Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (27 page)

Although the Germans had long since given up that river, Third Panzer and Ninth Armies’ higher headquarters was still named Army Group Vistula, now commanded by defensive specialist Heinrici. He and his men would have to hold the direct route to Berlin. The heaviest load fell on the Ninth Army, while the Third Panzer’s eleven weak divisions fought on Berlin’s far northern margin. Von Manteuffel’s command also included Volkssturm men from Stettin and Potsdam, foreign volunteers, Hungarians, Soviet ex-POWs under Vlassov, Hitler Youth and other para-militaries for a total of about 105,000 men. The panzer army had no artillery and 242 AFVs. Facing them was the 2nd Belorussian Front with 33 rifle divisions, 4 tank and mechanized corps that included 6,642 tubes of indirect fire weapons and 951 tanks and assault guns. Stavka made clear one of its main missions: prevent Third Panzer from contributing to the defense during the Battle of Berlin.
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Soviet artillery and CAS preparation of the battlefield began on 19 April. At 0400 hours on the next day, Hitler’s fifty-sixth birthday, Rokossovsky’s 65th and 70th Armies came across the Oder which stood, at that time, approximately 3km wide (including its flooded plains). The 49th Army, scheduled to participate in the assault, inexplicably did not move. Under the cover of smoke, the Soviets claimed numerous small bridgeheads. But the marshy ground reduced their artillery’s effects. The defense held reasonably well under the circumstances. On the 21st, Rokossovsky reinforced the 65th Army’s success, but it would still take another day to fight through the initial defensive lines.
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Still under the delusion that he could somehow hold off the Soviet onslaught, Hitler put great faith in a planned counterattack by Group Steiner, based on the III SS Panzer Corps (SS 27th Langemarck and 28th Wallonie Panzer-grenadier Divisions) plus other units. Felix Steiner had the mission of clearing ‘every last bridgehead on the Oder and get ready to attack south [to rescue Berlin]’.
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After 24 hours and no counterattack (by an SS Obergruppenführer no less), Hitler broke down during the daily conference in his bunker. Heinrici ordered Steiner to attack on the 23rd, ready or not, which the SS general did. However, threatening moves by the 2nd Guards Tank Army caused the attack to be cancelled and Group Steiner redirected toward Oranienburg ‘at once’. The whole affair caused Hitler to lash out again at the 24 April situation conference: ‘The Russian success against the Third Panzer Army can only be attributed to German military incompetence.’
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Somehow von Manteuffel maintained his panzer army’s sketchy defensive line at places along the Oder as late as 25 April, but his defenses were about to cave in. That day, Hitler ordered von Manteuffel to ‘prevent expansion of the Oder bridgehead’, but that afternoon the 2nd Belorussian Front shoved its way past the panzer army’s last reserves and advanced as far as Prenzlau. Rokossovsky had been especially successful in the north, around Stettin, and planned to swing north and separate Third Panzer from Berlin for good. Von Manteuffel pulled in his flanks so he could concentrate on defending his center. Even Group Steiner forsook its mobile mission and manned the defensive line. A day later, after another Soviet push, Jodl commented, ‘The enemy has clearly broken through Third Panzer Army at Prenzlau.’
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That night, von Manteuffel telephoned Heinrici to say his army had quit fighting and 100,000 men were trying to escape west. He had seen nothing like this before, not even in 1918. Just 24 hours later, on the 28th, Keitel tried to relieve Heinrici (and replace him with von Manteuffel!) because commanders would no longer obey the Führer’s orders.
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The German military had begun to implode.

General of Panzer Troops Hasso–Eccard Freiherr von Manteuffel

Born in Potsdam in 1897 to an old Prussian military family, von Manteuffel entered the Kaiser’s army in February 1916 as a lieutenant in Hussar Regiment 3. In the 1930s he was drawn to the new panzer branch, serving as commander of a motorcycle battalion in Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Division and teaching at the Kramnitz Panzer School. He commanded Motorcycle Battalion 3 during the Polish campaign. He began Barbarossa as a lieutenant colonel, commanding a motorized rifle battalion in the 7th Panzer Division. Despite his small stature (he was shorter than even Hoth), he rose throughout the general ranks like few other German officers and served in every major German theater of the Second World War.

During Barbarossa, von Manteuffel led from the front in the central sector, advancing through Lepel and Vitebsk as part of Third Panzer Army. Two months into the campaign he took command of Rifle Regiment 6 (also of 7th Panzer) when the original commander fell in battle. He led his regiment farther east in the northern pincer against Moscow that first winter than any other Army Group Center unit, a maneuver that earned him the Knight’s Cross. Fritz Kurowski wrote that von Manteuffel ‘was first in attack and last to retreat’. He became commander of the 7th Brigade of the 7th Panzer during the division’s refit in France during the summer of 1942. By early 1943, he commanded a Kampfgruppe named ‘Division von Manteuffel’ in combat against the British in Tunisia. In the spring of that year, he collapsed on the battlefield due to illness and exhaustion and evacuated North Africa by hospital ship. After recovery and promotion to major general, he returned to the 7th Panzer Division, again under Hoth’s command, now fighting west of Kiev. His leadership in the battles of Fastov and Zithomir earned him the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross.

In January 1944 von Manteuffel took command of Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland (adding that cuff title to his Afrika Korps version), and was promoted to lieutenant general a month later. For most of that year he commanded the elite formation during defensive battles in the Ukraine, Romania, East Prussia and the Baltic States. On 1 September, he took the helm of the battered Fifth Panzer Army fighting George Patton’s forces near Arracourt. He led that panzer army during the Ardennes Offensive in December. There, von Manteuffel achieved significant gains on the southern flank of the bulge, despite its supporting role, bringing him the Diamonds. In March 1945, von Manteuffel was given command of Third Panzer Army, another battered outfit, which he led for the last two months of the war in hopeless combat north of Berlin. Von Manteuffel survived the fighting and postwar captivity to become a Bundestag deputy from 1953–57, but later served a couple of months in prison for war crimes. Throughout the 1960s, he wrote and lectured about his experiences, and was praised by former colleagues and foes alike. He died in 1978.

Nonetheless, Third Panzer still managed to fight a delaying action among the many canals in northern Germany. The 7th Panzer Division arrived by boat from Danzig and joined the fight. The Germans, Soviets and British all raced for Lübeck. On 28 April, at a famous and apocryphal meeting between three generals at a Neubrandenburg crossroads, it became clear that the end of the ‘Thousand Year Reich’ was near. Keitel ordered Heinrici to halt the headlong retreat of von Manteuffel’s command. At the top of his lungs, Heinrici screamed at Keitel that he would not order Third Panzer to stand fast. The panzer army’s commanding general in turn yelled at Keitel, ‘the Third Panzer Army listens only to General Hasso von Manteuffel!’ When Keitel challenged his subordinate, the panzer general replied, ‘The von Manteuffels have served Prussia for 200 years.’ The shouting match solved nothing. The mass exodus continued for days. By 2 May, the Third Panzer and neighboring Twenty-first Army had been squeezed into a strip of land 25-30km wide. The 2nd Belorussian Front, British 21st Army Group and US Ninth Army surrounded them near Wittenberge and Parchim. That night, von Manteuffel surrendered to the Americans.
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Chapter 5

Fourth Panzer Army

Of all the panzer armies, the story of the Fourth is probably the most interesting. Its combat trail begins with attacks on both Leningrad and Moscow. Through the second half of 1942, it was a major component of Operation Blau against Stalingrad, which it almost conquered, from which it barely escaped and for which it was the main hope for rescue. In 1943, Fourth Panzer parried Soviet drives into the heart of the German line, led the way in Operation Citadel and then avoided destruction once more trying to defend Kiev and the western Ukraine that autumn and winter.

For the last eighteen months of this period, Hermann Hoth commanded the Fourth. After the war’s momentum irreversibly switched to the USSR, the panzer army withdrew through southern Poland. During the second half of 1944, it manned the middle Vistula River. Beginning in January 1945, the Red Army shoved the Fourth west through Lower Silesia. It ended the war in Saxony, squeezed there between Soviet and American forces. The Fourth Panzer Army fought on nearly every sector of the eastern theater at one time or another, providing invaluable service to the Reich.

Unlike Moscow, capturing Leningrad did figure prominently in Barbarossa’s planning. Taking the USSR’s second city would deprive the Soviets of a huge industrial center, a massive naval base and control of the Baltic Sea, while simultaneously giving Hitler a solid connection to Finland and possession of Bolshevism’s birthplace. Unfortunately for Fourth Panzer Army, charged with leading the way, the same sanguine German planning that condemned all of Barbarossa ‘hoped’ that getting close to the great metropolis was as good as its outright capture.

Army Group North published its campaign orders on 29 May. Colonel General Erich Hoepner’s mission was to attack to Dünaburg and Jekabpils to gain crossings over the Dvina River, push on to the Pskov–Opotshka Line and from there toward the southern approaches of Leningrad. Along with the Dnepr to the south, both sides believed that the Dvina held the key to success. Speed, mainly getting to the bridges as quickly as possible, was of the essence. Accordingly, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb did not tie Hoepner to an infantry army as had been the case with the other three panzer armies. As intended, this meant Fourth Panzer would not have to wait for the marching Landsers to catch up. It was difficult to conceal the tremendous build-up of German troops in the congested Memelland, especially Hoepner’s, but his men disguised themselves as Lithuanian farmers and reconnoitered the frontier. The panzer army had other limitations as well. It belonged to the smallest army group, which had the smallest complement of Luftwaffe support. The terrain was an infamous mixture of woods and marshes, once across the Dvina it turned into a ‘thick green jungle’. Many panzer army wheeled vehicles were commercial and French made, and 42 percent of Hoepner’s panzers were of Czech manufacture. For example, the 6th Panzer Division’s 155 PzKw 35(t)s were among the oldest panzers in the Wehrmacht inventory. Their 37mm main gun had been rendered obsolete by newer armor, and along with other problems, its pneumatic steering made the vehicle nearly useless in freezing weather. As soon as Germany captured the Czechoslovak arsenal in 1938–39, they declared the 35(t) ‘no longer suitable for combat.’
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After moving into their attack positions north of the Nieman River during the shortest night of the year, Barbarossa began for the men of Fourth Panzer at 0305 hours with an artillery preparation fire that for some divisions lasted 3 hours. The LVI Panzer fired 550 tubes of artillery, Nebelwerfer and railway guns at the defenders. The Germans attacked through a thick morning fog and immediately hit swampy ground. All the Panzertruppen knew their army commander’s motto: ‘Surprise, then forward, forward, forward!’ The Sixteenth Army on von Leeb’s right reported some resistance, but initially the enemy opposite Hoepner’s men appeared disjointed. The 8th Panzer Division broke free of
the Soviet defenses, covered 80km that day and crossed the Dubyussa River at Ariogala. Von Manstein’s LVI Panzer had avoided all Red Army units sent to intercept him and was in the open country deep in the enemy rear. Unfortunately for Reinhardt, his lead division, the 6th Panzer encountered stiffer defenses. The heavy combat meant logistics support could not safely get forward. On the very first day of what would be nearly a four-year-long war the division ran out of ammunition. It failed to accomplish its daily mission, securing a bridgehead across the steep valley of the Dubyussa. Such are the fortunes of war, however. While von Manstein made spectacular advances thanks to splitting the 8th and 11th Armies, XLI Panzer Corps was stymied despite destroying 186 tanks in the war’s first armored battle.
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