IBM and the Holocaust (81 page)

RECAPTURING DEHOMAG
was a long, involved process that began within days of Germany's surrender. On May 18, 1945, IBM NY sent three letters to the State Department's War Problems Division. The first explained that IBM owned a company called Dehomag that installed equipment around Germany. Certainly, much of that machinery had been moved in the last days of the Third Reich. IBM wanted State Department help in locating every one of those devices. "From January 1937," IBM's letter claimed, "Dehomag has failed to give us detailed information of installations in Germany. . . . Consequently, we do not know the exact location of the machines. We attach a list of the places in which at one time we knew machines were located." A two-column list itemized eighty-eight German cities and towns where Holleriths had been installed. The statement about not knowing addresses since 1937 was made in spite of IBM's assistance in preparing the
Civil Guide,
which included up-to-date addresses as of 1944 on numerous key Hollerith installations.
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The company's second letter to the War Problems Division included the addresses of two residential properties that had been managed by IBM's tax attorney. IBM wanted the rents. "He has, no doubt, accumulated a substantial amount of money for the rentals of the buildings."
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A third letter just reminded the State Department that by immediately establishing communications with Dehomag, a list of the precise locations of shifted equipment could be obtained.
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Shortly thereafter, the State Department sent instructions to American foreign service officers in Germany and Austria to "extend such protection as may be possible to the property."
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On October 24, 1945, Chauncey returned triumphantly to Germany to reclaim Dehomag. The setting was quite different from his last visit. Then, in 1941, he never knew from moment to moment whether he would run afoul of the Nazi Party. Now he was in the company of victors.
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Chauncey's journey began in liberated France, where the U.S. Army assigned Capt. Philip Kober as his escort. The two men traveled to Frankfurt where another escort, Capt. Philip Hayter, joined them. Their first stop was IBM's Frankfurt office. As he entered the property, Chauncey was abundantly cautious in his demeanor. General Eisenhower had decreed strict "non-fraternization," forbidding such common courtesies as shaking hands with Germans, engaging in friendly conversation, or visiting in German homes. IBM could adapt to any geo-political setting. When the rule was banquets and social graces, the company could summon up corporate celebrations and par-take of festive extravangazas at a moment's notice. Now under strictures of cold communication, IBM could exhibit regulation chilliness. In that vein, Chauncey visibly asked his military escorts' permission before conversing with anyone, spoke only in the presence of officers, and even declined to look at papers unless cleared in advance. After first obtaining permission to speak to IBM's Frankfurt manager, Chauncey, in a dispassionate, formal tone, requested a complete list of financial data on the office. Little more was discussed with the Dehomag manager.
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From Frankfurt, the trio traveled the next day to Stuttgart, hoping to inspect the vital Dehomag factory in nearby Sindelfingen. In Stuttgart, Chauncey first met with Maj. J. M. Teasdale, the U.S. officer in charge of Dehomag and other commercial property in the area. When Chauncey asked if there was any existing procedure for an American company to regain control of its property, Teasdale replied that none yet existed. But if it would help, Teasdale offered to make Chauncey the custodian. He explained that if Chauncey accepted the custodianship, he would be functioning not in IBM's interest as much as in the army's interest. Chauncey was not receptive, feeling, "I think it unwise for any IBM man to be in charge." In any event, Teasdale declared he would not permit any German to continue working for an American firm against the American company's wishes. That included Dehomag.
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What's more, there was business to be done. The U.S. military needed more Hollerith alphabetizers in France and Germany. The army was prepared to sign leases for equipment. Teasdale declared he was more than willing to permit Dehomag to fill those orders. He then assigned a field investigator, Private Schufert, to accompany Chauncey and his escorts to Sindelfingen.
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Dehomag's Sindelfingen plant was undamaged. No bombs had struck. Chauncey and the three military men were met by Oskar Hoermann. Taut and unfriendly, Chauncey informed Hoermann he would not converse with him except with the permission and within earshot of "the Army people . . . ac companying me." Having been authorized to speak, Chauncey stated that the army wished IBM to recover the Holleriths the German Army had removed from France. Hoermann replied, as Chauncey noted in his report, that "Dehomag had little information, since the taking of the machines was done by the German Army and not with the cooperation of Dehomag." Ironically, few knew more about those transferred machines than Hoermann. Hoermann, of course, was deputy Nazi custodian of CEC, the key Dehomag engineering manager in charge of French equipment, and aware of page after page of CEC billing demands on the Reich. What's more, Hoermann functioned as the intermediary between CEC and the
MB
as Fellinger negotiated and finalized all machine-specific lease contracts. Chauncey did not correct Hoermann.
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Instead, Chauncey merely went on to the next order of business. The U.S. Army, said Chauncey, was anxious to obtain German-made alphabetizers, especially the advanced D11-A. Hoermann replied that although five such machines were placed into production, only one was fully assembled and in operation—the machine used at Dachau. Then in the presence of two special military escorts and an army field investigator, Chauncey inspected the Dachau machine. It was partially dismantled. He noticed that the device, which featured a rotary printing mechanism, seemed larger than the Model 405 American alphabetizer. Hoermann asserted that the Dachau machine never worked as well as it should. Captains Kober and Hayter also examined the device. In reporting back to IBM NY about the D11-A, Chauncey wrote, "This machine was used at Dachau, but was sent to the Dehomag at Sindelfingen through the cooperation of Mr. Hendricks." Sergeant Hendricks was a U.S. Army industry liaison that headed up "a special installation" at Bad Nauheim.
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As Chauncey turned to leave, the gregarious Hoermann tried to ask several questions about his IBM friends. He had openly corresponded with them during the war years. But Chauncey stiffly cut him off, asserting that no personal conversation or other pleasantries could be exchanged. Hoermann demurred.
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That day, the group returned to Frankfurt where they met with Hendricks, who had just returned from Berlin. Hendricks had inspected the damaged Lichterfelde facility, and was carrying an envelope for IBM containing a full report from the German staff there. Lieutenant Colonel Flick had conveyed the report to Hendricks. In the awkward moment that followed, Hendricks pulled the envelope out of his pocket, but Chauncey declined to actually accept it. Instead, Chauncey immediately handed the envelope—without looking inside, to Captain Kober standing next to him. Kober, who read German, skimmed the reports and then granted permission for Chauncey to review it as well. Chauncey did so, but quickly realized the reports "convey no information not previously known."
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Hendricks told Chauncey some additional information about Dehomag managers. Rottke's imprisonment by the Russians for Nazi connections was considered a lost cause because Mrs. Rottke was known for pronounced Nazi views. But Hummel was back. After Hummel was released from the Allied prison at Bad Kreuznach, Hendricks saw no harm in transporting him to Stuttgart in a truck.
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Even though Watson had wanted Hummel excised, he had already been restored to the company.

On October 30, 1945, Chauncey returned under escort to Paris to continue the methodical process of reclaiming the German subsidiary. He continued to petition various offices of the occupying authorities in Europe and the State Department in Washington. Even though a complete policy on resumption of corporate control had not yet been defined, as soon as any ad hoc element of the policy was espoused, IBM was ready to swiftly act on it. During late summer and fall 1945, the bureaucratic barriers gradually began to crumble.
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The Berlin and Sindelfingen operations were administered as two distinct entities. During the summer, the military had initially appointed Dehomag Manager H. Beckmann as custodian of the Berlin operation. But he was extremely inefficient and depressed over Germany's fortunes. His son had been killed in the war. His wife had her teeth knocked out during an alter cation with Russian soldiers. Chauncey called Beckmann "a broken man." What's more, he was on bad terms with Fellinger. Beckmann ordered guards to stop Fellinger at the gate. Fellinger complained. So the military replaced Beckmann with another Dehomag manager, W. Cimbal, who was more to Fellinger's liking. Whoever was appointed to run Dehomag was dependent upon Fellinger for transitional help. After all, Fellinger had been effectively running the subsidiaries since 1943. Nonetheless, occupation authorities, overlooking Fellinger's Nazi Party connections, designated him a special advisor to Cimbal.
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Although IBM had not regained control of Dehomag, the company was now allowed to resume its normal operations as quickly as possible. Considerable monies were still frozen in bank accounts. An August 1945 review reported that salaries had not been paid since the fall of Berlin. So Cimbal rallied Lichterfelde's resources, cut expenses and salaries, and re-established monthly leasing patterns. To earn extra cash, toys were produced from scrap metal. Soon Lichterfelde's tabulators were rattling again. Punch cards were rolling off the presses. By September 1945, more than 320 prior German installations were in operation, including Holleriths at public utilities, insurance companies, and railroads. One plant filling card orders for the French and U.S. armies was already at 75 percent capacity; it had produced 58 million cards from September to November. A military order for 17 million was waiting to be produced. Cimbal was compelled to seek IBM NY permission to order $12,000 in additional machine tools to restart the manufacturing program.
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Before the end of the year, Chauncey would be able to report in a letter to Watson, "Cimbal has done a good job. The territory under him is operating on a cash basis profit. You know already of their manufacture of toys from scrap and novelties from American Army discarded tin cans. The rentals, however, remain the backbone of the revenue."
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In August 1945, the military instructed Fellinger to prepare comprehensive reports on his command of IBM subsidiaries in Germany, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, as well as his knowledge in other territories. In addition to a resume of activities, Fellinger was required to forecast the prospects for each division. Fellinger addressed some reports directly to Watson. But most of the surveys were formally submitted to American military government for IBM's review.
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These extensive country-by-country summaries, backed up by financial data, contained most of the information IBM NY needed to resume control.

Shortly after the submission, an unidentified branch of the military arrested Fellinger.
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That was end of his involvement with IBM.

On December 3, 1945, the American military government in Stuttgart passed a message for Chauncey through an army office in Paris. Firm policies were still unresolved on restoring American property. But Chauncey could again travel to Germany to resume discussions.
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The next day, December 4, Chauncey and another IBM officer, Mr. Warrin, flew from Paris to an airport near Frankfurt. The late connecting flight to Berlin was canceled due to poor weather. They tried again in the morning, but the weather was unimproved. While waiting in Frankfurt, they again called on Captain Hayter, who asked IBM to prepare whatever contract it deemed appropriate to allow the military to begin the widespread leasing of needed Dehomag machines and secure repair services for mobile U.S. machines in the area.
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Chauncey was happy to comply.

With the weather still difficult, Chauncey and Warrin resorted to an overnight train. Purchasing tickets at the last minute, they were required to travel all the way to Berlin in regular seats instead of first-class berths. Once in Berlin, they sought out Major Curry at the local Property Control Office. He authorized Chauncey to finally inspect the Lichterfelde facility. No escort would be necessary and any useful discussion could take place.
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When Chauncey and Warrin arrived at Lichterfelde, December 6, 1945, an American flag was flying atop the Dehomag factory roof. They were met by Cimbal and a delegation of Dehomag employees. From the outset, Chauncey announced, as before, no "friendly discussion" could take place, but only an exchange of business information required by IBM NY.
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The next day, Chauncey received a message to come to Cimbal's home to speak to Major Curry. That evening, Chauncey and Warrin arrived at Cimbal's home as requested, and met Curry. But when they walked in a bit further, they saw a beautifully set dinner table. It was nothing like the grandiose banquets IBM had staged during the war, but Mrs. Cimbal had spent some time trying to be hospitable with the little they had. Abruptly, Chauncey stopped and harshly demanded that no party-like atmosphere could ensue. Adhering to a strict non-fraternization ethic, he insisted only business in a business-like setting could be discussed.
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