battalion. Historian John B. Lundstrom noted, with a sense of ironic contradiction, a major mystery of the Alamo, writing with some dismay how “the Zapadores only took 27 casualties, in spite of the fact that the unit was the first over the wall and led the assault down the east walls and barracks.” This surprising development can be best explained by the fact that these rearmost attackers upon the north wall suffered less from fratricide than those command in front.
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Overall, the fact that around 2,000 attackers suffered only 60 fatalities—many of which were caused by fratricide—indicated what weak resistance was offered that early morning, adding additional evidence that a large percentage of the Alamo garrison chose flight instead of fighting to the bitter end. While Santa Anna reported 70 killed and around 300 wounded, General Andrade, of the cavalry, listed a total of only 311 killed and wounded during the assault. In the first and earliest detailed summary of Mexican casualties, Andrade counted 60 dead and 251 wounded.

And Colonel Almonte described a comparably low casualty figure of 65 killed and 223 wounded for a total of 288.
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In his March 6 journal entry, he wrote: “Our loss was 60 soldiers and 5 officers killed, and 198 soldiers and 25 officers wounded—2 of the latter General officers. The battalion of Toluca lost 98 men between the wounded and killed.”
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Offering a more accurate tabulation and testimonial in the battalion’s journal, the adjutant of the San Luís Potosí Battalion revealed that 316 total casualties were suffered by Santa Anna’s attackers, which corresponded with other equally low totals of around 300. For instance, General Bradburn stated that “300 men were lost,” including killed and wounded.
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In his 2002 biography of Santa Anna, Robert L. Scheina came close to the truth by writing how: “Santa Anna lost 78 dead (which included 26 officers) and 251 wounded (including 18 officers).”
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Providing evidence in his diary, Colonel José Juan Sánchez-Navarro wrote how: “two hundred forty-seven of our troops were wounded and one hundred killed”—a total of 347 men.
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Therefore, Mexican losses were not only well below 400, but possibly under 300. Therefore, Santa Anna was indeed correct in later deriding the politically inspired criticism for his relatively light Alamo losses that were “later judged to be avoidable and charge, after the disaster of San Jacinto, to my incompetence and precipitation.”
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Combined with other collaborating evidence, the final casualty figure from Colonel Almonte, who was the best educated member of Santa Anna’s staff, serving as the generalissimo’s trusty “chief” and “special advisor,” was in fact the more correct figure. Indeed, as Santa Anna’s chief of staff, he would have known better than anyone the exact number of losses for the Army of Operations on this day. Therefore, on March 6 he wrote in his detailed Order Book the correct total of the Army of Operation’s losses: 65 killed and 223 wounded, for a total of 288.
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One of the most heroic Mexican deaths was that of Lieutenant José María Torres of the Zapadores Battalion, who was killed while tearing down the garrison’s flag flying from the roof of the Long Barracks. Of course, equally heroic was the unknown Alamo defender who shot him down while while briefly able to protect the garrison’s banner.

The relatively low number of Mexican casualties is in line with the realities of the surprisingly brief—around 20 minutes—struggle for the Alamo’s possession. And if around half of the Mexican losses resulted from fratricide, as numerous Mexican accounts indicated, then all resistance from the Alamo’s defenders might well have accounted for less than 150 Mexican casualties.

It is also important to consider that there may have been more men present at the Alamo than previously recognized. De la Pena disputed the standard, long-accepted number of 182 Alamo defenders. As he wrote: “According to documents found among these men [and] subsequent information, the force within the Alamo consisted of 182 men; but according to the number [of dead bodies] counted by us it was 253.”
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It can be remembered that prior to the reinforcement of the 32 men of the Gonzalez Ranging Company, Travis had reported 150 men at his disposal, which corresponds with other primary evidence; however, he may have been referring only to able-bodied defenders, not those who were sick or disabled, some of whom may have been able to handle weapons, if not serve on active duty. After the tough fight in the Alamo’s hospital, there may indeed have been more bodies for the Mexicans to count than commonly recognized.