Fighting Terrorism (6 page)
Read Fighting Terrorism Online
Authors: Benjamin Netanyahu
Within short order, the SovietâPLO axis had managed to transform an astonishing collection of domestic terrorist factions into a full-blown international movement devoted to anti-Western and anti-Israeli political violence. In time, the PLO's newfound playground of horrors offered a base of operations and a safe haven for virtually every one of the most notorious terror groups ever to raise its head. The IRA, the German Baader-Meinhof, the Red Army Faction, and numerous neo-Nazi splinters, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the French Action Directe, the Sandinistas and a
dozen other Latin American groups, the Turkish Liberation Army, the Armenian Asala, the Kurdish PKK, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guardsâall came to the PLO camps in Lebanon, were trained and armed there, and were dispatched to their targets. In 1972, the alliance was formalized at a terrorist conference organized in Badawi, Lebanon, by George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) faction of the PLO. At the end of the Badawi Conference, Habash triumphantly announced: “We have created organic supports between the Palestinians and the revolutionaries of the entire world.” The nature of these “organic supports” became obvious as the PLO's “Black September” group (operated by Abu Iyad of Arafat's Fatah faction) carried out firebombings in Trieste for the Red Brigades; Japanese Red Army gunmen massacred pilgrims in Israel's Ben-Gurion airport; Italian terrorists were caught smuggling Soviet-made SAM-7 missiles for the PFLP; German terrorists participated with Palestinian gunmen in the Entebbe hijacking; and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) carried out joint attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe with Odfried Hepp's VSBD neo-Nazi group.
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dozen other Latin American groups, the Turkish Liberation Army, the Armenian Asala, the Kurdish PKK, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guardsâall came to the PLO camps in Lebanon, were trained and armed there, and were dispatched to their targets. In 1972, the alliance was formalized at a terrorist conference organized in Badawi, Lebanon, by George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) faction of the PLO. At the end of the Badawi Conference, Habash triumphantly announced: “We have created organic supports between the Palestinians and the revolutionaries of the entire world.” The nature of these “organic supports” became obvious as the PLO's “Black September” group (operated by Abu Iyad of Arafat's Fatah faction) carried out firebombings in Trieste for the Red Brigades; Japanese Red Army gunmen massacred pilgrims in Israel's Ben-Gurion airport; Italian terrorists were caught smuggling Soviet-made SAM-7 missiles for the PFLP; German terrorists participated with Palestinian gunmen in the Entebbe hijacking; and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) carried out joint attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe with Odfried Hepp's VSBD neo-Nazi group.
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Arafat's activities in Lebanon were replicated to different degrees by Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen. They cut deals with dozens of terror factions, allowing them to establish head offices in their respective capitals, providing them with training, diplomatic cover, financing, and refuge in exchange for terrorist services directed at enemies of their choice. These states soon became a second, independent
source of international terror. Essentially radical Pan-Arabists in their ideologiesâthe ideas of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi being an original cross between Pan-Arab fascism and militant Islamâtheir great enemy was and is the West, which they understood to have dismembered the Arab world and left it “colonized” by pro-Western lackeys such as the Saudi and Kuwaiti royal families. Each of the regimes made its own independent arrangements with the Soviets, enjoying Soviet military assistance and diplomatic support, in exchange for its staunch anti-Western stance. Libya in particular became a clearinghouse for Soviet military equipment. In 1976, it was party to one of the largest arms deals in history, purchasing perhaps $12 billion worth of arms, a small part of which were in turn supplied to terrorist groups around the world, including the PLO, the IRA, Carlos's Arm of the Arab Revolution group, the Baader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army, and other terrorist and insurgent groups in Turkey, Iran, Yemen, Eritrea, Chad, Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and the Philippines.
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source of international terror. Essentially radical Pan-Arabists in their ideologiesâthe ideas of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi being an original cross between Pan-Arab fascism and militant Islamâtheir great enemy was and is the West, which they understood to have dismembered the Arab world and left it “colonized” by pro-Western lackeys such as the Saudi and Kuwaiti royal families. Each of the regimes made its own independent arrangements with the Soviets, enjoying Soviet military assistance and diplomatic support, in exchange for its staunch anti-Western stance. Libya in particular became a clearinghouse for Soviet military equipment. In 1976, it was party to one of the largest arms deals in history, purchasing perhaps $12 billion worth of arms, a small part of which were in turn supplied to terrorist groups around the world, including the PLO, the IRA, Carlos's Arm of the Arab Revolution group, the Baader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army, and other terrorist and insurgent groups in Turkey, Iran, Yemen, Eritrea, Chad, Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and the Philippines.
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The full extent of the Soviet-Arab terrorist networkâindeed, the fact that it
was
a networkâwas throughout the traumatic years of international terrorism obscured by successful efforts to “delegate” much of the violence to other Eastern bloc and Arab regimes that could be blamed for these activities. For example, much of Soviet covert operations in the Western Hemisphere was taken over by the Cuban secret service, the DGI, although it eventually became clear that the DGI was itself nothing more than an arm of Soviet intelligence. And in all the
Western countries, including the United States, there prevailed the view that the incredible wave of terrorism gripping the Western countries was indeed the work of frustrated and deranged individuals, or else groups responding to local problems resulting from oppression of one sort or another. It was not until 1982, when Israel invaded the PLO's labyrinth of training bases in southern Lebanon, that extensive documentation was captured giving an idea of the actual magnitude of the international cooperation between the terrorist groups and the supportive climate that had been afforded them by their sponsors.
was
a networkâwas throughout the traumatic years of international terrorism obscured by successful efforts to “delegate” much of the violence to other Eastern bloc and Arab regimes that could be blamed for these activities. For example, much of Soviet covert operations in the Western Hemisphere was taken over by the Cuban secret service, the DGI, although it eventually became clear that the DGI was itself nothing more than an arm of Soviet intelligence. And in all the
Western countries, including the United States, there prevailed the view that the incredible wave of terrorism gripping the Western countries was indeed the work of frustrated and deranged individuals, or else groups responding to local problems resulting from oppression of one sort or another. It was not until 1982, when Israel invaded the PLO's labyrinth of training bases in southern Lebanon, that extensive documentation was captured giving an idea of the actual magnitude of the international cooperation between the terrorist groups and the supportive climate that had been afforded them by their sponsors.
The Israeli incursion resulted in the destruction of the kingdom of terror that the PLO had carefully built up in south Lebanon over more than a decade. The leadership of the PLO was expelled to Tunis, where its ability to wreak havoc was significantly curtailed. Moreover, the mid-1980s saw the West open up a broad and unprecedented offensive against international terror. This offensive was first and foremost political; it was intended to expose those countries supporting terror, and to unequivocally label terrorism as immoral, regardless of the identity of the terrorists and their professed motives.
The political offensive had been preceded by a deliberate intellectual effort spanning a number of years to persuade the West to change its policies regarding terrorism. It was in the context of these efforts that the Jonathan Institute was founded. Named after my brother Jonathan, who had fallen while leading the Israeli force that rescued the hostages at Entebbe in 1976, its purpose
was to educate free societies as to the nature of terrorism and the methods needed to fight it. The Jonathan Institute's first international conference on terrorism, held in Jerusalem in 1979, stipulated that terror had become a form of political warfare waged against the Western democracies by dictatorial regimes. The participants at the conference, among them Senator Henry Jackson and George Bush, then a candidate for the U.S. presidency, provided evidence of the direct involvement of the Eastern bloc and Arab regimes in spawning international terror. These revelations met with no small amount of resistanceâso much that a correspondent covering the conference for
The Wall Street Journal
commented that “a considerable number in the press corps covering the conference were much annoyed.”
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The idea that terrorism was not merely a random collection of violent acts by desperate individuals but a means of purposeful warfare pursued by states and international organizations was at that time simply too much for many to believe. (After the collapse of the Soviet Union, I had the opportunity to discuss this incredulity with a number of officials of the former Soviet bloc, and they expressed astonishment at the naivete of Western journalists and government figures in this regard.) Yet these and other revelations had a sobering effect on Soviet sponsorship of terror in the 1980s. Increasingly, the glare of publicity regarding their complicity in terrorism impaired the Soviet Union's capacity to pursue detente, and forced it to back off from supporting terrorist groupsâeven compelling it to begin denouncing terrorism with fewer and
fewer reservations. By mid-decade, Soviet support for international terrorism was almost a thing of the past.
was to educate free societies as to the nature of terrorism and the methods needed to fight it. The Jonathan Institute's first international conference on terrorism, held in Jerusalem in 1979, stipulated that terror had become a form of political warfare waged against the Western democracies by dictatorial regimes. The participants at the conference, among them Senator Henry Jackson and George Bush, then a candidate for the U.S. presidency, provided evidence of the direct involvement of the Eastern bloc and Arab regimes in spawning international terror. These revelations met with no small amount of resistanceâso much that a correspondent covering the conference for
The Wall Street Journal
commented that “a considerable number in the press corps covering the conference were much annoyed.”
8
The idea that terrorism was not merely a random collection of violent acts by desperate individuals but a means of purposeful warfare pursued by states and international organizations was at that time simply too much for many to believe. (After the collapse of the Soviet Union, I had the opportunity to discuss this incredulity with a number of officials of the former Soviet bloc, and they expressed astonishment at the naivete of Western journalists and government figures in this regard.) Yet these and other revelations had a sobering effect on Soviet sponsorship of terror in the 1980s. Increasingly, the glare of publicity regarding their complicity in terrorism impaired the Soviet Union's capacity to pursue detente, and forced it to back off from supporting terrorist groupsâeven compelling it to begin denouncing terrorism with fewer and
fewer reservations. By mid-decade, Soviet support for international terrorism was almost a thing of the past.
At the second conference of the Jonathan Institute, held in Washington in 1984, the participants, including leading figures in American politics, called for political, economic, and military sanctions against the states sponsoring terrorism. The proceedings were edited by me into a book entitled
Terrorism: How the West Can Win
, to which I contributed an essay arguing the need to take direct military action against the terrorist states, which by then were primarily radical Arab regimes. The essay and other sections of the book were reprinted in
Time
magazine and read by prominent members of the U.S. administrationâleading some commentators in the Arab press to pin the “blame” on me for some of the subsequent American actions against terrorist states.
Terrorism: How the West Can Win
, to which I contributed an essay arguing the need to take direct military action against the terrorist states, which by then were primarily radical Arab regimes. The essay and other sections of the book were reprinted in
Time
magazine and read by prominent members of the U.S. administrationâleading some commentators in the Arab press to pin the “blame” on me for some of the subsequent American actions against terrorist states.
From the beginning of my involvement with the Jonathan Institute, and later in my tenure as a diplomat, I believed that the key to the elimination of international terror was having the United States lead the battle, and that this American leadership would harness the countries of the free world into line, much as a powerful locomotive pulls the cars of a train. But it was no simple matter to change the minds of American opinion makers on this subject. Since the view that prevailed in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s held that terrorism was the result of political and social oppression, the inescapable conclusion was that terror could not be eliminated without first bringing these conditions to an end. My colleagues and I rejected this view out of hand.
We believed that the American position was not set in stone and that it could be changed by a vigorous effort to present the truth to the American public. At the heart of this effort was bringing to light basic facts about international terrorism, some of which were publicly unavailable. The evidence was checked and rechecked, and from it emerged a clear picture: International terrorism was the result of collusion between dictatorial states and an international terrorist networkâa collusion which had to be fought and could be defeated.
We believed that the American position was not set in stone and that it could be changed by a vigorous effort to present the truth to the American public. At the heart of this effort was bringing to light basic facts about international terrorism, some of which were publicly unavailable. The evidence was checked and rechecked, and from it emerged a clear picture: International terrorism was the result of collusion between dictatorial states and an international terrorist networkâa collusion which had to be fought and could be defeated.
Israel played an important role in persuading the United States to adopt this stance. In the military sphere, Israel served as an example of an uncompromising fight against terrorism. The refusal of successive Israeli governments to capitulate to terrorist demandsâa refusal that found expression in the repeated assaults by the Israel Defense Forces against terrorists in hostage situations from Maalot to Entebbeâand the Israeli policy of active military pursuit of terrorists into their strongholds, showed other nations that it was possible to fight terrorism.
On the political level, Israel's representatives in the United States waged a concerted campaign to convince American citizens that they should adopt similar policies. This effort began in full force during Moshe Arens's tenure as ambassador to Washington in 1982. Arens arrived in the United States shortly before the Israeli campaign against the PLO terrorist haven in Lebanon. The United States was hostile to this operation, and the Reagan administration applied various pressures to rein in the assault,
including suspending delivery of fighter planes to the Israeli Air Force. Arens did much to reverse the American position, especially through the special relationship he was able to establish with Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan.
including suspending delivery of fighter planes to the Israeli Air Force. Arens did much to reverse the American position, especially through the special relationship he was able to establish with Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan.
In July of that year, I joined the embassy as deputy ambassador and soon participated in the effort to persuade the American government to shift its policy to a more aggressive opposition to terrorism. When Arens returned to Israel in 1983 to serve as Minister of Defense, I served for six months as acting ambassador. During this period I kept up the contacts with Shultz. Both in diplomatic channels and in appearances in the media, I used every opportunity to attack international terrorism and the regimes and organizations that stood behind it. The West could defeat international terrorism, I insisted, provided that it adopt two principles as the foundation stones of its policy. First, it must refuse to yield to terrorist demands; and second, it must be ready to confront the regimes sponsoring terror. I repeatedly called for an active policy that would include diplomatic, economic, and even military sanctions against these states.
One of the early supporters of an active American policy against international terrorism was Secretary of State George Shultz. Shultz was particularly shaken by the series of car bombings in 1983 aimed at the American embassy in Beirut, and the American and French servicemen stationed there as peacekeepers under the agreement negotiated for the PLO withdrawal. The bombings left many hundreds dead, including 240 American Marines.
At one point during this terrible year, Shultz called me into his office and told me that he was extremely concerned about the spread of terrorism. “These terrorists aren't human beings,” he said. “They're animals.”
At one point during this terrible year, Shultz called me into his office and told me that he was extremely concerned about the spread of terrorism. “These terrorists aren't human beings,” he said. “They're animals.”
He made it clear that he was determined to effect a change in American anti-terror policy from one of passive defense to a more active one, taking the battle against the terrorists to their bases abroad and to the countries supporting them, “even if there are some who are opposed to this.” (He meant primarily Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who was hesistant about using America's armed forces against terrorist targets.) Shultz suggested a series of meetings in which we could work to define what the United States could do in conjunction with the other countries of the free world to uproot the terrorist scourge. I told him that the Jonathan Institute would be holding a second conference, this time in Washington, and suggested that he speak at the conference and make his position clear.
On July 4, 1984, seven years after the Entebbe rescue, Shultz made the following statement to the gathered diplomats and journalists at the conference:
Many countries have joined the ranks of what we might call the “League of Terror” as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate, and not so indiscriminate, murder ⦠The epidemic is spreading, and the civilized world is still groping for remedies.
Nevertheless, there is also cause for hope. Thanks
in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments and private organizations like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism, in intellectual and in practical terms â¦
in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments and private organizations like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism, in intellectual and in practical terms â¦
What we have learned about terrorism is, first, that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorists and those who support them have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals ⦠With rare exceptions, they are trying to impose their will by force, a special kind of force designated to create an atmosphere of fear. And their efforts are directed at destroying what we are seeking to build â¦
Can we as a country, can the community of free nations, stand in a purely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists? I think not. From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about more active means of defenseâdefense through appropriate preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups
before
they strike.
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before
they strike.
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