Freud - Complete Works (736 page)

   Some readers of this work may
further have an impression that they have heard the formula of the
struggle between Eros and the death instinct too often. It was
alleged to characterize the process of civilization which mankind
undergoes but it was also brought into connection with the
development of the individual, and, in addition, it was said to
have revealed the secret of organic life in general. We cannot, I
think, avoid going into the relations of these three processes to
one another. The repetition of the same formula is justified by the
consideration that both the process of human civilization and of
the development of the individual are also vital processes - which
is to say that they must share in the most general characteristic
of life. On the other hand, evidence of the presence of this
general characteristic fails, for the very reason of its general
nature, to help us to arrive at any differentiation, so long as it
is not narrowed down by special qualifications. We can only be
satisfied, therefore, if we assert that the process of civilization
is a modification which the vital process experiences under the
influence of a task that is set it by Eros and instigated by Ananke
- by the exigencies of reality; and that this task is one of
uniting separate individuals into a community bound together by
libidinal ties. When, however, we look at the relation between the
process of human civilization and the developmental or educative
process of individual human beings, we shall conclude without much
hesitation that the two are very similar in nature, if not the very
same process applied to different kinds of object. The process of
the civilization of the human species is, of course, an abstraction
of a higher order than is the development of the individual and it
is therefore harder to apprehend in concrete terms, nor should we
pursue analogies to an obsessional extreme; but in view of the
similarity between the aims of the two processes - in the one case
the integration of a separate individual into a human group, and in
the other case the creation of a unified group out of many
individuals - we cannot be surprised at the similarity between the
means employed and the resultant phenomena.

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   In view of its exceptional
importance, we must not long postpone the mention of one feature
which distinguishes between the two processes. In the developmental
process of the individual, the programme of the pleasure principle,
which consists in finding the satisfaction of happiness, is
retained as the main aim. Integration in, or adaptation to, a human
community appears as a scarcely avoidable condition which must be
fulfilled before this aim of happiness can be achieved. If it could
be done without that condition, it would perhaps be preferable. To
put it in other words, the development of the individual seems to
us to be a product of the interaction between two urges, the urge
towards happiness, which we usually call ‘egoistic’,
and the urge towards union with others in the community, which we
call ‘altruistic’. Neither of these descriptions goes
much below the surface. In the process of individual development,
as we have said, the main accent falls mostly on the egoistic urge
(or the urge towards happiness); while the other urge, which may be
described as a ‘cultural’ one, is usually content with
the role of imposing restrictions. But in the process of
civilization things are different. Here by far the most important
thing is the aim of creating a unity out of the individual human
beings. It is true that the aim of happiness is still there, but it
is pushed into the background. It almost seems as if the creation
of a great human community would be most successful if no attention
had to be paid to the happiness of the individual. The
developmental process of the individual can thus be expected to
have special features of its own which are not reproduced in the
process of human civilization. It is only in so far as the first of
these processes has union with the community as its aim that it
need coincide with the second process.

Civilization And Its Discontents

4529

   Just as a planet revolves around
a central body as well as rotating on its own axis, so the human
individual takes part in the course of development of mankind at
the same time as he pursues his own path in life. But to our dull
eyes the play of forces in the heavens seems fixed in a
never-changing order; in the field of organic life we can still see
how the forces contend with one another, and how the effects of the
conflict are continually changing. So, also, the two urges, the one
towards personal happiness and the other towards union with other
human beings, must struggle with each other in every individual;
and so, also, the two processes of individual and of cultural
development must stand in hostile opposition to each other and
mutually dispute the ground. But this struggle between the
individual and society is not a derivative of the contradiction -
probably an irreconcilable one - between the primal instincts of
Eros and death. It is a dispute within the economics of the libido,
comparable to the contest concerning the distribution of libido
between ego and objects; and it does admit of an eventual
accommodation in the individual, as, it may be hoped, it will also
do in the future of civilization, however much that civilization
may oppress the life of the individual to-day.

   The analogy between the process
of civilization and the path of individual development may be
extended in an important respect. It can be asserted that the
community, too, evolves a super-ego under whose influence cultural
development proceeds. It would be a tempting task for anyone who
has a knowledge of human civilizations to follow out this analogy
in detail. I will confine myself to bringing forward a few striking
points. The super-ego of an epoch of civilization has an origin
similar to that of an individual. It is based on the impression
left behind by the personalities of great leaders - men of
overwhelming force of mind or men in whom one of the human
impulsions has found its strongest and purest, and therefore often
its most one-sided, expression. In many instances the analogy goes
still further, in that during their lifetime these figures were -
often enough, even if not always - mocked and maltreated by others
and even despatched in a cruel fashion. In the same way, indeed,
the primal father did not attain divinity until long after he had
met his death by violence. The most arresting example of this
fateful conjunction is to be seen in the figure of Jesus Christ -
if, indeed, that figure is not a part of mythology, which called it
into being from an obscure memory of that primal event. Another
point of agreement between the cultural and the individual
super-ego is that the former, just like the latter, sets up strict
ideal demands, disobedience to which is visited with ‘fear of
conscience’. Here, indeed, we come across the remarkable
circumstance that the mental processes concerned are actually more
familiar to us and more accessible to consciousness as they are
seen in the group than they can be in the individual man. In him,
when tension arises, it is only the aggressiveness of the super-ego
which, in the form of reproaches, makes itself noisily heard; its
actual demands often remain unconscious in the background. If we
bring them to conscious knowledge, we find that they coincide with
the precepts of the prevailing cultural super-ego. At this point
the two processes, that of the cultural development of the group
and that of the cultural development of the individual, are, as it
were, always interlocked. For that reason some of the
manifestations and properties of the super-ego can be more easily
detected in its behaviour in the cultural community than in the
separate individual.

Civilization And Its Discontents

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   The cultural super-ego has
developed its ideals and set up its demands. Among the latter,
those which deal with the relations of human beings to one another
are comprised under the heading of ethics. People have at all times
set the greatest value on ethics, as though they expected that it
in particular would produce especially important results. And it
does in fact deal with a subject which can easily be recognized as
the sorest spot in every civilization. Ethics is thus to be
regarded as a therapeutic attempt - as an endeavour to achieve, by
means of a command of the super-ego, something which has so far not
been achieved by means of any other cultural activities. As we
already know, the problem before us is how to get rid of the
greatest hindrance to civilization - namely, the constitutional
inclination of human beings to be aggressive towards one another;
and for that very reason we are especially interested in what is
probably the most recent of the cultural commands of the super-ego,
the commandment to love one’s neighbour as oneself. In our
research into, and therapy of, a neurosis, we are led to make two
reproaches against the super-ego of the individual. In the severity
of its commands and prohibitions it troubles itself too little
about the happiness of the ego, in that it takes insufficient
account of the resistances against obeying them - of the
instinctual strength of the id, and of the difficulties presented
by the real external environment. Consequently we are very often
obliged, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the super-ego, and we
endeavour to lower its demands. Exactly the same objections can be
made against the ethical demands of the cultural super-ego. It,
too, does not trouble itself enough about the facts of the mental
constitution of human beings. It issues a command and does not ask
whether it is possible for people to obey it. On the contrary, it
assumes that a man’s ego is psychologically capable of
anything that is required of it, that his ego has unlimited mastery
over his id. This is a mistake; and even in what are known as
normal people the id cannot be controlled beyond certain limits. If
more is demanded of a man, a revolt will be produced in him or a
neurosis, or he will be made unhappy. The commandment, ‘Love
thy neighbour as thyself’, is the strongest defence against
human aggressiveness and an excellent example of the
unpsychological proceedings of the cultural super-ego. The
commandment is impossible to fulfil; such an enormous inflation of
love can only lower its value, not get rid of the difficulty.
Civilization pays no attention to all this; it merely admonishes us
that the harder it is to obey the precept the more meritorious it
is to do so. But anyone who follows such a precept in present-day
civilization only puts himself at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis
the person who disregards it. What a potent
obstacle to civilization aggressiveness must be, if the defence
against it can cause as much unhappiness as aggressiveness itself!
‘Natural’ ethics, as it is called, has nothing to offer
here except the narcissistic satisfaction of being able to think
oneself better than others. At this point the ethics based on
religion introduces its promises of a better after-life. But so
long as virtue is not rewarded here on earth, ethics will, I fancy,
preach in vain. I too think it quite certain that a real change in
the relations of human beings to possessions would be of more help
in this direction than any ethical commands; but the recognition of
this fact among socialists has been obscured and made useless for
practical purposes by a fresh idealistic misconception of human
nature.

Civilization And Its Discontents

4531

   I believe the line of thought
which seeks to trace in the phenomena of cultural development the
part played by a super-ego promises still further discoveries. I
hasten to come to a close. But there is one question which I can
hardly evade. If the development of civilization has such a
far-reaching similarity to the development of the individual and if
it employs the same methods, may we not be justified in reaching
the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural urges, some
civilizations, or some epochs of civilization - possibly the whole
of mankind - have become ‘neurotic’? An analytic
dissection of such neuroses might lead to therapeutic
recommendations which could lay claim to great practical interest.
I would not say that an attempt of this kind to carry
psycho-analysis over to the cultural community was absurd or doomed
to be fruitless. But we should have to be very cautious and not
forget that, after all, we are only dealing with analogies and that
it is dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to tear
them from the sphere in which they have originated and been
evolved. Moreover, the diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with
a special difficulty. In an individual neurosis we take as our
starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his
environment, which is assumed to be ‘normal’. For a
group all of whose members are affected by one and the same
disorder no such background could exist; it would have to be found
elsewhere. And as regards the therapeutic application of our
knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis of
social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a
therapy upon the group? But in spite of all these difficulties, we
may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a
pathology of cultural communities.

Civilization And Its Discontents

4532

   For a wide variety of reasons, it
is very far from my intention to express an opinion upon the value
of human civilization. I have endeavoured to guard myself against
the enthusiastic prejudice which holds that our civilization is the
most precious thing that we possess or could acquire and that its
path will necessarily lead to heights of unimagined perfection. I
can at least listen without indignation to the critic who is of the
opinion that when one surveys the aims of cultural endeavour and
the means it employs, one is bound to come to the conclusion that
the whole effort is not worth the trouble, and that the outcome of
it can only be a state of affairs which the individual will be
unable to tolerate. My impartiality is made all the easier to me by
my knowing very little about all these things. One thing only do I
know for certain and that is that man’s judgements of value
follow directly his wishes for happiness - that, accordingly, they
are an attempt to support his illusions with arguments. I should
find it very understandable if someone were to point out the
obligatory nature of the course of human civilization and were to
say, for instance, that the tendencies to a restriction of sexual
life or to the institution of a humanitarian ideal at the expense
of natural selection were developmental trends which cannot be
averted or turned aside and to which it is best for us to yield as
though they were necessities of nature. I know, too, the objection
that can be made against this, to the effect that in the history of
mankind, trends such as these, which were considered
unsurmountable, have often been thrown aside and replaced by other
trends. Thus I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men
as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no
consolation: for at bottom that is what they are all demanding -
the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most
virtuous believers.