Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun (29 page)

The fighting on Cactus made the Japanese effort especially critical. By
now General Vandegrift felt confident on the offensive, and American troops flooded out to assault Japanese positions. These early November battles resulted in the Marines capturing Point Cruz, west of the Matanikau, and Koli Point, east of Vandegrift’s hedgehog. Hyakutake’s troops were sorely tried. The Tokyo Express runs to Starvation Island were barely making good the losses. Bull Halsey visited on November 8 to see for himself. He got an eyeful—emaciated Marines, thousand-yard stares, the sick and the wounded. The soldiers were delighted to see him but obviously in great need. That night one of Tanaka’s destroyers peeled off the Tokyo Express to shell Lunga, putting Halsey in fear for his life, worrying whether he was “yellow,” and more determined than ever.

Halsey returned to SOPAC on November 9 to get an earful. Captain Miles Browning, SOPAC’s new chief of staff, met the Bull’s plane to tell him the Japanese were on the move again. Browning’s warning represented the culmination of new Allied intelligence breakthroughs that afforded a peek inside Yamamoto’s planning rooms. The JN-25 code was becoming transparent again. Codebreakers were already aware of convoys bringing Japanese 38th Division troops from Palau up to Rabaul. The first inkling of an actual Combined Fleet operation appeared in an intelligence summary on November 5. The Kondo fleet had yet to leave Truk. Indications solidified. Seaplane tender and convoy movements were noted, so that by the sixth, CINCPAC intelligence expected ground and air operations at a minimum. Then codebreakers penetrated the dispatch containing Yamamoto’s operations order, sent in a JN-25 code transmission on November 8. Though they did not initially break the entire message, the Allies became aware of “Z-Day” and its connection to Cactus. The “Z-Day” terminology appears in intelligence reports and also the CINCPAC war diary.

At his morning staff meeting on November 9 (the eighth at Pearl Harbor), Admiral Nimitz discussed indications of an impending Japanese offensive “on a grand scale.” With Captain Layton and his people, Nimitz considered the maximum strength Yamamoto might employ. The next day was key—building on Browning’s warning to Halsey. CINCPAC confidently predicted an “all out attempt upon Guadalcanal soon, using transports to carry Army troops and supported by carriers.” Admiral Nimitz authorized a warning dispatch sent out that night—a little after 8:00 a.m. on November 10 in Nouméa:

Radio fixes placed the
Junyo
at sea near Kavieng and indicated that battleships might be moving toward the southern area. Intelligence tentatively expected operations to begin on the twelfth or thirteenth. By November 11 details were becoming apparent: Z-day involved the arrival of a convoy, preceded by strong air attacks. Coastwatcher Paul Mason confirmed, reporting Japanese naval strength around Shortland as including seventeen merchantmen, at least one troopship, two oilers, plus strong fleet strength of four heavy and two light cruisers and thirty-three destroyers. Once direction finding placed Eighth Fleet commander Mikawa in the area, the circle seemed complete.

Missing was the impending Japanese surface bombardment, but radio fixes definitely put Admiral Kondo in the Solomons, and on the fourteenth he was reported to be in command. That intelligence energized Halsey and SOPAC leaders.

In terms of perceptions of the South Pacific balance, it is significant that by now COMINCH was conducting actual conversations with Royal Navy officers about an aircraft carrier loan. Halsey reiterated and amplified his earlier appeal for the ship, and he and Nimitz conducted a cable dialogue on how quickly the vessel could be reequipped with American gear. At the
time the British considered the
Illustrious
, but the ship finally selected would be the HMS
Victorious
.

Rabaul looked calm and beautiful as Lieutenant Ito Haruki’s plane approached. He too would fall under the spell of the Southern Cross. Ito was among a new contingent of Japanese fighters in the radio wars. Following a Rabaul visit from the Imperial Navy’s communications chief, the number of operators at Rabaul assigned to the 1st Combined Communications Unit, which worked with the Owada Group, had been increased. Known as the “special duty group,” radio monitors were the key to Japanese communications intelligence as much as they were to Allied. Lieutenant Ito came from the naval signal intelligence center in September. With sixty other officers and men he augmented Lieutenant Ogimoto’s 1st Unit complement.

The intelligence unit, located in a palm grove at the west end of Vunakanau base, had a radio shack with a monitoring room, a pair of direction-finding huts, and a barracks. With two direction finders at Rabaul and another on Guadalcanal, the Japanese now had the means to obtain more accurate radio fixes on Allied ships. Ogimoto was an experienced shadow warrior, involved in signals intelligence since before the war, when he listened in on American transmissions from the Japanese embassy in Washington. Traffic levels on Japanese naval intelligence circuits soared.

Combined Fleet also obtained good scouting information. Submarine-launched aircraft from Captain Uchino Shinji’s
I-8
scouted Efate during the night of November 2, and Fujii Akiyoshi’s
I-9
put its floatplane over Nouméa on November 4 and Espíritu Santo on the eleventh. Lieutenant Commander Nagai Takeo’s
I-7
reconnoitered Fiji on the eleventh as well, while another I-boat checked Nouméa again. By radio and aerial means the Japanese knew of convoys headed for the Solomons from Fiji, Australia, and the New Hebrides, and they had covered the principal SOPAC bases at a critical moment in the run-up to Kondo’s operation. The covers of Nouméa would have shown the
Enterprise
in port, since the floatplanes flew at dawn and “Big
E
” sailed at 10:00 a.m. on the eleventh, but this was set right next day as a JNAF patrol bomber sighted an American carrier at sea south of Guadalcanal. In short, Combined Fleet was aware Allied forces were in play, if
not of Halsey’s specific plans. By November 12 Admiral Ugaki had concluded that the fleet’s concentration at Shortland for Z-Day must be known to the Allies.

Determined to make good his promises to the Marines, Admiral Halsey set his various cruiser-destroyer groups to escort convoys. These delivered heavy artillery, coast defense units, and 6,000 more troops. American superiority grew. Once there the warships formed a task force. Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan, the erstwhile SOPAC staff boss, took command, though Norman Scott, the victor of Cape Esperance, had his ships in the force too. There is a dispute about which of these two was actually superior in rank, but neither seems to have raised the question himself. Callaghan wore his flag in heavy cruiser
San Francisco
, Scott in the light cruiser
Atlanta.
Heavy cruiser
Portland
, light cruisers
Helena
and
Juneau
, and eight tin cans completed the unit. Halsey had Callaghan patrol Ironbottom Sound the night of November 11—without incident.

Admiral Thomas Kinkaid steamed out of Nouméa that day. All fifty-nine sailors of the “Big
E
’s” damage control division, plus eighty-five specialists from SOPAC’s repair ship
Vestal
, continued to labor on the ship even as she cruised the South Pacific. Pearl Harbor estimated the “Big
E
” at 70 percent effective. The
Enterprise
was accompanied by two cruisers and six destroyers. Also in train was Task Force 64, under Rear Admiral Willis A. “Ching” Lee, now consisting of the battleships
Washington
and
South Dakota
. As Kinkaid and Lee hovered in Torpedo Junction, Cactus reported a force of two Japanese carriers about 150 miles away—some 575 miles from “Big
E
’s” position. Kinkaid began a high-speed chase. Meanwhile SOPAC ordered Callaghan’s cruisers back into Ironbottom Sound.

At Truk, based on his intelligence, Admiral Ugaki asked Combined Fleet staff to restudy the plan. Ugaki wanted additional strong air attacks and a preliminary prompt sortie by Mikawa’s Eighth Fleet cruisers. Senior staff officer Kuroshima Kameto argued against changing the arrangements. Ugaki did not insist. To the south, Admiral Kondo detached his “raiding unit” with battleships
Hiei
and
Kirishima
.

The Abe force had been awarded a commendation for earlier battles, and Abe himself was rewarded with promotion to vice admiral at the beginning of November. Now they were to repeat the bombardment of “The Night.” According to Hara Tameichi, who commanded destroyer
Amatsukaze
in Abe’s
screen, the admiral feared his sortie would fail. Rear Admiral Kimura Susumu’s Destroyer Squadron 10, including Hara’s ship, along with light cruiser
Nagara
and seven other tin cans, had departed Truk on November 9 separately from Kondo’s main body. They joined Abe, under way near Shortland, before dawn on the twelfth. It was early in the day, as the tropical heat rose, that the Abe Force was first seen by an American B-17.

In addition to Kimura’s screen, a contingent of Rear Admiral Takama Tamotsu’s Destroyer Squadron 4 strengthened the raiding unit. Takama’s five warships were also spotted by Allied aircraft. Abe ordered a double-ring cruising formation, with Takama’s tin cans in the lead on the outside perimeter. Takama took position around midafternoon. In all, Admiral Abe would have two battleships, a light cruiser, and eleven destroyers. The
Hiei
launched a floatplane scout that reported ten Allied vessels off Lunga Point about sunset. As evening deepened into night, the flotilla entered a storm front. Unable to return to its ship, the floatplane flew to Shortland. Abe neared Guadalcanal amid squalls, alternating with soaking rain and occasional calm. At times
Hiei
’s lookouts found the wakes of nearby vessels practically invisible. The R Area Force reported that weather would preclude aerial spotting. Abe signaled his final plan around 7:00 p.m. Takama would sweep Ironbottom Sound ahead of the bombardment unit. The battleships were to execute a forty-minute shoot beginning shortly before 2:00 a.m. Admiral Abe, who yearned to avenge the death of his boon companion Goto Aritomo in these same waters a month before, would have his chance.

“WE WANT THE BIG ONES!”

Dan Callaghan had skippered cruiser
San Francisco
before moving to South Pacific headquarters. A seasoned sailor and practical fellow, Callaghan wanted to make his command work despite the awkward presence of two admirals so close in rank. Not overly proud, Callaghan assigned light cruiser
Atlanta
, Norman Scott’s flagship, to the lead position in his line. Thus the two American admirals sailed in the first two major vessels in the battle line. Neither of them had the more sophisticated surface search radars. Callaghan posted his destroyers in front of and behind his cruisers, in a line-ahead formation that became a standard tactic in the U.S. fleet. The
warships cleared for action and expected battle. Heavy cruiser
Portland
, for example, had sent her floatplanes back to Espíritu Santo to prevent their flammability from becoming an issue.

All day Callaghan’s ships had been off Lunga Point shepherding transports and cargo ships of Turner’s latest convoy and bombarding Japanese positions. Anticipating the usual noontime air raid, the flotilla had gone to Condition Red but then stood down—Kelly Turner signaled that a flight of U.S. cargo planes would be arriving. When the first showed up, sure enough someone began shooting, and bedlam followed. Admiral Turner angrily demanded to know which ships had
not
fired. Fortunately no friendly aircraft were destroyed. At midafternoon the alert was real. The Japanese mounted a torpedo attack alongside their usual bombing. Amazingly, ships that had not managed to score against a single friendly aircraft virtually obliterated the JNAF strike force, which accomplished little except to get the transports to weigh anchor. One torpedo bomber crashed aboard the
San Francisco
, however, disabling her after the main battery gun director. The warships screened the convoy as it left through Indispensable Strait.

Meanwhile, in shelling Japanese positions they claimed destruction of a midget submarine near Kamimbo. Around sunset U.S. sailors went to general quarters again, and Callaghan’s flotilla prepared for the expected battle. In the gun director of destroyer
Sterett
, third in the van, despite his advanced optics Lieutenant Ray Calhoun could barely see the ships ahead of them. Their boiling wakes were the most visible feature. The vessels behind were ghosts, the night very dark with squalls.

The rain and dark especially bothered Vice Admiral Abe. Shortly after midnight he elected to turn away, reducing speed. Then the weather seemed to break and messages from Guadalcanal promised better conditions there. About twenty minutes after turning, Abe changed his mind, ordered a course reversal, and increased to eighteen knots. At 12:48 a.m. of November 13—Friday the thirteenth—Abe instructed Takama to begin his sweep. The battleships started loading the special incendiary AA shells that had been so effective on The Night. Another thing they had learned: This time the battleships would use weaker propellant charges to reduce overshoots. Unfortunately for them, Admiral Abe never did deploy into battle formation, and the two successive course reversals threw his armada
into confusion. Rather than an arrowhead of Vs protecting the core battlewagons, Abe now had small clumps of warships scattered across the sea. It was almost exactly 1:00 a.m.