Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Find, Fix, Finish (37 page)
What lessons have we learned, and where can the US go from here?
The find-fix-finish model is effective as part of a larger strategy.
The US has greatly improved the art of hunting individuals in out-of-reach areas, but this process must ultimately serve a larger strategic effort. Taking pivotal individuals off the battlefield may be satisfying to policymakers and the public alike, but without a strategic vision to finish conflicts in enormously complex parts of the world such as Pakistan’s tribal lands, Iraq’s Anbar province, Yemen’s hinterlands, and elsewhere, the find-fix-finish model will encounter certain hard limitations.
The US has greatly improved the art of hunting individuals in out-of-reach areas, but this process must ultimately serve a larger strategic effort. Taking pivotal individuals off the battlefield may be satisfying to policymakers and the public alike, but without a strategic vision to finish conflicts in enormously complex parts of the world such as Pakistan’s tribal lands, Iraq’s Anbar province, Yemen’s hinterlands, and elsewhere, the find-fix-finish model will encounter certain hard limitations.
In 2001, the US proved it could wage a mobile war against an unconventional enemy. Small teams of CIA and Special Forces, combined with local allies, routed Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. However, with a battered al-Qaeda on a precipice—perhaps literally—the US shifted resources away from South Asia for a costly and counterproductive invasion of Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath was a grievous, self-inflicted diplomatic, military, and intelligence wound from which the US is still recovering, and a godsend to the perpetrators of 9/11.
By the time the US refocused on the remnants of al-Qaeda’s core in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the organization had spread and scattered to the winds. The US could not go to war against Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, Iran, and other nations all at once. Instead, the fight against al-Qaeda became a search in the cracks and seams of these countries. Essential to the implementation of the find-fix-finish model is the ability to find and fix the target, two actions only possible with a strong, coordinated intelligence effort. The most effective counterterrorism reform of the last ten years has been the improved coordination between intelligence agencies, especially in conflict zones.
America needs help from other countries, whether it likes it or not.
Despite its $80 billion intelligence system, the US still requires assistance from other countries to fight terrorism, as international partnerships continue to play a central role in thwarting terror plots. Just about every foreign-hatched plot against the US has required intelligence cooperation from foreign intelligence services. In 2005, CIA operations director Jose Rodriguez informed Congress that nearly every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq since 9/11—more than 3,000 in all—was the result of CIA cooperation with foreign intelligence services.
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In late October and early November 2010, Saudi intelligence alerted their American counterparts that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had sent explosives-filled packages to the US.
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These warnings were accurate and probably saved many lives in the air and on the ground.
Despite its $80 billion intelligence system, the US still requires assistance from other countries to fight terrorism, as international partnerships continue to play a central role in thwarting terror plots. Just about every foreign-hatched plot against the US has required intelligence cooperation from foreign intelligence services. In 2005, CIA operations director Jose Rodriguez informed Congress that nearly every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq since 9/11—more than 3,000 in all—was the result of CIA cooperation with foreign intelligence services.
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In late October and early November 2010, Saudi intelligence alerted their American counterparts that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had sent explosives-filled packages to the US.
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These warnings were accurate and probably saved many lives in the air and on the ground.
Although some believe that working with foreign countries is an encumbrance, maintaining robust liaison relationships with many countries around the world is critical to fighting terrorism. Working with other services provides US intelligence several direct benefits, including access to specific information about areas denied to large-scale US penetration, as often is the case in the Middle East and South Asia. Foreign services also can provide direct force to solve a particular problem—such as battering down terrorists’ front doors and making arrests. Finally, other intelligence services can mask American actions as local ones, obscuring otherwise obvious US interventions on distant shores.
At the same time, foreign services may harm US interests. They may have conflicting political missions, may attempt to gain insight into American intentions, sources, and methods via covert means, or may provide poor or mistaken information.
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Finally, working with liaison often opens the US to moral hazards. Foreign intelligence services are not bound by the peculiarities of the American legal system, may be involved in unethical or illegal activities, or may utilize methods not in consonance with US practice. This could be a positive or a negative aspect of international relations, depending on the perspective.
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Finally, working with liaison often opens the US to moral hazards. Foreign intelligence services are not bound by the peculiarities of the American legal system, may be involved in unethical or illegal activities, or may utilize methods not in consonance with US practice. This could be a positive or a negative aspect of international relations, depending on the perspective.
Further, counterterrorism efforts are not pursued in an international relations vacuum. In exchange for fighting al-Qaeda, the US has been obliged to overlook other thorny diplomatic issues such as prisoner abuse, clandestine nuclear deals, and human rights violations. The US continues to do business with many unpleasant regimes in exchange for information and direct action. For example, the US has partnered with the Sudanese regime—an active supporter of the genocide in Darfur—to track al-Qaeda operatives in its country. Of course, the Washington-Khartoum relationship continues to be strained due to serious and legitimate concerns about the government and its intelligence apparatus. Fighting terrorism, it seems, sometimes comes at a hefty diplomatic and moral price.
Most terrorism, like politics, is local.
Most terror groups have narrowly defined parochial interests and have little interest in attacking the US homeland—or anywhere outside a small, coveted patch of earth. For example, neither Hamas nor Hizbollah has specific agendas to attack the US. As such, these groups do not immediately jeopardize the American homeland.
Most terror groups have narrowly defined parochial interests and have little interest in attacking the US homeland—or anywhere outside a small, coveted patch of earth. For example, neither Hamas nor Hizbollah has specific agendas to attack the US. As such, these groups do not immediately jeopardize the American homeland.
What makes al-Qaeda the foremost challenge to the US is the transnational nature of the group. That this organization is willing to strike the US and other countries’ interests worldwide makes it a threatening presence. But its transnational behavior and desire to showcase the gruesome attack distinguish it from other extremist organizations. For example, Hamas—theoretically al-Qaeda’s Sunni brothers-in-arms—has a low opinion of al-Qaeda and vice versa, which has led to violent clashes of words and arms between the two groups.
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Al-Qaeda has had great difficulty in gaining a toehold in Gaza due to Hamas’s actions—even the “al-Qaeda inspired” Jund al-Islam organization that kidnapped BBC reporter Alan Johnston in 2007 was quickly and brutally suppressed by Hamas.
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Al-Qaeda has had great difficulty in gaining a toehold in Gaza due to Hamas’s actions—even the “al-Qaeda inspired” Jund al-Islam organization that kidnapped BBC reporter Alan Johnston in 2007 was quickly and brutally suppressed by Hamas.
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Al-Qaeda’s utopian ideology has been inhibited by the desires of other extremist groups around the world. Before his death, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi attempted to fuse AQI with the more established Ansar al-Sunnah, a Kurdish terrorist outfit that had a long-standing relationship with al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.
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Despite the organizations’ shared goals, mutual enemies, religious outlook, and the best efforts by some in al-Qaeda’s leadership, Ansar al-Sunnah declined to formally join forces with AQI.
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Why? Probably because Zarqawi—a Jordanian Arab with no familial ties to Iraq—was an outsider, an arriviste upstart in their long fight.
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Despite the organizations’ shared goals, mutual enemies, religious outlook, and the best efforts by some in al-Qaeda’s leadership, Ansar al-Sunnah declined to formally join forces with AQI.
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Why? Probably because Zarqawi—a Jordanian Arab with no familial ties to Iraq—was an outsider, an arriviste upstart in their long fight.
Al-Qaeda has benefited from the destruction of other extremist groups. It expanded its presence in Somalia only after Ethiopia, with heavy US assistance, destroyed the conservative Islamic Courts Union. Al-Shabaab—which in early December 2011 renamed itself “Imaarah Islamiyah”—exploited the political vacuum and has proven itself more violent and vicious than its predecessor. More disturbingly, al-Shabaab seems to have attracted numerous US citizens to its banner. The US has thus empowered an enemy much more likely to strike at vital US interests than the one displaced.
Establishing a thoughtful counternarrative is the key to undermining al-Qaeda’s appeal.
Al-Qaeda serves its adherents an intoxicating stew of otherworldly ideology fused with petty national grievances. Through the use of imagery, violence, and martyrdom, the organization created a worldview that distorts reality. It takes the tropes of religious learning and exploits the emotional pull of communal identity for its own political ends.
Al-Qaeda serves its adherents an intoxicating stew of otherworldly ideology fused with petty national grievances. Through the use of imagery, violence, and martyrdom, the organization created a worldview that distorts reality. It takes the tropes of religious learning and exploits the emotional pull of communal identity for its own political ends.
However, US experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have indicated that many of the foot soldiers and midlevel cadres in the organization are not true believers in al-Qaeda’s global cause or its hall-of-mirrors Islam. Rather, they join the organization because of the promises of employment, money, and power. Worldwide jihad does not seem to interest many of its own adherents. Although they are willing to fight under its banner in their nation, many choose not to fight so-called infidels elsewhere. For example, the number of Iraqis that have left Iraq to do damage outside of the country despite years of fighting and grievance can be counted on one hand.
Al-Qaeda’s quasi-religious ideology is based on wobbly foundations. One common strand in al-Qaeda and other extremist groups is that the leadership possesses little religious training. KSM, for example, did not claim to have much formal training in Islam despite his father’s teachings. Neither did bin Laden (a rich man’s idle son), Zawahiri (a lackluster surgeon), Zarqawi (a thug and ne’er-do-well), or Mohammad Atef (a police officer). Al-Qaeda’s leaders are ideological charlatans, religious hucksters who wear the robes of learned scholars but in actuality have little patience for serious religious study.
Sun Tzu said, “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans.”
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Hence, an effective counternarrative campaign—known to varying audiences as public relations, information operations, or covert influence—is one of the core needs currently lacking in the global effort to defeat al-Qaeda. The organization is clearly open to such critiques, and it is partially up to the US to take advantage of this opportunity.
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Hence, an effective counternarrative campaign—known to varying audiences as public relations, information operations, or covert influence—is one of the core needs currently lacking in the global effort to defeat al-Qaeda. The organization is clearly open to such critiques, and it is partially up to the US to take advantage of this opportunity.
Indeed, the writings of various highly regarded jihadist intellectuals in recent years, such as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl) in Egypt, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan, or the various LIFG members in Libya, have all attacked al-Qaeda’s global campaign of terror. Their critiques have been profoundly unsettling to al-Qaeda’s leadership, forcing it to produce intricate refutations.
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Many of these battles are still jihadist inside baseball, opaque to most outside observers. Still, the counternarrative produced by these credible voices combined with an aggressive US effort may be the best means to undermine al-Qaeda’s morale and moral foundations.
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Many of these battles are still jihadist inside baseball, opaque to most outside observers. Still, the counternarrative produced by these credible voices combined with an aggressive US effort may be the best means to undermine al-Qaeda’s morale and moral foundations.
Too much bureaucracy impedes counterterrorism efforts and harms national security.
The government’s answer to a new challenge is often to create new organizations and bureaucracies. And yet bureaucracy, like too many cooks in the kitchen, can greatly hinder agility, responsiveness, and speed in the fight against terror.
The government’s answer to a new challenge is often to create new organizations and bureaucracies. And yet bureaucracy, like too many cooks in the kitchen, can greatly hinder agility, responsiveness, and speed in the fight against terror.
Anecdotally, the best time to have worked in CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and similar organizations was during the weeks following 9/11, when the system was so scrambled by the attacks that bureaucratic impediments were removed and creative thinking was encouraged. Unfortunately for those energized by the opportunities afforded, the system soon returned to its normal, sclerotic self. The way things are now, according to Professor Richard Russell of the National Defense University, is that the intelligence community and the CIA are reminiscent of a “1950s bureaucracy. It’s far too hierarchical, and the top-down style of bureaucracy in place [is] just added fat and infrastructure.”
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Some counterterrorism experts additionally suggest that the US government squanders resources and provides ineffective defenses against terrorist attacks. According to Ishmael Jones, a pseudonym for a former CIA officer who worked for most of his career without official cover, Congress provided the CIA over $3 billion after 2001 to upgrade its abilities to fight terrorism. But the funding was instead spent on domestic bureaucracy and new buildings, items that do not inherently generate foreign intelligence.
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He noted in mid-October 2010 that, “We need financial accountability and whistle blower systems to stop tremendous waste and theft.”
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He noted in mid-October 2010 that, “We need financial accountability and whistle blower systems to stop tremendous waste and theft.”
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Theft is a strong charge and a bureaucratic affection for red tape may not necessarily rise to a criminal act. Bureaucracy and administration are, after all, necessary for the functioning of the modern national security apparatus. Nonetheless, former and current officials agree that the multiple layers of bureaucracy have been an impediment to doing their job and defending the nation. The system by its very nature forces many talented, creative people out the door because they challenge assumptions, attempt to change established norms, and oblige the slothful to perform their job more adequately. Few sharp, smart people will put up with eight or nine layers of bureaucracy, even in the interest of national security, for very long.
The ODNI must have a real mandate or be eliminated.
Looking for something positive to say about the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which was founded in 2005, may be a fruitless effort. There are talented individuals staffing its ranks but the function these people are meant to play is, at best, unclear and, at worst, destructive. Beyond its information-sharing and relationship-building abilities—two areas that the intelligence bureaucracy has improved apart from the ODNI’s efforts—the office has not added value in the fight against al-Qaeda. The ODNI—and its subcomponent, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—has yet to take center stage in thwarting an attack or identifying a critical node in a terror plot, despite multiple chances to do so. Rather, organizations with clearly defined missions—the FBI, CIA, the military, even local police—have actually made things happen.
Looking for something positive to say about the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which was founded in 2005, may be a fruitless effort. There are talented individuals staffing its ranks but the function these people are meant to play is, at best, unclear and, at worst, destructive. Beyond its information-sharing and relationship-building abilities—two areas that the intelligence bureaucracy has improved apart from the ODNI’s efforts—the office has not added value in the fight against al-Qaeda. The ODNI—and its subcomponent, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—has yet to take center stage in thwarting an attack or identifying a critical node in a terror plot, despite multiple chances to do so. Rather, organizations with clearly defined missions—the FBI, CIA, the military, even local police—have actually made things happen.
In late 2008 the ODNI inspector general blasted his own organization, stating that “the majority of the ODNI and IC employees (including many senior officials) . . . were unable to articulate a clear understanding of the ODNI’s mission, roles, and responsibilities with respect to the IC.”
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Furthermore, the ODNI’s authority remains unclear, encouraging some agencies “to go their own way, to the detriment of the unified and integrated intelligence enterprise envisioned by [the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act] IRTPA.”
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Furthermore, the ODNI’s authority remains unclear, encouraging some agencies “to go their own way, to the detriment of the unified and integrated intelligence enterprise envisioned by [the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act] IRTPA.”
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