Golden (81 page)

That was right, Blagojevich repeated on the stand. Good.

“Good, sounds like you didn't cross any lines.”

Now Niewoehner was smirking openly, as Schar looked down at the table and visibly shook his head.

By Monday, it was still too early to tell if the jury could be buying Blagojevich's explanation that he was part aggressive fundraiser and part victim of circumstance. It might be tough to expect them to believe that time and
time again—in conversations that they could hear played in court—it was just unfortunate coincidence that Blagojevich was involved in discussions that could be so often misconstrued.

His third day on the witness stand started with his microphone mysteriously going in and out as he answered questions, dropping his voice to only a normal speaking volume in the courtroom over and over again and making it impossible to hear him in the back of the gallery. Off and on it clicked as Blagojevich looked down at it and cocked his head.

“That's not my fault,” he said, chuckling toward the jurors, who were ushered from the room so they didn't have to sit there while it was fixed.

One quick look determined the cause. Blagojevich had sat his binder of transcripts on the base of the microphone and on the switch. When he leaned on the binder, it would turn the mic off, and when he lifted his weight up slightly, it was popping back on. Problem solved, so the jury filed back in.

“I misspoke. Apparently it was my fault,” Blagojevich told them as Zagel peered down with a look that almost could have been interpreted as pity.

These aren't the moments you're hoping for when you're trying to get the jury to swallow a tale of bad luck and truthiness, but there it was, and Blagojevich had no choice but to plow onward. Back to the fall of 2008, when Krozel said he got the squeeze over the tollway expansion plan. Krozel had said there was no doubt in his mind that Blagojevich was linking Krozel's ability to bring in cash to a larger tollway expansion than the one the governor was first announcing.

There was a reason for all of that, Blagojevich offered, and again it had everything to do with his archenemy, Michael Madigan. He wasn't holding out to extort Krozel and wait for money; he was going slowly to keep the pressure on Madigan to move on the large-scale capital bill. If he gave too much to the road builders right away, they wouldn't have any incentive to keep any pressure on the powerful house speaker to get them the larger package.

Blagojevich acknowledged he did meet with Krozel that September in the campaign office and that both the expansion and fund-raising were discussed. But the two never had been linked, he said. Actually, Blagojevich said he remembered telling Krozel he probably was
not
going to support the more significant tollway plan because he thought it would more than likely have to include a toll hike.

The campaign money “would be very helpful to me” is what he recalled saying, but that was it, Blagojevich said. He hadn't put the arm on the guy.
He would appreciate some money help, is how he said he phrased it, though he said he also did mention that the ethics law going into effect at the end of the year was going to put a damper on such efforts in the future. In the most innocent explanations for his conduct, Blagojevich again said he was on the line with a seasoned political player who should have been able to handle what was happening and not get the wrong idea. He couldn't say it, but Blagojevich wanted the jury to get the idea that when the FBI had come around after his arrest, men like Krozel were willing to shape the meetings in a different way to toe the government line and keep themselves out of trouble.

It was a similar situation with Children's Memorial Hospital. Blagojevich answered “no” at least a half-dozen times as Goldstein asked whether the discussions with Patrick Magoon were a shakedown attempt that fall. He hadn't demanded money, he hadn't threatened him, and he hadn't directed anyone to do it for him. Blagojevich said he never planned to hold up the increase in state reimbursement for the hospital, trying to tell the jury there was a specific reason why. Goldstein started to ask about something in his own life that had crystallized children's health care for Blagojevich, who counted his efforts to make health insurance for families his greatest accomplishments in public office.

“My life experiences shaped my commitment—” Blagojevich started to say, when Schar objected. After another try, it was the same reaction, with Schar even throwing his hands up in protest.

It would take a few minutes before Blagojevich could find a way to tell the jury that a twelve-year-old cousin had died at Children's Memorial Hospital in 1967. Blagojevich was willing to be muzzled some by the prosecutor, but not on that point.

Among the calls Blagojevich and his lawyers had to contend with was the one between Blagojevich and Greenlee, when the then-governor had asked about the rate increase. Blagojevich had asked if it could be held if need be. “Budget concerns, right?” is what Blagojevich had said, which the prosecution argued was Blagojevich facetiously “explaining” the reasoning to Greenlee, who did shelve the plan.

Blagojevich testified that it wasn't a great budget year in 2008 and that he should be taken literally on the call. Things had been so bad that he had been forced to use his veto power to amend the budget, and there were cuts happening everywhere. Still, he had a great relationship with the hospital and was prepared to go ahead with the rate increase. Blagojevich said he had
the understanding that his staff—namely Greenlee—was finding the dollars for the plan and carrying out his wishes. Additionally, Blagojevich said he knew that he was going to be the one to call Magoon again in the near future about fund-raising, so he was just checking to make sure the hospital was definitely getting what was pledged.

The budget issues were the reason he asked Magoon not to talk publicly, Blagojevich said. He didn't ask Magoon not to say anything so he could extort him; he just didn't want everyone knowing that CMH was getting more state help when others were being asked to sacrifice and having their funding cut, Blagojevich explained.

“I was very clear to him I was breaking a policy,” Blagojevich said. “I didn't want the word to get out because I was making an exception.”

More than two years after his arrest, and after the better part of two federal trials and most of three days on the witness stand, Blagojevich was finally ready to answer questions—under oath—about the allegations he tried to peddle the US Senate seat that had been vacated by the president of the United States to the highest bidder. He had been awakened in his home by the head of the Chicago FBI and carted to court like a criminal. He had been impeached over his conduct. He was facing a long prison term. And he had told anyone and everyone who would listen that it was all a big misunderstanding. Now was the time to explain it away, if he could. Blagojevich was risking much opening himself up to the cross-examination that would follow in a few days, but he was taking a calculated risk his testimony was going to make it worth it.

Blagojevich started his explanations by repeating how his attempts to offer an exchange progressed and agreeing he had discussed his options “incessantly” during those key months.

Much of the talks had happened on calls to and from Blagojevich's house, where he had been “hunkered down” trying to make one of the biggest decisions of his time in office. He had been governor already for six years and wasn't counting on running again. He had made mistakes and done some things he was proud of, but his time as the state's chief executive was not going to last forever.

“I thought that this Senate seat was one of my last, best opportunities” to make a good decision, Blagojevich testified. The strategy involved all of the
talking. He wasn't just indecisive; he was throwing out thoughts to see how people would react to them. Most of all, the governor wanted to hear how John Harris would respond to each idea. “The good ones, the bad ones, the stupid ones, the ugly ones,” Blagojevich said.

Central for him was the Madigan deal, and he stayed on it throughout the early parts of his testimony. It had been on his mind from the beginning, he said, and was what he actually planned to do by December. His agenda would do good things for people, he said more than once, and he had to placate Madigan in 2008 to get it through before he left the governor's office.

He was also fearful that if Lisa wasn't the pick, a vengeful Madigan would punish him and strain things even more, creating even more gridlock, Blagojevich said.

“Her father was my nemesis,” Blagojevich said. But apparently, he wasn't all bad. Blagojevich told the jury that he sometimes spoke with Madigan about raising kids in the glare of politics and that he thought Madigan was a good father. That brought an objection from Schar.

“I just want to say something nice about him, Judge,” Blagojevich joked.

At any rate, the actual “deal” that Blagojevich said he was thinking of at the time called for him to appoint Lisa in exchange for the capital bill being passed, an expansion of health care, and a guarantee that there would be no increase in the state income tax while he was governor. Regarding alternative candidates, Blagojevich said the key to him was to replace Obama with another black senator from Illinois. The seat had also been held by Carol Moseley Braun, and Blagojevich said he thought it was important to keep that chain.

One African American who was not going to be chosen, Blagojevich swore, was Jesse Jackson Jr.

“My position was, no, not interested in it,” he testified. Blagojevich said he knew what was being offered on that front, and it was not going to happen.

“I wasn't interested in making an appointment of a US senator in exchange for campaign fund-raising or accelerated fund-raising from my Indo-American supporters. I didn't want to do it,” he said.

The jury had heard calls where Blagojevich had described Jackson supporters approaching him to “pay to play” and going so far as calling him at home. That was actually irritating, Blagojevich testified, and he had no plans to appoint Jackson regardless of any financial promise.

“It was just over the top.”

That seemed believable, as Blagojevich's disdain for Jackson was obvious. And not far-fetched was Blagojevich's contention that he was dangling the idea of a Jackson appointment to the Washington establishment to get DC leadership to reach back and help him get Madigan to agree to his swap. But what was probable was that Blagojevich was simply pushing on all fronts at once. It wasn't necessarily either Lisa Madigan or Jackson in early December 2008. It may very well have been both, with Blagojevich wanting options for a choice he could make later in the month. If Madigan balked and nothing else materialized, Blagojevich would have the Jackson consolation prize.

But that wasn't going to cut it with the jury. The prosecutors' position was that just the asks were illegal and could get Blagojevich convicted. He had to find convincing ways to explain to jurors what he was thinking earlier in 2008 when it sure sounded like he was trying to get a paying position in exchange for appointing Valerie Jarrett. Blagojevich had heard from Harris that there was an Obama preference, and immediately he had asked what Harris thought he could get for that. In suggesting an appointment as secretary of health and human services, Blagojevich said, he was just imagining a way he might promote his main agenda item—health care for everyone, on a national stage. It was just out-loud wishful thinking, Blagojevich said. It was an issue he loved and something that was good for people. But he wanted the jury to think that he wasn't totally serious or at least that he didn't really expect it would ever happen. He might as well have said he would appoint Jarrett in exchange for a ride on the space shuttle.

It was like the poet Robert Browning had said.

“Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp—or what's a heaven for?”