A tense silence filled the air for a few seconds before he extended what I felt was a heartfelt offer from a friend, “Kirk, if you need anything, please let me know.” The meeting quietly ended, I rose from my chair and thanked him, leaving his office to go back to work; the nation was still at war.
Nine months later, on a brilliantly sunny day, May 24, 2007, I retired after twenty-six years of service to the Navy and nation. Over 150 people, including a dozen flag and general officers, attended the ceremony, held publicly in the outside courtyard of the Navy Memorial in downtown Washington. A long-time friend and former Executive Officer on
Arleigh Burke
, Admiral Ray Spicer, honored me as the guest speaker with my chaplain, “Chaps” Thornton giving the invocation for the ceremony. I was also honored with the presence of someone from every at-sea and shore assignment I had in the Navy; from my roommate at the Naval Academy, Commander Bill Lewis, to Lieutenant Matt Fleisher, who worked for me in the Navy's International Strategy division and organized the ceremony. I was even blessed to recognize in my remarks a special attendee and the parent of one of my sailorsâTom Wibberley, whose son Craig was killed in the attack. Several of my crew from
Cole
also attended, including a few who had been wounded in the attack. After the conclusion of the ceremony, all of my former chief petty officers surprised me by presenting a bronze CPO statue. Once again, the chiefs proved themselves the backbone of our Navy. Just as
Cole
had left Aden harbor, I left the Navy proud and undeterred. I knew what the crew and I had accomplished and nothing that happened to me in the intervening years could ever take that pride away from me.
Four years later, more than ten years after the attack on
Cole,
I sat in my living room in Nevada on a quiet Sunday evening, watching nothing
in particular on TV. The first day of May 2011 had been quiet and filled with the mundane routine of household choresâlaundry, grocery shopping, and preparing for the upcoming busy workweek. Suddenly, the local station announced that the President was going to address the nation at 2230. Immediately, I sensed trouble. For the President to address the nation on a Sunday evening that late at night, it could only mean one thingâtragedy or disaster. Without warning, text messages began to inundate my phone as speculation ran rampant.
Within minutes, the word was outâOsama bin Laden was dead. It was no tragedy but rather long-overdue justice and miraculously good news. As the President's news conference was continually delayed, the minutes seemed to creep by. Finally, the President strode up to the podium and made his announcement:
It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day was darkened by the worst attack on the American people in our history. The images of nine-eleven are seared into our national memoryâhijacked planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the actions of heroic citizens saved even more heartbreak and destruction....
For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda.
Yet his death does not mark the end of our effort. There's no doubt that al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us. We mustâand we willâremain vigilant at home and abroad....
So Americans understand the costs of war. Yet as a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to
those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda's terror: Justice has been done.
11
While there was no mention, once again, of the attack on
Cole
, I knew we had been avenged. I watched as the scenes of revelers flooded into the streets of downtown New York near Ground Zero and many more celebrated on Pennsylvania Avenue along the fence surrounding the White House. While I wanted to immerse myself in the joy of the moment, instead I got up out of my chair, turned off the television, and walked outside. The night was quiet as the stars brilliantly shone in the crystal clear Nevada sky. Out there, in homes across the country, I prayed that the families of the sailors killed in the attack on
Cole
and those who had survived and continued to rebuild their lives, as well as the entire nation, would hopefully sleep a little easier this night.
There was no feeling of happiness or celebration, only a deep sense of vindication and satisfaction. It was almost too surreal to comprehend that finally we had achieved this elusive victory. Before I left the still night air, I paused to remember those dark days in Aden and a crew that had reached into the deepest recesses of their souls to fight for their ship and shipmates. We lived up to the motto of USS
Cole
and its namesake, Sergeant Darrell S. Cole, USMCâ
Gloria Merces Virtutis
âGlory is the Reward of Valor.
APPENDIX
COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99â01
Force Protection
Tab B to Appendix 1 of Annex M
Threat Condition (THREATCON) Measures
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THREATCON Alpha.
This condition is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels, and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON Bravo measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from THREATCON Bravo as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
1.Brief crew on the port specific threat, the Security/Force Protection Plan, and security precautions to be taken ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON
requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures. Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity. Report unusual activities to the Officer of the Deck.
2.Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.
3.Review security plans and keep them available. Retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call.
4.Secure and periodically inspect spaces not in use.
5.Consistent with local rules, regulations, and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), post qualified armed fantail sentry and forecastle sentry.
6.Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, post qualified armed pier sentry and pier entrance sentry.
7.Ensure sentries, roving patrols, response force and the quarterdeck watch have the ability to communicate. If practical, all guards will be equipped with at least two systems of communication (e.g., two-way radio, telephone, whistle, or signal light).
8.If available, issue night vision devices to selected posted security personnel.
9.Review pier and shipboard access control procedures.
10.Coordinate pier and fleet landing security with collocated forces and local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support (security personnel, boats, and equipment) and define methods of activation and communication.
11.Tighten shipboard and pier access control procedures. Positively identify all personnel entering pier and fleet landing areaâno exceptions.
12.Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish unloading zone(s) on the pier away from the ship.
13.Deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from the ship. Barriers may be ship's vehicles, equipment, port provided barrier systems,
marine containers, or items available locally. Consistent with local conditions, 400-foot standoff from the ship is preferred.
14.Request husbanding agent arrange and deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from ship (400-foot standoff from the ship preferred).
15.Inspect all vehicles entering pier and check for unauthorized personnel, weapons, and/or explosives.
16.Inspect all personnel, hand carried items, and packages before allowing them on board. Where available, use baggage scanners and walk through or hand held metal detectors to screen packages and personnel prior to boarding the ship.
17.Direct departing and arriving liberty boats to make a security tour around the ship and give special attention to the waterline and hull. Boats must be identifiable night and day to ship's personnel.
18.Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft require special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists. Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship; authorized craft should be carefully controlled, surveilled, and covered. Inspect authorized watercraft daily.
19.Identify and inspect workboats.
20.Secure spaces not in use.
21.Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment. Lighting should include illumination of the waterline.
22.Rig hawsepipe covers and rat guards on all lines, cable, and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar.
23.Raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, Jacob ladders, etc., when not in use. Clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts, and lines.
24.Conduct security drills to include bomb threat and repel boarders exercises.
25.Review individual actions in THREATCON Bravo for possible implementation.
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THREATCON Bravo.
This condition is declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardships, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations with local authorities.
26. Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha measures.
27. Review liberty policy in light of the threat and revise it as necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship and crew.
28. Conduct divisional quarters at foul weather parade to determine the status of on-board personnel and to disseminate information.
29. Ensure that an up-to-date list of bilingual personnel for the area of operations is readily available. Ensure the warning tape in the pilot house and/or quarterdeck that warns small craft to remain clear is in both the local language and English.
30. Remind personnel to lock their parked vehicles and to carefully check them before entering.
31. Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15-minute alert. If the situation warrants, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship with the motor whaleboat or gig. Boat crews will be armed with M16 rifles, one M60 with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 10 concussion grenades.
32. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and SOFA, establish armed brow watch on pier to check identification and inspect baggage before personnel board ship.
33. Restrict vehicle access to the pier. Discontinue parking on the pier. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreement, establish unloading zones(s) and move all containers as far away from ship as possible (400-foot standoff distance preferred).
34. Man signal bridge or pilot house and ensure flares are available to ward off approaching craft.
35. After working hours, place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best cover areas about the ship.
36. If not already armed, arm all members of the quarterdeck watch and Security Alert Team (SAT). In the absence of a SAT, arm two member of the Ship's Defense Force (SDF).
37. Provide shotgun and ammunition to quarterdeck. If the situation warrants, place sentry with shotgun inside the superstructure at a site from which the quarterdeck can be covered.
38. Issue arms to selected qualified officers to include Command Duty Officer (CDO) and Assistant Command Duty Officer (ACDO).
39. Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. Authorized craft should be carefully controlled. Coordinate with host nation/local port authority, husbanding agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.
40. If not already armed, arm Sounding and Security patrol.
41. Muster and brief ammunition bearers or messengers.
42. Implement procedures for expedient issue of firearms and ammunition from small arms locker (SAL). Ensure a set of SAL keys are readily available and in the possession of an officer designated for this duty by the Commanding Officer.
43. Inform local authorities of action taken as the THREATCON increases.
44. Test internal communications, communications with local authorities, and communications with other U.S. naval ships in port.
45. Instruct watches to conduct frequent random searches under piers, with emphasis on potential hiding places, pier pilings, and floating debris.
46. Conduct searches of the ship's hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before it puts to sea.
47. Move cars and objects such as crates and trash containers as far from the ship as possible.
48. Hoist boats aboard when not in use.
49. Consider terminating all public visits.
50. Set materiel condition Yoke, main deck and below.
51. After working hours, reduce entry points to the ship's interior by securing selected entrances from the inside.
52. Duty department heads ensure all spaces not in regular use are secured and inspected periodically.
53. If two brows are rigged, remove one of them. Use only one gangway to access the ship.
54. Maintain capability to get under way on short notice or as specified by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal.
55. Ensure .50-caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers (.50-caliber machineguns will be maintained in the armory, pre-fire checks completed, and ready for use).
56. Prepare fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft.
57. Obstruct possible helicopter landing areas in such a manner to prevent hostile helicopters from landing.
58. Review riot and crowd control procedures, asylum-seeker procedures, and bomb threat procedures.
59. Monitor local communications (e.g., ship-to-ship, TV, radio, police scanners).
60. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.
61. Inform local authorities of actions being taken as THREATCON increases.
62. Review individual actions in THREATCON Charlie for possible implementation.