Inside the Crosshairs (32 page)
Read Inside the Crosshairs Online
Authors: Col. Michael Lee Lanning
Kroesen admits a need for snipers in certain combat situations, such as static warfare, but states that they did not meet
his division’s needs during the latter stages of American involvement in Vietnam. According to Kroesen, the few remaining snipers in his command were “of little consequence” to overall operations and he found them to have “prima donna” attitudes.
Major General Kenneth J. Houghton, USMC (Ret.), who commanded the 5th Marine Regiment in 1967, states that his snipers did “a hell of a job” but were not “extra special.” Houghton continues by relating that his regiment’s snipers “were not a player” during his command time because of the nature of warfare and the terrain in which they worked and so they operated mostly as ordinary infantrymen.
Many other officers, at all levels of command, have little or nothing at all to say about the sniper program. At the highest level, General William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret.), who headed the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as well as all U.S. forces in the combat zone from 1964 to 1968, made no mention of snipers in his postwar autobiography,
A Soldier Reports
. More recently, Westmoreland simply stated, “Snipers did play a role in the war in Vietnam, but there is nothing significant I have to add.”
General Creighton W. Abrams, who replaced Westmoreland, came from an armor background and had no affinity for special operations units. He left no formal record of his opinion of American snipers in Vietnam before his death in 1974.
Snipers also made little impression on the last MACV commander, General Fred C. Weyand, who replaced Abrams in June 1972 and supervised the final withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the war zone. When asked in 1997 about sniper operations in Vietnam, Weyand responded, “There is nothing in my personal experience that would be helpful.”
Some of the recollections of army and Marine commanders in Vietnam about snipers reflect the time periods they served in-country. Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, USMC (Ret.), who commanded the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade early in the war, wrote that “no meaningful tasks or duties were available for our sniper platoons.” Another retired Marine, General Raymond G. Davis, wrote about his service
with the 3rd Marine Division in 1968 and 1969, saying, “I cannot contribute anything substantial on snipers.” Davis added that he saturated his area of operations with small recon teams with orders not to directly engage the enemy but rather to observe and report so a helicopter reaction force could attack.
Like the Marine leaders, army commanders had recollections about snipers or their effect on overall operations. Major General Paul F. Smith, USA (Ret.), stated, “During my tour in Vietnam, July 1965–July 1967, and more particularly my time with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 1966, I had absolutely no experience with snipers. When I took command of the brigade there were no designated snipers nor do I recall my being aware of any brigade personnel who had received such training. Our operations were such that snipers could not have been employed profitably.”
Smith’s comments provide a good summary of the first several years of involvement by U.S. Army ground units in Vietnam. He concluded, “My other year in Vietnam was spent in two different jobs—establishing as Chief of Staff what later became I Field Force (July 1965–January 1966) and working for the Ambassador in the redevelopment business (January 1967–July 1967). While in those two jobs I do not recall ever hearing anyone mention snipers.”
Even more telling are the recollections of General W. B. Rosson, who served six years in Vietnam in positions that included command of a division and a field force and deputy commander of MACV. Rosson, one of the better field commanders of the war and a man who has a deep understanding of the conflict, had nothing to say about army snipers, and only stated, “I recall, however, that the 1st and 3rd Marine divisions placed strong emphasis on snipers.”
Other army generals also have little to say about their snipers. General Michael S. Davison, USA (Ret.), who assumed command of the II Field Force in April 1970, stated, “Sniping was not an issue at my level.”
Major General A. R. Bolling Jr., USA (Ret.), who commanded the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, in 1968,
added, “Ninety-nine percent of the time, the 82nd Airborne Division refrained from using snipers. We also found our fights either when we ambushed the NVA or vice versa. Early on, some of our LRRPs tried setting out snipers. They never saw the enemy.”
These comments must, of course, be taken in context of the great many duties and responsibilities of commanders in Vietnam and the passage of more than twenty-five years since their service. Opinions about snipers in Vietnam, like those about the precision marksmen in previous conflicts, vary greatly. Although their collective impact on the war itself is debatable, the young men who shouldered the special rifles and viewed the enemy through the crosshairs of their scopes were certainly as dedicated, brave, and effective as the shooters who preceded them in earlier wars. Even more important, after Vietnam peace would not bring an end to authorized snipers and sniper units in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.
*
In 1986 and 1987, while researching what became
Inside the LRRPs: Rangers in Vietnam
, the author queried more than fifty retired officers who had served as generals in Vietnam. Less than a decade later, because of death or poor health, more than a third of that group was unable to contribute to this book. Many had had significant information to share and great stories to tell, but the long-term disdain of the American publishers for anything related to the Vietnam War and its participants discouraged the recording of that aspect of history. Much is now lost forever.
†
Editors significantly shortened and altered Henderson’s original seven hundred-page manuscript, apparently combining some events and embellishing others to create more dramatic impact for market appeal in an era (1986) when Vietnam War books were usually shunned. Henderson admits in his preface that he took “the liberty of inventing” the dialogue of the VC/NVA; combat veterans and others knowledgeable of the “real” Vietnam War recognize that several operations detailed in the book do not remotely reflect Marine Corps sniper standard operating procedures. Even so, editorial and dramatic considerations in no way diminish the accomplishments of Hathcock.
‡
Sniper veterans are welcome and encouraged to provide additional information about their own personal experiences as well as those of their units in Vietnam for possible inclusion in future editions of this book. For details, see
Appendix G
“Information Request.”
§
The number of sniper kills per week, month, or even year varied from unit to unit, depending on the level of enemy activity and the degree of support by individual division, regiment, and battalion commanders. Availability of weapons, particularly the introduction of the M40s, also impacted the pace of sniper kills.
‖
Interestingly, although there is no substantiation of the rumored bounties announced by the VC/NVA, the Americans and South Vietnamese did issue “wanted posters” for Vietcong leaders in the Mekong Delta as a part of Project Phoenix. The reward announcements, which were counter to provisions of the Geneva Convention, were implemented on an extremely limited basis. Only a few examples are known to have survived, and most remain in the hands of private collectors and Project Phoenix veterans.
a
Except for the opening scenes of Marine sniper training, the movie adds nothing to the history or understanding of precision marksmen in combat. Later in the film, snipers in the field shout at each other, use nonmatch ammunition, and employ telescopes that resemble nothing in the United States’ or any other country’s inventory.
b
This reference and the letters and summaries of telephone conversations that follow result from the author’s direct correspondence and conversation with the sources. Original copies are in the author’s files.
Vietnam Sniper LegacyD
ESPITE
an uneven performance and an incomplete picture of their effectiveness, army and Marine snipers in Vietnam made an impression. For the first time in U.S. history, the military services began to investigate the retention of snipers in the peacetime force, but the decision to do so was not a straight-line action.
As American combat forces withdrew from Vietnam between August 1969 and June 1972, soldiers and Marines were reassigned Stateside and around the world to prepare for new challenges and emergencies. In an atmosphere in which the American public held the military responsible for the long war in Vietnam and in which their respect for those in uniform had reached an all-time low, the services faced budget and personnel cuts that were not conducive to innovation.
*
In the austerity of the post—Vietnam War period and the general disapproval of all things military by the American taxpayer, neither the Marine Corps nor the army was able to take any immediate or direct action to include snipers in the
peacetime forces. The army, which had never established an official sniper organization during the war, simply let the marksmen once again fade into obscurity. Their sniper schools in Vietnam had closed with the withdrawal of their senior headquarters and their sniper rifles had been placed in storage. The only semblance of a sniper legacy was the Marksmanship Training Unit at Fort Benning, which resumed its prewar marksmanship training and competitive shooting missions.
Initially, Marine Corps leaders, although satisfied with the concept and performance of their snipers in Vietnam, did not see a place for the infantry regiment and reconnaissance battalion scout-sniper platoons in the peacetime force organization. When the 3rd Marine Division began its withdrawal from Vietnam in August 1969, Marine Corps commandant General Leonard F. Chapman directed that the platoons be phased out by 1972.
While budget and political restraints ended the scout-sniper platoons that had evolved in Vietnam, Chapman and other Marine leaders intended to restructure the program so that the snipers did not completely disappear. In addition to proclaiming that snipers had a future in the Marine Corps, Chapman also directed that studies continue to determine their proper organization and to develop the most efficient weapon system.
Chapman detailed his directions in a letter to the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) on August 2, 1971, writing, “The capability will be maintained in the Marine division. It is envisioned that the sniper squads will be formed in infantry and reconnaissance battalions with Marines assigned on an additional-duty basis.”
The commandant also directed that sniper training be conducted at the division level and stated that detailed training guidance would be forthcoming. More important, Chapman concluded, “It is deemed prudent at this time to continue evaluation of candidate sniper weapons systems and to develop a specific operational requirement for a sniper rifle and telescope.”
Over the next five years various Marine commands conducted studies and tests to determine the most effective sniper
organization, training, and weapons. That work produced an improved sniper rifle system, an updated sniper manual, an authorization for sniper units, and provisions for the reopening of a sniper-training school.
Experience in Vietnam had shown that the Marine Corps’s M40, based on the Remington 700, and the army’s M21, based on the M14, were the best available sniper rifles. After additional tests, Marine ordnance experts determined that the bolt-action M40, although needing improvements, continued to meet their requirements better than the gas-operated M21.
In 1976, the Marine Corps approved funding for improvements to the M40. The resulting M40A1 retained the Remington 700 receiver group but had a heavy twenty-six-inch-long barrel and a fiberglass/epoxy stock. Other modifications included the addition of a steel trigger guard and magazine cover to increase durability. By 1977 the Marines began delivering the rebuilt M40A1s to field units and training centers. The only other major modification to the M40A1 came in 1980, when the Unertl 10X telescope replaced the Redfield 3X–9X variable scopes. By 1983 all M40A1s were equipped with the Unertl 10X scope.
While the weapon studies continued, other sections of the MCDEC worked on updating sniper doctrine. On April 7, 1976, the Marine Corps issued FMFM 1–3B, “Sniping,” replacing the 1969 edition used in Vietnam and laying out the techniques and procedures for selecting, training, and employing scout-snipers. With minor changes in 1981, the manual remains even today the primary Marine sniper document.
Other updates to Marine manuals of the period reconfirmed the military occupation specialty of scout-snipers and authorized their inclusion in infantry units. MCO P1200.7, “Military Occupational Specialties Manual,” assigns MOS 8541 (military operational specialty, i.e., military for “job”) to “Scout-Sniper.” The manual’s summary of the mission of scout-snipers differs little from that of Vietnam and previous conflicts. “Scout-snipers participate in activities designed to deny the enemy freedom of movement by shooting enemy leaders, crew-served weapons operators, radiomen, observers,
messengers, and other key personnel with single, well-aimed shots. Scout-snipers also engage vital materiel targets such as command and control equipment, air defense radars, and missile launchers, which require precision fire to neutralize. Scout-snipers also provide close reconnaissance and surveillance to the infantry battalion.”