Global Futures in East Asia: Youth, Nation, and the New Economy in Uncertain Times (Contemporary Issues in Asia and Pacific) (45 page)

Under the name of “productive welfarism,” the first extensive welfare system to be established in South Korea prioritized “workfare” through reference to the apparent failure of welfare in advanced capitalist societies: This failure is construed as the draining of the public budget for social services that do not contribute to productivity and economic growth but result instead in forms of dependency on the state (Shin 2002). When Kim Dae Jung implemented the welfare state in 1998, he invited civic groups to respond to the Asian Debt Crisis as partners of government. Initially, the invitation was well received not only because of the urgency to address the crisis at hand but also because the idea of a welfare state for many of these groups was a symbolic entrance to social democracy and a commitment to economic justice. However, the program of productive welfarism as implemented by the government followed neoliberal models, the primary focus of which were to protect economic growth rather than to promote economic redistribution among disadvantaged populations. This represented a fundamental shift in the political commitment of the postdemocratization South Korean government in response to global logics of economic restructuring. Since the crisis officially ended in 2001, neoliberal ideas have become much more concrete in the daily lives of most South Korean people. They have become embodied in narratives of self-management of health and life style (Abelmann, Park, and Kim,
Chapter Four
in this volume; Song 2004) and in their perceptions of the value of refined living or “well-being” (Song 2004; Koo 2006). This conception of “well-being” is defined through consumption of certain commodities and practices of self-care (environmentally friendly electronics, organic food, and yoga and Zen exercise programs). The discursive and consumer practice of well-being is a continuum and culmination of a changed value of life from an emphasis on economic growth to one of quality of life after liberal democratization in late 1980s. While the period of rapid economic growth in South Korea (1960–1980) was appreciated for its contribution to quantity of living, such as the increase of GDP, middle-class social movements have become more focused on the quality of living—indicating the importance of pursuing individual happiness rather than sacrifice for collective survival—which Kim Dae Jung has picked up as a catchphrase for his welfare state.
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The
need to improve the quality of life as an authentic concept of social well-being rapidly expanded during the crisis in conjunction with commercial products that individuals would purchase as a form of self-care (Song 2004; Wong 2005). This commitment to improving the quality of life along with the shift toward political democracy in 1997 raised expectations that Kim Dae Jung would promote significant social reform. Moreover, because the previous president, Kim Young Sam, was heavily criticized and ridiculed by the majority of South Koreans for his failure to prevent the Asian Debt Crisis, the moment was ripe for a political hero.

Kim Dae Jung’s political achievement can also be attributed to his effective deployment of policies in welfare and education. During his exile in Britain prior to gaining the presidency, he began to develop his commitments to economic liberalization and governmental restructuring as an effective means to manage business–government relations and combat corrupt practices, especially bribe taking, which had been widespread in the South Korean government.
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These developments, which were in line with the policies of the IMF and the World Bank, became more conspicuous during the time of the economic crisis. Even before he was inaugurated, Kim Dae Jung promptly executed a series of plans for reform and restructuring. He also expanded government funding for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) to elicit their participation in sharing the responsibility for helping the unemployed and homeless. In this fashion, Kim Dae Jung was able to secure the support of many long-standing members of progressive civic groups by mobilizing partnerships between government organizations (GOs) and NGOs in response to the crisis. For instance, civil groups took major roles in promoting a national campaign for gold collection to repay the debt in ways that were reminiscent of the Repay Debt Movement or the Korean Production Movement, which had taken place in 1920 during the Japanese colonial period.
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In response to the economic crisis, gold came not only from middle-class citizens but also from lower-income people. The proceeds were handed over to respected delegates representing the three most popular religions (Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism) to distribute to those in need as part of the National Movement for Overcoming Unemployment (
Sirŏpkŭkpok kungmin udong
).

The growth of civil groups during this time should be historically contextualized to understand the political atmosphere leading up to the crisis. The Great Democratization Movement in 1987 engendered mass protests demanding
the end to a period of nearly three decades (1960–1987) of military dictatorship. In the aftermath of the 1987 protests, South Korea established an electoral democracy that led to the flowering of popular civil movements advocating for women’s rights, gay liberation, environmental protection, and economic justice. These movements were distinct from pre-1987 political movements, which had featured collective opposition to the political oppression of the military dictatorship and the capitalist exploitation of low-income workers and farmers. By contrast, sociopolitical movements after 1987 emphasized individualistic values and included middle-class issues such as consumer campaigns as legitimate objectives for social activism. Middle-class citizens were the main supporters of these movements (Koo 2001).

Although there were allegations of marginalizing the working poor by South Korean progressive political activists, Kim Dae Jung’s liberal platform remained steadfast, quashing any hopes of socialist democratic reforms. Kim Dae Jung’s strategy of partnering NGOs with GOs optimized a regime of liberal social governing that grew in response to the national debt predicament (Haggard, Pinkston, and Seo 1999: 202–204). The increased participation of activist groups in different realms of social management enabled the Kim Dae Jung government to implement neoliberal policies to reduce the costs of government under the guise of social security and the welfare state. These were the social policies that came to be called “productive welfarism.” At the beginning of Kim Dae Jung’s administration, a general welfare plan was not articulated by the new government, even after the issue of unemployment burst on the scene as an issue of poverty. Rather, the government selectively implemented crisis-related relief policies for only certain categories of the unemployed and homeless. It was only after Kim Dae Jung’s Celebration Speech during Independence Day (August 15) in 1999 that the blueprint for productive welfarism was introduced to the public and the Planning Committee to Improve the Quality of Life, equivalent to a U.S. White House executive office, was set up as the blueprint’s brain trust.

The South Korean government presented this program as the first in South Korean history to guarantee a minimum standard of living for its population. A 1999 government white paper proclaimed that South Korean welfarism followed the “Third Way” by combining liberal and socialist systems (The Presidential Secretary Plan-Committee to Improve the Quality of Life 1999: 14–16). However, the “Third Way,” as it was used originally by Tony Blair in Britain as well as by Kim Dae Jung in South Korea, can be better
understood
as a neoliberal model, rather than a combination of neoliberalism and social democracy. The emphasis on economic growth in neoliberal discourses and the blueprint for productive welfarism were strikingly similar insofar as the latter promoted unimpeded economic growth and restricted the use of state funds for addressing economic inequality. At first glance, the commitment for a guaranteed minimum standard of living appeared to contradict this. However, the goal was to establish the welfare state at minimum cost. The welfare cost was minimized through the requirement of employability and minimal public provision. “Welfare” was conceptualized as “workfare” or “postwelfare” in this first stage of South Korea’s self-proclaimed welfare state. The criteria of employability and normative families were used to discriminate between “deserving” and “undeserving” welfare citizens. Laid-off workers reduced to living on the street temporarily due to the immediate effects of restructuring were labeled
nosukcha
—a new label created during the crisis, literally meaning “people who sleep in the street”—and deemed to be deserving of welfare benefits, whereas the chronically homeless (
purangin
)—a term with a longer history prior to the crisis that literally means “floating” or “rootless” people—were deemed to be undeserving. This distinction was produced through popular discourses of “family breakdown” in the wake of the financial crisis (Song 2006).
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Hence, it is not a coincidence that “employable” and “familial” male breadwinners emerged as deserving welfare subjects under productive welfarism.

The new state welfare system also perceived newly unemployed members of the middle class (
chungsanch’ŭng
) as deserving welfare citizens along with those from the poor working class (
sŏmin
). It was the first time that members of the middle class had been recognized as deserving of state support. This seemed absurd to many lower-level state administrators accustomed to the idea that the government could afford welfare provision only to truly destitute people. This would have been compatible with the principles of a developmental state by minimizing the scope of beneficiaries of social policy to focus resources for economic development. Activists had expected Kim Dae Jung to pursue more leftist ideals (such as socialist democratic welfare), and they too were confused by the inclusion of middle-class citizens among deserving welfare recipients. However, this reformulation of welfare citizenship corresponded with the liberal account of deserving welfare citizenship; that is, employable and taxable citizens who do not depend on public provision
but are self-sufficient and, preferably, responsible for other family members by virtue of being male breadwinners.

At the outset of the crisis, three tiers of laid-off or unemployed people were established by the state and city administration in Seoul. The first tier was made up of workers who had been laid off with employment pensions by
chaebŏl
(big conglomerates). They received unprecedented state benefits, including as much as 70 to 80 percent of their previous salaries for extended periods and free access to vocational education for reemployment. The second tier consisted of workers who were laid off without employment pensions but who were eligible to work in the Public Works Programs (
Konggong Kŭllo Saŏp
). The third tier consisted of unemployed people who were living on the street in despair. The “IMF homeless” (
ai-em-epŭ nosukcha
) were, therefore, the deserving recipients of government unemployment policies, although long-term homeless people were considered undeserving by definition and were further disadvantaged by the creation of this new category of “IMF homeless” (Song 2009). Although the government could have focused on the overarching issue of homelessness by setting up more inclusive public provisions or policies of entitlement in this new welfare system, homelessness was instead characterized as an extension of more temporary unemployment issues.
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Within this historical and sociopolitical context, I found myself an unlikely beneficiary. In the midst of my dissertation research on social minorities, I had proposed to do a study on homelessness for the Seoul City Committee for Unemployment Problems (SCCUP) and became temporarily employed through the Public Works Program under a new category, “unemployed person with higher education” (
kohaknŏk sirŏpcha
), a classification that had to be invented to cover this somewhat novel situation. The SCCUP consisted of a dozen high-ranking civilians (including faculty from various universities, researchers from government-sponsored research institutes, the chief editors of major newspapers, and leaders of NGOs) and upper-level city officials (two vice mayors and four major city bureau heads). My role was to lead short-term research projects on the relationship between unemployment and homelessness for youth, women, and disabled people. In the course of this research, I met many South Korean intellectuals who participated in GO–NGO partnerships around the issues of homelessness and who had become entangled in the engineering of neoliberal social policy.

Dr.
Uh

I met Dr. Uh while doing a short-term research project assessing the needs of homeless women for the SCCUP.
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We met at a time when state administrators had just declared that the government could afford to assist only those homeless men who had been living on the street for a short time. Long-term homeless men and all homeless women (whether short-term or not) were classified as undeserving citizens whom the government could not afford to help. In my work with the SCCUP, I had encountered great difficulty convincing state administrators to pay attention to the broader spectrum of homeless people, especially women. Dr. Uh’s research on long-term homeless men and men who were at risk of homelessness (mainly day laborers) was influential in the creation of the first homeless policies in South Korean national history as a primary expert on homeless policy in Seoul and other cities during the crisis.

Dr. Uh and I often worked together to persuade state administrators to reconsider their narrow definition as to who was deserving of welfare benefits. However, even he expressed doubt about whether the plight of homeless women could be viewed with equal significance to that of homeless men. Dr. Uh’s prioritization of class over gender reflected his background as a student activist in the 1980s, a period in which South Korean activism largely focused on labor exploitation and the political oppression of the military dictatorship at the expense of other social issues, including gender discrimination. To his credit, Dr. Uh did not dismiss women’s needs, nor did he view homeless issues from the distanced perspective of a bureaucrat. Rather, he expressed sympathy toward marginalized people perhaps in part because he was himself a semi-independent researcher without secure employment.