Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (7 page)

Grave fears were entertained at first for the safety of American civilians in Luzon, Mindanao, and elsewhere, but such apprehensions proved to be groundless. Once in occupation of the islands the Japanese exercised great moderation in their treatment of the inhabitants, foreigners as well as natives. American civilians were allowed to pursue their ordinary avocations on giving a pledge to abstain from all interference with the new
regime
, and except for a few recalcitrants, who were removed to Japan, the bulk of them chose to remain at their posts, confident as they were that the United States would take early steps to eject the intruders and recover possession of her property.

As invariably happens in times of national crisis, there were plenty of amateur strategists who bitterly assailed their Government for its supineness in failing to send a relieving force across the Pacific while the invasion was in progress. They did not realise that had the American fleet entered the Western Pacific at this juncture it would, in all likelihood, never have returned. Japan had not sent her armies on their errand of conquest without taking measures to protect them from interference. Before a single transport left Japanese harbours a cordon had been established across every line of approach to the waters of the South-West Pacific. At Port Lloyd, in the Bonin Islands, lay the main body of the Japanese fleet. From the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana islands Japanese cruisers, submarines, and aircraft maintained watch and ward over the South Seas.

Had any large American force advanced westward from Hawaii, it must speedily have been detected, whereupon the Japanese patrol craft would have been called up from every quarter to harry it like a pack of wolves. Compelled to travel at low speed in order not to outdistance its indispensable supply ships and auxiliaries, the fleet would have been exposed day and night to attack by Japanese submarines, and, as it got further to the west, to raids by aircraft. If a ship were damaged in any way that prevented it from keeping up with the rest of the fleet, its fate would be sealed. The chances were that a considerable portion of the fleet would be destroyed on its westward voyage, and even if the greater part of the ships got through in safety there would be no friendly base awaiting them at the end of their long journey. They would find themselves in hostile waters, short of fuel, and unable to obtain fresh supplies. Every day they remained in the Western Pacific would increase their peril and bring them nearer to disaster. With their numbers depleted by the campaign of attrition waged by submarines, aircraft, and mine-layers, they would be liable to be brought to action by the Japanese battle fleet, which could strike with full force at its selected moment. No wonder that the American naval authorities, with a clear appreciation of all these circumstances, hesitated to send the fleet to what they believed would prove certain destruction.

Nor must it be forgotten that for a full fortnight after the outbreak of war they remained absolutely in the dark as to what was passing in the Western Pacific. Owing to interference by high-power Japanese installations, no radio messages from the Philippines got through. The station at Guam had been silent since March 4. It was therefore impossible to tell whether the American flag was still flying at Manila or Guam. True, the simultaneous fall of both places within a few hours of the beginning of hostilities was a contingency that seemed outside the sphere of possibility; but on the other hand it was not improbable that Japanese expeditions had been approaching the islands long before war was formally declared, and had effected landings both at Manila and Guam while the American Government was yet in doubt as to whether hostilities had begun. In point of fact Guam remained in American hands up to April 3, so that a fleet sailing from Hawaii immediately after Japan had made plain her warlike intentions could have reached the island well before that date, provided it was not delayed by attacks
en
route
— a very unlikely supposition. But the American naval chiefs, knowing nothing of this, rightly refused to send the fleet west until they had gained some intelligence of the actual situation there. To do so would have been an act of blatant folly.

The silence of Guam can be briefly explained. A flight of Japanese war planes, evidently from Saipan, had appeared over the island on March 4 and dropped several tons of bombs on the radio station at Machanao, completely demolishing it and bringing down the masts. As the damage was far too extensive to be capable of repair with the facilities available locally, and cable communication had failed since the previous day, Guam was completely isolated. Its subsequent fate will be described in due course, but before proceeding with the narrative of events in the actual zone of war, some reference must be made to the resources which the two antagonists had at their command in this opening phase of the struggle.

CHAPTER V

Strength of United States and Japanese armed forces at outset of war — Difficulties imposed by vast distance between the two countries — Position of Guam described

WHILE the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922 had put a stop to the competitive building of capital ships and aircraft carriers, it imposed no limit on the multiplication of smaller craft, whose relative war value had been proportionately increased by the restriction of battleship tonnage. And so, from 1922 onward, a certain rivalry developed between the maritime Powers, each aiming to build up a fleet of so-called “auxiliary” vessels adapted to the new tactics of mosquito warfare, which had already begun to trench upon the traditional
guerre
d’escadre
, and seemed likely in the end to supersede it altogether. Japan had set the pace a few months after the Washington Conference by adopting a large programme of cruiser construction. It was designed to cover her requirements up to the year 1928, at which date she expected to have, in addition to her battle fleet of ten capital ships, the following ancillary craft: twenty-five fast cruisers, all capable of steaming at thirty-three knots, and ranging in size from 3,500 to 10,000 tons; approximately one hundred destroyers of seagoing dimensions, and eighty submarines. Generous provision was also made for fuel ships, ammunition carriers, parent vessels for the destroyer and submarine flotillas, repair ships, and other auxiliary vessels required for the replenishment and maintenance of a modern fleet at sea. But late in the year 1925, following on the adoption of a new programme of cruiser construction by the United States, Japan had considered it necessary to enlarge her own building scheme in order, as she claimed, to preserve the balance of power. Accordingly, eight more cruisers and twenty extra submarines were projected, for completion in 1930. In actual fact, however, the construction of these vessels proceeded so rapidly that all, or nearly all, were ready for service a full year in advance of the date originally named.

Meanwhile the United States, in fear of being outdistanced in small naval tonnage, made a new effort in 1927, when Congress, after prolonged debate, appropriated funds for the building of four cruisers and twenty-four large scouting submarines. The Japanese retort was to introduce a supplementary Bill providing for the completion by 1933 of five more cruisers and an unspecified number of submarines. Most of these vessels had been commenced before the outbreak of war. Thus, in the eight years succeeding the Washington Conference, the fleets of both Powers had been substantially reinforced. On two occasions within this period the United States Government had proposed the holding of a new Conference to check the growth of minor naval armaments. But the response was not deemed sufficiently encouraging to justify the matter being pressed.

The position on the eve of the war was that Japan had a pronounced superiority in every type of small fighting ship except the destroyer. She had ready a fleet of thirty-three swift cruisers, with five others on the stocks; besides one hundred submarines, mostly of ocean-going dimensions, and from twenty-five to thirty more under construction. Only in destroyers was she outnumbered, possessing as she did not more than a hundred of these, against an American total of two hundred and seventy-five, though the majority of her boats were of a later and more powerful design.

In airplane carriers the Japanese fleet was slightly inferior, for the Washington Treaty had restricted her aggregate in this class to 81,000 tons, while permitting the United States 135,000 tons. The latter, by converting two battle cruisers for aircraft duty, had locked up 66,000 tons of its quota in two ships, and invested the balance in three carriers of 23,000 tons each, making five ships in all. Japan had followed much the same policy by rebuilding the former capital ships
Kaga
and
Akagi
as aircraft carriers with a displacement of 27,000 tons each. This left her a balance of only 27,000 tons, which she had utilised by building the
Hosho
, of 9,500 tons, and three ships of slightly under 6,000 tons each. The
Kaga
and
Akagi
could steam at twenty-four and twenty-eight knots respectively, and carry fifty planes apiece. The
Hosho
had a speed of twenty-five knots and an equipment of twenty planes. Each of the three smaller vessels was designed for a speed of twenty-eight knots and had fifteen planes on board. In all, therefore, Japan had six ships of good speed fitted for the transport of aircraft.

Japanese submarines were of three classes: Medium boats, of 700 to 1,100 tons, with radii of 7,000 to 9,000 miles; large boats, of from 1,500 to 2,500 tons, with radius equal to the medium type; and submersible cruisers. These last-named had been introduced into the Japanese Navy in 1925. Built from designs prepared in Germany, six had been completed on the outbreak of war, and two others were under construction. Owing to the profound secrecy observed concerning this type, its apparently formidable qualities were but little known outside Japan.

In 1924 a Japanese naval mission visiting Europe had acquired from Professor Otto Schramm, of Berlin (one of Germany’s leading experts in submarine construction), a complete set of drawings for an underwater cruiser of dimensions far exceeding those of the largest submarine then in existence. At the same time German engineers were engaged to supervise in Japan the building of these giant craft and their engines. The first vessel was laid down at Kure dockyard in the spring of 1925. With a length of 405 feet and a breadth of 45 feet, the surface displacement was 7,080 tons.

Diesel engines of 29,000 horse power gave a speed of twenty-three knots on surface, and electro-motors a velocity of eleven knots when submerged. Forward of the conning tower was a low turret containing a pair of 8-inch 250- pounder guns. This turret was rotated by electrical power, and the guns had a clear field of fire in every direction save astern. Three 4-inch rapid-fire guns were also mounted. On deck there were two torpedo tubes, with eight more built into the hull below the water line. For each 8-inch gun 500 rounds of ammunition were provided, and for each of the ten tubes four torpedoes. Thick armour plate covered the turret, the conning tower, and the whole of the deck that was visible when the ship was running on the surface. This carapace of steel made her invulnerable to all but the heaviest gunfire. The hull was exceptionally strong, for the purpose of resisting bomb or depth-charge attack. Sufficient oil could be stored in the tanks for a voyage of 24,000 miles at moderate speed. In spite of her enormous weight and great length, the ship, when manned by a highly trained crew, was supposed to be no more difficult to handle than a submarine only one-tenth her size. In deep water she could dive in less than two minutes. This remarkable vessel was named
Nagasaki
.

Five others of similar design were laid down before she had finished her trials, but one of these was a mine-layer, carrying in place of the two heavy guns a few light rapid fire pieces, together with 2,500 mines. No other navy possessed underwater craft of such remarkable size and power as these six giants. As will be seen later, however, their fighting value was greatly overrated.

The active
personnel
of the Navy included 7,500 officers and 70,000 men. The proportion of officers to men, it will be observed, was abnormally high — about one to nine; whereas in the United States Navy it was only one to seventeen. This disparity was due to the Japanese practice of carrying on board each vessel at all times the full complement of officers, both staff and specialist, who would be required in war. In the same way, the crews were invariably kept at ninety to ninety-five per cent of the full war establishment. Though this system naturally added to the cost of maintaining the fleet in time of peace, it conduced to a high state of preparedness for war.

So far as the first-line fleet was concerned, it lived always on a footing of instant readiness for action, and mobilisation was therefore only the affair of a few hours. Behind this active
personnel
stood a reserve of nearly 50,000 officers and men, who averaged fifteen days' training per year during the seven years they remained in the first
ban
. Japanese naval discipline, at one time extremely good, had tended to deteriorate in recent years, probably owing to the spread of anti-militarist doctrines among the class of population from which the seamen were drawn. Nevertheless, for all-round quality the
personnel
was equal to that of any other fleet. The officers were well-educated, painstaking, and absorbed in their profession; the men were intelligent, and, when properly led, obedient and devoted to duty. Technical training was on very sound lines. Although not mechanical by temperament, the Japanese are imitative to a degree, and in the Navy, at any rate, they had successfully mastered the intricacies of modern technique as applied to warfare at sea. Gunnery and torpedo practice were well up to the mark. Both in the design and construction of ships, machinery, and equipment they had adopted, and in some cases improved upon, the best Western models.

In no branch had they made more progress than in aviation. By the year previous to the war the naval flying corps had attained a strength of 1,200 pilots and 900 planes, many of which were equal to the best in service abroad. So well had the domestic aircraft industry developed that an output of 150 machines a month was easily attainable without special effort. Prominent among naval planes were the huge Asahi bombers, carrying a ton-and-a-half of bombs, and powerful torpedo-planes, each armed with two 23-inch short torpedoes. The Japanese merchant marine comprised nearly 1,000 steam and motor ships above 1,000 tons, including a fair number of large, high-speed liners. Many of these were taken over for naval duty as armed cruisers, auxiliary airplane carriers, and so forth.

For a war with the United States, Japan’s strategical position very closely approached the ideal. The nearest American fortified naval station was at Hawaii, 3,400 miles distant. From the Kuriles in the north to Formosa in the south an almost continuous rampart of insular bases guarded Japan from assault. Most of the waters that lapped the eastern shores of Asia were dominated by her: the Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Yellow and East China Seas. And now her conquest of the Philippines had extended this control to the South China Sea. Her vital lines of communication with the Asiatic mainland were therefore perfectly secure so long as her fleet remained in being. Furthermore, in the Bonins and the ex-German islands north of the Equator she had a cluster of actual or potential naval bases which lay athwart the direct route of shipping from the Eastern Pacific. Only from the north-east did it seem possible for a hostile fleet to approach her shores without passing within range of some Japanese torpedo base.

Most of her insular outposts had been strongly fortified years beforehand. Under the terms of the mandate she was prohibited from making military use of her ex-German territories in the Pacific, but this ruling naturally ceased to have weight with her when war became imminent. Anticipating a possible American attempt to seize one or more of these islands as an advanced base, Japan had taken steps during February and March, 1931, to safeguard them from a
coup
de
main
. Guns were mounted at the most important islands, as at Yap, Jaluit (in the Marshall Group), and Saipan (in the Marianas); but reliance was placed mainly on aircraft and submarines to keep enemy ships at a distance. While it was manifest that sea-power was destined to play the chief
rôle
in the struggle now developing, military strength on land was by no means a factor to be overlooked. Upon the Japanese army devolved the important task of ensuring the safety of those reservoirs on the Continent from which Japan obtained the major part of her imported food and raw materials. If these were to fail she could not continue the war. It was therefore of paramount importance that the claims she had staked out in China should be adequately protected from interference, the more so as the Chinese would gladly have seized the chance of revenging themselves for past injuries by denying Japan the commodities she required, had they been in a position to do so. China’s attitude in the war had yet to be defined, but that she would be at best a malevolent neutral was fully understood at Tokyo. Moreover, if Japan were to suffer reverses, nothing was more likely than that China would take up arms against her, a contingency the more to be dreaded in view of the growing strength and efficiency of the Chinese military forces, to which allusion has been made in a previous chapter.

It was clear, then, that a considerable portion of Japan’s army would be tied down to garrison duty in Manchuria and Mongolia, from which provinces she derived most of her Continental supplies. In fact, as the war proceeded and the attitude of China became more menacing, it was found expedient to keep no fewer than six divisions at various centres in Chinese territory. All the arts of Japanese diplomacy were employed to cultivate the goodwill of Russia, with whom relations had been none too cordial during the preceding decade.

On the outbreak of war, the Moscow Government proclaimed its neutrality; but, here again, Japan saw a doubtful friend who might be translated into an open foe if the fortune of war should go against her. So long as she remained at her full strength, Japan could afford to brave the covert enmity of her Continental neighbours, whom, in the heyday of her power, she had never scrupled to exploit and oppress. But engaged as she now was in a life-and-death struggle, the dread of active intervention by China or Russia, or both, was ever-present in the minds of her strategists, and profoundly influenced their military decisions. It needed the acid test of war to reveal the full consequences of the high-handed policy which Japan had pursued for so many years. When adversity overtook her she found herself encompassed with enemies, eager to strike a deadly blow at her from the rear.