Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (26 page)

The trouble was, such a “decisive” act was likely to run counter to the recently adopted German foreign policy of Gleichschaltung and peaceful penetration. It would represent the very kind of unwarranted German interference in domestic Austrian affairs that the German Foreign Office had repeatedly warned might provoke an international anti-German reaction. And it would come at a time when Germany was still militarily weak.

The only apparent way for Habicht to escape this dilemma was to make a Putsch appear to be a purely domestic revolt provoked by the repressive Dollfuss regime. Even so, Habicht hesitated to act until after the Venice meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in mid-June failed to have any effect on the Austrian chancellor.

The pretext Habicht was looking for came on 18 June 1934, when the Dollfuss government announced that the death penalty would no longer be restricted to cases involving martial law. This decree seemed to confirm Wachter’s earlier argument that Dollfuss was hoping the execution of a Nazi would lead to a spontaneous uprising which the government could easily smash
.*
⁸

Apparently sometime during the spring of 1934 Habicht put Baron von Wachter in charge of the political aspects of a prospective Putsch. The baron later claimed he had accepted the appointment only on the assumption that the action had been approved by Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess
.
²⁷
However, this contention seems more than dubious in view of Wachter’s obvious effort to establish an alibi for the action when he spoke with two officials of the German Foreign Office in late May.

Wachter and Habicht had two precedents—one positive, the other negative —to use as lessons when planning the Putsch. In the summer of 1933 the Nazis had learned that force could be successfully used against the government when they freed the imprisoned Gauleiter of Tyrol-Vorarlberg, Franz Hofer
.
²⁸
But they had later learned from the Socialist uprising in February that Vienna and the government could not be seized from the outside. Only the capture of the government in its entirety seemed to hold the prospect of success
.
²⁹

Nevertheless, the SA of Vienna and Lower Austria were completely excluded from the planning of the Putsch even though Vienna was destined to be the heart of the rebellion. Fridolin Glass, the leader of the SS Standarte Eighty-nine, which was supposed to capture the Dollfuss cabinet, saw the Putsch as an opportunity to weaken the Austrian SA decisively. Habicht’s only connection with the SA was through Hermann Reschny, who, it was hoped, would lead an SA uprising in the federal provinces. But not surprisingly, Reschny refused to accept any second-class status in the Putsch. A successful Putsch, he feared, could only benefit his bitter rival, Habicht, as well as the SS. Once he received definite word of the final plans on 16 July he secretly relayed the information to the Austrian security forces. Reschny had been preparing his own plans for many months; however, his SA men would not be properly armed with smuggled-in weapons until September. Consequently, when the Putsch came many SA leaders were taken utterly by surprise
.
³⁰

Habicht’s hopes for success, like Hitler’s in 1923, rested on the expecta-

tion, or at least the wish, that the army would join an armed uprising. Contacts with various high-ranking officers in the Austrian army were made before the Putsch. And certainly many Nazi sympathizers could be'found in military ranks. Pro-Nazi soldiers had joined a Deutsche Soldatdigewerkschaft (later called a Soldatenbund or German Soldiers’ League). Some of these men were expelled from the army and proceeded to form the same SS Standarte Eighty, nine, which invaded the Ballhausplatz on 25 July
.
³¹
Moreover, some Nazis believed (quite erroneously, as it turned out) that the reserve and retired officers of the Imperial and Royal Army were secretly pro-Nazi. In reality the Nazis were relatively successful only in recruiting that generation which had fought in the World War as young men
.
³²
But in any event Dollfuss had Been careful to dismiss pro-Nazi officers from the army. As late as 5 June 1934 General Muff had warned the German Foreign Office that “today, and probably for a considerable time yet, the armed forces are still firmly in the hands of the government
.”
³³

Habicht also grossly underestimated the size of the Austrian army and the paramilitary formations that supported the government. According to his calculations the army had only 15,000 men; even adding the gendarmerie and paramilitary formations the regime, he believed, could count on only 44,000 troops. The German Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, estimated with far more accuracy that the Austrian government could rely on 22,000 men in the army and 74,000 armed supporters altogether
.
³⁴

Somewhat more realistic and encouraging was Habicht’s appraisal of the internal weaknesses of the Dollfuss government. He was correct in telling an officer of the German Legation in Vienna that sharp differences existed between Starhemberg and Fey, and between Starhemberg and Dollfuss. Habicht also pointed out that factionalism was rife within the Heimwehr as a whole. And, of course, Habicht knew he could count on the active support of the Nazis’ armed ally, the Styrian Heimatschutz (now part of the SA), as well as the former governor of Styria and current ambassador to Italy, Anton Rintelen
.
³⁵
The latter was to be the new chancellor in a Nazi-dominated government which would hold new elections and later a plebiscite on the Anschluss question.

Habicht put the finishing touches on the Putsch plans in a meeting in Zurich with Fridolin Glass. The Austrian chancellor and his cabinet would be captured before Dollfuss had the opportunity to visit Mussolini in Italy, a visit that was expected to consolidate the chancellor’s position. Habicht appears to have left other details to the illegal Nazi leaders inside Austria, above all to those in the Vienna SS
.
³⁶

The Premature Putsch • 131

Course and Failure of the Putsch

The Putschists had three targets, which they hoped to capture
simultaneously:
the entire cabinet meeting at the Ballhausplatz in Vienna, the
national
radio station or “Ravag” (also
in
the capital), from which the revolution would be announced, and President Miklas, who was vacationing in
Carinthia.
In none of these aims were the rebels completely successful.

Although the Ravag was captured briefly by the Putschists, the Nazis
broadcast
only one quick message announcing the “resignation” of Dollfuss
and
his replacement by Anton Rintelen. This announcement was to be the : signal for a mass uprising throughout the country. But the proclamation was too short and general to be fully effective
.
³⁷
Incredibly, the Nazis played records after their announcement. Nor were any helpful announcements made by German stations, much to the bitter disappointment of the Putschists in the provinces
.
³⁸

At the Chancellery, the disguised rebels had little difficulty in overpowering the few (unarmed) guards, who mistook them for soldiers and policemen. After entering the building, they captured its 150 inhabitants, including part (but only part) of the cabinet. The chancellor was mortally wounded (under still mysterious circumstances, but possibly as he was trying to escape). But within a short time the Ballhausplatz was surrounded by members of the police and Heimwehr. The Putschists were forced to surrender after negotiating at length over a guaranteed free passage to the German frontier. The government withdrew the guarantee, however, after learning of the chancellor’s death
.
³⁹

Heavy fighting also took place in the Austrian provinces, especially in Styria and Carinthia. However, with the Putsch in Vienna already squelched, and with Hitler denouncing the revolt, the cause was lost. For a short time the Nazis (or to be more exact, 2,800 members of the former Styrian Heimat-schutz) may have controlled as much as two-thirds of Styria outside the capital of Graz. In fact, the role played by the old Heimatschutz was so great that after the rebellion the
Volkischer Beobachter
and several other German newspapers claimed that the revolt had been nothing more than a clash between the Heimatschutz and the progovemment Austrian Heimwehr, into which a few Nazis had been inadvertently drawn
.
⁴⁰

Still heavier fighting occurred in neighboring Carinthia, which, according to SA plans, was supposed to be the center of its separately coordinated rebellion. The SA in Carinthia suffered less from a lack of arms and training

than the SA in any other province and was unique in enjoying considerable popular support. Nevertheless, because earlier plans had not called for an uprising until September, and a general alert for a Putsch was not issued until 23 July, the Putschists were caught unprepared. The fighting did not begin until 27 July, when it had already ended in Vienna and Styria. Elsewhere there was only light fighting in Salzburg and Upper Austria. In those two states, as in Styria and Carinthia, the Putschists were inadequately trained and poorly armed
.
⁴¹

The
Austrian
Legion, now located in southern Bavaria, was somewhat better prepared in these respects and was alerted for action on the twenty-fifth. However, its training was still insufficient, and it had lost many men‘In previous terror raids into Austria or through flight. Austrian Nazi leaders were therefore opposed to an invasion by the Legion and doubted whether the general population would respond favorably to such an action. Consequently, the Legion made only minor border raids into Austria before Hitler, fearing an armed intervention by Italy, Yugoslavia, and possibly Czechoslovakia, ordered the Legion to cease further activity
.
⁴²

The poorly planned attempt to kidnap President Miklas, who was vacationing at the Worthersee in Carinthia, was also foiled. The police, who were informed about the plot, arrested the three conspirators before they could even approach the president
.
⁴³

The Putsch as a whole collapsed for a variety of reasons: poor strategy, decentralization of authority, insufficient preparations, and many others. But two general causes stand out: overconfidence and internal rivalries. Despite their pre-Putsch frustrations and their awareness that Dollfuss was growing stronger, not weaker, the Austrian Nazis, like the Fuhrer in the middle of the Second World War, had fallen victim to their own propaganda. “Eighty percent” of the general population, they imagined, would support a revolution
.
⁴⁴
In reality, the Austrians remained largely passive during the uprising, and the Austrian army, far from joining it as Habicht had hoped, played an active role in its suppression
.
⁴⁵
The same was true of 52,820 well-armed and well-trained members of the Heimwehr and other paramilitary formations who took the lead in crushing the revolt. Nowhere, in fact, did any members of the executive or the Heimwehr refuse to obey orders
.
⁴⁶
It is little wonder, then, that the Nazi rebels felt betrayed by Habicht’s promises of support from the Austrian executive.

Actually, the Putsch was doomed before it even began. The state police had learned of the plot from a Nazi informant, Johann Dobler, twenty-four hours before its scheduled implementation. Police incompetence prevented Dollfuss from hearing the news until a scant forty-five minutes before the rebels burst into the Ballhausplatz. But the chancellor still had enough time and good sense to order some of his cabinet members to return to their respective ministries. Much more inexplicable, from the Nazi point of view, was their ignoring the fact that Starhemberg (recently appointed vice-chancellor) was safely beyond their reach in Italy
.
⁴⁷

The other overarching cause for the Putsch failure was the rivalries within the Nazi party, especially those between the SA and the SS. Bitterness between the two militant organizations had been greatly intensified by the Rohm Purge of 30 June, when SA leaders in Germany were summarily dragged from their beds in the middle of the night and shot. So embittered was the SA over these events that the leadership of the Austrian SA in Munich, as we have seen, tried to warn the government in Vienna about the Putsch plans of the SS; unfortunately these warnings were not taken seriously
.
⁴⁸

We have already noted how the Austrian SA had Putsch plans of its own that it sought to keep secret from Habicht. As a consequence, when in the middle of the Putsch itself the SS tried to get the SA in Vienna and Lower Austria to march to the Ballhausplatz and relieve the besieged SS Standarte Eighty-nine occupying the Chancellery, the SA units refused to move. They may never have received the order or they may have simply refused to obey it
.
⁴⁹
In the provinces the situation was reversed with the SS refusing to assist the beleagered SA.

Although the Nazis
¹
own internal problems were quite sufficient to ruin their hopes for success, the Putsch would likely have failed in any case. Mussolini, who was awaiting the arrival of his personal friend and protege, Dollfuss, was infuriated by the news of the assassination. He immediately ordered four Italian divisions (approximately 48,000 men) to join the more than 50,000 soldiers already stationed near the Brenner Pass to guard against a possible invasion of Austria by either the Austrian Legion or the German army.