From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 (53 page)

9 THE LEX AGRARIA. The idea of compensation depends on a remark by Plutarch (
Ti. Gr.
9. 2) which is probably a misunderstanding of what was recorded by the source of Appian,
Bell Civ.
1. 11. 5. Since neither the amount of land available nor the number of claimants would be known in advance, no standard size for allotments is likely to have been fixed in the bill; a reference to thirty
iugera
in the
lex agraria
of 111 B.C. might suggest a possible maximum. The evidence that rent was charged is that it was abolished by Drusus in 122. The prohibition on selling was probably not meant to be permanent: allotments could be passed by inheritance. The view, based on Appian, that Italian allies as well as citizens might benefit under the bill, has once again been refuted by E. Badian,
For. Cl.,
169 ff. It has however again been revived, and D. Stockton,
The Gracchi
(1979), 42, seems inclined to accept it: Bernstein,
Tiberius Gracchus
(1978), 137 ff., believes that it was Tiberius’ original intention to include the Italians but that he later changed his mind, while J. S. Richardson,
JRS,
1980, 1 ff., argues that Tiberius did include in his measure Italians who thereby received both Roman citizenship and land. Badian has also given a salutary warning (
Historia
, 1962, 210, n. 52) that the supposed 500 extra
iugera
granted for two sons is in fact only a modern suggestion, based on references in the sources to 500 and 1000
iugera
; in any case demographic policy and later parallels would suggest three children rather than two sons. He is, however, inclined to think (
Aufstieg
, 702 f.) that the law, as finally passed, imposed an absolute limit of 500
iugera
, without any extra for children. [p. 22]

10 CLASH BETWEEN TIBERIUS AND OCTAVIUS. One of the chief problems of historical criticism for this period is to determine what historical value should be given to those episodes which are recorded by Plutarch and not by Appian. They are rejected by Carcopino (
op. cit.,
ch. i) but for a criticism of Carcopino and a defence of Plutarch see R. M. Geer,
Classical and Medieval Studies presented to E. K. Rand
(1938), 105 ff. Cf. also A. E. Astin,
Scipio Aemilianus
, 332 ff. Thus the historicity of Plutarch’s account of
Tiberius’ redrafting of his law and declaration of a
iustitium
is uncertain. Appian (
BC
, 1. 12) describes three meetings of the People when (
a
) Octavius vetoed, (
b
) Octavius repeated his veto, and (
c
) Tiberius carried Octavius’ deposition. He implies that they were held on consecutive days, but the probability that there is a gap in the text and the possibility that in his description of the adjournment of the first meeting the phrase
may mean ‘to the next meeting’ rather than ‘to the following day’ (i.e. to the next comitial day, not the next day in the calendar) suggest an interval in which may be placed some of the episodes recounted by Plutarch and not by Appian. D. C. Earl has argued (
Latomus
, 1960, 657 ff.) that an alliance of Octavii, Popillii and Cornelii Scipiones, formed earlier in the century, was operating against Tiberius in 133 and that Octavius was known as a political opponent. Cf. also A. E. Astin,
Scipio Aemilianus
, 346. Octavius himself maintained that the vote deposing him was invalid and refused to leave the tribunal, but was forced away by part of the crowd. In a sense this was a resort to open violence, but it was ‘a brawl rather than a riot’ (Astin, 209) in which Tiberius himself probably tried to shield Octavius. Nevertheless by Octavius and his supporters it would be represented as forcible violation of a tribune’s sacrosanctity. Badian (
Aufstieg
, 706 ff.) emphasizes the role of Octavius, through whose persistence (
patientia
) the conflict came about. ‘The veto – or at least its persistence – could not have been expected: it was nothing less than a breach of all constitutional custom.’ M. G. Morgan and J. A. Walsh,
Cl. Ph.,
1978, 200 ff., stress the deposition of Octavius as Tiberius’ crucial mistake. [p. 23]

11 DATE OF THE LEX AGRARIA. This was probably passed either in Feb. or April. Tiberius perhaps waited until after March when the consul Calpurnius Piso went off to Sicily; the other consul, Scaevola, was friendly. Also a lull in agricultural work in April may have made it easier for the peasants to come to Rome to vote. D. C. Earl has suggested that, contrary to the usual belief, Calpurnius Piso was not hostile to Tiberius: at worst he showed a benevolent neutrality (see
Athenaeum
, 1960, 283 ff.). But he later opposed Gaius Gracchus (
Cic. Tusc. Disp.
3–48). [p. 23]

12 THE AGRARIAN COMMISSION. A law of uncertain date prohibited anyone who proposed a commission from becoming a member of it. If the law was pre-Gracchan, Tiberius’ action will have contravened it: if slightly post-Gracchan, his action will have been unprecedented though not technically illegal. Appian’s phrase
(1. 9. 37) is generally interpreted as in the text, since the personnel in fact changed only when vacancies were caused by death. Carcopino argued (
op. cit.,
149 ff.) that the phrase refers to an internal change of an acting president with two ‘sleeping partners’; this view, if not acceptable in full, at least emphasizes the fact that at given times some commissioners were more actively engaged on this work than at others. On the commissioners see J. Seihert,
Rivista Storica Antica,
I (1972). R. A. Bauman,
Historia
, 1979, 384 ff., argues that the commission was illegal (contrary to an earlier
lex Licinia
, he supposes), received its judicial powers under a subsequent law, and had
imperium
. [p. 23]

13 TIBERIUS AND ATTALUS. E. Badian has suggested (
For. Cl.,
173 f.) that Tiberius was able to anticipate senatorial action on Attalus’ will because he heard about it before the Senate did: because of the personal connexions of Tiberius’ father with the Attalid house, the Pergamene envoy who brought the will to Rome would naturally stay at the home of his Roman patrons, the Gracchi. [p. 23]

14 RE-ELECTION TO THE TRIBUNATE. Despite Appian
Bell. Civ.
I.14 (which is supported by L. R. Taylor,
Athenaeum
, 1963, 56 f., and A. E. Astin,
Scipio Aemilianus
, 351 f.), it is unlikely that re-election was technically illegal (cf. A. H. M. Jones,
Proc. Cambr. Philological Soc.,
1960, 35 ff.; Earl,
Ti. Gracchus
, 103 f.); if it had been, anti-Gracchan
sources would surely have left stronger traces in the tradition that Tiberius was acting illegally. But if not illegal, it certainly was excluded by custom (
mos maiorum
), and some genuine contemporary uncertainty or confusion may have existed arising from the fact that though the tribunate was not technically a magistracy, in practice tribunes had for long been treated as magistrates. But Tiberius’ decision to stand again, though shocking to many, was not entirely ‘out of tune with the times’ (Astin, 216) since Scipio Aemilianus and Scipio Nasica had held a second consulship within the forbidden period of ten years and thus accepted constitutional practice was subordinated to immediate political interests.

L. R. Taylor, believing that re-election was illegal, goes further and argues that the last Assembly meeting, which led to Tiberius’ death, was in fact not electoral (i.e. called to elect new tribunes) but legislative, i.e. to vote on a proposal to legalize his candidature. Although Appian clearly indicates (
BC
, 1. 14) that the Assembly was electoral, she prefers the indications of Plutarch and the Livian tradition (Plut.,
Ti. Gr.
16; Obsequens, 27a; Ampelius, 26. 1; and, if taken quite literally, even another passage of Appian, viz. 1. 2. 4) that it was legislative. One of her arguments is that since Appian describes the tribes giving their votes successively, this indicates the procedure of a legislative Assembly because at elections the tribes voted simulataneously: this latter point however has been denied as valid for 133 by U. Hall (‘Voting Procedure’,
Historia
, 1964, 288 f.), while even if valid, the actual
renuntiatio pro tribu
would have to be proclaimed in order of tribes successively and thus Appian might still be describing an electoral meeting. Miss Taylor’s arguments have been rejected by D. Earl,
Athenaeum
, 1965, 95 ff., to which Miss Taylor has replied in
Athenaeum
, 1966, 238 ff., and by Badian,
Aufstieg
, 720 f. He also argues (716 ff.) that it was fear of a successful prosecution when he became a
privatus
, rather than fear that his programme might suffer if he retired, that led Tiberius to seek re-election. [p. 23]

15 TIBERIUS’ NEW PROGRAMME. Plutarch (
Ti. Gr.
16) attributes to him proposals to shorten the period of military service, to allow
provocatio
against judicial decisions by senatorial commissions, and to constitute the jurors of the
quaestio repetundarum
equally from senators and Equites instead of from senators alone. It is uncertain whether these proposals were in fact put forward by Tiberius or may have been falsely transferred to him from his brother’s programme; if any go back to Tiberius, the military service proposal is perhaps the most probable. Fears among some of Tiberius’ opponents that he might be approximating to the revolutionary pattern set by the Spartan social reformer, Cleomenes, will, according to H. C. Boren (
AJP
, 1961, 358 ff.) have increased their hostility. According to Dio Cassius (fr. 83. 7 f.) not only was Tiberius to stand for a second tribunate, but his young brother was also to be a candidate and his father-in-law Appius Claudius (already consul in 143) was to stand for a second consulship. This tradition may derive from anti-Gracchan sources. Yet it could be reliable, at least as regards Claudius if not Gaius Gracchus, and if so, the Gracchan threat to the opposition might indeed appear strong, if not even sinister.

D. B. Nagle (
Athenaeum
, 1970, 372 ff. and 1971, 111 ff.) believes that Tiberius’ main support came from men still living in the countryside rather than from those that had drifted to Rome (incidentally a considerable part of the commissioners’ work would therefore be to resettle men who were still in the districts where they had lost their farms). An important result was that as Tiberius’ attempt to implement his programme dragged on in Rome, it became increasingly difficult for him to get his country supporters to stay on in Rome or return to it; hence he later had to appeal more to urban dwelling voters. [p. 24]

16 VIOLENCE. Differences in the surviving sources about the events of Tiberius’ last day
make it impossible to reconstruct the details of the tragedy, still less the motives of the opposed factions. Since both sides had to improvise weapons, neither group apparently had come with the cold-blooded intention of initiating violence (though they might accuse each other of such intentions): cf. Astin,
Scipio Aemilianus
, 219 ff., who, in general minimizes the revolutionary aspects of Tiberius. A. W. Lintott,
Violence in Republican Rome
(1968), 68, 221, argues that ‘there was at least mental preparation on both sides to use violence in self-defence or to protect supposed rights’. Much depends on the interpretation of Nasica’s words and acts: did he really call on Scaevola to ‘put down the tyrant’, or is the phrase a
post eventum
intrusion (cf. Astin, 223, n. 1)? When Nasica, the Pontifex Maximus, covered his head with his toga, was his action meant to convey that he was about to offer a sacrifice, namely to kill Gracchus to save the State (cf. Earl
Ti. Gracchus
, 118 f.) or was the gesture that of a consul when declaring a
tumultus
and calling the citizens to arms (the phrase in which Nasica is said to have called upon his fellow-senators, ‘let all who wish to save the State, follow me’, is that used by a consul in proclaiming an emergency levy. Thus Lintott, 91, 183, 221)? While the absence of cold steel and the use of sticks and stones does suggest that Nasica did not start the day with the intention to kill, it is impossible to say how precisely his purposes developed, especially when what started as a brawl began to escalate. The fact remains that a private citizen had led others to kill their fellow-citizens untried. The casualties, 200 or 300, may be exaggerated or else be the result in part of panic and confusion as well as deliberate clubbing to death. On the topography of the events see B. Bilinski,
Helikon
, 1961, 264 ff. [p. 24]