Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (11 page)

By the second week of February, First Panzer was back on the middle Donets near Slavyansk. With 100,000 men and 40 serviceable panzers, it took control of the front to the left of Armeeabteilung Fretter-Pico, and absorbed this corps-sized collection of mostly broken units trying to avoid being ridden down by Operation Gallup, the Soviets’ post-Stalingrad offensive. Von Mackensen’s main panzer striking force, 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, remained stuck in the deep snow around Rostov so were of no help at that time. On 12 February, Hitler ordered First Panzer to firm up the Donets River Line and regain contact with Armeeabteilung Lanz in order to protect the approaches to Zaporozhe. Von Richthofen’s Luftflotte Four maintained a large airbase at Stalino from which to provide CAS. However, Mobile Group Popov and significant Red Army forces had already broken through the German lines and were making for the Dnepr. A gap of nearly 200km already existed between First Panzer and Lanz (on the 20th renamed ‘Kempf’), so von Mackensen attempted to stretch northward a bit to narrow the distance. At the time, the following units made up First Panzer: III Panzer Corps, (3rd and 17th Panzer Divisions), Group Schmidt (19th Panzer plus one regiment from 7th Panzer) and XL Panzer (7th (-) and 11th Panzer, 333rd Infantry). Given its small size this proved impractical, and besides, von Manstein had conceived,
and equally important, had sold Hitler on the idea of an operational counter-stroke using the rapidly growing Fourth Panzer Army. Hoth would cover the northern edge of the penetration, while von Mackensen would deal with Popov on the southern edge.
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Popov’s three tank corps counted only twenty-five operational tanks between them on 22 February, and when First Panzer struck it achieved complete surprise. Von Mackensen had freed up 7th Panzer from Slavyansk, and with the return of SS Viking to his command, XL Panzer Corps packed a powerful punch. By the second day of the counterattack, Popov requested permission to abandon his salient only to have front commander Vatutin tell him such a move was ‘counter to the assignments given the mobile group’. Von Mackensen dispatched Viking (five panzers in running order) directly west with 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions (Group Balck, thirty-five and sixteen panzers, respectively) on a sweeping maneuver initially southwest toward the railway station at Krasnoarmeyskoye. After reaching that point, they would head back northeast, link up with Viking and encircle Popov. With Soviet forces over extended, isolated and out of supply, plus with the ground frozen solid, First Panzer enjoyed weeks of good fortune. On 18-19 February, heavy fighting took place between the panzers (with 333rd Infantry) against the 4th Guards Tank Corps at Krasnoarmeyskoye. The Soviets mistook this generally westward movement for a retreat. Popov knew better, realized by the 23rd that he was in real danger and began to maneuver northward toward Barvenko. By 24 February, Popov’s command was hardly mobile – its tanks could not move due to lack of fuel and maintenance, and it was hardly a group – it had broken into many small pockets. The XL Panzer pinched off the small Kessels, but the cordons were fairly porous and many Soviets escaped to fight another day.
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First Panzer’s contributions to von Manstein’s gutsy Backhand Blow maneuver are less well known that those of Fourth Panzer, but following the twin debacles of Stalingrad and flight from the Caucasus, the Ostheer welcomed any good news.

Panzerwaffe Selection, Training and Organization

It is well known that older, traditional leaders of the German Army initially opposed mechanization and the Panzerwaffe. By the late 1930s, this resistance collapsed in the face of Hitler’s support and the tremendous expansion of the Third Reich which brought in masses of middle-class officers in place of the ‘aristocrats’. In his classic
Misbrauchete Infantrie
, General of Infantry Maximillian von Fretter-Pico may have lamented that the panzer troops got the best men, best equipment, high-calorie food and countless other benefits over his long-suffering infantry, fighting and dying for the Fatherland. However, from the start, with their black uniforms and Death’s Head emblems for example, the Panzerwaffe was made to feel special. The rebellious ‘us versus them’ attitude of early panzer leaders like Guderian seeped ‘into the souls of the first panzer soldiers’ and later into the entire armor branch.

Training resources were lavished on the panzers. The army created new and expanded panzer schools at Wunsdorf, Bergen, Potsdam, Erlangen and Paderborn and elsewhere, teaching new mechanics, tactics and command and control techniques. With his professional background in training, Guderian took an intense interest in this area. Therefore a highly trained and experienced cadre of panzer leaders carried the Wehrmacht through spectacular early victories, especially in the West and during Barbarossa. Unfortunately for Germany, as happened elsewhere (e.g., Japanese naval aviators in the Pacific), once this core of experts had been attrited and once the enemy recovered from its initial shock and losses, the odds first evened, then turned against it. As history and this book show, by 1943 the Soviets caught up with the invader. A year later we can see that the tide had turned against Germany. Its shrinking manpower pool, now ever more diluted with foreign soldiers less enamored with Nazism, training time in increasing short supply, panzers desperately needed at the front plus fuel and ammunition for training considered a luxury, the relative advantage disappeared.

Operation Barbarossa almost de-mechanized the Wehrmacht, its losses in that campaign were so great. After 1941, the Panzerwaffe lurched from campaign to campaign, rebuilding its strength then losing disastrously, only to repeat the cycle. Tactically, by the middle of the struggle, German and Soviet used many of the same tactics. Here, Red Army numerical superiority and approaching equity in training and quality made themselves felt. During 1943–44, a formulaic dance of action, reaction and counteraction developed, with the usual result being the Germans were pushed back. By 1945, there was no semblance of evenness.

From the very beginnings of Panzerwaffe, divisions were organized as combined arms teams. With the general de-mechanization and dilution of the panzer branch over its ten-year existence, the proportion of actual panzers declined relative to other arms. By the time of Barbarossa, a panzer division had a headquarters, one panzer regiment of two battalions, two motorized infantry/ panzergrenadier regiments (sometimes organized into a brigade) each of two battalions, an artillery regiment plus one battalion each of engineers, reconnaissance, anti-tank, Flak, signal and support troops. Ad hoc Kampfgruppen (battle groups) were common throughout the war, and came in two principal varieties: a combined arms task force created for a particular mission, and as a way to describe a division so reduced that it could not be legitimately counted as a division any longer. In the first case, it was probably named after the senior commander or the commander of the largest sub-unit, e.g., KG Rothenberg, and in the second case it took the name of its former division, e.g., KG 297.

As is the case with most of the world’s armies, formations above division did not have a permanent establishment. Most panzer corps had a headquarters, an artillery command (Arko) to coordinate attached artillery units, signal and support troops. In addition, it might have any combination of anti-tank, engineer, Flak, machine-gun and replacement detachments. Panzer army orders of battle also changed with mission or situation on the ground. The only constant units would be the headquarters, a higher artillery command (Harko - again only to coordinate, with no units of its own) and a signal regiment. Temporary attachments would be artillery, construction, support and training assets.

No sooner had Popov’s threat to Zaporozhe been neutralized and Kharkov recaptured, than the spring rasputitsa brought operations to a halt. The front lines stood where attack and counterattack during the winter left them, and included many salients and jagged edges. The high commands of both sides cast about for plans for the upcoming summer. Hitler had grown accustomed to taking the initiative during good campaigning weather and had no reason not to do the same in 1943. Stalin, on the other hand, was beginning to feel strong enough to not simply take a passive wait-and-see attitude. Both had big plans for the summer of 1943. In First Panzer’s sector, the Soviets still occupied a dangerous bulge near Izyum on the Donets. On 22 March, the Fuhrer issued orders for Operation Hawk (Habicht) only to supersede it two days later with a larger scaled assault, Operation Panther. Both would be joint endeavors of First Panzer and Armeeabteilung Kempf and in the case of Panther, include Hoth’s panzer army as well. In both cases, von Mackensen’s objective was the area around Kupyansk. Hitler tied Panther to the summer’s major offensive, Operation Citadel (Zitadelle) against the Kursk bulge. Therefore, all the formations intended for Hawk and the other operations stood at the ready for days and weeks (and in the case of Kursk, eventually months), waiting for Hitler to give the green light. Bearing in mind all the intangible factors involved with large military undertakings, plus Germany’s numerous weaknesses, the Fuhrer cancelled both Hawk and Panther in favor of Citadel.
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As can be said about Blau the year before, and many other German operations, Hitler figuratively waited for the planets to align with the perfect combination of weather, developments on either side, the correlation of forces, new weapons systems and numerous other variables. Of course this alignment never occurred, while Stalin went ahead with his own counter moves that inevitably complicated Hitler’s calculations.

Except for a small attack launched by III Panzer toward the Izyum bend in early April, the spring was quiet in expectation of the anticipated showdown at
Kursk. Stavka had come to the conclusion that the Red Army could deflect whatever Hitler threw at it that summer, then promptly take the initiative from him. Accordingly, German intelligence noticed that the Soviets began to build up forces across the Donets from First Panzer Army. Von Mackensen’s men did not have a role to play in Citadel, but from a safe distance watched the entire operation unravel from the beginning. After barely a dozen days, the offensive was over. Two days after Hitler pulled II SS Panzer Corps out of the line, on 17 July, the Southwest and South Fronts counterattacked. The First Panzer’s exposed positions near Izyum were obvious targets of opportunity. As a precaution, three days earlier, Hitler ordered XXIV Panzer Corps (23rd Panzer and SS Viking) behind von Mackensen’s front as a reserve. The Red Army’s main blows hit Fourth Panzer and Eighth Armies, but First Panzer fought a vicious 10-day defensive battle that cost the attackers over 500 combat vehicles lost. The main danger to von Mackensen came from the southern flank, however. The Soviets attacked across the Mius against the (resurrected) Sixth Army. Contrary to their earlier fears, von Manstein did not withdraw, he instead sent in III Panzer and II SS Panzer Corps. Of course a force this massive stabilized the situation, but only temporarily. Elsewhere along the eastern front, and indeed in the entire European theater, conditions rapidly deteriorated so these assets had to be transferred away.
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During the various Stalingrad battles the Soviets outperformed the Germans both in terms of operational skill and functioning within a faster decision cycle. Except for a skillful retreat, First Panzer Army cannot be said to have performed in an operational manner. Its participation in the Backhand Blow maneuver was significant but tactical and its role during Citadel, even more limited. The First Panzer’s days as an operational actor were over, and it would spend the remainder of the war largely reacting to Red Army initiatives.

To defend its 155km front, First Panzer Army had 8 infantry and 3 mechanized divisions with a total of 220 AFVs. Von Manstein estimated that his real combat value in divisions stood at five–and–a–half infantry and one–and–a–half panzer and panzergrenadier. Between 13 and 18 August, the South Front renewed its attacks around Izyum and against Sixth Army. As in July, First Panzer held on despite receiving tremendous artillery fire. Unfortunately the Sixth Army, as in July, allowed penetrations, but in this case, von Manstein no longer had two panzer corps to send to the breach. Within a week, von Mackensen’s exposed Izyum positions were becoming untenable. On the last day of August, the field marshal allowed his two southern armies to withdraw to the Kalmius River, a decision seconded ‘in principle’ by Hitler that night. First Panzer occupied that new river line on 4 September, only to have Southwest Front
attack and overwhelm these defenses two days later. On 6 September, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps split the junction with Sixth Army and on the following day, without looking back, 23rd Tank Corps joined them. With two mobile formations rampaging in his rear areas, von Mackensen had no option but to pull back himself. A major problem was that the enemy was much closer to the Dnepr and the critical Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe crossings than the Germans. On 8 September, Hitler again flew to von Manstein’s command post at Zaporozhe, scene of their famous meeting six months earlier; Soviet spearheads were again just as close. This time the field marshal had no Backhand Blow trick up his sleeve. The Ostheer had squandered its last mobile reserves at the poorly conceived and executed disaster at Kursk, it had been losing a battle of attrition during the ensuing two months and a confident Red Army was bearing down, fast. First Panzer would be allowed to retreat to the Dnepr - if it could get there before the enemy.
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The panzer army had already begun to withdraw before Hitler gave
de jure
approval. On 12 September, it made contact with the Sixth Army for the first time in over two weeks and by the 16th it began to close on the Dnepr bridgeheads. Meanwhile, the damage done, Southwest Front ordered its two mobile corps to turn around and seek safety with their own kind. Von Mackensen tried for two days to hunt them down, only to have them escape, battered but unbowed, through loopholes in the Sixth Army Front which had no panzers or anti-tank guns. First Panzer generally fell behind the Dnepr, believing in the illusory safety of the great river. Hitler stressed the importance of Zaporozhe and the manganese mines at Nikopol. Von Mackensen maintained a bridgehead on the east bank at Zaporozhe, which the Southwest Front attacked but failed to capture on 1 October. On 10 October, two Guards Armies, 3rd and 8th, attacked again. The XL Panzer Corps had improved its positions in the interim, including a half–dozen Ferdinand self–propelled 88mm gun platforms, but the Soviets had brought forward their new artillery divisions and prodigious amounts of ammunition. First Panzer units faltered but held on the second day. By the third day they reported massive losses and numerous breakthroughs in their lines. Hitler, von Manstein and von Kleist debated the wisdom and practicality of holding the bridgehead. On the night of 13 October, 1st Guards Mechanized and 23rd Tank Corps surprised von Mackensen’s defenders and drove them back to the city, first to the Heinrich positions and then to the Friedrich. The Germans gave up the city on the 14th, but not before demolishing the bridges and dam consistent with Hitler’s scorched earth policies.
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