JFK & the Unspeakable: Why He Died & Why It Matters (59 page)

[
116
]. Nagell, November 21, 1975, affidavit in
Man Who Knew Too Much
, p. 56.

[
117
]. Ibid.

[
118
].
WCH
, vol. 20, p. 270.

[
119
].
WCH
, vol. 19, p. 577.

[
120
].
WCH
, vol. 20, p. 271.

[
121
]. Jim Garrison’s CIA-connected staff member William R. Martin reported back to Garrison on his prison interview of Nagell: “When questioned as to the identity of the persons speaking on the tape the subject stated openly that one of them was ‘Arcacha’ and another individual whom the subject would only identify as ‘Q.’ The subject did not wish to go into more detail concerning the tape at that time since he, all during our previous conversations, had indicated that our conversation could possibly be bugged.” William R. Martin Memorandum to Jim Garrison, April 18, 1967. Cited by James DiEugenio in
Assassinations
, p. 237. In Nagell’s own written comments on another Martin memorandum to Garrison, he described further the four persons on the audiotape as: (1) Oswald; (2) Nagell himself, who served as Oswald’s interpreter for the predominately Spanish conversation; (3) an unidentified person; (4) Angel. Cited by Russell in
Man Who Knew Too Much
, p. 425.

[
122
]. Russell,
Man Who Knew Too Much
, pp. 424, 642-44.

[
123
]. Ibid., p. 46.

[
124
]. Ibid., p. 47.

[
125
]. Ibid., p. 670.

[
126
]. Ibid., p. 695.

[
127
]. Nagell finally came to believe his immediate CIA contact was a double agent working for the Soviets, and that he’d been misled by him into “basically operating for the Soviets since signing his CIA contract the year before.” Russell concluded “that when Nagell found himself left out in the cold [in September 1963] by not only his CIA controllers, but by his contacts within Soviet intelligence as well, something in him snapped. Coming to the realization that he was being used, already aware that Oswald had long been in a similar boat, Nagell found himself backed into a lonely, terrifying and extremely dangerous corner. He was essentially a man without a country.” Dick Russell,
The Man Who Knew Too Much
(1992; updated ed., New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003), pp. 463-64.

[
128
]. Ibid., p. 447 (Russell’s emphasis).

[
129
]. Ibid., pp. 447, 451-52.

[
130
]. Ibid., pp. 449, 452.

[
131
]. Ibid., p. 452.

[
132
]. Ibid.

[
133
]. Ibid., p. 451.

[
134
]. Ibid., p. 465.

[
135
].
WCH
, vol. 11, p. 370. Gaeton Fonzi,
The Last Investigation
(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994), p. 111. Anthony Summers,
Conspiracy
(New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 387.

[
136
]. Fonzi,
Last Investigation
, pp. 382, 385. Also Silvia Odio interview by Gaeton Fonzi, January 16, 1976.

[
137
]. Ibid., p. 109.

[
138
]. Ibid., p. 111.

[
139
]. George Michael Evica,
And We Are All Mortal: New Evidence and Analysis in the John F. Kennedy Assassination
(West Hartford, Conn.: University of Hartford, 1978), pp. 119-20.

[
140
]. Ibid., pp. 109-10. Also Odio interview by Fonzi.

[
141
].
WCH
, vol., 11, p. 381.

[
142
]. The author of a State Department memorandum, written on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis, noted that JURE was “opposed by most of the established exile groups.”
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
,
October 1962-December 1963
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 25.

[
143
]. E. Howard Hunt,
Give Us This Day
(New York: Popular Library, 1973), p. 185.

[
144
].
Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba
, edited by Peter Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1998), p. 223.

[
145
]. Jean Daniel, “Unofficial Envoy: An Historic Report from Two Capitals,”
New Republic
(December 14, 1963), p. 16.

[
146
]. Hunt,
Give Us This Day,
p. 94.

[
147
]. Ibid.

[
148
]. CIA dispatch, July 22, 1963; cited by Gaeton J. Fonzi and Elizabeth J. Palmer, “Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE),”
Appendix
to Hearings Before the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of
Representatives (HSCA) Vol. 10: Anti-Castro Activities and Organizations, Investigation of the Assassination of President
John F. Kennedy
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 78.

[
149
]. CIA cables, October 11, 1963, and September 7, 1963; ibid.

[
150
].
WCH
, vol. 11, p. 371.

[
151
]. Odio interview. Also
Fonzi,
Last Investigation
, p. 111.

[
152
]. Odio interview.

[
153
].
WCH
, vol. 11, p. 379.

[
154
]. Fonzi,
Last Investigation
, p. 112.

[
155
]. Odio interview.

[
156
].
WCH
, vol. 11, p. 372.

[
157
]. Fonzi,
Last Investigation
, p. 112.

[
158
].
WCH
, vol. 11, pp. 372-73.

[
159
]. Ibid., p. 373.

[
160
]. Silvia Odio interview. Annie Laurie Odio Mallo interview by Gaeton Fonzi, September 19, 1978.

[
161
]. Ibid.

[
162
]. Edward Jay Epstein,
Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth
(New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 105.

[
163
].
Warren Report
, pp. 322-24. The
Warren Report
also claimed that a Cuban exile, Loran Eugene Hall, said that he and two companions (one of whom Hall said resembled Oswald) were the visitors at Odio’s door. Ibid., p. 324. However, Hall denied having made such a statement. Fonzi,
Last Investigation
, p. 115. And once again the
Warren
Report
’s argument ignored the at least equally sinister implications of the incident if it was not Oswald himself at the door.

[
164
]. Sylvia Meagher,
Accessories after the Fact: The Warren Commission, the Authorities, and the Report
(New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p. 379.

[
165
]. William P. Bundy, unpublished manuscript on the Vietnam War Decisions, chapter 9, “The Decline and Fall of Diem (May to November 1963),” p. 8; Papers of William P. Bundy, Box Number 1, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

[
166
].
FRUS
,
1961-1963,
vol. III, p. 591.

[
167
]. Ibid., p. 629.

[
168
]. “Steel: The Ides of April,”
Fortune
(May 1962), p. 97.

[
169
]. Charles Mohr, “Vietnam—Where We Stand and Why,”
Time
(May 2, 1963); cited by Blair,
Lodge in Vietnam,
p. 21.