Authors: Oliver Stone,L. Fletcher Prouty
Both parties were satisfied with the information they acquired from the Pentagon and from other sources in Washington. In due time the acquisition took place, and on October 13, 1963, news media in South Vietnam reported that an elite paramilitary force had made its first helicopter strike against the Vietcong from “Huey” Bell-Textron helicopters. It was also reported in an earlier chapter that more than five thousand helicopters were ultimately destroyed in Indochina and that billions of dollars were spent on helicopter purchases for those lost and their replacements.
Continuing the warfare in Vietnam, in other words, was of vital importance to these particular powerful financial and manufacturing groups. And helicopters, of course, were but one part of the $220 billion cost of U.S. participation in that conflict. Most of the $220 billion, in fact, was spent after 1963; only $2—$3 billion had been spent on direct U.S. military activities in Vietnam in all of the years since World War II up to and including 1963. Had Kennedy lived, it would not have gone much higher than that.
It is often difficult to retrace episodes in history and to locate an incident that became crucial to subsequent events. Here, however, we have a rare opportunity.
The success of the deal between the First National Bank of Boston, Textron, and Bell hinged on the escalation of the war in Indochina. A key man in this plan was Walter Dornberger, chief of the German Rocket Center at Peenemünde, Germany, during World War II and later an official with the Bell Aircraft Company. Dornberger’s associate and protégé from Peenemünde, Wernher von Braun, who had been instrumental in the development of the army’s Pershing and Jupiter rocket systems, became a central figure in NASA’s plans for the race to the moon. Such connections among skilled technicians can be of great importance within the military-industrial complex, as they generally lead to bigger budgets for all related programs.
Kennedy had announced a reduced military budget, the end of American participation in Indochina, and a major change in the race to the moon. It takes no special wisdom or inside knowledge to understand that certain vested interests considered the Kennedy proposal to defuse Vietnam and these other major budget items to be extremely dangerous to their own plans.
The pressure brought to bear upon Kennedy was intense, but some sort of major event was needed that would stir emotions and trigger action. It is very likely that the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, on November 1, 1963, in Saigon was one of those events. There were at least eight or nine more that, in retrospect, indicate that a plot against Kennedy had begun to unfold.
For example, in an unprecedented action, almost the entire Kennedy cabinet traveled to Honolulu for that conference on November 20, 1963, with Henry Cabot Lodge, then ambassador to Saigon.
Meanwhile, President Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon Johnson had left Washington for a goodwill visit to Texas. On November 21, the President and his party spent the night in Fort Worth, a city that had given him a particularly warm welcome because it was a major recipient of TFX aircraft contract funds and was scheduled to get the multi-billion-dollar Bell helicopter business.
Both of these trips were highly unusual. The Honolulu trip removed most of the Kennedy inner circle—a cabinet quorum—from Washington. To then extend such an absence with a trip to Tokyo by virtually the entire group would have been hard to justify on any grounds, at any time.
At the same time, the swing through Texas by the President and vice president directly violated a long-standing Secret Service taboo on events that brought both men together in public appearances.
Whatever the answers to these apparent mysteries, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the master scenario of the planned coup d’état had been set in motion, at the highest levels, well before the President set out for Texas. On the morning of November 22, the presidential party made the short flight from Fort Worth to Love Field, Dallas, and debarked from Air Force One for a rousing parade through the city.
As the presidential motorcade began its procession through the streets of Dallas, we note that many things which ought to have been done, as matters of standard security procedure, were not done. These omissions show the hand of the plotters and the undeniable fact that they were operating among the highest levels of government in order to have access to the channels necessary to arrange such things covertly.
Some of these omissions were simple things that are done normally without fail. All windows in buildings overlooking a presidential motorcade route must be closed and observers positioned to see that they remain closed. They will have radios, and those placed on roofs will be armed in case gunmen do appear in the windows. All sewer covers along the streets are supposed to be welded to preclude the sewer’s use as a gunman’s lair. People with umbrellas, coats over their arms, and other items that could conceal a weapon are watched. The list is long, but it is sensible and routine.
These things were not done that day in Dallas.
By 1963, the Secret Service had many decades of experience in the task of protecting presidents. There were ironclad procedures and policies that had been established ever since the Secret Service was given protection of the President and his family as its main responsibility by Congress following the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901.
Because the Secret Service is a relatively small organization, it customarily calls upon local police, the local sheriffs office, state police, the National Guard, and the regular military establishment for assistance as necessary. There is even a special course, called “Protection,” for personnel of selected military units to familiarize them with this responsibility. In this day of high technology, it has become a profession of great precision and expertise.
In a bureaucracy, it is more difficult to arrange for some office not to perform its duties than to let it do them. Such duties are automatic and built into the system. Therefore, when a unit does not perform its duties in accordance with custom and regulations, it is a signal that something highly unusual has occurred. In the case of the killing of President Kennedy, certain key people had been told they would not be needed in Dallas. Some were told not to do certain things, while others were simply left out altogether.
It is not always easy to obtain positive proof of a conspiracy, even when many facts point to its existence. The power of the conspirators may be such that they can squelch usual legal procedures. Thus, the public, if it is to know the truth, must discover what happened from details and circumstantial material supporting the case. Then, from whatever valid evidence becomes available, the public can eventually determine the nature of the conspiracy and the identity of those behind it.
More than 120 years ago, Special Judge Advocate John A. Bingham observed:
A conspiracy is rarely, if ever, proved by positive testimony. Unless one of the original conspirators betrays his companions and gives evidence against them, their guilt can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. It is said by some writers on evidence that such circumstances are stronger than positive proof. A witness swearing positively may misrepresent the facts or swear falsely, but the circumstances cannot lie.
2
In something as routine as the providing of protection for the President during a parade through a major U.S. city such as Dallas, the presence of variations in the routine can reveal the existence and the skill of the plotters. Let us review certain facts concerning the events surrounding President Kennedy’s death.
The Warren Report contains testimony by Forest Sorrels of the Secret Service. Sorrels said that he and a Mr. Lawson of the Dallas Police Department selected “the best route. . . to take him [the President] to the Trade Mart from Love Field.” This is a legitimate task. But was the route Sorrels chose truly the “best route” from a security standpoint? Why was that specific route chosen?
The route chosen by Sorrels and the Dallas police involved a ninety-degree turn from Main Street to Houston Street and an even sharper turn from Houston to Elm Street. These turns required that the President’s car be brought to a very slow speed in a part of town where high buildings dominated the route, making it an extremely dangerous area. Yet, Sorrels told the Warren Commission, this “was the most direct route from there and the most rapid route to the Trade Mart.”
What Sorrels did not say was that such sharp turns and high buildings made the route unsafe. Why did he and the police accept that hazardous route, especially when it was in clear violation of security regulations?
President Kennedy was shot on Elm Street just after his car made that slow turn from Houston. Many have considered this to be a crucial piece of evidence that there was a plot to murder the President. It is considered crucial because the route was selected by the Secret Service, contrary to policy, and because this obvious discrepancy has been ignored by the Warren Report and all other investigations since then. The conclusion that has been made is that it was part of the plot devised by the murderers; they had to create an ideal ambush site, and the Elm Street comer was it. Furthermore, no matter what route was selected for the presidential motorcade, the Secret Service and its trained military augmentation should have provided airtight protection all the way. This they did not even attempt to do, and this serious omission tends to provide strong evidence of the work of the conspirators. Someone, on the inside, was able to call off these normal precautions.
According to the Secret Service’s own guidelines, when a presidential motorcade can be kept moving at forty miles an hour or faster (in most locales), it is not necessary to provide additional protection along the way. However, when the motorcade must travel at slower speeds, it is essential that there be protection personnel on the ground, in buildings, and on top of buildings in order to provide needed surveillance. These personnel would have discovered, for instance, that before the shooting many windows in the Texas Schoolbook Depository Building were open, as on-the-spot photos revealed.
So few of the routine things were done in Dallas. Incredibly, there were no Secret Service men or other protection personnel at all in the area of the Elm Street slowdown zone. How did this happen? It is documented that Secret Service men in Fort Worth were told they would not be needed in Dallas.
The commander of an army unit, specially trained in protection and based in nearby San Antonio, Texas, had been told he and his men would not be needed in Dallas. “Another army unit will cover that city,” the commander was told.
I have worked with military presidential protection units. I called a member of that army unit later. I was told that the commander “had offered the services of his unit for protection duties for the entire trip through Texas,” that he was “point-blank and categorically refused by the Secret Service,” and that “there were hot words between the agencies. ”
I was told that this army unit, the 316th Field Detachment of the 112th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston in the Fourth Army Area, “had records on Lee Harvey Oswald, before November 22.” It “knew Dallas was dangerous,” the commander told my associate in explaining why he had offered his services, despite a call to “stand down.” Like an old dog, he’ll do his tricks without further instructions. Telling him “not to do his old tricks” would be futile.
This leaves an important question: Why was the assistance of this skilled and experienced unit ‘point-blank refused’? Who knew ahead of time that it would not be wanted in Dallas?
There were no Secret Service men on the roofs of any buildings in the area. There had been no precautions taken to see that all windows overlooking the parade route in this slowdown zone had been closed. The man alleged to have killed the President is said to have fired three shots from an open window on the sixth floor of the building directly above the sharp turn at the comer of Houston and Elm streets.
The availability of that “gunman’s lair,” if it was occupied at all, violated basic rules of protection. It overlooked the spot where the car would slow down. The building had many open windows at that time. No Secret Service men were covering that big building, and no Secret Service men were on the roofs of adjacent buildings to observe it or other such lairs. And no military units were in Dallas for that duty.
Why did the Secret Service men do everything wrong or omit doing things that were customary and were required for protection? Had they actually been told they were not needed? If so, who had the power and know-how to tell the Secret Service such a thing? Obviously, that authority had to have come from a very high level.
The official scenario of the President’s murder is patently absurd, for many reasons. The Warren Commission was required to base its entire story on a script that said there was only one gunman, that this gunman fired three shots from a single-shot Italian rifle from a comer, sixth-floor window, and that only these three shots were fired. The FBI and the Secret Service told the same story. They both reported three shots, fired by a single gunman, from the same rifle.
There are twenty-six volumes of the Warren Report. Most of that report is obfuscation and irrelevant data. If there was more than one gunman, if any shots were fired from any other location, or if there were more than three single shots, the entire house of cards fabricated by the Warren Commission and its allies, such as the FBI, the Secret Service, the armed forces, and the Dallas Police Department, among others, collapses.