Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (132 page)
Read Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Online
Authors: Herbert P. Bix
Tags: #General, #History, #Biography & Autobiography, #Military, #World War II
Obviously Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. The broadcast of his August 14 rescript became Japan's first official, public confirmation of the bombs' effectiveness. Whether the emperor and his advisers ever really believed that, however, is unlikely. For three days later, on August 17, Hirohito issued a second “Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors” in all war theaters of Asia and the Pacific, ordering them to cease fire and lay down their arms. This time, addressing only his
military forces, he stressed the cause-and-effect relationship between Soviet entrance into the war and his decision to surrender, while conspicuously omitting any mention of the atomic bombs.
Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continueâ¦under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity.
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The less-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, and maintenance of the
kokutai
as the aim. Dissembling until the endâand beyondâthe emperor stated two different justifications for his delayed surrender.
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Both statements were probably true.
E
leven-year-old Crown Prince Akihito had been evacuated to the safety of a hotel in the town of Nikk
, Tochigi prefecture, to escape the American bombing. Following the capitulation, Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako wrote to him, explaining why Japan had been beaten so badly. Their letters, filled with parental warmth, furnish glimpses of the tense situation in the beleaguered capital; more important, they reveal the mind-set of Japan's rulers in the immediate aftermath of defeat.
On August 30, 1945, Nagako reported: “Every day from morning to night B-29s, naval bombers, and fighters freely fly over the palace in all directions, making an enormous noiseâ¦. Unfortunately the B-29 is a splendid [plane]. As I sit at my desk writing and look up at the sky, countless numbers are passing over.”
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Hirohito too was impressed by the technological prowess of the Americans, embodied in their “superfortress.” Many months earlier he had mentioned to Akihito how he and Nagako had been going around the garden of the Gobunko “picking up various articles related to B-29s.”
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In a letter to his son dated September 9, the emperor skipped over the policy-making process in which he had been the central figure and laid out the large, general causes of the defeat:
Our people believed too much in the imperial country and were contemptuous of Britain and the United States. Our military men placed
too much weight on spirit and forgot about science. In the time of the Meiji Emperor, there were great commanders like Yamagata,
yama, and Yamamoto. But this time, as with Germany in World War I, military men predominated and gave no thought to the larger situation.
They knew how to advance but not how to retreat.
If we had continued the war, we would have been unable to protect the three imperial regalia. Not only that, more of our countrymen would have had to die. Repressing my emotions, I tried to save the seed of the nation.
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Young Akihito's long diary entry, written on August 15, 1945, and formally headed “Constructing the New Japan,” revealed other factors. Echoing what his parents and palace tutors were teaching him about the nation's humiliating defeat, he confessed that he felt “deeply mortified” by his father's having had to take upon himself “the shame of the nationâunconditional surrender.” Japan, however, had been defeated:
because of the overwhelming material superiority of Britain and the United Statesâ¦and the great skillfulness of the American way of fighting. [The Anglo-Americans] were defeated at the start because they were not then adequately prepared. But once they were prepared, they came at us like wild boars. Their methods of attack were very skillful and scientificâ¦. Finally they used atomic bombs and killed and wounded hundreds of thousands of Japanese, destroyed towns and factoriesâ¦. In the end we could fight no longer. The cause for this was the inferiority of Japanese national power and scientific power.
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Akihito concluded by blaming the defeat on the Japanese people rather than their leaders, and the political institutions under which they lived. “It was impossible for the Japanese to win this total war because from Taishto early Shwa, they thought only of their pri
vate interests rather than the country, and behaved selfishly.” Now the only course lay in following the emperor's words:
â¦maintain the spirit of protecting the
kokutai
, unite, and labor to climb out of this pit of darkness. No matter how one looks at it, individually, Japanese are superior to Americans in every respect. But as a group, we are inferior to them. So from now on we must have group training, foster science, and the entire nation must labor hard to construct a new, better Japan than today.”
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The new Japan should foster science, tighten group commitment to national goals, and consider the past closed. From the outset, the elites dwelt on responsibility for the loss of the “War of Greater East Asia.” Their autopsy ignored the preâPearl Harbor expansion into Manchuria, which Hirohito had abetted, the North China Incident of 1937 that, with his encouragement, the Konoe cabinet had escalated into an all-out war, and the role of Asian nationalism in contributing to defeat. Responsibility for having attacked China in 1931 and the United States and Britain in December 1941 shifted to responsibility for final defeat, which had cost the nation so much shame and misery. Naturally Hirohito did not in any way hold himself or the court group responsible for this consequence.
Crown Prince Akihito's sense that Japanese pursuit of self-interest was selfishness reflected another element in the official war autopsy. Hirohito's character and training disposed him to distrust individual self-assertion. Following the dictates of one's conscience posed, he believed, a threat to belief in the idealized collective self, and in the
kokutai
. From the start of Shwa, Hirohito and the court entourage had actively encouraged the indoctrination of the nation in habits of self-effacement and obedience to officials. From 1937 onward they had supported policies designed to drastically lower
living standards in order to rapidly build up war power. When it came time to consider how to construct the new nation, they initially imagined that they could continue this old emphasis. Hostile to liberalism, individualism, and democracy, they decried, on the one hand, the Japanese people's tendency to “follow blindly,” and on the other, the blindness of putting self-interest ahead of state interest.
These widely held views on the nature of the war prevented Hirohito, his entourage, and the old-guard leaders from ever pursuing the connection between the causes of defeat and the construction of a new Japan. They also colored the tack that they now took toward their American occupiers.
I
Having ended his alliance with the military hardliners, thus reunifying the court group, Hirohito tried to reconcile himself to a period of temporary disarmament and foreign occupation. A new campaign of “spiritual mobilization” to protect the monarchy, based on his imperial rescript of August 15, and driving home its message, was now an obvious necessity. The next prime minister would need to explain to a dazed, demoralized, and battered nation what had happened, and why all loyal subjects must now change their thinking, courteously accept the enemy, and raise no questions as to who was responsible for the horrendous plight in which they found themselves. The immediate tasks of the next cabinet were to prepare a peaceful reception for the largely American army of occupation, and to hearten the nation by conveying an impression of continuity with the past. Only a member of the extended imperial family at the head of the next government could accomplish these tasks.
Acting on the recommendation of Kido, who dispensed with a conference of the senior statesmen and consulted only Hiranuma,
Hirohito, on August 17, appointed Prince Higashikuni as prime minister.
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The prince had close ties to the imperial family. His wife was Emperor's Meiji's ninth daughter, and his son was married to Hirohito's daughter, Teru no miya. Having no reason at this time to think Higashikuni anything but trustworthy, even though he was a complete political novice, Hirohito charged him with overseering a swift, peaceful, and preemptive demobilization of the army and navy. Higashikuni's “Imperial Family Cabinet,” as the press immediately labeled it, was charged with demonstrating to the Allies that the monarchy alone had the power to demobilize Japan peacefully and control the situation. Higashikuni selected Konoe to be vice prime minister, and Ogata Taketora, vice president of the Asahi newspaper company, to be chief cabinet secretary. Both men were to play key roles in protecting the
kokutai
, legitimizing the emperor's actions, and shielding him from criticism. Ogata the propagandist directed the campaign to counter criticism of the war leaders; Konoe focused on preparations for the arrival of the American and British Commonwealth forces.
Although suicides occurred in different parts of the country immediately following surrender, the overwhelming majority of Japanese accepted the new situation. They also responded positively to Higashikuni's unprecedented radio speech to the nation, on August 17, informing them of his general principles for government. Act together “in accordance with the imperial will,” he enjoined, and “we shallâ¦construct the highest culture as advanced as any in the worldâ¦. Toward that endâ¦I wish to encourage the development of constructive discussion and recognize the freedom to form healthy associations.”
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Peace would offer hope for the return of loved ones, and also allow some shedding of wartime constraints.
On the other hand few Japanese had any idea of what occupation would bring. Some, living in the vicinity of military bases, worried whether Allied troops would behave as their own soldiers had in China: pillaging, plundering, and raping, and voiced fear of a
weakening of the race through miscegenation. The issue of rape and the fear of violence once the occupation troops landed was dealt with promptly. Konoe suggested, and Higashikuni approved, mobilizing prostitutes to deal with the sex-starved Allied troops who would, in only a few weeks, be descending upon the land.