Hellcats (45 page)
Authors: Peter Sasgen
Chapter Eight: The Magic Loses Its Magic
1
Lockwood to Lawrence L. Edge. November 13, 1944. Edge family.
Lockwood to Lawrence L. Edge. November 13, 1944. Edge family.
2
In summer 1943, Watkins, then a submarine division commander, asked Lockwood for permission to make a war patrol as a skipper. The USS
Flying Fish
(SS-229) was available, and Watkins, at age forty-five, became the oldest man to ever command a sub on a war patrol. Watkins's performance was mediocre at best. Ironically, Lockwood had requested permission from Nimitz to make a war patrol, not as a skipper but as a rider, and was turned down. Nimitz felt it was too risky to put his sub force commander in a position to be captured and tortured for information from the Japanese.
In summer 1943, Watkins, then a submarine division commander, asked Lockwood for permission to make a war patrol as a skipper. The USS
Flying Fish
(SS-229) was available, and Watkins, at age forty-five, became the oldest man to ever command a sub on a war patrol. Watkins's performance was mediocre at best. Ironically, Lockwood had requested permission from Nimitz to make a war patrol, not as a skipper but as a rider, and was turned down. Nimitz felt it was too risky to put his sub force commander in a position to be captured and tortured for information from the Japanese.
3
Lockwood to Rear Adm. C. W. Styer, USN. Lockwood papers, Box 14. Library of Congress. (Hereafter, LPLC.)
Lockwood to Rear Adm. C. W. Styer, USN. Lockwood papers, Box 14. Library of Congress. (Hereafter, LPLC.)
4
Lockwood to Watkins, January 26, 1945. LPLC, Box 14.
Lockwood to Watkins, January 26, 1945. LPLC, Box 14.
6
Lawrence L. Edge to Mr. and Mrs. Ralph W. Edge (Lawrence Edge's parents). Edge family.
Lawrence L. Edge to Mr. and Mrs. Ralph W. Edge (Lawrence Edge's parents). Edge family.
Chapter Nine: An Operation Called “Barney”
1
Lockwood to Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, USN. LPLC, Box 15.
Lockwood to Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, USN. LPLC, Box 15.
3
Lockwood to Captain H. C. Bruton, USN. LPLC, Box 15.
Lockwood to Captain H. C. Bruton, USN. LPLC, Box 15.
Chapter Ten: The Minehunters
1
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. April (undated) 1945. Edge family.
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. April (undated) 1945. Edge family.
2
Ibid. Edge family.
Ibid. Edge family.
4
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. Edge family.
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. Edge family.
5
Ibid.
Ibid.
Chapter Eleven: Probing the Line
2
Ibid.
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
Ibid.
9
Ibid. Endorsement letter by Edge's division commander, Captain Louis Chappell, USN.
Ibid. Endorsement letter by Edge's division commander, Captain Louis Chappell, USN.
10
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. Edge family.
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. Edge family.
11
Ibid.
Ibid.
Chapter Twelve: “Hydeman's Hellcats”
1
Letter from Lawrence L. Edge to Jane Tharpe, May 10, 1945. Edge family.
Letter from Lawrence L. Edge to Jane Tharpe, May 10, 1945. Edge family.
2
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. Edge family.
Lawrence L. Edge to Sarah S. Edge. Edge family.
3
Ibid. Edge family.
Ibid. Edge family.
4
Unpublished manuscript by Earl T. Hydeman concerning submarine operations and Operation Barney. Undated. Courtesy of Barbara Hydeman Barnes. (Hereafter, Hydeman Ms.)
Unpublished manuscript by Earl T. Hydeman concerning submarine operations and Operation Barney. Undated. Courtesy of Barbara Hydeman Barnes. (Hereafter, Hydeman Ms.)
5
Lawrence L. Edge to his parents. Edge family.
Lawrence L. Edge to his parents. Edge family.
6
Lockwood,
HOS
, p. 110. Neither Voge nor Lockwood explained how this arrangement was to be worked out with the Russians, as they were supposed to be kept in the dark about U.S. subs in the Sea of Japan. Perhaps they simply hoped that if a U.S. sub showed up at Vladivostok, they'd be welcomed for the twenty-four-hour time limit imposed upon warships seeking refuge in neutral ports. Likely Lockwood just kept his fingers crossed that nothing would happen that would require porting there.
Lockwood,
HOS
, p. 110. Neither Voge nor Lockwood explained how this arrangement was to be worked out with the Russians, as they were supposed to be kept in the dark about U.S. subs in the Sea of Japan. Perhaps they simply hoped that if a U.S. sub showed up at Vladivostok, they'd be welcomed for the twenty-four-hour time limit imposed upon warships seeking refuge in neutral ports. Likely Lockwood just kept his fingers crossed that nothing would happen that would require porting there.
7
ComSubPac Operation Order No. 112-45, May 26. Declassified. NARA II. Modern Military Records, College Park, MD. RG 313. 5.3 Records of Naval Operating Forces, including those of Operation Barney. (Hereafter, Op ord 112-45.)
ComSubPac Operation Order No. 112-45, May 26. Declassified. NARA II. Modern Military Records, College Park, MD. RG 313. 5.3 Records of Naval Operating Forces, including those of Operation Barney. (Hereafter, Op ord 112-45.)
8
Lockwood,
HOS
, p. 114. The original SORG document defied attempts to locate it at NARA II and the LPLC. Lockwood makes reference to it in both
HOS
and in his memoir,
Sink 'Em All
.
Lockwood,
HOS
, p. 114. The original SORG document defied attempts to locate it at NARA II and the LPLC. Lockwood makes reference to it in both
HOS
and in his memoir,
Sink 'Em All
.
Chapter Thirteen: Running the Gauntlet
1
Commander Earl T. Hydeman's Standing Orders Log for the period May 27- July 4, 1945. Courtesy of Robert Barry and Patricia Hydeman Barry.
Commander Earl T. Hydeman's Standing Orders Log for the period May 27- July 4, 1945. Courtesy of Robert Barry and Patricia Hydeman Barry.
3
“War and Remembrance: The Mighty Mine Dodgers; Saga of the
Sea Dog
, Sea of Japan, June 4-25, 1945.” From
SubmarineSailor.com
Internet posting, August 1, 1998.
www.submarinesailor.com
“War and Remembrance: The Mighty Mine Dodgers; Saga of the
Sea Dog
, Sea of Japan, June 4-25, 1945.” From
SubmarineSailor.com
Internet posting, August 1, 1998.
www.submarinesailor.com
5
Ibid.
Ibid.
Chapter Fourteen: Threading the Needle
2
From a description of the
Tinosa
's penetration of the Tsushima Strait told to Lockwood by skipper Latham (
HOS
, pp. 142-47). The incident is described in a single short paragraph in Latham's top secret addendum to the
Tinosa
's Sea of Japan patrol report. The description gives no details other than the fact that the mine cable made contact with the hull outside the after engine room. In fact, Latham reported to Lockwood that the contact originated outside the hull at about the conning tower, which is slightly forward of the middle of the ship. In his patrol report Latham merely stated the bare fact that “This [noise] is believed to have been a mine cable from the [FMS] contact [of a mine] on the port bow.”
From a description of the
Tinosa
's penetration of the Tsushima Strait told to Lockwood by skipper Latham (
HOS
, pp. 142-47). The incident is described in a single short paragraph in Latham's top secret addendum to the
Tinosa
's Sea of Japan patrol report. The description gives no details other than the fact that the mine cable made contact with the hull outside the after engine room. In fact, Latham reported to Lockwood that the contact originated outside the hull at about the conning tower, which is slightly forward of the middle of the ship. In his patrol report Latham merely stated the bare fact that “This [noise] is believed to have been a mine cable from the [FMS] contact [of a mine] on the port bow.”
3
Lockwood to Watkins, June 1, 1945. LPLC, Box 15.
Lockwood to Watkins, June 1, 1945. LPLC, Box 15.
4
Watkins to Lockwood, June 9, 1945. Ibid.
Watkins to Lockwood, June 9, 1945. Ibid.
Chapter Fifteen: The Death of an Empire
1
Latham's comment on the sinking of the
Wakatama Maru
, published in the April 1981
Tinosa Blatt
newsletter.
Latham's comment on the sinking of the
Wakatama Maru
, published in the April 1981
Tinosa Blatt
newsletter.
2
Though Lockwood said that the torpedo problem had been solved by late 1944, it's clear from reading the patrol reports of the Hellcats (and other subs on patrol late in the war) that it wasn't. There were still far too many erratic runs (see the
Tinosa
's experience with one of her own torpedoes that made a circular run), broachers, and duds. The same problems that had bedeviled the Mk 14 and Mk 18 torpedoes were evident in the newer Mk 23s. Due mainly to these problems the Hellcats sank fewer ships than they could have. That failure can also be traced in part to poorly executed attacks, overeagerness, and faulty judgment on the part of the Hellcat skippers. While the Hellcats took a sizable toll in ships sunk, many got away unscathed.
Though Lockwood said that the torpedo problem had been solved by late 1944, it's clear from reading the patrol reports of the Hellcats (and other subs on patrol late in the war) that it wasn't. There were still far too many erratic runs (see the
Tinosa
's experience with one of her own torpedoes that made a circular run), broachers, and duds. The same problems that had bedeviled the Mk 14 and Mk 18 torpedoes were evident in the newer Mk 23s. Due mainly to these problems the Hellcats sank fewer ships than they could have. That failure can also be traced in part to poorly executed attacks, overeagerness, and faulty judgment on the part of the Hellcat skippers. While the Hellcats took a sizable toll in ships sunk, many got away unscathed.
5
Ibid.
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
Ibid.
8
In
Silent Victory
(p. 839), Clay Blair says that Lockwood radioed the Hellcats, “Did anybody shoot northwest of La Pérouse Strait?” The answer came back from Germershausen, who suspected he'd erred: “Guilty.” When the Hellcats returned after their mission Germershausen received a summons to Nimitz's office. Questioned by the admiral, the skipper told his side of the story and was told by Nimitz, “Glad you made it back safely, son.” The episode reinforced Lockwood's determination to keep Soviet warships, especially submarines, from operating in the Sea of Japan. By then Nimitz had dropped the idea altogether.
In
Silent Victory
(p. 839), Clay Blair says that Lockwood radioed the Hellcats, “Did anybody shoot northwest of La Pérouse Strait?” The answer came back from Germershausen, who suspected he'd erred: “Guilty.” When the Hellcats returned after their mission Germershausen received a summons to Nimitz's office. Questioned by the admiral, the skipper told his side of the story and was told by Nimitz, “Glad you made it back safely, son.” The episode reinforced Lockwood's determination to keep Soviet warships, especially submarines, from operating in the Sea of Japan. By then Nimitz had dropped the idea altogether.
Chapter Sixteen: A Dark Silence
1
Hydeman Ms.
Hydeman Ms.
2
There is no evidence that the
Crevalle
's crew killed the Japanese sailor in question. However, the fact that they tried to corresponds to the one issue that, despite Dudley W. Morton's outstanding war record, has, in some critics' view, left him tarnished. That issue is the gun attack Morton ordered unleashed on the survivors of a troop transport sunk by the
Wahoo
on January 26, 1943. In his patrol report Morton described battle surfacing among the hundreds of survivors (some said thousands), many of them in so-called “troop boats,” or lifeboats, of various kinds. When the
Wahoo
's gunners started shooting at them, their fire was returned by what Morton described as “[S]mall caliber machineguns. We then opened fire with everything we had” (USS
Wahoo
(SS-238), third patrol report, p. 58). In Morton's judgment this apparently made the Japanese survivors fair game, as he went on to mow them down. If submarine command had misgivings about Morton's actions it's not apparent in the glowing endorsements to his patrol report, one of which reads, “An outstanding patrol. This patrol speaks for itself, and the judgment and decisions [of the commanding officer] demonstrate what can be done by a submarine that retains the initiative.” It's interesting to note that the International Military Tribunal for the Far Eastâthe Japanese war crimes trialsâbrought charges that the Japanese regularly machine-gunned survivors of Allied ships that had been sunk as well as Allied POW survivors of Japanese slave ships sunk by U.S. forces. (See USS
Bonefish
Sinking of POW ship, footnote p. 49-50.
There is no evidence that the
Crevalle
's crew killed the Japanese sailor in question. However, the fact that they tried to corresponds to the one issue that, despite Dudley W. Morton's outstanding war record, has, in some critics' view, left him tarnished. That issue is the gun attack Morton ordered unleashed on the survivors of a troop transport sunk by the
Wahoo
on January 26, 1943. In his patrol report Morton described battle surfacing among the hundreds of survivors (some said thousands), many of them in so-called “troop boats,” or lifeboats, of various kinds. When the
Wahoo
's gunners started shooting at them, their fire was returned by what Morton described as “[S]mall caliber machineguns. We then opened fire with everything we had” (USS
Wahoo
(SS-238), third patrol report, p. 58). In Morton's judgment this apparently made the Japanese survivors fair game, as he went on to mow them down. If submarine command had misgivings about Morton's actions it's not apparent in the glowing endorsements to his patrol report, one of which reads, “An outstanding patrol. This patrol speaks for itself, and the judgment and decisions [of the commanding officer] demonstrate what can be done by a submarine that retains the initiative.” It's interesting to note that the International Military Tribunal for the Far Eastâthe Japanese war crimes trialsâbrought charges that the Japanese regularly machine-gunned survivors of Allied ships that had been sunk as well as Allied POW survivors of Japanese slave ships sunk by U.S. forces. (See USS
Bonefish
Sinking of POW ship, footnote p. 49-50.
During Operation Barney the
Spadefish
,
Flying Fish
,
Tinosa
, and
Bowfin
also attacked and sank small craft with their guns, but their patrol reports contain no mention of gun crews shooting at survivors in the water.
Spadefish
,
Flying Fish
,
Tinosa
, and
Bowfin
also attacked and sank small craft with their guns, but their patrol reports contain no mention of gun crews shooting at survivors in the water.
5
Neither Pierce's nor Lynch's patrol report makes any reference to hearing explosions coming from Toyama Wan.
Neither Pierce's nor Lynch's patrol report makes any reference to hearing explosions coming from Toyama Wan.
Chapter Seventeen: Breakout
1
Lockwood, June 23, 1945. LPLC, Box 15.
Lockwood, June 23, 1945. LPLC, Box 15.
3
Lockwood to James Fife, June 27, 1945. LPLC, Box 15.
Lockwood to James Fife, June 27, 1945. LPLC, Box 15.
4
Lockwood to Nimitz, July 18, 1945. Ibid.
Lockwood to Nimitz, July 18, 1945. Ibid.
5
Ibid.
Ibid.
6
Lockwood diary. LPLC, Box 1.
Lockwood diary. LPLC, Box 1.
Chapter Eighteen: The Long Search
1
Sarah S. Edge to Lawrence L. Edge, July 26, 1945. A handwritten note on the letter says, “Never mailed as Gov't telegram came three days later.” This is a reference to the missing-in-action telegram Sarah received on July 28, 1945. Edge family.
Sarah S. Edge to Lawrence L. Edge, July 26, 1945. A handwritten note on the letter says, “Never mailed as Gov't telegram came three days later.” This is a reference to the missing-in-action telegram Sarah received on July 28, 1945. Edge family.
4
Ibid.
Ibid.
6
Lockwood to Sarah S. Edge, August 12, 1945. Edge family.
Lockwood to Sarah S. Edge, August 12, 1945. Edge family.
7
Lucius H. Chappel to Sarah S. Edge, August 12, 1945. Edge family.
Lucius H. Chappel to Sarah S. Edge, August 12, 1945. Edge family.
8
Potter, E. B.,
Nimitz
, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 388. In the context of the situation of August 11, King's message prefix could almost be taken as a rejoinder to the infamous “This is a war warning” message transmitted to the hapless Admiral Kimmel before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Potter, E. B.,
Nimitz
, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 388. In the context of the situation of August 11, King's message prefix could almost be taken as a rejoinder to the infamous “This is a war warning” message transmitted to the hapless Admiral Kimmel before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
9
Lockwood to Sarah S. Edge, September 13, 1945. Edge family. Lockwood does not make clear in his reply to Sarah if, in referring to the “
Bonefish
going on this special mission at her own request,” he meant Operation Barney or entry into Toyama Wan. In the letter, Lockwood makes reference to Edge's seeking permission from Pierce to enter the bay, which under the circumstances was the proper thing to do. It would make sense that if Lockwood understood that Sarah was seeking clarification of the latter point, he would forward her letter to Pierce, because as force commander the admiral knew that Operation Barney was not organized on a volunteer basis. Because few family members knew anything at all about the
Bonefish
's operations in Toyama Wan, it seems likely that any questions they had about volunteering referred to Operation Barney itself.
Lockwood to Sarah S. Edge, September 13, 1945. Edge family. Lockwood does not make clear in his reply to Sarah if, in referring to the “
Bonefish
going on this special mission at her own request,” he meant Operation Barney or entry into Toyama Wan. In the letter, Lockwood makes reference to Edge's seeking permission from Pierce to enter the bay, which under the circumstances was the proper thing to do. It would make sense that if Lockwood understood that Sarah was seeking clarification of the latter point, he would forward her letter to Pierce, because as force commander the admiral knew that Operation Barney was not organized on a volunteer basis. Because few family members knew anything at all about the
Bonefish
's operations in Toyama Wan, it seems likely that any questions they had about volunteering referred to Operation Barney itself.
10
Ibid.
Ibid.
Chapter Nineteen: The Hour of Sacrifice
1
George Pierce to Sarah S. Edge, September 18, 1945. Edge family.
George Pierce to Sarah S. Edge, September 18, 1945. Edge family.
2
The questions Sarah posed show her extraordinary grasp of the tactical situation as it pertained to Operation Barney. It's not clear from any of the extant correspondence between her and Lockwood or the Department of the Navy how she acquired this information, as none of Lockwood's letters nor those from McCann, Chappell, and others go into the tactical details of Operation Barney. One suspects that there may have been other newspaper or magazine articles, which she saw, that did.
The questions Sarah posed show her extraordinary grasp of the tactical situation as it pertained to Operation Barney. It's not clear from any of the extant correspondence between her and Lockwood or the Department of the Navy how she acquired this information, as none of Lockwood's letters nor those from McCann, Chappell, and others go into the tactical details of Operation Barney. One suspects that there may have been other newspaper or magazine articles, which she saw, that did.
3
Sarah S. Edge to Richard B. Lynch, October 3, 1945. Edge family. The letter as quoted is a rough draft with many excisions. Typically, Sarah produced rough drafts of her correspondence, and this is one of only a few that survive in the Edge family archive.
Sarah S. Edge to Richard B. Lynch, October 3, 1945. Edge family. The letter as quoted is a rough draft with many excisions. Typically, Sarah produced rough drafts of her correspondence, and this is one of only a few that survive in the Edge family archive.
4
Richard B. Lynch to Sarah S. Edge, October 16, 1945. Edge family.
Richard B. Lynch to Sarah S. Edge, October 16, 1945. Edge family.
5
The so-called “families” letter is undated. It contains all the information she'd received from Lynch and others as noted. She makes no references to comments made by some family members of the crew that the men had done more than their fair share and that, having been ordered to undertake Operation Barney and not receiving more help when they needed it, the order was akin to murder. For the full text of the letter see Appendix Three. Edge family.
The so-called “families” letter is undated. It contains all the information she'd received from Lynch and others as noted. She makes no references to comments made by some family members of the crew that the men had done more than their fair share and that, having been ordered to undertake Operation Barney and not receiving more help when they needed it, the order was akin to murder. For the full text of the letter see Appendix Three. Edge family.
Chapter Twenty: A Shining Glory
1
Allen R. McCann to Sarah S. Edge, June 21, 1946. Edge family.
Allen R. McCann to Sarah S. Edge, June 21, 1946. Edge family.
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