First SEALs (16 page)

While Hayden was with the group, a scout brought word that a German gunboat was laying up in an inlet a short distance away to ride out the weather. After hearing the message, “
No one said a word. [The partisans] just loaded up two sorry-looking horses with machine guns and ammo and we all took off.”

They soon located the 120-foot craft “
in a cove so small she was tied up aft to some trees.” Although “nobody gave any orders,” the experienced fighters knew what to do. “We fanned out on a bluff full of dwarf pines directly over the vessel,” recalled Hayden. “A kid no more than twelve stayed with the horses and kept stuffing dead grass in their mouths.”

One of the German officers chose that unlucky moment to make an appearance on deck. “This fat bastard comes out on the bridge in his slippers and yawns and stretches,” said Hayden. “And the fellow in charge of our group fired at him—and missed. Hell broke loose, of course.” Within minutes the skirmish was over. One of the Germans held a towel out of a porthole as a sign of surrender. Not one of the Allies was injured, but several of the enemy had taken grievous wounds. “It made me sick to see the crew—mostly just fuzzy-faced kids—some with their faces half shot off and one holding his eye in his hand, which he kept trying to put back.” A French surgeon with Hayden's group immediately set to work patching up the injuries and even “shared his cigarette with two Germans.” But the operating conditions were far from ideal. “In place of anesthetic, they took the butt of a pistol and gave the patients a crack on the temple, which laid them out for a time.”

On another mission Hayden sailed the
Yankee
to Albania to pick up a group of thirty Italians who were hiding in a cave. For more than a year the group had been on the run, trying desperately to return home. “I had agreed to carry the Italians back to Otranto,
but I reckoned without my pilot, Ivosevitch,” recalled Hayden. “He took a Thompson gun ashore with the rubber boat, and then I heard the firing. He came back on board alone.”

“We go!” shouted Ivosevitch.

Hayden, knowing that Italian soldiers had previously raped the man's wife to death, had nothing to say in response.

N
OT FAR INTO THE NEW YEAR
,
the Yugoslav supply operation underwent a major change. Tofte, Taylor, and Hayden “
were suddenly relieved of their duties,” to be replaced by U.S. Army personnel. “This sudden change left the new officers in complete ignorance as to how [the mission] operated and the reasons why.” Eventually, British forces began taking over the operation from the clueless Army personnel. “Soon the American officers were simply figure heads.” Lieutenant Ellen recommended, “
Since the British Army has shown so much interest in the Shipping Operation, this officer suggests that it be turned over to them.”

Despite the change of command, the mission was a resounding success. A small number of the right men in the right place made a difference. Altogether the operation shipped around 6,500 tons of supplies to the partisans, including “
18,932 rifles, 20 field pieces, 33 mortars, 659 machine guns, 72 anti-tank rifles, 165,775 hand grenades, 3,567½ bales of overcoats and woolen clothing, 1,325 bales of GI shoes.” They also transported more than two thousand troops from Bari to Yugoslavia as well as evacuating more than eight hundred wounded soldiers. According to the OSS, “
These figures indicate that OSS made possible the activation of a force of 30,000 or more guerrillas. So effective was this aid, that the Germans diverted [several units] from their winter offensive solely to attack the supply line itself. Thus, the impact on the enemy of this operation may conservatively be considered equivalent to that of three American divisions.” It had kept German forces busy in
the Balkans so they couldn't attack Allies elsewhere. In addition, it provided the Allied forces with valuable intelligence.

Yet this tremendous undertaking cost the OSS amazingly little—just $35,000. And of that, $29,000 was a loan that the partisans promised to repay. By comparison, according to the OSS, “the cost of putting only one American division in the field [at the time was] $57,000,000, or about the total yearly expenditure for the whole of OSS.”

*
The author tells the story of this incredible mission in his fifth book,
The Brenner Assignment.

14

NO PICNIC

A
S THE OPERATION TO SUPPLY
T
ITO ENDED
,
activities behind the lines seemed to increase over the course of several months. Jack Taylor never let up and conducted eight separate missions into enemy-occupied Albania, repeatedly transporting intelligence agents and necessary supplies to the war-torn region. He also captained two sorties to the Greek island of Corfu, delivering and picking up agents as well as “
supplying ten tons of food to starving islanders.” Taylor planned and participated in actions, and in addition to being chief of the Maritime Unit, he continued to serve as the operations officer and principal planner for SO and MU missions out of Bari. Although the British had intelligence agents in place in the country and OSS had an SI presence, Taylor recognized the need for additional eyes on the ground. His objective was to have an American covert base of operation. The OSS had been “
using British pinpoints, and he wanted to establish greater independence.” Once again taking matters into his own hands, Taylor outlined a plan for establishing a base in Cape Rodoni, Albania, and convinced his superior officers to approve the mission, code-named “Picnic I.” However, bad weather caused repeated delays, and Taylor's commanding officer “
strongly recommended that the project be postponed because the dark moon was practically over.” He was concerned that Taylor might end up stranded in the country for more than a month until it would again be dark enough to
approach the enemy shores at night. Despite his misgivings, OSS HQ allowed Taylor to conduct the operation “
because he had confidence in Taylor's ability and judgment” and because the mission had already been approved.

At 8:30 p.m. on the evening of March 31, 1944, Operation Picnic I got underway. Taylor along with two other men under his command boarded an Italian MAS boat and left for the Albanian coast. Around 1:30 in the morning they arrived at their destination and began the laborious and perilous process of unloading the passengers and gear. For more than two hours the ship, anchored about five hundred to seven hundred meters off shore, remained undetected by roving German patrol boats as two small rubber boats ferried the men and equipment to shore. Taylor and the others planned to conduct reconnaissance on land for a couple of days and then be exfiltrated by boat. But as his commanding officer had feared, the retrieval operation did not go as planned.

To their horror, Taylor and the two other operatives soon realized that they had landed in an area crawling with Germans: “
We discovered that we landed between two machine gun nests about three hundred yards apart.” On April 2, the night of the scheduled pickup, he radioed back to the OSS base in Italy: “
Since the sector is full of Germans, boat must come even if moon is shining. No shore signals should be flashed by the boat. Two boats must first come to the beach.”

But the dangerous situation on the shore soon became much worse. A short time later Taylor sent a follow-up message: “Every hour men's lives are becoming more perilous. Surf is all right. The boat should come but no signal given. We shall signal from 0100 to 0300 hours GMT.” Headquarters responded, “Please stand by from 0100 to 0300 hours GMT as the boat is coming tonight. Boat will not signal.”

Once again, however, bad weather intervened. The boat radioed Taylor with a second, more urgent message: “Because of bad weather could not possibly send sortie tonight. Please
maintain contact if possible. Will make another attempt during the night of April 3.” The boat continued its efforts to reach the MU officer and sent one message assuring him they were “doing everything possible.” Surrounded by the enemy, Taylor could not respond.

Plans moved ahead for another attempt to extract Taylor and his fellow agents on April 4. Once again the Italian Navy, most likely the San Marco Group, provided transportation, but when they arrived at the cape where they had dropped off Taylor and the others they found artillery emplacements capable of hitting the ship. The Italians cut their engines about six hundred yards offshore and settled in to wait for the signal from Taylor.

When the signal came forty-five minutes later, it wasn't the Morse code flash of the letter “T,” which they had been expecting. Instead, the Germans fired a “
pyrotechnic signal flare” that lit up the night sky. The captain started the engine just as small-arms fire broke out from the shoreline. German bullets whizzed “over their heads on the port side.” Concerned about being intercepted by enemy boats, the Italian captain abandoned the mission and raced back to his home port, leaving Taylor and the others behind. Taylor recalled, “
The vessel returning for the pickup was fired on, and we spent sixteen days getting back to the interior: four days without food and two days without water.”

It would be three long months of ongoing hardships and continuous efforts to avoid capture before Taylor returned to Italy again. Trapped in an area infested with Germans, he and his comrades spent their time as productively as possible, gathering and communicating actionable intelligence. An after-action report recorded,

At all times surrounded by enemy forces and on three occasions forced to flee from enemy searching parties when his whereabouts had been discovered, Lieutenant Taylor, nevertheless, maintained his party intact and through frequent clandestine radio contact with
his communications base at Bari, Italy, transmitted intelligence as to enemy troop movements, supply dumps, coastal fortifications, anti-aircraft installations and other military intelligence of value to the Allied forces. All of this intelligence was collected either personally by Lieutenant Taylor or at his specific direction by the men under his command. Lieutenant Taylor himself operated the clandestine radio transmitter.

Taylor made the most of a botched mission. Stranded, he pushed inland, “
dodging Germans and unfriendly Albanians.” Taylor carefully navigated his small party through this political minefield, and on his own initiative contacted Abaz Kupi (the Zogist movement leader, loyal to the king). Kupi gave Taylor documents outlining their geopolitical positions during and after the war. Contact with Abaz Kupi put Taylor into the highest levels of World War II geopolitics; SOE and the British government largely supported the Communists, the group that was ultimately victorious and would run the government after the war. Taylor and his party, which now included six downed airmen from the U.S. 15th Air Force, traversed their way across the beautiful yet treacherous snow-capped Albanian Alps, through Montenegro, and eventually to Yugoslavia, where an Allied OSS mission arranged for them to fly to Italy.

The documents Taylor carried from Kupi went to the highest levels, and Donovan personally wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, “
The enclosed communications from the Albanian Legitimist Committee (Zogist Movement) were brought out of Albania by Lieutenant J.H. Taylor. They are unknown to the British Government.” According to Taylor, the British prohibited communication with the Zogists because it potentially could threaten their relationship with the Communists. Donovan pressed Hull: “If it is necessary to call them [the documents] to the attention of the British, it is requested that this agency be consulted in advance.”

The letters included a manifesto on the history of Albania and what the movement hoped to achieve after the war and from Britain and the United States: