Goebbels: A Biography (23 page)

In the late summer of 1931 Goebbels was for the most part preoccupied with private problems. His relationship with Magda was constantly troubled by outbursts of jealousy. He simply could not get over her earlier love affair.
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Furthermore, a real disaster was in the making: Hitler took a liking to Magda. Though Goebbels was pleased to hear Hitler’s “fabulous verdict”
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on her, he was less pleased to note that his interest in Magda did not stop there. On his next visit to Berlin, while Goebbels was away at a memorial ceremony,
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he settled down for a few hours in her apartment with his entourage. The next day Goebbels and Magda got together with Hitler in the Kaiserhof, and later the leader turned up again at Magda’s place with some of his retinue. To Goebbels’s great annoyance, during this visit there was some flirting between Magda and Hitler: “Magda is letting herself down somewhat with the boss. It’s making me suffer a lot. She’s not quite a lady. Didn’t sleep a wink all night. I must do something about it. I’m afraid I can’t be quite sure of her faithfulness. That would be terrible.” Goebbels didn’t extend his judgments to Hitler himself: “However, I don’t begrudge the boss a little heart and charm. They are so lacking in his life.”
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The next day there followed a tearful heart-to-heart: “At midday Magda came and cried a lot. She is innocent, I’m sure; it was just a slight lapse of decorum. She gave me back the ring, and tears were streaming from her lovely eyes.” They were reconciled again, and she got her ring back.
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At the beginning of September Goebbels was staying in Hamburg when he once more had cause to doubt Magda’s faithfulness, and once again it centered on Hitler: “A call to Magda. Boss on the telephone. Invited himself for a meal. The devil! I’m quite sad. Come if you like.” And he continued: “Terrible night. Agonizing jealousy!”
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Eventually he was able to persuade Magda to join him in Hamburg. It could not go on like this: “Magda will have to invite the boss around and tell him how things stand with us. Otherwise love and stupid jealousy will come between us.”
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A few days later he called Magda from Bochum and discovered she was not alone: “She’s talking to the boss right this minute.” He suffered the pangs of hell: “I spend the evening in a state of pointless agitation! […] I can’t sleep and keep thinking up crazy, wild tragedies.” The pain was all the greater when Magda, having promised to meet him on the way back, begged off because of “toothache.”
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He later cut out various diary entries from this time, for his “great rage at Magda” turned out to be “unjustified.”

As soon as he was back in Berlin, they had another discussion. Magda told him that she had met her ex-husband and let him know that she intended to marry Goebbels. But that was not all; she had already told Hitler of her intention: “Then with boss. Said the same to him. He was dumbfounded, too. But won’t betray my trust. Nor will Magda.” Goebbels was blissful: “Hitler resigned. He really is very lonely. Has no luck with women. Because he’s too soft. Women don’t like that. They need to know who’s in charge. I’m very happy now. Blissful evening.” But one thing concerned him still: “Poor Hitler! I’m almost ashamed to be so happy. I hope it doesn’t ruin our friendship. He spoke very well of me.” Some days later it seemed that this fear had been unfounded: “Hitler asks me to come outside and is quite warm-hearted toward me. Friend and brother. Lucky devil, he says. He loves Magda. But he doesn’t begrudge me my happiness. ‘A clever and beautiful woman. She won’t hold you back, but help you to make progress.’ He shakes both my hands and has tears in his eyes. Good
luck! I’m quite grateful. He says a lot of good things about me. My honest comrade and leader! We should marry right away.”

During this conversation Goebbels found Hitler “somewhat resigned. […] He too is looking for a good woman to marry one day. I have found Magda. Lucky beggar. We will all three be good to each other. He intends to be our most loyal friend. […] When he leaves us on that note, I have a bit of a bad conscience. But he wishes me the best of luck, and he has tears in his big, astonished eyes. I am proud of Magda.”
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To recapitulate: In September Magda Quandt and Joseph Goebbels decided to move up the date of their wedding, which was originally intended to take place after the NSDAP had gained power. This move was clearly Magda’s idea; she told her ex-husband and Hitler about it before informing her future spouse. It emerges from Goebbels’s account that, once he had overcome his initial astonishment, Hitler advised them to marry quickly.

It is also worth investigating a different version of the marriage plan. A devotee of Hitler’s, Otto Wagener, wrote that the plan of a Goebbels-Quandt marriage was conceived in Hitler’s entourage as a way of providing the Party leader with a respectable female partner. According to Wagener, Hitler already had his eye on Magda before he learned to his disappointment that the one he adored was already spoken for by Goebbels.
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Hitler then developed the notion of building an intimate relationship with Magda, whom he regarded as the ideal “female opposite pole to my purely masculine instincts.” Hitler believed that a precondition for this was that Magda should be married. Wagener claims that when he presented this idea to Magda shortly afterward, simultaneously proposing Goebbels as the candidate for marriage; after some time for reflection both accepted the idea.
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Wagener’s report contains one or two chronological inconsistencies,
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but it seems entirely plausible that a contributory factor in Magda’s surprise decision to marry Goebbels was a desire to place her relationship to the much-admired Hitler on a firm footing. It also seems quite possible that Goebbels took this on board and that he hoped to curry favor with Hitler by going along with the arrangement. Thus a triangular relationship developed among Hitler, Goebbels, and Magda Quandt whereby Magda became the woman who
would take her place at Hitler’s side, offering him her social skills, her good taste, and her advice but would outwardly be neutralized, erotically speaking, by being married to Goebbels. Goebbels, for his part, swallowed his jealousy and accepted the arrangement for the sake of its promise of undreamed-of influence over Hitler.

The Goebbelses’ Berlin apartment became a refuge for Hitler. Often accompanied by members of his entourage, he felt completely at home there.
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He was such a familiar visitor to the Goebbelses that over the years he became practically a member of their growing family. Hitler was fond of the Goebbels children, all of whose names would begin with the letter
h
.

What possessed Magda Quandt to enter into this arrangement, even to encourage it? After all, by doing so she forfeited a generous alimony settlement from her divorced husband. Magda was a highly ambitious woman. From what we know of the way her life had gone, it must have been the prospect of coming closer to someone who might in the future be the most powerful man in Germany, thus achieving a position that would eclipse even her previous status as the wife of one of the richest men in the country.

Hardly had the three of them established this relationship, however, when terrible news struck. On the morning of September 19, Hitler’s niece, his beloved Geli Raubal, was found shot dead in Hitler’s apartment, where she had a room. The bullet came from a revolver belonging to Hitler, who was not in Munich at the time. The circumstances pointed to suicide: “I simply don’t dare to look for motives,” wrote Goebbels in his diary. “How will the boss ever get over this?”
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Geli’s death at this point raises a whole series of questions. Was there a connection between the arrangement Hitler had entered into with Goebbels and Magda and the death of Geli? Had Hitler’s interest in Magda upset the balance of his relationship with Geli and brought on a crisis between them? Had he perhaps indicated to Geli that only a more mature woman was suitable for him, not a twenty-three-year-old girl?

In contrast to Hitler, who moved closer to the conservatives, Goebbels continued to advocate a more radical course. What this might look like was demonstrated on September 12, 1931, the Jewish New Year, when the SA started a protest “action” on the Kurfürstendamm. About a thousand SA men in civilian clothes began to jostle, abuse, and beat up passersby they took to be Jews. The head of the Berlin SA, Count Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf, who was newly appointed in August, was driving his car up and down the Kurfürstendamm when he was arrested and interrogated by the police along with twenty-seven other SA men.
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Six days later came the beginning of the so-called Kurfürstendamm trial of thirty-four of the accused; Helldorf and the SA leaders would get a separate trial later. Goebbels feared a ban on the Party: As it happens,
Der Angriff
was suppressed on the day the trial began, but that was because of a cartoon on another topic.
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After several days of hearings, a total of twenty-seven National Socialists were given prison sentences.
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Goebbels complained about the verdicts on the telephone to Reich Minister of Justice Gottfried Treviranus (who allegedly referred in this conversation to a “miscarriage of justice”)
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and to Reich Chancellor Brüning. On September 26 he even called on the chancellor in his office in order to question the way the law had treated the assailants. Goebbels commented on this first meeting with the Center Party politician: “He too finds the sentences intolerable and is very strong in his condemnation of the red terror. There’s no question of a ban.” Brüning had even instructed Robert Weismann, state secretary in the Prussian State Department, to block everything that might lead to a ban, saying to him: “I’ve got to be careful. I have let the judge know that I would find a heavy sentence for Helldorf incomprehensible.”
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Goebbels was not impressed: “The eternal ditherer! […] You can’t expect anything from Brüning.” Finally Brüning directed the state secretary for justice, Curt Joël, who was also present, to “do something” for Helldorf and the other accused.
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And in fact the second Kurfürstendamm trial was postponed for a few days. “That’s Brüning’s work,” commented Goebbels on September 30.
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So his intervention had yielded fruit. But on the same day,
Der Angriff
was banned for a further three weeks. It was clear to Goebbels: “This is Severing’s work.”
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The trial began on October 8, and sentences were passed on November 7. Helldorf received a six-month prison sentence but was freed; the other accused were given jail sentences of up to two years.
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An appeal hearing took place in January 1932. The prison sentences imposed in November were reduced, and Helldorf was now fined only 100 Reichsmarks, since his role as instigator of the offenses could supposedly no longer be proved conclusively. Goebbels was partly responsible for this lack of evidence. He was called as a witness but refused to testify when confronted with the accusation of jointly planning the violence with Helldorf. His behavior in the courtroom—Goebbels shouted at the state prosecutor and used insulting language in his evidence—earned him a fine of 500 marks for contempt of court.
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To return to autumn 1931: At the beginning of October Hitler came to Berlin to conduct various discussions about the possibility of a place in the coalition. These talks took place just a few days before a mass demonstration of the nationalist parties in Harzburg demanding the resignation of the governments of the Reich and of Prussia.
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Goebbels looked on suspiciously as Hitler and his partners—or competitors—on the political right jockeyed for tactical advantage.

On October 3 Hitler met General Kurt von Schleicher, state secretary at the Reichswehr Ministry and one of Hindenburg’s closest confidants. Goebbels learned about this discussion from Hitler, who had already declared that he was prepared to join a Brüning government but only on the condition that new elections were held. He had also stated that the NSDAP was ready to form a single-party government, should the occasion arise.
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Goebbels’s note on Hitler’s report continued: “We are willing to renounce Prussia for the time being if we can gain decisive power in the Reich. […] In Prussia we can put in a governor to force the communists to their knees.” The deal
emerging from talks between Hitler and Schleicher suggested an invitation to the NSDAP to form a Reich government, while in return the Party would be prepared to accept a Reich governor for Prussia nominated by Hindenburg.

On October 10 Hitler met Hindenburg. Immediately afterward he informed Goebbels: “Result: We are respectable. The old man has met us face-to-face. The boss calls him venerable. But what does that mean? In no way is he up to the job. A disaster for Germany.”
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After these discussions about possible direct routes to government for the NSDAP, during the next few days Hitler increased the pressure. On the evening of October 10 Hitler, Goebbels, and Göring drove to Bad Harzburg, a small town in the state of Braunschweig. Here the NSDAP was already in charge; there was no ban on uniforms here,
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and that was why the state had been chosen. This was the site for the long-planned mass rally of nationalists, a powerful demonstration by the NSDAP, the Stahlhelm, the DNVP, the Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German League), and the Reichslandbund (Reich Agricultural League).

The attitude with which Hitler and his National Socialist leadership team approached Bad Harzburg was ambivalent: They were happy enough to make use of their nationalist partners to put the government under pressure, but Hitler had conducted negotiations for a share in government solely on his own behalf. In Harzburg the decision was made to demand the resignation of Brüning’s government. Yet only a short while before, Hitler had declared himself ready to participate in a government led by Brüning. The mutual distrust between Hitler and the nationalists, reflected in subsequent entries in Goebbels’s diaries, was therefore not without cause.

The first encounter in Harzburg went badly: “Hitler is fuming because they’re trying to push us aside […]. I spend an hour talking to him. More distance from the right.” The next morning, at a joint meeting of the NSDAP and DNVP parliamentary parties, the mistrust broke out into the open. Hitler, who was not taking part, had previously delivered a declaration put together by himself and Goebbels, the tone of which was a good deal fiercer than that of the agreed-upon joint communiqué.
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During the ensuing military review he did not wait for the Stahlhelm formation but ostentatiously left the platform after reviewing the SA section.

Goebbels waited impatiently for the outcome of an hour-long discussion
between Hitler and Hugenberg, during which it cost the latter a great effort to prevent Hitler from leaving the rally early. Then there were speeches by Hugenberg (“an oddball!”) and Hitler, who according to Goebbels was rendered “off form” by sheer rage, followed by, among others, the head of the Stahlhelm; Franz Seldte and his deputy, Theodor Duesterberg; Eberhard Graf von Kalckreuth, president of the Reichslandbund; and a surprise guest speaker, the former president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, who delivered a stinging attack on the government’s financial policy.
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Goebbels was inwardly seething: He saw the whole event as nothing but a display of “organized disloyalty to us.” After Harzburg, Hitler and Goebbels were agreed: “Never again a mass rally. Only a leaders’ conference.” On October 13, 1931, having been suspended for more than six months, the Reichstag reconvened. On October 16 the government narrowly survived a vote of no confidence on which Hitler had been pinning high hopes. Then Parliament was adjourned again until the following February. “We’ve been conned,” was Goebbels’s comment.
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Goebbels, Magda, and Harald drove to Braunschweig, where a big National Socialist march was planned for October 18. Harald too wore his little made-to-measure SA uniform; he looked, said Goebbels, “so sweet” in his “high yellow boots.”

On the Schlossplatz in Braunschweig there was a parade lasting over six hours in which more than a hundred thousand members of the SA, SS, and Hitler Youth took part; it was followed by a meeting addressed by Hitler. Goebbels assessed the day—it was in fact the biggest National Socialist parade before the “seizure of power”—as “our answer to Harzburg and Brüning,” a show of strength that was meant to blot out the memory of the parliamentary defeat only two days earlier and the preceding tactical skirmishing with the nationalist parties.
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In an article in
Der Angriff
, he described Harzburg as a “tactical half-way stage,” while Braunschweig had clearly demonstrated that the “political leadership of the anti-Brüning front was in the hands of the National Socialist movement.”
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