Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun (47 page)

Japanese officers might be depressed, but on the other side of the mirror Allied leaders were not quite riding high. Admiral Halsey saw the enemy redoubts at Munda and Vila becoming major thorns in SOPAC’s side. The need to retrain troops and the disagreements with MacArthur hindered Halsey’s grinding ahead. The delay attendant in preparing new Russells bases also retarded an offensive. Even as codebreakers put finishing touches on their Yamamoto shoot-down decrypts, Halsey flew to Australia to coordinate with MacArthur. It was the first time they had met, and in person they cooperated very well.

In the meantime Admiral Halsey wore the enemy down. The Imperial Navy had begun sending the Tokyo Express to its new outposts as early as February. It had also run a few merchant ships into those places. Interdicting the traffic led the Bull to order offensive mining. While not a desperate measure, the mining represented a double-edged sword—with Halsey fully expecting to operate SOPAC forces here, minefields sown to catch the Japanese might very well cripple Allied vessels. Once the PT boat base in the Russells became active, and patrol craft were plying these waters regularly, the mines could become even more dangerous to Americans. The aspect of calculated risk was manifest.

Halsey also pursued the neutralization of Munda and Vila. By the time of Yamamoto’s I Operation, which obliged SOPAC to cancel a cruiser bombardment that Rear Admiral Ainsworth was to have carried out, the Japanese bases had been hit a good half dozen times. Beyond the cruiser forces, Admiral Halsey assigned destroyer units to these missions as well. Much like the Japanese at Guadalcanal, SOPAC commanders discovered that cruiser and destroyer bombardments appeared more effective than they actually were. Regardless of the weight of shells fired, the enemy air bases were typically in working order the next day. Naval bombardments supplemented constant air action. Three times Allied warships shelled Munda, the last on the night of May 12–13. The Vila base and nearby Stanmore Plantation were the targets on four occasions. Sometimes the bombardments were simultaneous, as on May 12–13, when Ainsworth’s cruisers hit Vila while Captain Colin Campbell’s destroyers shelled Munda. Since the JNAF had stopped actually basing aircraft, the number of planes vulnerable
to these bombardments was small. Every cruise involved a danger of being caught by enemy warships or air strikes, so Halsey used the sorties to punctuate an aerial campaign.

Aerial interdiction did not suppress Munda or Vila, but it did exact a price. And the campaign would be extended beyond New Georgia to hit the enemy farther up The Slot. Buin, Ballale, and Kieta went on the target lists. With B-17s and B-24s now flying from Guadalcanal—the Thirteenth Air Force was formed to lead Army air units in the Solomons—Halsey’s airmen ranged far afield. The air attacks were never milk runs. Japanese flak took a toll of strike aircraft, enough so that night missions became the primary tactic, at least against Bougainville. AIRSOLS and the Thirteenth Air Force also ran a vigorous night-intruder operation. JNAF night-fighter capability was quite limited. In any case the air campaign would be massive and constant.

The Navy’s communiqués tell the story. The department’s press office issued releases almost daily, sometimes more than one, reporting events as news reached Washington. Typically the information office ran a day or two behind operations, and, of course, the releases were shorn of such relevant information as the size of attacks, specifics of combat action, and so on. But the contours are readily apparent. In the seven-week (forty-nine-day) period through Yamamoto’s death, Munda was hit at least twenty-two times and Vila twenty-one. From the releases it is clear that some of these were multiple attacks, some were mass efforts, and some were simultaneous strikes at both places; a few were fighter sweeps, and some seemed to be intruder operations. Bombers struck the Buin complex twenty-one times. Kahili was by far the most popular target, but most “attacks” appear to have been harassment. Bombings or fighter sweeps engaged Rekata Bay on six occasions. Other places were also hit, but these targets absorbed by far the greatest effort. The massive I Operation strike at Guadalcanal did not prevent AIRSOLS from hitting Vila early that same morning, or Rekata Bay in the afternoon. Rabaul was not struck even once.

The handling of the Yamamoto shoot-down is quite interesting: Where news usually ran days behind, Navy Department Communiqué 348 of April 18 stated: “A number of Lightning (Lockheed P-38) fighters engaged two Japanese bombers, escorted by six Zero fighters, over Kahili in the Shortland Island area,” and went on to claim destruction of both bombers.
Everything else in the release concerned April 16. The mention of two bombers, information that
had not been
in the radio intercepts, reveals that authorities must have arranged in advance for the press office to run this current item, quite likely for the purpose of suggesting that the ambush had been nothing more than a routine air battle.

An Allied reorganization in March designated SOPAC naval forces as the Third Fleet and those under SOWESPAC the Seventh Fleet. Though the latter did not yet truly merit that appellation, Halsey’s Third Fleet had become a potent force. His major weakness remained lack of aircraft carriers. The
Saratoga
still represented the only fully capable flattop. The
Enterprise
continued to be hampered by her damage from Santa Cruz. Following a last round of training maneuvers, the “Big
E
” left the South Pacific at the beginning of May. At that moment the Royal Navy’s
Victorious
was en route to the Third Fleet. The
Victorious
and the
Saratoga
made up Halsey’s fast carrier force. He had several jeep carriers too, but they did not sail in the battle line. The
Victorious
served in the South Pacific throughout. Crewmen who had expected a long-term deployment were astonished when she was recalled. America’s industrial behemoth had begun to spew forth the new warships that would overwhelm Japan. Indeed, the same week the Americans hustled to prepare Yamamoto’s ambush, higher authority informed CINCPAC that
eight
new aircraft carriers would join the Pacific Fleet before the end of the year. By June 19, Nimitz had decided to release the
Victorious
to Royal Navy control on August 1. The light carrier
Princeton
replaced her.

Meanwhile SOPAC initiated its mine-laying campaign on March 20, initially focusing on Bougainville waters, especially Shortland harbor. Avenger aircraft from Guadalcanal laid most of the mines. They were credited with damaging a destroyer and a merchantman, and sinking another. Aerial mines laid in Blackett Strait—off Vila—and in the Munda area did not seem to faze the Tokyo Express, however. Accordingly, on May 6, Rear Admiral Ainsworth’s cruiser-destroyer group sauntered through Blackett Strait to clear it. Then, under Commander William K. Romoser, the modern destroyer
Radford
led three older tin cans converted into minelayers into the strait to deposit a standard three-row field. In no time this outing produced a signal success. The next day Captain Tachibana Masao led four Japanese destroyers from Buka to Buin, loading supplies for Vila, where they arrived after midnight on May 8. While getting under way, the
Kuroshio
touched off a mine, rendering her unnavigable. About half an hour later the
Oyashio
also hit a mine. Less heavily damaged, she took off many crewmen of the other vessel. The
Kuroshio
drifted onto a couple more mines, broke up, and sank. In the morning the
Oyashio
’s engines failed. Australian coastwatcher A. R. Evans promptly reported the enemy presence. They were set upon by SOPAC aircraft. Supported by destroyers
Kagero
and
Michishio
,
Oyashio
drove off the first strike, but the Americans returned in the afternoon to sink both
Oyashio
and
Kagero.
Tachibana’s single remaining ship, damaged by strafing, rescued survivors of all the others. Thrilled by such results, Halsey’s mine group repeated the exercise a week later in Kula Gulf, covered by Ainsworth’s cruiser bombardment of Vila. Alerted this time, the Japanese swept the mines. Repetition of operational formulas did not work on either side.

The hapless heavy cruiser
Aoba
staggered into the lagoon at Truk on April 25. The cruiser tied up next to repair ship
Akashi
, which labored to make her seaworthy enough to sail home for a proper fix in a shipyard. The
Aoba
’s brief return and almost instant crippling were a metaphor for Japan’s desperate condition. The ship would be hors de combat for seven long months. At midafternoon that day an Emily flying boat landed from Yokosuka. The patrol bomber carried Admiral Koga Mineichi, chief of the Yokosuka Naval District, ostensibly down for an inspection. Upon his arrival Admiral Koga assumed command of the Combined Fleet.

The
Aoba
held special meaning for Koga. The admiral had skippered that cruiser in 1930, a moment that from the Navy’s perspective might be considered the twilight of peace, before Imperial Japan had gone far into the machinations in China that led ineffably to the Pacific war. Koga had been a member of the so-called “treaty faction,” those who favored naval disarmament as part of a program to avoid conflict. The faction had been outplayed by others who aggressively sought advantage, and disputes begun in north China had embroiled Japan in a progressively deepening crisis, now extended across the Pacific. With the Imperial Navy increasingly tested, and its acknowledged finest leader—Yamamoto, Koga’s good friend—now dead, Koga was summoned to pick up the pieces.

The advent of Koga Mineichi surprised no Japanese. As early as January
1941, Yamamoto had written a memorandum advising on officers who could succeed him. Koga’s name was at the top of that list. That paper was secret, but opinion in the fleet put Koga in line for the top command. Only ten men stood ahead of Koga on the Navy List, including admirals who were retired, elevated to the supernumerary Supreme War Council, dead, or serving in indispensable positions, such as NGS chief Nagano or Navy Minister Shimada. Toyoda Soemu was just ahead of Koga, and the latter’s promotion to full admiral in May 1942, eight months after Toyoda, made Koga junior in rank. But Koga had Imperial household connections that Toyoda lacked, while Yamamoto’s secret advice had specifically counseled Koga over Toyoda. Both had graduated Etajima in 1905, a year behind Yamamoto, who had known them well.

When Admiral Nimitz mulled over the Yamamoto ambush, he and Captain Layton had discussed Koga’s potential. They agreed he would be a step down from his illustrious predecessor. But beyond a small circle of former American naval attachés, intelligence professionals, or officers with service in China, Koga Mineichi remained a cipher to the Allied camp. “In a race of unknown men,”
Time
magazine prattled, “he is an especial anonym.”

Koga wholly lacked Yamamoto’s flamboyance, probably the main reason for his not being better-known. The admiral was a stolid, competent officer who acted with caution and care, advancing steadily through the ranks. In the officer corps Koga was considered able, prudent, and amiable. He and Yamamoto had been shipmates as well as midshipman contemporaries, and political allies in the treaty faction. Koga was knowledgeable on both naval matters and international affairs, spoke French and some English, and was viewed as friendly to the United States. In 1937, when the fighting in China became generalized, Admiral Koga as vice chief of the Navy General Staff had participated with Yonai Mitsumasa in a last-ditch effort to settle the crisis. As a subordinate fleet commander in 1940, when Japan made demands on Vichy France that increased America’s hostility, Koga Mineichi had objected to the myopic policy. Before Pearl Harbor, informed of even more aggressive policies sure to bring war, Koga—who knew Yamamoto opposed them—complained of measures being taken without consulting the Combined Fleet leader.

Born in Saga prefecture of samurai stock, the fifty-nine-year-old Koga
Mineichi had graduated Etajima near the top of his class. His braininess showed in many ways. Hardly a year after passing the course at the Naval War College, Koga returned as an instructor. He had spent nearly five years assigned in France, including a tour as naval attaché. Koga had been a Combined Fleet staff officer. There were several berths on the Navy General Staff, including a stint in charge of the intelligence bureau and an unusual three-year tour. He had also been active on technical boards and worked for the staff of the emperor’s special inspector.

But Koga Mineichi was a battleship man amid an upheaval in the nature of warfare. In addition to the
Aoba
, Koga had skippered the battleship
Ise
and led a cruiser division. He had preceded Kondo Nobutake in command of the Second Fleet. Koga remained a solid surface warrior imbued with the traditional doctrine of decisive battle. With the NGS in the late 1930s, the admiral had argued that surface ships need not fear airplanes. The
Aoba
’s misfortune contradicted that view. As Second Fleet commander in 1941 he had opposed the transfer of his attached carrier unit to become part of the new all-flattop
Kido Butai.
In part, Koga’s opposition had been overcome by reassignment to lead the China Area Fleet, in which capacity he had blockaded Hong Kong when war began. Much now depended on Koga Mineichi’s flexibility and intellect.

The emergency nature of his appointment at least afforded Admiral Koga the opportunity to have his pick of subordinates, and the new C-in-C prevailed on the Navy General Staff to send him its vice chief, Fukudome Shigeru, as his staff boss. Vice Admiral Fukudome, who had been with Koga on the NGS in the 1930s, had much more experience with aviation, and that was a help. But a certain fatalism had set in. On several occasions when the press of business let up, Koga reflected to Fukudome that Yamamoto had been lucky to have passed while the war situation still seemed favorable.

Admiral Koga told Fukudome that the fleet would not stop its effort to force a decisive battle. On the plan for third-phase operations, necessary once IGHQ declared the war had entered this new period, Koga altered Combined Fleet’s contingency plans. He took account of changed conditions by designing a new kind of decisive battle. Completed in the summer, Koga’s plan divided the broad expanse of the Pacific into sectors and made local commanders responsible for preparing numerous air bases and fortifying each one. The various air flotillas could shuttle—as they had been
doing into Rabaul—among threatened sectors. Once an opportunity arose, the main strength of Combined Fleet would join with land-based air to smash the enemy. Under Koga the Navy began creating a new First Air Fleet as an elite JNAF formation—but it would not be ready for many months. Koga also engineered Kondo Nobutake’s relief. Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo, promoted to replace him at Second Fleet, had a reputation as an aggressive surface commander. Kondo went to the China Area Fleet.