JFK & the Unspeakable: Why He Died & Why It Matters (104 page)

“The order to destroy the letter was relayed to Dallas, where the letter was on file, by one of Mr. Hoover’s assistants, but the assistant would never have ordered the destruction of possible evidence except on Mr. Hoover’s expressed order, the source said.”
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Special Agent Hosty was not simply obeying orders from his Dallas chief, J. Gordon Shanklin. When Hosty flushed the Oswald letter down the toilet, then withheld that criminal fact from the Warren Commission, he was obeying the FBI’s chain of command. Everyone familiar with the FBI knew J. Edgar Hoover ruled it with an iron fist. Hosty was serving as Hoover’s instrument when he destroyed critically important evidence, from either Oswald or an impostor, three hours after Oswald was killed.

The Oswald letter to the FBI, if exposed and investigated, could have quickly unraveled the plot that had just killed Kennedy. That was not an option. J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI made certain the evidence would never be seen again.

After the FBI’s destruction of the letter became public in 1975, the House investigating committee referred it to the Justice Department for possible prosecution. The Justice Department chose not to pursue the matter against its own agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Although John Kennedy was in deepening conflict with his own Cold War government, he was supported in his turn toward peace by two improbable companions, a dying pope and a beleaguered Communist. In the final year of Kennedy’s life, Pope John XXIII and Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev became the president’s greatest allies in his pursuit of peace. They made all the difference. Without them, his isolation would have been almost complete.
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With them, he could begin to lay the foundations for a more peaceful world.

The unlikely trio of the capitalist president, the dying pope, and the Communist premier began to conspire for peace in the midst of an equally unlikely event for such collaboration, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because the Missile Crisis shocked and sobered Kennedy and Khrushchev, in spite of themselves they joined hands and began an about-face from war—with the active support of the pope and his secret peacemaking agent, a New York journalist, Norman Cousins. It was Cousins who, because of the behind-the-scenes cooperation of this odd trio, later dubbed them “the improbable triumvirate.”
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In October 1962, a group of leading Soviet academicians, writers, and scientists and a corresponding group of Americans converged at a secluded site in Andover, Massachusetts. They had journeyed secretly from mutually distant locations for a frowned-upon exercise in the frigid atmosphere of Cold War politics—seeking peace. Their quiet purpose in a weeklong dialogue was to begin to overcome East–West conflicts. In an unofficial context that encouraged honest talk, genuine peace initiatives could emerge. Norman Cousins, editor of the
Saturday Review
and a founder of SANE (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), was a prime mover of this peacefully subversive process.
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On their first night together, the Russians and Americans huddled around a television set. They had met just in time to hear President Kennedy speak to the nation on October 22, 1962. His speech defined, in U.S. terms, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy said, because Soviet missiles had been secretly delivered to Cuba, creating an intolerable situation, he had ordered the U.S. Navy to intercept further Soviet shipments.
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Confronted by an apocalyptic conflict that called into question their even being together, the national delegations agreed unanimously to continue their meeting. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. delegates then spent the week debating intensely but respectfully the questions involved in the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba and the U.S. blockade in response. While sharply divided along national lines, they shared a deep desire to find a way out of the crisis.
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Into this volatile, peace-seeking community came a Vatican visitor, Father Felix Morlion, an adviser to Pope John XXIII. Norman Cousins had met Father Morlion earlier that year. The Dominican priest had told Cousins about the pope: “All the world will come to acclaim and love this gentle man, Pope John. He is not arbitrary or fixed. He has a profound respect for people of all faiths. He wants to help save the peace.”
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At Andover, Father Morlion asked the members of both delegations, “Might a papal intervention in the Cuban crisis—even if only in the form of an appeal for greater responsibility—serve an important purpose? Would a proposal to both nations be acceptable that called for a withdrawal both of military shipping and the blockade?”
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Cousins phoned the White House. He spoke with Ted Sorensen, who consulted with President Kennedy. Sorensen told Cousins: “The President welcomes the offer of Pope John’s intervention.” However, Sorensen added, “The President cannot encourage Pope John to believe that his proposal meets the central issue. That issue is not so much the shipping but the presence of Russian missiles on Cuban soil. Those missiles have to be removed—and soon—if the consequences of the crisis are to be averted.”
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After a member of the Soviet delegation phoned Moscow, he reported, “The Pope’s proposal calling for withdrawal both of the military shipping and the blockade is completely acceptable to Premier Khrushchev.”
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Father Morlion relayed the Washington and Moscow reports to the Vatican.

The next day, Pope John issued a public plea for moral responsibility and peace that was delivered to the U.S. and Soviet Embassies: “We implore all rulers not to remain deaf to the cry of humanity for peace . . . to reassume negotiations . . . To set in motion, encourage and accept discussions at all levels and at any time is a maxim of wisdom and prudence.”
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Cousins noted: “In line with President Kennedy’s reservations, [the Pope] made no specific reference to the military shipments or the blockade. Instead, he directed himself to the clear obligation of political leaders to avoid taking those steps that could lead to a holocaust. He said that not just the Americans and Russians but all the world’s peoples were involved, and that their fate could not be disregarded. He said that history would praise any statesman who put the cause of mankind above national considerations.”
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“This message,” Khrushchev said later, “was the only gleam of hope.”
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The pope’s appeal was headlined around the world, including Moscow.
Pravda
, not known for its endorsement of papal statements, carried a front-page, banner headline citing Pope John’s plea to the Cold War leaders “not to remain deaf to the cry of humanity for peace.”
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When Khrushchev announced on October 28 that he would withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba,
Pravda
printed the pope’s message as a commentary on the resolution of the Missile Crisis, praising the “realism of the Pope concerning the question of peace.”
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At the Andover meeting, Father Morlion raised with Soviet delegates the idea of further communications between Rome and Moscow on peace. He suggested Norman Cousins would be an acceptable intermediary, “unofficial and unattached,” for the Vatican. Would he be acceptable also to Moscow? The Russians said they would find out.
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In late November 1962, Norman Cousins received a phone call in New York from Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington. Father Morlion’s project was approved. Premier Khrushchev had invited Cousins to meet with him in Moscow in mid-December.
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When Cousins notified the White House of his upcoming Vatican–Moscow mission, he was invited to meet with President Kennedy. The president told Cousins that Khrushchev “will probably say something about his desire to reduce tensions, but will make it appear there’s no reciprocal interest by the United States. It is important that he be corrected on this score. I’m not sure Khrushchev knows this, but I don’t think there’s any man in American politics who’s more eager than I am to put Cold War animosities behind us and get down to the hard business of building friendly relations.”
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When Norman Cousins arrived in Moscow, he was briefed by government representatives on how critically necessary it was for Khrushchev “to vindicate his basic policy of coexistence and to demonstrate that the Cuban situation, far from representing capitulation, could lead to agreements with the United States . . . Khrushchev’s supporters felt that the decision to withdraw from Cuba was an act of statesmanship and high responsibility, and could represent a vital turning point in the Cold War. Others, however, reserved judgment, saying it would be necessary to come up with specific agreements, before such an optimistic interpretation could be sustained.”
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In his meeting with Khrushchev, Cousins learned how much Pope John had impressed the Soviet premier.

“I am not religious,” Khrushchev said, “but I can tell you I have a great liking for Pope John . . . There’s something very moving to me about a man like him struggling despite his illness to accomplish such an important goal before he dies. His goal, as you say, is peace. It is the most important goal in the world.”

Khrushchev spoke of the impossibility after a nuclear war of distinguishing “Communists or Catholics or capitalists or Chinese or Russians or Americans. Who could tell us apart? Who will be left to tell us apart?”

Cousins found himself suddenly looking at a man whose “eyes were in a vacant stare.” The Soviet leader had retained an enlightened awe of nuclear weapons from the near-holocaust in October.

“During that week of the Cuban crisis,” he said, “the Pope’s appeal was a real ray of light. I was grateful for it.”

Cousins asked, “How did it feel to have your fingers so close to the nuclear trigger?”

Khrushchev said, “The Chinese say I was scared. Of course I was scared. It would have been insane not to have been scared. I was frightened about what could happen to my country—or your country and all the other countries that would be devastated by a nuclear war. If being frightened meant that I helped avert such insanity then I’m glad I was frightened. One of the problems in the world today is that not enough people are sufficiently frightened by the danger of nuclear war.

“Anyway, most people are smart enough to understand that it is ridiculous to talk in terms of another war. Pope John understands this. I would like to express my appreciation to him for what he did during the crisis of the Cuban week. Do you have any suggestions?”
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Cousins raised the prickly issue of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. He said Pope John was hopeful Archbishop Slipyi of the Ukraine could be released after eighteen years of internment.

Khrushchev stiffened.

“You know,” he said, “I’m rather familiar with the Slipyi case. I’m from the Ukraine. The entire matter is still fresh in my mind.”

Cousins said the point was not to reargue the case. The pope only hoped Archbishop Slipyi might be granted the freedom to live out his life in a distant seminary.

Khrushchev shook his head. “It is not a good idea. I would like to have improved relations with the Vatican, but this is not the way to do it. In fact, it would be the worst thing we could do. It would make a terrible stink.”
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“In what respect?” Cousins asked.

Khrushchev said if Slipyi were freed, banner headlines would proclaim falsely, “Bishop Reveals Red Torture.” Reporters would be certain to exploit his release. In the end, it would worsen relations with the Vatican.

Cousins assured Khrushchev that Pope John was acting in good faith. He would not exploit Archbishop Slipyi’s release for propaganda purposes. Khrushchev remained skeptical.

Cousins pushed Khrushchev for several minutes on the issue of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. The American then stood up to leave, feeling he might have overstayed his welcome. Yet he had still not raised other matters that concerned President Kennedy.

“Please sit down,” Khrushchev said. Reading Cousin’s mind, he asked, “How is President Kennedy?”

Assured by Cousins that the president was in good health and spirits, Khrushchev proceeded to explore with Kennedy’s unofficial intermediary the prospects for a test ban treaty and the Soviet premier’s fear of a re-armed Germany. When Cousins said in conclusion that there was no aspirant to the presidency in the United States more eager than Kennedy to end the Cold War, Khrushchev said, “If that’s the case, he won’t find me running second in racing toward that goal.”
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Cousins flew to Rome and met with Pope John, giving him warm written messages from both Kennedy and Khrushchev. The two Cold War leaders were deeply aware of Pope John’s pain and approaching death. The pope was becoming a dying bridge between them.

“Pain is no foe of mine,” the pope said. “Wonderful memories give me great joy now and fill my life. There is really no room for the pain.”