Goebbels: A Biography (40 page)

Credit 14.1

During his summer vacation in July 1935 at the Baltic resort of Heiligendamm, Goebbels found himself obliged to curb the escalation of anti-Semitic thuggery in Berlin. The summertime relaxation shown in this press photo is intended to distract attention from the seriousness of the situation (from left to right, SA-Gruppenführer Ludwig Uhland, Artur Görlitzer, Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf, Goebbels, Kurt Daluege, and Julius Lippert).

By concluding a non-aggression pact with Poland in the summer of 1934, the regime took a step forward in breaking out of its near-total diplomatic isolation. Goebbels played a very active role in this improvement in German-Polish relations. In February 1934 the two sides had signed up for a press truce, and in June Goebbels had visited Warsaw on a fact-finding tour, including talks about cultural questions of mutual interest.
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Over the course of 1935, the regime brought in other policies that had even greater significance in leading
Germany out of its isolation. This development began with the removal of two important Versailles Treaty restrictions: the decision about annexing the Saarland to the Reich and the reintroduction of conscription. It was difficult to calculate where foreign policy developments would go from here and what their impact at home might be, but the propaganda minister’s diary shows that, while the leadership of the regime was certainly experiencing insecurity and anxiety, it was also gaining in self-confidence, sometimes to the point of feeling triumphantly superior.

January 13, 1935, was the date set for a plebiscite in the Saar territory (mandated to the League of Nations by the Versailles Treaty) to decide its future: annexation by Germany, annexation by France, or an independent political entity? Naturally, the Propaganda Ministry had thrown everything into the campaign effort. While the Nazi “German Front,” with huge support from the Propaganda Ministry and other German sources, almost completely dominated the campaign in this tiny area of just 800,000 inhabitants, in the southwest of the Reich, in Trier, Koblenz, and other places, mass rallies were held to back the annexation of the Saarland by Germany. Goebbels himself had spoken at several events.
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Ten days before the vote, a meeting of the “German leadership” was convened in the Berlin State Opera, to which cabinet members, Gauleiters and NSDAP Reich leaders, other top officials of the Party, and high-ranking military personnel were invited. This hastily summoned gathering was a response, on the part of a regime that was evidently rattled, to proliferating rumors of divisions within the government, indeed of an imminent domestic political settling of scores comparable to June 30, 1934.
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After Hess had opened this memorable occasion with a “declaration of loyalty” on behalf of all present, Hitler gave an hour-long speech in which he called for unity, particularly in view of the forthcoming Saarland plebiscite. In conclusion, Göring read out a “loyal address,” which, as its co-author Goebbels recorded, was “received with cheers.”
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An entry the next day in Goebbels’s diary, about a conversation with Hitler, bears witness to the regime’s deep insecurity, which had motivated the dictator to stage such an overt demonstration of the alleged unity of his administration: “After the Saar we’ll be facing extortion from Paris. 1935 another tough year. Keep nerve.”
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On the morning of January 15, two days after the plebiscite ballot
on January 13, the preliminary results were announced, indicating an overwhelming victory. Almost 91 percent of the population had voted for the Saar to join the German Reich. Goebbels then gave the signal for celebrations throughout Germany: “In a few minutes the entire country covered in flags. It’s beyond description. Triumph of patriotism!”
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Goebbels had issued the call for flags everywhere that morning on the radio and in the press. In addition, between 12 and 1 o’clock the bells of every church in Germany were to be rung; by order of the education minister a school holiday was also declared. In his capacity as head of propaganda for the Reich, Goebbels ordered that “between about 19 and 21 hours today, Tuesday, January 15, the population will spontaneously [
sic
] attend mass rallies to celebrate victory in the Saar.”
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In the days that followed, Goebbels had the opportunity to discuss the diplomatic situation with Hitler in depth, as for example on January 20: “Big project re: England. Protection of the Empire, therefore 30-year alliance. Still in progress. He’s working hard on it.” And on Hitler’s view of the situation, he noted: “Poland will stand solidly with us. France and England are getting ready for extortion. But we will stay tough.”

A few days later, during a train journey, Hitler informed him about a visit by the pacifist British politician Clifford Allen, which had just taken place: “The English are having political trouble domestically. That is to our advantage. The Führer hopes to have them in an alliance in 4 years’ time: us superior on land, them at sea, parity in the air. This offer made an impression. Well, we can only wait and rearm.”
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Goebbels was pleased at the outcome of Franco-British discussions at the beginning of February in London: There were proposals for an international air pact and for the replacement of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty by an international arms agreement. And in fact, in the middle of the month the Reich government reacted for the most part positively to the proposals.
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Foreign Secretary Simon and Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden were invited to talks in Berlin for March 7. But when in early March the British government published a “nasty white paper on German rearmament”—as Goebbels put it—“the Führer became hoarse and canceled the English visit.”
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On Goebbels’s advice, Hitler abstained from all official business in the following weeks, went to Bavaria, and
recovered from his sore throat in Wiesbaden. It had actually been more than a mere diplomatic indisposition.
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In the end it was agreed that the British visit to Berlin should take place at the end of the month.

The self-assurance of the head of state was boosted not least by the “liberation festivities” that had celebrated the annexation of the Saar on March 1. Goebbels had insisted on personally overseeing the final preparations for the main rally in Saarbrücken. The annexation was officially completed with the ceremonial hoisting of the swastika flag in Saarbrücken; howling sirens throughout the Reich; and the official handover of authority in Saarbrücken Town Hall to the Reich governor, Gauleiter Josef Bürckel, who was responsible for incorporating the Saarland into the Reich. In Saarbrücken, Hess, Goebbels, Bürckel, and finally Hitler all gave speeches that were broadcast across Germany. In his address, Goebbels called the Saar population “soldiers of peace” and said that the vote gave Hitler the opportunity “to shape this declaration into the basis of a new European understanding and a better order in Europe.”
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In an interview for the
Daily Mail
on March 10 Göring revealed, more or less in passing, the existence of a new German air force—another breach of the Versailles Treaty. Goebbels’s reaction to this news was conspicuously relaxed. He had little choice, since Göring had obviously given him no opportunity in advance to devise a propaganda presentation of the move. So, on the afternoon of the day when Göring’s interview appeared in the German press, Goebbels decided to take the day off and visit the Berlin Boat Show, where he viewed a motorboat he was thinking of buying.
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Equally unexpected for Goebbels was the announcement Hitler made to him three days later. The Führer had decided to introduce universal conscription. Hitler justified his decision by saying that he wanted to create a fait accompli before the visit by the British delegation later in March.
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In an editorial in
Der Angriff
, titled “Clarity and Logic,” Goebbels praised this violation of the Versailles Treaty—which became law on March 16
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—as an “open and unrestrained presentation of German intentions,” representing, as such, an “element of reassurance” meant to further the preservation of peace.
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No serious repercussions for the regime stemmed from this move.
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On March 24 Simon and Eden arrived in Berlin as planned,
to spend the next two days—though without managing to extract any promises from the German leadership—discussing with Hitler the topic of arms limitation and the possible inclusion of Germany in international treaty agreements. Goebbels was told retrospectively by Hitler about the most important results of these talks; he himself took no part in the visit except to arrange the accompanying social agenda.
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After the British visit, Goebbels went over various aspects of the foreign relations situation with Hitler. He thought Mussolini was bluffing when he said, as reported by Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, that he believed war was inevitable, but in Goebbels’s estimation there was a danger that “the ball might be set rolling by some sudden stupid action.”
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Hitler, stated Goebbels, did not believe in a war, either, but “if it should happen, it would be dreadful,” because Germany had very limited stocks of raw materials.
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When the Italian, French, and British heads of government declared in Stresa in the middle of April that they would “oppose with all appropriate means the unilateral cancellation of treaties,” Goebbels was unconcerned: “We don’t care, as long as they don’t attack us. Just keep on rearming.”
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He was equally relaxed in his comment on a further reaction to Germany’s remilitarizing policy, the signing of a Franco-Soviet military pact on May 2, 1935: In his view it was nothing more than a “legal anomaly.”
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At the beginning of April Goebbels flew to the Danzig Free State to support the Danzig election campaign by attending a mass rally of the local Nazi Party, for which sixty thousand people turned out.
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But it was a great disappointment to find that the outcome of the Danzig election on April 7 was nowhere near the high level of approval the NSDAP now routinely expected in the Reich. The election target announced beforehand was a majority of two thirds, but the NSDAP gained only 59.3 percent of the vote. Only with some difficulty was Goebbels able to restrain Gauleiter Albert Forster from announcing a result of 67 percent on the radio. “We’re all very disappointed. People have become quite sullen here and there. We’ve got
to pull ourselves together. We’ve played too well and too often on the ‘soul of the Volk.’ Less pomp and speeches, more simplicity and work.”

But things were to get even worse: The opposition contested the result. However, the League of Nations could not bring itself to revoke the election, despite the Danzig High Court’s finding of wide-scale manipulation. While funding from the Reich had enabled the NSDAP to mount a comprehensive campaign, the opposition parties’ campaigns—the Communist Party had been banned since 1934—had been largely suppressed. They had scarcely been able to hold public meetings; press bans were in place; and the authorities had massively favored the NSDAP in other ways. Finally, there was the outright falsification of results, particularly in rural areas. The court, under great pressure from the Nazi local government, did not propose that the election should be held again, but it did retroactively reduce the NSDAP’s share of the vote. What is more, its sober findings brought to light the terror tactics and manipulation employed by the Danzig Nazis, thus giving a glimpse of the reality behind the facade of the supposedly irresistible and unstoppable process of mobilizing mass sentiments by National Socialism.
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It should be borne in mind that the NSDAP in the Danzig Free State, despite huge interference in the democratic voting process, had only managed an increase of nine points on its above-average result of 50.1 percent in 1933. Taking the manipulation into account, this means that the Party enjoyed scarcely more support from the voters than in 1933, arguably less. The judicial exposure of the extensive manipulations in Danzig also throws light on the state of affairs in the Reich. If we take Danzig as a model, it becomes clear that the much-vaunted solidarity of the “national community” was to a very large extent an illusion created by the regime, produced by the celebrations, orgies of flag-flying, and mass marches decreed by Goebbels and reinforced by the everyday use of intimidation and terror on the part of the regime. This is all the more evident when we take into account that both terror and propaganda were even less constrained in the Reich than in the “Free State” on the Baltic.

It is not really surprising that the NSDAP had not succeeded by 1935 in raising its standing with the public. For by that date the regime had not actually achieved any grand-scale successes. Internationally, despite some important progress, the Reich was as isolated
as ever; the economic upturn had certainly had a beneficial effect on employment, but the financial circumstances of most Germans were just as modest as before. In addition, there were several negative factors: the anticlerical policy; the aggressive attitude toward “reactionaries,” that is to say, that section of the population that voted for the nationalist parties; the terror tactics used against political opponents and other undesirables; and the arbitrary, self-important, and officious manner of many Party functionaries toward their fellow citizens. At the same time, the euphoric honeymoon period of the early days was a thing of the past.
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Goebbels had his eye on this uncertain public mood in spring 1935, when he became preoccupied with another great event. “Göring is marrying Frau Sonnemann on April 11,” wrote Goebbels in his diary in March, adding with a sigh: “Why should he have it better than me.”
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Actually there had been a long-term relaxation in Goebbels’s relationship with Göring. After Goebbels, on Hitler’s recommendation, had included some praise of Göring in his
Kaiserhof
book, Göring approached him in June 1934 to make “a renewed offer of friendship.”
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Yet now, in April 1935, he took a somewhat jaundiced view of the ostentatious wedding planned by Göring and the actress Emmy Sonnemann: He feared that “this will do us no good at all among the little people.”
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The great day finally came: He and Magda took part in the solemnities in Berlin Cathedral as well as the banquet in the Kaiserhof to follow: “7 courses. Uplifting sight for the hungry. Best forget it.”
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