Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (27 page)

was the essential element in the organization of the public that the Nazi

government associated with the third wave of anti-Semitism in 1938. The ‘Jewish

question’ within Germany, raised repeatedly by the Nazi regime since 1933, was

now declared to have been largely ‘solved’; after almost six years of radical anti-

Semitic policies, the Jews living in Germany had essentially played their part as

dangerous aliens to its conclusion. Disregard and contempt for the Jews still

living in Germany, indifference to their further fate was now the attitude that

propaganda prescribed for the population. With the worsening of the inter-

national situation and the approaching war, the ‘Jewish question’ had to be

raised onto the international stage, the Jewish ‘enemy’ had to be presented as the

potential enemy in the capital cities of potential opponents. A Volksgemeinschaft

under National Socialist rule battling against the ‘Jewish global enemy’—that

was how one might describe the new arrangement that the Nazi regime, in the

phase of transition to war, presented as a leitmotif for the treatment of the

‘Jewish question’.

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Racial Persecution, 1933–1939

Judenpolitik between the Pogrom and the Start of the War

Discussions of the Party and State Leaderships Concerning

Further Anti-Jewish Measures

In the weeks that followed the pogrom, a series of major conferences of leading

representatives of the Nazi state were held to discuss further steps in Judenpolitik. So

far researchers have reconstructed the sessions chaired by Goering on 12 November

and 6 December, and the discussion on 16 December, chaired by Frick. At the centre

of these debates was the problem, and the solution of that problem: how the planned

complete exclusion of the Jews from German society could be harmonized with the

goal of forced emigration.

On 12 November, two days after the official announcement of the end of the

pogrom, more than a hundred representatives of a great variety of state and Party

offices met to discuss further developments in Judenpolitik.
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At this meeting leading representatives of the regime made a series of remarkable declarations on

the ‘Jewish question’, which should be quoted here in some detail.

Goering introduced the session by first referring to the ministerial meeting of

28 April at which the ‘Aryanization question’ had been discussed, and finally

considered the June events in Berlin, the ‘dry run’ for Reichskristallnacht: ‘In the

meeting at which we first discussed this question and made the decision to

Aryanize the German economy, take the Jews out of the economy, put them

into the debt register and pension them of, alas we only made very fine plans,

which were then only pursued very slowly. Then we had a demonstration here in

Berlin. Then the people were told: something decisive is going to happen. But

again nothing happened. Now we have had this thing in Paris. After it came more

demonstrations, and now something must happen!’

But, Goering went on, ‘I have had enough of these demonstrations. They

damage not the Jews, but ultimately me, since I am finally responsible for the

economy.’

As for ‘Aryanization’, Goering elaborated, the ‘basic idea’ was this: ‘The Jew is

excluded from the economy and signs over his business to the state. He receives

compensation for it. This compensation is recorded in the debt register and

interest is paid at a particular percentage. That is what he has to live on.’

After Goering had explained further details of the Aryanization process, Heydrich

provided a survey of the destruction caused: 101 synagogues were destroyed by fire,
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76 demolished; 7,500 shops were demolished. Thirty-five deaths, he later added to

the debate, were to be recorded.

In the subsequent discussion, Goebbels made further suggestions: they con-

cerned the prohibition on visiting theatres, cinemas, circuses etc.;
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the Reich Deprivation of Rights and Forced Emigration, late 1937–9

115

railways were to install special compartments for Jews; Jewish pupils were to be

removed from general schools. Goebbels also demanded a decree ‘that Jews should

be forbidden to visit German swimming pools, beach pools, and German sana-

toriums’. They should ‘consider whether it might not be necessary to forbid Jews

entering German forests. Today Jews are running in packs around the Grunewald

[in Berlin]. That’s a constant provocation, there are constant incidents . . . And

then that the Jews can’t sit around in German parks.’

Finally Heydrich brought the discussion back to the ‘basic problem’, the

question of ‘getting the Jews to leave Germany’. Heydrich referred in detail to

the experiences they had had with the ‘Jewish Emigration Centre’ in Vienna, and

suggested the creation of a similar institution for the whole of the Reich. Goering

agreed with this suggestion.

Next Heydrich suggested an ‘Emigration operation for the Jews in the rest of

the Reich’, which should stretch over ‘at least 8–10 years’. In this period one of the

chief problems was the ‘proletarianization of the remaining Jews’, which was

already under way; the Jews should be allowed to practise certain occupations.

To be able to keep an eye on the Jews still remaining in Germany, according to

Heydrich, they should be identified by a badge. (‘A uniform’, Goering added.) On

the other hand, Heydrich considered unrealistic Goering’s suggestion of ghetto-

izing the Jews: the ‘control of the Jews by the watchful eye of the population as a

whole’ was the better way.

The fact that the suggestion of large-scale emigration of the German Jews was

generally positively received at the meeting was the crucial step for Heydrich and

the SD to assume the leading role in future Judenpolitik. The development by the

‘Jewish department’ of a comprehensive plan of expulsion secured in terms of

both domestic and foreign policy now had the chance of being declared the

official policy of the ‘Third Reich’. In contrast it became apparent that Goebbels

still clung to the concept of total segregation for the Jewish minority, without his

being able to integrate this within an overall plan for a ‘solution’ of the ‘Jewish

question’.

Finally Goering made the following fundamental statement about the future of

Judenpolitik: ‘If, in the near future, the German Reich should come into conflict with

foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it

come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Führer will now take the

initiative with those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in

order to deal with the Madagascar project. He explained it all to me on 9 November.

There is no other way. He will say to the other countries, “Why are you always talking

about the Jews?—Take them!” ’

Just four weeks after this remarkable meeting, on 6 December Goering held a

further major discussion with the Gauleiters, Reich Governors, and Oberpräsi-

denten, in which he set out the latest guidelines on Judenpolitik that ‘the Führer’

had explained to him in a conversation a few days before.
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Racial Persecution, 1933–1939

At the meeting Goering particularly stressed Hitler’s decision ‘that all decrees to

be passed on the “Jewish question” are to be examined by me’. However, Hitler did

not want Goering’s new role to be publicly revealed, since ‘in my present position I

would be too compromised both at home and abroad’. Elsewhere he stressed that

he actually wanted ‘nothing to do with the whole Jewish question. But then of

course I don’t know how I am to keep my Four-Year Plan, the German economy,

in order.’

The most important aspect of the further development of Judenpolitik lay in

‘vigorously forcing emigration’. Goering discussed the plans pursued by Austrian

Economics Minister Fischböck and Schacht to make emigration possible through

international loans and a large-scale basic agreement, and analysed individual

aspects of the plan, which had already been authorized by Hitler.

The ‘Aryanization’ of Jewish property was to take place gradually and in a

controlled form. Goering expressly warned against a complete expropriation of

German Jews, since, in the event of renewed reprisals, the regime would then be

forced to go beyond economic measures: ‘If—God forbid—any of you or another

prominent man were got at by the Jew, the Jew knows that things would come

thundering down on him in quite a different way. Then if he has no more goods to

lose, he knows how he can be got at.’

Goering went on to reveal a series of concrete decisions made by Hitler with

regard to Judenpolitik. According to these, Jews were not to be labelled;
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no prohibitions were to be introduced for selling to Jews; a Judenbann (ban on entry

by Jews) could be introduced in particular localities. On the ghetto question

Goering commented in general terms that ‘the Jews would somehow finally be

brought together in certain residential districts’.

Goering then revealed his intention of continuing to treat at least some of the

German Jews as hostages: ‘Of course we will retain a certain category of Jews.

Certain Jews, whom I could very easily allow to emigrate, I will not allow to do so

because I need them as guarantees that the other tribe outside will also contribute

for Jews without means.’

Finally Goering discussed the question of the employment of Jews; it could

occur in closed ‘worker formations’ or, within production facilities, in closed-off

areas.

Ten days after this conference, on 16 December 1938, another major discus-

sion of the ‘Jewish question’ took place, in which several Reich Ministers

participated, among them Heydrich and a large number of Gauleiters and

heads of the Prussian provincial administration.
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On this occasion Wilhelm Frick, the Minister of the Interior, clearly distanced himself from the events of

9/10 November, which he described as ‘nonsense’, ‘indeed madness’. The

whole action had ‘only one positive consequence’, namely that the impetus

of the Jews to leave Germany had now become so great that ‘it is to be hoped

that in a few years we will be freed from them’.

Deprivation of Rights and Forced Emigration, late 1937–9

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Frick went on to discuss Schacht’s emigration project, already mentioned by

Goering, and made a series of statements concerning the next imminent steps in

Judenpolitik. In the foreground were the problems that had, at the two Goering

conferences, emerged as the chief problems of future Judenpolitik: comprehensive

emigration, the conclusion of ‘Aryanization’, the questions of employment, and

accommodation.
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Legislation after the Pogrom

As early as 12 November 1938, the day when Goering held his first conference on

the future of Judenpolitik, the first concrete legal and administrative measures had

been set in motion. These measures primarily concerned ‘Aryanization’. Jews were

prohibited from working in retail or business enterprises, and forbidden to offer

goods or services at fairs and so on. A Jew could no longer run a business; where

Jews occupied posts as managerial employees, they could be summarily dis-

missed.
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The Decree to Restore the Appearance of the Streets as affecting Jewish Businesses decreed that Jewish shop- and home-owners were obliged immediately

to remove all damage caused in connection with the pogrom. All insurance claims

by Jews of German nationality were to be confiscated for the benefit of the Reich.
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A further act of 12 November imposed an ‘atonement payment’ of one billion

Reichmarks upon Jews with German citizenship.
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The businesses of domestic and stateless Jews had to be closed immediately, while foreign Jews were granted a

deadline of the end of the year.
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A decree of 3 December 1938 ordered the compulsory ‘Aryanization’ of still

existing Jewish businesses by officially appointed trustees. Cash, securities, and

jewellery could no longer be freely sold, but had to be offered to public purchasing

offices; securities were to be put in depositories in foreign exchange licensed

banks.
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In addition, during the weeks after the pogrom, a whole series of further

discriminatory anti-Jewish regulations was introduced:
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on 15 November 1938

the Reich Education Minister ruled that ‘all remaining Jewish pupils in German

schools be dismissed immediately’;
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with the law of 8 December Jewish academics were forbidden to do private work in libraries and universities;
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Jews were prohibited from owning any weapons;
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they were excluded from any kind of cultural events;
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they were no longer permitted to drive motor vehicles.
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A police ordinance of 28 November empowered the authorities to impose spatial and

temporal residential restrictions upon the Jews.
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This provided a major precondition for the implementation of the ‘ghettoization’ of the German Jews, the details

of which were still unclear. This new instrument was immediately applied: the chief