Hezbollah (49 page)

Targeting the Israeli Heartland

IN THE EARLY TO MID-1990S
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with the Oslo peace accords signed and Palestinian autonomy slowly growing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, opponents of peace funded, supported, and executed terrorist attacks to undermine the prospects for peace. Iran was especially active in promoting terrorism targeting Israel at this time. According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “in February 1999, it was reported that Palestinian police had discovered documents that attest to the transfer of $35 million to Hamas from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), money reportedly meant to finance terrorist activities against Israeli targets.”
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Iran’s primary proxy group, however, has always been Hezbollah. It should therefore not be surprising that Hezbollah increased its support for Palestinian groups in the 1990s, invested in its own terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, and went to great lengths to infiltrate operatives into Israel to collect intelligence and execute terror attacks. Hezbollah established a dedicated unit to pursue these goals—Unit 1800.

While Israel occupied southern Lebanon, Hezbollah largely satisfied itself with targeting Israeli forces there or at the border. Carrying out attacks along the border with Lebanon in Israel’s far north was one thing, but to effectively undermine the peace process, Hezbollah leaders decided they needed to target key Israeli decision makers, symbolic sites, or ordinary Israeli civilians in downtown shopping districts. Hezbollah was out to hit the Israeli heartland.

For its part, Iran sought to intensify and coordinate the terrorist operations of the various Palestinian groups it supported through its primary proxy, Hezbollah. According to a Palestinian intelligence document dated October 31, 2001, officials from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hezbollah met in Damascus “in an attempt to increase the joint activity inside [i.e., in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza] with financial aid from Iran.” The meeting was held “after an Iranian message had been transferred to the Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaderships, according to which they must not allow a calming down [of the situation on the ground] at this period.” The Iranian funds, the report added, were to be transferred to these groups through Hezbollah.
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From Iran’s perspective, only Hezbollah’s direct involvement would guarantee a truly successful terror campaign targeting Israel. According to US officials, shortly after Palestinian violence erupted in September 2000, Iran assigned Imad Mughniyeh to bolster the operational capacity of Palestinian militant groups, specifically Hamas and PIJ. According to a former Clinton administration official, “Mughniyeh got orders from Tehran to work with Hamas.”
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In fact, to carry out the March 27, 2002, “Passover massacre” suicide bombing, Hamas reportedly relied on the guidance of a Hezbollah expert to build an extra-potent bomb.
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Following the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Hezbollah was said to have received an additional $22 million from Iranian intelligence to support Palestinian terrorist groups and foment instability.
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This assignment surely struck a chord for Mughniyeh and his lieutenants, who already operated a program aimed at infiltrating operatives into Israel through third countries in order to collect intelligence, train local Palestinian groups, and execute spectacular terrorist attacks deep within Israeli territory. Beginning in 1995, a select group of operational leaders within Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) developed plans to penetrate Israel’s defenses, in the process tapping their extensive support networks abroad. Starting in the mid-1990s—unlike in his earlier operational activity in Europe, which focused on carrying out attacks there—Mughniyeh tasked his European networks with providing clandestine support for operatives who would use Europe as a launch pad for infiltrating operatives into Israel. An Israeli intelligence report assessed that “the most dangerous component in Mughniyeh’s activity and the arena in which he excels is building a Hezbollah operational infrastructure abroad. This enables him to send more and more attackers from various arenas in the world, while exploiting the international system and its laws to implement these missions.”
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One of Mughniyeh’s key deputies within Unit 1800 would be Qais Obeid, an Israeli Arab and experienced drug smuggler whose intimate knowledge of Israel would prove invaluable for realizing Mughniyeh’s desire to take the fight into Israel’s cities and towns.
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Mughniyeh was now well positioned to pair his own international operations expertise with Obeid’s extensive experience in the Palestinian and Israeli Arab communities in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Under Mughniyeh’s command, Obeid would become Hezbollah’s point man for recruiting Palestinians and Israeli Arabs and, with the help of Hezbollah’s European networks, infiltrating operatives into Israel through Europe.

For years, Mughniyeh—aided by a handful of lieutenants—personally oversaw Hezbollah’s clandestine networks in Europe.
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By 1995, Mughniyeh was ready to use this network once more—this time to help a highly educated, English-speaking, light-skinned Hezbollah devotee infiltrate Israel via Europe.

At 7:15
AM
on April 12, 1996, in room 27 of the Lawrence Hotel in East Jerusalem, a man quietly prepared a bomb on his bed. Without warning, the bomb detonated, shattering windows and ripping doors off their hinges, one of which only narrowly missed a sleeping child. Miraculously, only the man preparing the bomb was injured—although his injury was dire. Israeli police and first responders arriving at the scene assumed the explosion was the result of a gas leak. A deep crater in the man’s room, however, indicated a less benign cause.
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The Shin Bet took over the investigation, suspecting the explosion was a bomb, but the agents were not yet clear why someone would target a small, two-star hotel in East Jerusalem. Searching the rubble, investigators found a shattered Sony radio and residue of military-grade C4 explosive, a type not commonly employed by local terrorists, who typically opted for crude, homemade explosives. Investigators also found a hair dryer and a blender—two appliances often used to mix raw explosives—and a pile of rusty nails, a common component in suicide bombs.
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Investigators found other puzzling evidence at the scene as well: sheets from a notebook listing phone numbers, accounting papers in English with a firm’s address in London, a roll of undeveloped film, a round-trip plane ticket from Zurich to Tel Aviv on Swissair, travel brochures and tourist maps of Zurich, and a British passport. The passport bore an official visa entry to Israel and showed its owner had traveled to Europe, the United States, and South America.
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The passport belonged to Andrew Jonathan Charles Newman, a British citizen born in London in 1970. The Mossad contacted Scotland Yard about its findings and soon located the original owner of the passport. The real Andrew Newman had told police his passport was stolen on a camping trip to France.
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Investigators would later determine that someone affiliated with Hezbollah subsequently purchased the passport on the black market.
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Further, when the roll of film was developed, Israeli intelligence found two pictures of the man shown in the passport standing in front of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Other photos of public areas were also found on the developed roll, including the popular Dizengoff Center in Tel Aviv, the site of a suicide bombing a month earlier that left 16 people dead and wounded 130 others.
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The Lawrence Hotel affair had its roots in late 1995, when Hezbollah leaders decided to carry out an attack in a major Israeli city, a new type of operation. In September 1995, Israel and the nascent Palestinian Authority (PA) signed the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which marked the conclusion of negotiations on the implementation of the first part of the Oslo Accords. To those hopeful for a two-state agreement that would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the interim agreement was a clear step in the right direction. To opponents of peace, foremost the Islamic Republic of Iran and its terrorist proxies, the agreement was a siren indicating the need to intensify attacks aimed at undermining the prospects for peace. Hezbollah would now use its global support network to infiltrate highly
trained operatives deep into Israel as well.
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In order to carry out the operation in Israel at Iran’s behest, Hezbollah would need someone who fit a particular profile. The man they chose was Hussein Mikdad.

Hussein Mikdad was born in Lassa, a town some forty miles north of Beirut. The oldest of four siblings, Mikdad grew up alongside the Christians of his village. In 1975, as the Lebanese civil war began, the area’s Shi’a Muslims fled for fear of sectarian violence. Mikdad, only twelve years old at the time, and his family landed in Haret Hreik, the Hezbollah stronghold in the Dahiya suburbs of southern Beirut.
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Mikdad eventually entered the Lebanese American University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in business management. “When I was at the university, I adopted the ideas of revolution, of change, democracy, and justice,” Mikdad said.
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After he graduated in 1991, his Hezbollah connections helped him get a job as a teacher and then, two years later, as the chief accountant for Hezbollah’s humanitarian, or social service, operations in Beirut.
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In September 1995, Mikdad was approached by a man who went by Abu Muhammad and who explained that he ran a section of Hezbollah’s “overseas security apparatus”—the IJO—that handles intelligence and conducts overseas terrorist attacks. The IJO saw in Mikdad not only a fervent believer but also someone who could pass as a European. In recruiting Mikdad, Abu Muhammad appealed to his vanity: “You have many attributes we need. You have leadership qualities and a European appearance. You have an academic education and you speak English.” Two days after his meeting with Muhammad, Mikdad was transferred to Hezbollah’s security branch. He was now a special case recruit.
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In November 1995, Mikdad was driven by Hezbollah operatives to the Iranian-run Janta training camp in the eastern Bekaa Valley, where in just under two months he mastered the art of guerrilla warfare.
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He learned how to fire submachine guns, evade and conduct surveillance, and transform the timer from a standard digital watch into a timer for a bomb.
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He specialized in assembling explosive devices using C4. Only after completing his training was Mikdad informed of his selection to engage in a special mission for Hezbollah. Abu Muhammad personally escorted Mikdad from the training camp back to Beirut in January 1996, telling Mikdad that he was “now a member of the security apparatus … it is best not to talk about it, even to your family.” Abu Muhammad told him to get a job in Beirut and await further instructions.
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Mikdad did not have to wait long. A couple of weeks later, in mid-January, Abu Muhammad gave Mikdad an urgent assignment: infiltrate Israel by walking through the front door of Ben Gurion International Airport. Mikdad, Abu Muhammad continued, would “serve as an example for later attacks” by being “the first in a line of fighters who [would] enter Israel in this way.” To secure this legacy, however, his action must be “impressive.”
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The photograph of Mikdad used for his forged passport was taken in March 1996 at the Iranian embassy in Beirut. According to Israeli intelligence, the theft and altering of such passports by Hezbollah operatives in Europe is widespread, and the documents are “used by the organization’s activists in their travels all over the world.”
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In one operation, according to a 1994 FBI report, Hezbollah members presented photo-substituted passports and fraudulent visa applications at a US embassy. Eighteen individuals successfully obtained passports in this manner.
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Abu Muhammad also provided Mikdad with a small clock radio that concealed bomb-making materials. The detonator was hidden in a hollow tube that ran into the antenna and was wired to the radio timer. Abu Muhammad made sure Mikdad received documents to support his cover story as a British accountant, as well as a new suitcase and new clothes. The explosive was vacuum-packed, making it difficult to detect. Only then, at the Iranian embassy, did Mikdad learn that the mastermind of his operation was the infamous Imad Mughniyeh.
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Hezbollah’s plot was rooted in a broader strategy of infiltrating operatives into Israel through neutral third countries using doctored travel documents from similarly neutral countries. When the time came for him to depart on his mission, Mikdad told his wife he was traveling to Turkey to buy leather coats for an import business. Instead, he set off for Israel via Syria, Austria, and Switzerland.
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Fearing a cousin who worked at the Beirut airport would recognize him, Mikdad convinced Abu Muhammad the two should drive to Damascus and fly out of Damascus International Airport. After touching down in Vienna on Austrian Airlines flight 708 and parting ways with Abu Muhammad, Mikdad converted $200 into Austrian currency. From the airport, he took a taxi to Westbahnhof, Vienna’s train station, where he met at a café with a Hezbollah contact who provided him with his false British passport. The two spent about an hour together, during which the Hezbollah contact likely reviewed other elements of the operation with Mikdad, who then caught a train to Zurich. Abu Muhammad’s men were reportedly on board, secretly watching and protecting Mikdad, although without Mikdad’s knowledge.
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On April 2, Mikdad arrived at Zurich’s Flughaven railway station. At a booth in the station, he printed fifty business cards identifying him as an accountant from London. He then called the Regina Hotel, presumably to check for a vacancy and book a room but possibly to speak to another contact already there, took a taxi to the hotel, and checked into room 217. Abu Muhammad called to set up a meeting for the next day at 9
AM
under the big clock at the central train station in the city’s old town. For the next two days Mikdad and Abu Muhammad walked along Lake Zurich, talking about religion and philosophy and reviewing details of the plan. This would be their last opportunity to refine the operation, finalize code words, review the details of Mikdad’s cover identity as Andrew Newman, and bolster his resolve. Mikdad’s goal in the operation was to revive the momentum of attacks in Israeli cities, in essence spurring on Hamas and PIJ to carry out more of the spectacular suicide bombings to which Israel, as an open society, was so vulnerable.
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