Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (49 page)

This compromise was brokered by the leaders of the main faction in the House of Peers. Behind it stood Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino and Imperial Household Minister Ichiki Kitokur
, who deplored the possible dissolution of the Diet and the holding of elections right at the start of a new imperial reign. They wanted the parties to show restraint out of consideration for the new emperor. Makino and Ichiki had been instructing Wakatsuki on political matters ever since he became prime minister. They now told him to meet with the leaders of the opposition and resolve any further political strife in the Diet. The no-confidence motion should be withdrawn and the budget passed.
²³
In this way they could
postpone the first democratic election to be held under the recently enacted universal manhood suffrage law—an election that the parties expected to be very costly.

When the lower house reconvened after Wakatsuki's sudden adjournment, the court group prevailed. The main opposition parties withdrew their no-confidence bill, prompting a nonaffiliated member of the Diet to charge that the conference of the three party leaders had been an attempt to stifle free debate. Although political fighting in the Diet based on problems of the
kokutai
abated temporarily, the parties now understood that they could make more political capital at the expense of their opponents by “protecting the
kokutai
” than by “protecting the Meiji constitution.”

Three months later, on April 17, 1927, the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsed: overthrown by its opponents in the privy council rather than in the Diet. Wakatsuki's fall was brought about by the opposition of Privy Councillors It
Miyoji and Hiranuma Kiichir
to the moderate China policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara, who had refused to send Japanese troops to China after earlier Chinese provocations against Japanese living in the treaty port settlements. For Emperor Hirohito and the court group, Wakatsuki's resignation furnished another opportunity to play a determining role. Kawai, Chinda, Ichiki, and Makino conferred among themselves and then with Hirohito, and decided that Gen. Tanaka Giichi, president of the largest party in the Diet, should form the next cabinet. Having established a consensus among themselves, they notified
genr
Saionji, who immediately agreed to their choice. Thereafter, until the assassination of Inukai Tsuyoshi, five years later, Japanese prime ministers were chosen not by the last
genr
but by a system of consultations centering on the lord keeper of the privy seal, with Saionji ratifying the choice of Hirohito and the court group after the fact.

Tanaka formed his cabinet on April 20, 1927—the same day that Gen. Chiang Kai-shek established his Nationalist (Kuomintang)
government in Nanking (now Nanjing) and renewed his Northern Expedition to unify China. Japanese foreign policy thenceforth took a decidedly more interventionist turn, as the intensification of the Chinese civil war increased the possibilities for dispatching troops to protect Japanese lives and property in China. The court group, having played the major role in the selection of General Tanaka as prime minister, now tried to impose its own political agenda and goals onto those of the new constitutional government.

Tanaka was the first prime minister to discover that a strong-willed emperor capable of playing a determining role in politics could make life absolutely miserable for the leader of a political party. Almost from the moment Tanaka became prime minister, Hirohito and the court group took a keen interest in his performance and soon found themselves at odds with most of his policies. They disapproved of the way the Seiy
kai Party had expanded its power through an aggressive policy of personnel appointments. With his Confucian and
bushid
education, Hirohito wanted officials appointed solely on the basis of ability, not political criteria or affiliation.

On June 15, 1927, Hirohito summoned Makino to complain about Tanaka's personnel policies. Makino also felt that the political parties—the Seiy
kai in particular—were slighting the young emperor. He promised to speak to Tanaka about it. Disturbed that the parties were using the
kokutai
as a political tool, and ashamed of their behavior on the floor of the Diet, Makino believed that the emperor's interest in politics was “the greatest blessing for the state and the imperial house at a time of difficulty in national affairs.” He saw nothing wrong in a politically active emperor, and credited that “achievement” to “our imperial entourage, which has contributed to cultivating his imperial virtues.”
²⁴

Tanaka had difficulty understanding why Hirohito was displeased with his handling of personnel appointments. After all, by placing as many Seiy
kai Party members as possible in bureaucratic
posts, he was merely following a traditional practice in “normal constitutional government,” one that went back to Hara Kei. “We did not increase the number of officials we replaced in a short period of time as compared with what the practice was before,” he reportedly told Hirohito in audience in the summer of 1927.
²⁵
But Tanaka's remark merely irritated Hirohito, who again ordered that the prime minister be set straight.

III

Meanwhile the attention of Hirohito and the court group was focusing increasingly on his forthcoming enthronement. The declaration of national mourning for Taish
and the staging of the enthronement rituals for Hirohito were conducted in accordance with the Shinto principle of the unity of politics and religion, and a separate tradition of court law, which had priority over the constitution. The rites and rituals of this key moment did not derive from the constitution or from legislation by parliament. The role of the Imperial Diet in these activities was only to vote the funds needed.