Godless (25 page)
We have read about the hypothetical ant crawling on the surface of a huge beach ball. Like flat-earthers wondering where the edge of the world was, no matter where the ant moves, it will never get to the end, to the edge. Every point on that surface is the same, so we might just say that every point is the beginning and every point is the end. The same is true with the dimension of time. Every instant is now. Every point in time is the “beginning” and every point in time is the “end.” It is meaningless to ask “When did time start?” or “What happened before time started?” In fact, scientists insist that the dimension of time is simply a by-product of objects moving in space. Before there was matter, there was no before.
If God is outside of time, then is time outside of God? If so, there is something else besides God in the cosmos.
To say that God does not exist within space-time is to say that God does not exist. And even if it is true that God does exist “outside of time,” despite our failure to intuitively grasp what appears to be an impossibility, then how can he possibly interact with us mere temporals? It would be similar to an author trying to interact with one of the fictional characters in his or her novel—you can’t get there from here.
At this point, the theist might remind us that we do have scientific knowledge of the beginning of the universe, but we have no such evidence regarding God. That is true, but it is self-incriminating. Yes, science is a material endeavor—it is impossible to probe the supernatural (whatever that is) with the tools of the natural world—but to say that we have no evidence that God had a beginning is to underscore the fact that we have no evidence about God at all. The Kalam argument was being propounded a millennium before scientists embraced the Big Bang, and its merits were then, as now, nonscientific.
Another way to show that the Kalam argument may be mere wordplay is to identify the supernaturalistic assumption hidden in the second premise. Here is the argument again:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Notice how the words “everything” and “universe” are paired. In this syllogism, the two terms are considered to be of the same essence, at the same logical level. As an analogy, consider the following faulty argument:
1. All apples that fall from trees become bruised.
2. This orange fell from a tree.
3. Therefore, this orange is bruised.
This argument is wrong because…well, because we are comparing apples and oranges. An orange is not a member of the set of apples.
“The universe,” to philosophers (or “the cosmos,” to cosmologists), is the set of all things. A set is a collection of items. A set can be a member or subset of another set, and it can be considered a subset of itself, but a set cannot meaningfully be a member of itself.
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Yet the cosmological argument treats the universe as if it were an item in its own set. The first premise refers to every “thing,” and the second premise treats the “universe” as if it were a member of the set of “things.” But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.
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Yet the cosmological argument treats the universe as if it were an item in its own set. The first premise refers to every “thing,” and the second premise treats the “universe” as if it were a member of the set of “things.” But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.
You can’t draw an inference or law from the relationships between items in a set that applies to the set as a whole. The fact that each member of an orchestra plays in harmony with all other members of that orchestra does not mean that all orchestras play in harmony with each other. The fact that a distance of two separates each number in the set of even numbers from its immediate neighbors does not mean that the set of even numbers is separated from
its
neighbors by a distance of two. Such thinking inaptly transfers a truth from one level to another. When you say that “Everything that begins to exist has a cause,” you can’t pull yourself up by your bootstraps and say that the set of all these things (the universe), even if it
did
have a beginning of sorts, must follow the same rules or maintain the same relationships as the items that it contains.
its
neighbors by a distance of two. Such thinking inaptly transfers a truth from one level to another. When you say that “Everything that begins to exist has a cause,” you can’t pull yourself up by your bootstraps and say that the set of all these things (the universe), even if it
did
have a beginning of sorts, must follow the same rules or maintain the same relationships as the items that it contains.
To illustrate, consider a faulty argument that uses the word “began”:
1. Every nation began with a revolution.
2. The Alliance of All Nations began 10 years ago.
3. Therefore, there was a revolution 10 years ago.
This is illogical because the Alliance of All Nations is not an individual nation, and the word “began” means something entirely different when it is applied to the set as a whole. Likewise, in the cosmological argument, the clause “begins to exist” should not mean the same thing when applied to “the universe” that it means when applied to individual “things” within the universe.
Explaining the Kalam cosmological argument, Craig writes:
“The logic of the argument is valid and very simple; the argument has the same logical structure as the argument: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. So the question is, are there good reasons to believe that each of the steps is true? I think there are.”
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But this is not right. The “all men are mortal” argument does not have the same logical structure as the Kalam. Socrates is a man, but the universe is not a “thing.” The argument would have the same logical structure as the Kalam if it said: All men are mortal; the human race is made of men; therefore, the human race is mortal. It is easy to spot the illogic when phrased in this manner.
Bertrand Russell, in his 1948 debate with Fr. Frederick Copleston, touched on the matter:
“I should say that the universe is just there, and that’s all… I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn’t a mother—that’s a different logical sphere.”
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What does “everything” mean? Standing alone, it is synonymous with the universe (or cosmos). But in the cosmological argument, “everything” does not refer to “all things that exist” because it is followed by the limiting clause “that begins to exist.” This implies (as we have seen) that there are some things (NBE) that are not a part of this particular set. “Everything” is understood, in this context, as two separate words—every thing—referring to each individual item within BE. This is supported by the fact that “begins to exist” is singular, referring to one “thing” in the set BE. (Craig uses the word “whatever,” which means “whatever thing.”)
A “thing” is an object or system that is distinct in some manner from other objects or systems.
Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language
defines
thing
as: “anything conceived of or referred to as existing as an individual, distinguishable entity;
specif.
, a) any single entity distinguished from all others [each thing in the universe]…” (The same dictionary also defines
thing
as an abstract concept, but we can assume that theists consider God and the universe to be real objects.)
Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language
defines
thing
as: “anything conceived of or referred to as existing as an individual, distinguishable entity;
specif.
, a) any single entity distinguished from all others [each thing in the universe]…” (The same dictionary also defines
thing
as an abstract concept, but we can assume that theists consider God and the universe to be real objects.)
A “thing” is something distinguishable, and to be distinguishable is to be limited. To say that I ate a strawberry is to say that what I ate was not a watermelon or a peach. To say that my daughter is a redhead signifies that she is not a blonde or a brunette. To say that my friend is from New York means that he is not from Chicago, Paris or any other city. In order to be considered a “thing,” an object must be a part of a larger context within which and by which it can be limited. The object must be able to be “pulled away” from other objects.
Is the universe a “thing”? When the cosmological argument moves to its second premise—the universe began to exist—we are being forced to view the universe as a particular item in the set of “things.” But is the “set of all things” a “thing” itself? How is the set of all things distinguished from other things or other sets? In what context does the universe exist within which it can be identified as a distinct object?
If we even
suggest
that the universe (cosmos) is a discrete “thing” (not just a concept), we are implying a realm above and beyond the universe within which it is contained, limited and defined. This amounts to assuming transcendence. Theistic philosophers hope no one will notice that the language they are using effortlessly conjures the existence of a realm beyond nature, portraying “the universe” from a distance as if “it” had an environment. It is easier for nontheists, who are not tempted to mix logical spheres to avoid such question begging.
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suggest
that the universe (cosmos) is a discrete “thing” (not just a concept), we are implying a realm above and beyond the universe within which it is contained, limited and defined. This amounts to assuming transcendence. Theistic philosophers hope no one will notice that the language they are using effortlessly conjures the existence of a realm beyond nature, portraying “the universe” from a distance as if “it” had an environment. It is easier for nontheists, who are not tempted to mix logical spheres to avoid such question begging.
18
Copleston, responding to Russell, asked: “But are you going to say that we can’t, or we shouldn’t, even raise the question of the existence of the whole of this sorry scheme of things—of the whole universe?”
“Yes,” Russell replied. “I don’t think there’s any meaning in it at all. I think the word ‘universe’ is a handy word in some connections, but I don’t think it stands for anything that has a meaning.”
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(Today, cosmologists would substitute the word “cosmos” for “universe,” which is what Russell was talking about: the entirety of existence.)
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(Today, cosmologists would substitute the word “cosmos” for “universe,” which is what Russell was talking about: the entirety of existence.)
What statements can we make about the universe that show us what it is not? The Grand Canyon is not in New Jersey, the Egyptian pyramids were not built in the 20th century and baseballs are not made of jellybeans. Where does the universe not exist? Of what is it not made? How does it differ from a non-universe?
20
Such questions are meaningless when asked of the “set of all things.”
20
Such questions are meaningless when asked of the “set of all things.”
In summary, in order for the Kalam Cosmological Argument to be salvaged, theists must answer these questions, at least:
1. Is God the only object accommodated by the set of things that do not begin to exist? If yes, then why is the cosmological argument not begging the question? If no, then what are the other candidates for the cause of the universe and how have they been eliminated?
2. Does the logic of Kalam apply only to temporal antecedents in the real world? If yes, this assumes the existence of nontemporal antecedents in the real world, so why is this not begging the question? If no, then why doesn’t the impossibility of an actual infinity disprove the existence of an actually infinite God?
3. Is the universe (cosmos) a member of itself? If not, then how can its “beginning” be compared with other beginnings?
In the absence of good answers to these questions, we must dismiss the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of a god.
Chapter Nine
Dear Theologian
Dear Theologian,
I have a few questions and I thought you would be the right person to ask. It gets tough sometimes, sitting up here in heaven with no one to talk to…I mean, really talk to. I can always converse with the angels, of course, but since they don’t have free will and since I created every thought in their submissive minds, they are not very stimulating conversationalists.
Of course, I can talk with my son, Jesus, and with the “third person” of our holy trinity, the Holy Spirit, but since we are all the same there is nothing we can learn from each other. There are no well-placed repartees in the Godhead. We all know what the others know. We can’t exactly play chess. Jesus sometimes calls me “Father” and that feels good, but since he and I are the same age and have the same powers, it doesn’t mean much.
You are educated. You have examined philosophy and world religions. You have a degree that makes you qualified to carry on a discussion with someone at my level—not that I can’t talk with anyone, even with the uneducated believers who fill the churches and flatter me with endless petitions, but you know how it is. Sometimes we all crave interaction with a respected colleague. You have read the scholars. You have written papers and published books about me, and you know me better than anyone else.
It might surprise you to think that I have some questions. No, not rhetorical questions aimed at teaching spiritual lessons, but some real, honest-to-God inquiries. This should not shock you because, after all, I created you in my image. Your inquisitiveness is an inheritance from me. You would say that love, for example, is a reflection of my nature within yourself, wouldn’t you? Since questioning is healthy, it also comes from me.
Somebody once said that we should prove all things and hold fast that which is good. My first question is this:
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