Find, Fix, Finish (9 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
The plan was to use teams of US and Pakistani officers to hit all the sites simultaneously at 2:00 AM—the first time an ambitious joint operation of this nature between the two countries had been attempted since 9/11. The Pakistanis would do the dangerous work of breaking down the doors and capturing the men inside; CIA and FBI officers would then join them to sort through the prisoners and the evidence, sweeping up computers, phones, weapons, and documents. The CIA planned the raids but worked closely with the Pakistanis to coordinate the teams.
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To build trust, and deferring to their Pakistani colleagues who were risking their lives, CIA case officers on the ground revealed the name of their target.
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Both sides knew it would be a key test of the new cooperation the US and Pakistan had forged after 9/11; its success—or failure—would set the tone for the future.
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To build trust, and deferring to their Pakistani colleagues who were risking their lives, CIA case officers on the ground revealed the name of their target.
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Both sides knew it would be a key test of the new cooperation the US and Pakistan had forged after 9/11; its success—or failure—would set the tone for the future.
When the strikes commenced, the team at Site X encountered stiff resistance. The battering ram they carried bounced off a steel-reinforced door, alerting the people inside and resulting in a protracted firefight.
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In the resulting chaos, three men ran onto the roof in an attempt to flee, but Pakistani soldiers had them in their sights when they tried to jump to the house next door. One was killed instantly; another was seriously wounded in the leg and a third was wounded in the stomach, groin, and leg.
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Once the apartment was secured, the FBI and CIA moved in and found bomb components and a map locating the British School in Lahore—evidence that suggested they were planning an attack that might have killed women and children. They also recovered a treasure trove of “pocket litter”—incriminating documents and debris that helped paint a more robust picture of Abu Zubaydah and his confederates.
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In the resulting chaos, three men ran onto the roof in an attempt to flee, but Pakistani soldiers had them in their sights when they tried to jump to the house next door. One was killed instantly; another was seriously wounded in the leg and a third was wounded in the stomach, groin, and leg.
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Once the apartment was secured, the FBI and CIA moved in and found bomb components and a map locating the British School in Lahore—evidence that suggested they were planning an attack that might have killed women and children. They also recovered a treasure trove of “pocket litter”—incriminating documents and debris that helped paint a more robust picture of Abu Zubaydah and his confederates.
Outside, Pakistani officers found a man they identified as Abu Zubaydah. By the time American officers reached him, he was unconscious and close to death. He had been shot three times.
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He looked nothing like his picture—he was forty pounds heavier, had different hair, and was covered with blood. His identity was confirmed through pictures of his ears. Concerned with the possibility of having a key intelligence source die as soon as they captured him, CIA officers at the house negotiated with the ranking Pakistani military officer and hauled the unconscious terrorist to the closest hospital in the back of a Toyota pickup. Startled doctors performed emergency surgery to stop the bleeding, and CIA officers began a twenty-four-hour watch over their captive until he could be turned over and rendered from the country.
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At one point, Abu Zubaydah reportedly woke up and saw his American captor standing over his bed in a SpongeBob Squarepants shirt. His heart rate soared and he nearly died again.
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He looked nothing like his picture—he was forty pounds heavier, had different hair, and was covered with blood. His identity was confirmed through pictures of his ears. Concerned with the possibility of having a key intelligence source die as soon as they captured him, CIA officers at the house negotiated with the ranking Pakistani military officer and hauled the unconscious terrorist to the closest hospital in the back of a Toyota pickup. Startled doctors performed emergency surgery to stop the bleeding, and CIA officers began a twenty-four-hour watch over their captive until he could be turned over and rendered from the country.
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At one point, Abu Zubaydah reportedly woke up and saw his American captor standing over his bed in a SpongeBob Squarepants shirt. His heart rate soared and he nearly died again.
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Meanwhile, back in the US, CIA deputy director John McLaughlin arranged for a US trauma surgeon to fly to Pakistan to keep Abu Zubaydah alive.
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After he was stabilized, he was loaded aboard a CIA plane and flown out of the country: probably to the remote island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and later to a secret facility in Thailand where he could be interrogated.
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After he was stabilized, he was loaded aboard a CIA plane and flown out of the country: probably to the remote island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and later to a secret facility in Thailand where he could be interrogated.
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Americans had Abu Zubaydah—but now what would they do with him?
By April 2002 the battle against the Taliban was basically over, but the cat-and-mouse war to eviscerate al-Qaeda was just beginning. The administration needed a victory to show progress in the war—and Abu Zubaydah’s capture fit the bill. But even more, Americans needed an intelligence coup to start turning the tables on their nimble foe. US intelligence officers needed to discern the significance of raw data gathered from the captured hard drives, paper, and communication devices recovered in the raid, before the enemy adapted and the information became useless. To achieve that level of operations, top officials argued, they would need to change the rules of the game.
Initially Abu Zubaydah wouldn’t cooperate.
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CIA director George Tenet recounts that he tried to outsmart his interrogators by giving nominal bits and pieces of information, without really compromising anything important.
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Nevertheless, he began yielding useful information that expanded CIA’s map of the al-Qaeda network and provided new targets for intelligence collection.
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He quickly identified Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as a key leader and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and revealed one of his aliases: “Mukhtar.”
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At the time, KSM was known but “did not even appear in [the CIA] chart of key al-Qaeda members and associates.”
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This new information allowed analysts to comb through previously collected intelligence and opened new leads that, in a roundabout way, helped lead to KSM’s capture.
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CIA director George Tenet recounts that he tried to outsmart his interrogators by giving nominal bits and pieces of information, without really compromising anything important.
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Nevertheless, he began yielding useful information that expanded CIA’s map of the al-Qaeda network and provided new targets for intelligence collection.
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He quickly identified Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as a key leader and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and revealed one of his aliases: “Mukhtar.”
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At the time, KSM was known but “did not even appear in [the CIA] chart of key al-Qaeda members and associates.”
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This new information allowed analysts to comb through previously collected intelligence and opened new leads that, in a roundabout way, helped lead to KSM’s capture.
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By late April, analysts had verified the accuracy of some of Abu Zubaydah’s information, and counterterrorism officials were cautiously issuing alerts based on his description of proposed attacks on US banks and other financial institutions.
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During one interrogation he accidentally revealed the existence of an al-Qaeda associate whose physical description matched that of American José Padilla, leading to Padilla’s arrest in May 2002.
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By mid-June, information from Abu Zubaydah—along with triangulated data from his cell phone, computer, bank cards, and documents—led to the capture of at least two senior al-Qaeda operatives, Abu Zubair al-Haili and Mohammed Haydar Zammar in Morocco.
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During one interrogation he accidentally revealed the existence of an al-Qaeda associate whose physical description matched that of American José Padilla, leading to Padilla’s arrest in May 2002.
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By mid-June, information from Abu Zubaydah—along with triangulated data from his cell phone, computer, bank cards, and documents—led to the capture of at least two senior al-Qaeda operatives, Abu Zubair al-Haili and Mohammed Haydar Zammar in Morocco.
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Still, the White House wanted more. Abu Zubaydah was the highest-ranking al-Qaeda leader captured to date and they believed he was withholding important information on imminent attacks. He had also stopped cooperating
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and according to a report by CIA officials, had “become accustomed to a certain (controlled) level of treatment,” displaying no signs of disclosing further information.
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CIA officers knew from recovered training manuals that al-Qaeda operatives received counterinterrogation training
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and believed that Abu Zubaydah was applying that training to keep investigators at bay. There was intense pressure from the highest levels of government for new and actionable information, and a growing sense within the CIA that American lives were at stake.
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and according to a report by CIA officials, had “become accustomed to a certain (controlled) level of treatment,” displaying no signs of disclosing further information.
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CIA officers knew from recovered training manuals that al-Qaeda operatives received counterinterrogation training
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and believed that Abu Zubaydah was applying that training to keep investigators at bay. There was intense pressure from the highest levels of government for new and actionable information, and a growing sense within the CIA that American lives were at stake.
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CIA officials had already begun discussing options for new “enhanced” methods of extracting information from captured operatives before Abu Zubaydah’s capture,
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but now they sat down with the National Security Council (NSC) and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to seek direct guidance on how to proceed. On July 24, 2002, the CIA received oral guidance from OLC head Jay Bybee, and on August 1 formal written guidance—the so-called Bybee memo that authorized the “enhanced interrogation techniques” that the CIA requested with Abu Zubaydah in mind.
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but now they sat down with the National Security Council (NSC) and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to seek direct guidance on how to proceed. On July 24, 2002, the CIA received oral guidance from OLC head Jay Bybee, and on August 1 formal written guidance—the so-called Bybee memo that authorized the “enhanced interrogation techniques” that the CIA requested with Abu Zubaydah in mind.
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US government employees and subcontracted personnel would eventually subject Abu Zubaydah to close confinement, extreme cold, forced stress positions, as well as waterboarding at least eighty-three times to force him to surrender information.
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In addition to the special interrogators trained in the new techniques, detainees like Abu Zubaydah were questioned by CIA subject matter experts—individuals who claimed deeper knowledge about al-Qaeda—allowing for an accelerated pace of questioning.
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In addition to the special interrogators trained in the new techniques, detainees like Abu Zubaydah were questioned by CIA subject matter experts—individuals who claimed deeper knowledge about al-Qaeda—allowing for an accelerated pace of questioning.
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Concerns about the techniques used to interrogate him started early. In a press briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld flatly denied that administration officials were considering torture as a way to extract information, and dismissed claims that Abu Zubaydah was being relocated to a foreign country where the legal restrictions against torture could be skirted.
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CIA officials later briefed senior lawmakers on his interrogation thus far, and did so again after they received approval from the White House to use the enhanced measures—seeking to ensure that the interpretation of the law the CIA had received was known and approved by all parts of the US government.
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CIA officials later briefed senior lawmakers on his interrogation thus far, and did so again after they received approval from the White House to use the enhanced measures—seeking to ensure that the interpretation of the law the CIA had received was known and approved by all parts of the US government.
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The US denied access to high value detainees to groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the CIA later destroyed the tapes that documented its interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and another prisoner.
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Sharp interagency disputes broke out regarding the legality and utility of such harsh methods. The FBI, which had initially been cooperating with the CIA to debrief Abu Zubaydah and other captives, eventually became so concerned that it required its interrogators to separate itself from “other agencies” (i.e., the CIA) that did not use FBI-approved interrogation methods.
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Sharp interagency disputes broke out regarding the legality and utility of such harsh methods. The FBI, which had initially been cooperating with the CIA to debrief Abu Zubaydah and other captives, eventually became so concerned that it required its interrogators to separate itself from “other agencies” (i.e., the CIA) that did not use FBI-approved interrogation methods.
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Later, the OLC would disavow the Bybee memo and experts would question whether Abu Zubaydah actually provided critical information to US interrogators after they adopted the enhanced interrogation techniques.
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According to senior US officials and newly declassified memos, Abu Zubaydah provided the most useful information prior to being subjected to harsh measures, and no significant plot was thwarted due to information gathered through enhanced interrogation.
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Some claimed that CIA officials ordered the enhanced methods to be used based on a highly inflated assessment of his importance, even after investigators said they believed he had already told them all he knew.
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CIA officials—most notably George Tenet—dispute this, insisting that Abu Zubaydah was an important player and that the information he provided led to the disruption of several attacks as well as the capture of other terrorist leaders.
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According to senior US officials and newly declassified memos, Abu Zubaydah provided the most useful information prior to being subjected to harsh measures, and no significant plot was thwarted due to information gathered through enhanced interrogation.
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Some claimed that CIA officials ordered the enhanced methods to be used based on a highly inflated assessment of his importance, even after investigators said they believed he had already told them all he knew.
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CIA officials—most notably George Tenet—dispute this, insisting that Abu Zubaydah was an important player and that the information he provided led to the disruption of several attacks as well as the capture of other terrorist leaders.
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The focused precision of the operation to find and capture him proved that the US was still discovering how to apply the find-fix-finish doctrine in the new counterterrorism setting. There was one other important detail in his capture that many overlooked, however: the safe house where he was found belonged to the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which had been closely managed and funded by Pakistan’s spy agency.
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Like the Taliban, LeT was an outgrowth of the ISI program to cultivate militant proxies who would carry the fight to Pakistan’s enemies—in this case, India—without being directly affiliated with the Pakistani government.
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Like the Taliban, LeT was an outgrowth of the ISI program to cultivate militant proxies who would carry the fight to Pakistan’s enemies—in this case, India—without being directly affiliated with the Pakistani government.
The fact that Abu Zubaydah was captured in a LeT safe house indicated that he and other al-Qaeda leaders were cultivating relations with other groups in Pakistan.
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It probably also indicated that the ISI sold them out. Finally a deal was struck: the CIA paid Pakistan some $10 million to help it find Abu Zubaydah, which the ISI then used to construct a beautiful new headquarters on thirty-five pristine acres outside Islamabad.
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A GIFT FROM A FRIEND: ABU FARAJ AL-LIBI (CAPTURED, MAY 2005)112
It probably also indicated that the ISI sold them out. Finally a deal was struck: the CIA paid Pakistan some $10 million to help it find Abu Zubaydah, which the ISI then used to construct a beautiful new headquarters on thirty-five pristine acres outside Islamabad.
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Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) became the number 3 man in al-Qaeda after Atef’s death, and when Mohammed was captured in March 2003 (see the next chapter) he was succeeded by his deputy, Libyan national Abu Faraj al-Libi (Mustafa Muhammad al-Uzayti).
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An experienced paramilitary operative, Abu Faraj appears to have been a second-tier operative who received a field promotion—a sign that the US strategy of eviscerating the senior leadership was working.
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An experienced paramilitary operative, Abu Faraj appears to have been a second-tier operative who received a field promotion—a sign that the US strategy of eviscerating the senior leadership was working.
Abu Faraj first met bin Laden in Sudan or Afghanistan and, by the mid-1990s, had become an early sworn member of al-Qaeda.
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He became expert at using explosives, helping administer and train operatives at several al-Qaeda-affiliated training camps in Afghanistan.
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He may also have worked as bin Laden’s personal assistant, a key step that would have smoothed his way up the chain of command. In Afghanistan, he learned to speak Pashto and Urdu and married a Pakistani woman, making him an ideal liaison for extremist groups in both countries.
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He became expert at using explosives, helping administer and train operatives at several al-Qaeda-affiliated training camps in Afghanistan.
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He may also have worked as bin Laden’s personal assistant, a key step that would have smoothed his way up the chain of command. In Afghanistan, he learned to speak Pashto and Urdu and married a Pakistani woman, making him an ideal liaison for extremist groups in both countries.
When Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance in 2001, Abu Faraj fled to Pakistan, moving between Karachi, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province.
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During this period, he probably kept track of the families of al-Qaeda operatives and assisted in the vetting and transportation of al-Qaeda fighters to Afghanistan.
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Shortly after KSM was captured, Abu Faraj took operational command; in December 2003 he met with other jihadists in Pakistan to plan operations against US forces in Afghanistan, and in September 2004 traveled to Syria to discuss a variety of operations against the US, Europe, and Australia.
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He was also entrusted with serving as the conduit between bin Laden and lower-level al-Qaeda leaders, receiving couriered messages and public statements from bin Laden and transmitting messages back as appropriate.
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Given the sensitivity of the communications, the US believed that his position within the organization almost certainly required personal meetings with bin Laden or Zawahiri—a privilege reserved for only the most trusted members of the group.
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During this period, he probably kept track of the families of al-Qaeda operatives and assisted in the vetting and transportation of al-Qaeda fighters to Afghanistan.
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Shortly after KSM was captured, Abu Faraj took operational command; in December 2003 he met with other jihadists in Pakistan to plan operations against US forces in Afghanistan, and in September 2004 traveled to Syria to discuss a variety of operations against the US, Europe, and Australia.
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He was also entrusted with serving as the conduit between bin Laden and lower-level al-Qaeda leaders, receiving couriered messages and public statements from bin Laden and transmitting messages back as appropriate.
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Given the sensitivity of the communications, the US believed that his position within the organization almost certainly required personal meetings with bin Laden or Zawahiri—a privilege reserved for only the most trusted members of the group.
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Although he communicated with the top leadership, senior Pakistani officials later characterized him as more of a “regional commander” rather than an international terrorist in KSM’s mold.
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As an operational commander, Abu Faraj lacked the strategic depth exhibited by Mohammad Atef and KSM. Furthermore, he did not have direct experience with the West useful for training al-Qaeda operatives for overseas missions.
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Finally, his distinctive appearance put him at a disadvantage; a relatively tall individual, he had discolorations on his face and arms that made him easily recognizable.
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As an operational commander, Abu Faraj lacked the strategic depth exhibited by Mohammad Atef and KSM. Furthermore, he did not have direct experience with the West useful for training al-Qaeda operatives for overseas missions.
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Finally, his distinctive appearance put him at a disadvantage; a relatively tall individual, he had discolorations on his face and arms that made him easily recognizable.
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