Ike's Spies (21 page)

What Eisenhower meant was that Patton seemed to think that all he had to do was send the XV Corps forward until it linked up with the Canadians, at which point the encirclement would be complete and the Germans would surrender. But as Eisenhower and Bradley knew, from all their intelligence sources, capped by
ULTRA
, there were two complete German armies inside the trap. Although they were short on supplies, they still could maintain a tremendous rate of fire, from heavy artillery through tank to small arms. To encircle is not to destroy. Already
ULTRA
indicated that the Germans would be fighting their way out. Hitler had relieved Kluge, but gave his successor, General Model, a free hand. Model started a full-scale retreat.

Beyond
ULTRA
revelations, Eisenhower was relying on intelligence estimates of the enemy's intentions that were, basically, his own. At its highest level, intelligence is more a hunch than a scientific matter. It has to be felt rather than studied, sensed rather than calculated. At this level, intelligence is an art form, a prediction about what the enemy will do before the enemy knows himself. Eisenhower was a master of it. One of his most notable traits as a human being was his sensitivity, his keen awareness of the other man's point of view. Those who worked with Ike have told of his concern for the well-being of his subordinates, of acts of kindness or awareness. One of the secrets of his success was his hardworking staff; his staff slaved for him precisely because he was concerned about them, as people. This tremendous concern gave him unmatched insights into other people's minds, and thus paid off with the most important kind of intelligence. From Hitler in 1945 to Khrushchev in 1959, Ike seldom misjudged his opponents.

As at Falaise, where Patton, and many others, assumed that the Germans in the West had had it, that their defeat was as obvious to
them as to the Allies, and that surrender was imminent. Eisenhower held a press conference on August 15 and the reporters kept asking him how many weeks it would take to end the war. Furious, “Ike vehemently castigated those who think they can measure the end of the war ‘in a matter of weeks.' He went on to say that ‘such people are crazy.' ” He reminded the press that Hitler could continue the war effort through the Gestapo and pointed out that the German leader knew he would hang when the war ended so he had nothing to lose in continuing it. Ike said that he expected Hitler would end up hanging himself, but before he did he would “fight to the bitter end” and most of his troops would fight with him.
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He was almost exactly right. All he missed was the method Hitler would use to kill himself.

Eisenhower was right in the short run, too, at Falaise. The Germans rejected the easy way out, surrender, and fought to hold open the jaws of the trap that were slowly closing on them. They, not Patton, made it a Dunkirk in reverse. Despite Eisenhower's plea, in an order of the day, for every man in his command “to make it his direct responsibility that the enemy is blasted unceasingly by day and by night, and is denied safety either in fight or flight,” it was the Germans, not the Allies, who made the supreme effort at Falaise.
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Lewin puts the last phase of the battle that began at Mortain into its proper perspective. No one, he writes, “who has not faced a German panzer army fighting for its life has the right to criticize those who have done so and apparently failed.” The Germans were “struggling for survival.” The failure at Falaise, if it can be called a failure, “was due to … a simple inability, on the Allies' part, to destroy the German will to survive.”
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The truth is that Mortain/Falaise was a great victory, thanks in largest part to the superb defense at Mortain, which was itself based in equal measures on the courage and fighting ability of the men of the 30th Division and on
ULTRA
. Together with the Allied air forces and the Canadians, they gave the Germans a hell of a licking. Some 50,000 German troops were captured, another 10,000 killed, while about 40,000 got away.

Those who escaped left their equipment behind. An officer who had observed the destruction of the World War I battlefields found that “none of these compared in the effect upon the imagination with what I saw near Falaise. As far as my eye could reach on
every line of sight, there were vehicles, wagons, tanks, guns, prime movers, sedans, rolling kitchens, etc., in various stages of destruction. I stepped over hundreds of rifles in the mud and saw hundreds more stacked along sheds. I saw probably three hundred field pieces and tanks, mounting large-caliber guns, that were apparently undamaged.”
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The full extent of the destruction is best measured in the August 28 strength report of the Fifth Army. It had only 1,300 men, twenty-four tanks, and sixty pieces of artillery.
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The full magnitude of the victory is best seen in the events that followed, as described by Adolph Rosengarten, the
SLU
with the U. S. First Army: “Many German Seventh Army formations escaped from the pocket and fled, although not in good order, to the German frontier. As it was three hundred odd miles away, following them was fun. We drove through the lovely French countryside in the August sun and pitched our tents for stands of two or three nights in the kitchen gardens of some beautiful chateaux.”
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IN THAT DASH THROUGH FRANCE, ULTRA
played little role, mainly because the Germans were so disorganized it was almost a case of every man for himself, which in turn meant there was little in the way of direction or control being exercised by radio. When the Germans did not use the radio,
ULTRA
was useless. The French people, however, provided an alternative source of information that was as accurate and trustworthy as
ULTRA
. In every village between the Seine and the German border, GIs and Tommies could count on the local inhabitants telling them exactly when the last German formation went through the village square, in what direction, with what equipment, and in what numbers. This priceless information made the pursuit effective and continuous. The Germans never got a chance to catch their breath.

Until they reached the German border. Suddenly the Allies, who had seen all and known all, were blind. Local inhabitants were sullen and noncommunicative instead of friendly and informative. Inside their own country, the Germans had secure telephone lines, and
ULTRA
could consequently hear nothing. Eisenhower, who until now had been well informed about his enemies' strengths and dispositions, was suddenly shut off from such information as completely as he would have been had a steel wall descended between the contending sides. He needed to prove himself as a commander
who did not need virtually a complete set of the enemy battle plans in order to win. But if he was now in the inferior position with regard to intelligence, he commanded the superior force, not only in air power, but in tanks, men, artillery, and fighting formations.

His biggest problem was overconfidence. After the dash through France, his officers and men felt that the Germans in the West were finished, done, kaput. All that was left was the formality of occupying Berlin. The heady success of the liberation of France had its effect everywhere, even in the mind of the supreme commander. He was quite confident he could wrap the whole thing up by Christmas. He even made a bet with Monty about it.

IKE'S CHIEF SPY
in World War II, and one of the best ever in the art of gathering intelligence, Major General Sir Kenneth Strong was a blunt, hardy Scot who got on famously with Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton, not so well with Monty. Strong had an explosive laugh, an appreciation of the wisecrack, and an easy acceptance of the West Pointers' rough language and casual manner rare in British officers. In his memoirs, he endeared himself to all those from the New World side of the Atlantic Ocean who had been put off by British stuffiness and snobbery when he remarked, “The best time in a man's life is when he gets to like Americans.”
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Strong had been Eisenhower's intelligence officer in North Africa. When Eisenhower moved to
SHAEF
in January of 1944, and asked Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to transfer Strong to London so that he could be G-2 at
SHAEF
, Brooke refused. He charged that Eisenhower and his chief of staff, Bedell “Beetle” Smith, had already robbed Allied headquarters in Algiers of its best officers and he insisted that Strong had to stay there to help fight the war in Italy.

Smith, who had come personally to make the request for Strong, let his always hot temper get away from him. He shouted at Brooke, demanding to know how in hell
OVERLORD
could be a success if the British refused to give Ike their best talent. Brooke, his voice icy cold, said the answer was still no. Smith started for the
door, grumbling that Brooke was “not being helpful.” Brooke called him back and “a bit of frank talk” ensued. That evening, Eisenhower apologized to Brooke for Smith and explained that Smith “fights for what he wants” but meant no disrespect.
²

Whatever Brooke's feelings, Eisenhower still wanted Strong. He kept repeating the request, only to meet more rebuffs. Finally, in an unusual move that in itself was an indication of Ike's estimate of Strong's abilities, the supreme commander went over the head of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to appeal directly to the Prime Minister. Churchill, who was anxious to give Eisenhower all the help he could for
OVERLORD
, got orders sent to Algiers directing Strong to come to London to take up his duties as
SHAEF
G-2.
³

As Ike's chief intelligence officer, Strong was the man who briefed the supreme commander on the enemy order of battle, capability, and intentions. His sources were wide and varied. The information flowed backward from company to battalion to division to corps to army to army group and, finally, to Strong's staff at
SHAEF
. Strong integrated it, digested it, summarized it, and then presented it to Eisenhower at a daily briefing.

In his memoirs, Strong described his methods and the nature of his relationship with his boss. The memoirs are an excellent source not only for their main theme,
Intelligence at the Top
, but also as an insight into Eisenhower's leadership techniques.

Strong learned, first of all, that Ike did not want him to think of himself as chairman of a committee, which was the British practice, but rather to regard himself as the commanding officer at the head of the staff section dealing with intelligence. His judgments should obviously be based on information supplied to him by his subordinates, but they should be
his
judgments, not the consensus views of a committee. Strong records, “I remember on one occasion suggesting to Bedell Smith that I would like to obtain the committee's view on a certain problem. His reply was prompt and to the point: ‘We've hired you for your knowledge and advice. If you are wrong too often we'll fire you and hire someone else in your place.' ”
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Eisenhower had unshakable views on the subject of staff. He had written to Marshall, in February of 1943, “I am constantly on my guard to prevent any important military venture depending for its control and direction upon the ‘committee' system of command.… I am sure my staff thinks I am getting tougher and
more arbitrary day by day but, although I admit the impossibility of working without adequate staffs, they do seem to develop diseases that include obesity and elephantiasis. Apparently only a sharp knife, freely wielded, provides any cure.” He was also adamant on the subject of decision-making, which he insisted belonged solely to the commander. He frequently told this writer that in all his career he never asked for a staff to vote on a decision (he insisted just as strongly that he always wanted every staff member's views, honestly expressed) and said that any leader who left his decisions up to a staff vote was not worthy of his job.
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Another difference between the American and British staff system was in access to the commanding officer. Monty was something of an extreme example, but his habits made a dramatic illustration of the point. Monty lived in splendid isolation. He rarely met with aides, leaving such mundane matters to his chief of staff, Freddie de Guingand, who would report to him the results of subordinates' labors. Monty would then study the reports alone, make his decision, and hand down the result. He considered himself superior to almost everyone, and let everyone know it; his curt manner, his pinched facial features, trim mustache, and ever-present beret all tended to put people off. Where Ike was warm and outgoing, Monty was cold and introverted.

Ike was in constant contact with the heads of his staff sections, meeting with them formally and informally, chatting, discussing, mulling over, considering this or that item. Although Strong was already a general officer and one of the top-ranking ones in the British Army at that, he was surprised to discover that “I had the right of direct access to Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff, and I could approach them whenever I wished.” He was even more surprised—and pleased—to learn that “above all, under the American system I was a member of the ‘inner circle,' where policy was decided and planning and other decisions taken. All my experience suggests that this status is vital to the efficient functioning of an Intelligence machine.”
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