Read Impossible: The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald Online
Authors: Barry Krusch
Tags: #Non-Fiction, #History
Chapter 8
Elements Of The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald
As noted in the previous chapter, propositions can be divided intosubpropositions,to be subsequently referred to more elegantly in this book aselements(note to attorneys: this usage, as a synonym for subproposition, is morefact-oriented than thelaw-oriented manner in which you are used to hearing the term).
As used in this book, the termelementrefers to a fact subsidiary to the proposition whichmustbe true for the proposition to be true.
Suppose you wanted to prove the general conclusion “men have walked on the moon.” You could start by creating this proposition:
“The first man walked on the moon on July 20, 1969.”
You could then analyze the proposition and determine the necessary subsidiary factual assumptions (i.e. elements) which also have to be true for the proposition to be considered true. Some of these are as follows:
At that point, you could choose one of the elements (for example, “America had the capacity to launch a rocket into outer space by July 20, 1969.”), and gather all the relevant evidence, whether it supports or contradicts your element. This evidence could be comprised of the following evidence types:
You would then implement the same procedure for all the other elements. As would soon readily become apparent, a massive amount of evidence supporting the elements would be gathered, and the sheer weight of this evidence, along with its quality and consistency, would demonstrate the truth of the elements, and therefore the proposition, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Note that with reference to the proposition “the first man walked on the moon on July 20, 1969,” a number of subpropositions could be formulated that arenotnecessary, and are thereforenotelements. For example, “America had the greatest desire of any country to put a man on the moon by July 20, 1969.” While this might have been true, even if false, it would not reduce the confidence level of the proposition. This wouldnotbe true of the elements: if evenoneof them was false, then the proposition would bedisproven.
This same general approach is especially necessitated in law, which requires the meticulous organization of facts into categories to add clarity to the case (“WTO Case Review 2004”, 22 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 99 at 215; emphasis supplied):
[A] judge ought not to fail at the task of organizing the elements of a case into widely understood cognitive categories, and the starting point of any case, in any country, at any time, is the category of “Facts.” A statement at the outset of the opinion of what exactly transpired yields a document that is more by virtue of its clarity and efficiency. In turn, the interest of justice — for the parties to the case and for lawyers advising clients in the future based on the jurisprudence of the case — is served.
With this proviso in mind, let’s once again look at the factual propositions comprising The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald:
THE CASE AGAINST LEE HARVEY OSWALD
LEGAL ASSUMPTIONAll the evidence in The Case Against Lee Harvey Oswald stipulated as admissible isauthentic. This admissible evidentiary record iscomprehensive,credible,sufficient, andconsistentto the extent that it precludes reasonable doubt regardingbothof the following propositions regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
PROPOSITION ONEThere was one and only one gunman in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, and that gunman was neither aided nor abetted by any person or group.
PROPOSITION TWOLee Harvey Oswald was the lone gunman in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963.
CONCLUSIONTherefore, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald fired the shot that killed President John F. Kennedy.
The validity of thelegal assumptionwill be determined as we analyze the evidence adduced for the propositions. Nor do we have to provide separate evidence for theconclusion; if the legal assumption and the propositions are true, then the conclusion willautomaticallybe true via the laws of deductive reasoning (if there is onlyonegunman, and Oswaldisthat gunman, then obviously Oswald fired the fatal shot). Consequently, all we need to do for each proposition is to determine its component elements, and thenanalyzethe evidence justifying each of the elements.
At the risk of being redundant,allof the elements must be considered as true for the proposition to be supported. “True,” in this case, must be seen in the context of reasonable doubt, which of course is a primary component of our legal assumption. Again, as noted earlier (and worth repeating), if there is reasonable doubt regarding the truth of evenoneof the elements (that is to say, if there is a confidence level of less than 95% forany oneelement), then the propositionitselfcannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (that is to say, there is a confidence level of less than 95% for the proposition).
This primary directive related toeveryelement having to achieve the threshold is drawn directly from the key holding determined by the Supreme Court in theWinshipopinion discussed earlier (In Re Winship, 397 US 358 at 364 (1970); emphasis supplied):
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except uponproof beyond a reasonable doubt ofeveryfact necessary to constitute the crimewith which he is charged.
Note that the Supreme Court is unequivocal on this point: proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be achieved foreveryfact necessary to constitute the crime:everyelement ofeveryproposition.
In fact, this is theminimumcriterion to be deployed. From a probability assessment perspective, the correct procedure is to actuallymultiplythe confidence level of the elements to arrive at the ultimate confidence level of the proposition. Thus, the Supreme Court directive would posit anecessary, but not asufficientcondition. This point will be discussed at length further in this book when we analyzeElement OneofProposition Onein detail.
With this critical protocol of due process in mind, let us look at thefactualelements comprisingProposition One.
ELEMENT ONEExactly three shots were fired from the sixth-floor southeast window of the Texas School Book Depository at Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963 — no more, no less — and the three shells found on the floor of the Depository — in the possession of the Warren Commission — were fired from Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world.
ELEMENT TWOAll of the shots fired at Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963 were fired from the sixth-floor southeast window of the Texas School Book Depository, and from no other location.
ELEMENT THREELee Harvey Oswald was theonlyperson on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository at 12:30 p.m. on November 22, 1963.
ELEMENT FOURThe shots fired at Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963 were fired from no other weapons besides Lee Harvey Oswald’s Mannlicher-Carcano.
ELEMENT FIVEA rifleman could plausibly have fired 3 separate shots from the Mannlicher-Carcano within the elapsed time of the shooting and corresponding with the keyframes of the Zapruder film.
ELEMENT SIXThere was one and only one bullet which struck Governor Connally, and that bullet (identified as CE 399) first passed through the body of President Kennedy.
Remember, these factual elements are allnecessary —theymustbe true for the proposition to be true. For most, the necessity of these elements will be obvious, but there is no harm in a little analytical redundancy to achieve clarity.
ELEMENT ONE
Exactly three shots were fired from the sixth-floor southeast window of the Texas School Book Depository at Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963 — no more, no less — and the three shells found on the floor of the Depository — in the possession of the Warren Commission — were fired from Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world.
The Warren Commission stated thatonlythree shots were fired in Dealey Plaza. Indeed, no more than three cartridges were ever claimed to have been found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, if there is other evidence that demonstrates that there weremorethan three shots fired, or evidence that Oswald firedfewerthan three shots, then obviously there was more than one gunman, and the proposition is disproven.
Vincent Bugliosi, inReclaiming History, agreed with the logic of this line of analysis in his discussion of the assassination of Robert Kennedy, and noted the importance of ancillary evidence in making a determination regarding the number of shots fired, such as additional bullet holes. As he stated in relation to that case (RH Endnotes 551):
[A]ny bullet holes observed in addition to those accounted for . . . would constitute evidence of a second gun being fired.
Bugliosi reiterated the point regarding statements he received on the number of bullets fired (including one from Thomas Noguchi, the coroner of Los Angeles) (RH Endnotes 551):
[I]n the absence of a logical explanation, these statements, by simple arithmetic, add up to too many bullets and therefore, the probability of a second gun.