Jungle of Snakes (6 page)

The result was General Order 100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” a synthesis
of the laws of war as they had evolved by the mid-nineteenth century. Its central theme was that the object of war was restoration
of peace, not the death of one’s foes. It included a long list of moderating guidelines for an occupying army. However, toleration
had limits and irregulars who fought out of uniform could be treated summarily as pirates rather than as legitimate combatants.
For active guerrilla sympathizers, legitimate sanctions included exile, relocation, imprisonment, fines, and confiscation.
Because of its realistic blend of moderation and severity, General Order 100 gained international accep-tance and served as
the basis for the first formal international agreements on the laws of war. On December 20, 1900, with the American presidential
election comfortably past, MacArthur informed the Filipino people of his new policy. Written in English, Spanish, and Tagalog,
his proclamation stated that the insurgents and their supporters were “collectively and individually” guilty of violating
the laws of war as encoded in General Order 100.
¹²
They would eventually be brought to justice. The proclamation’s special focus was on the most successful guerrilla elements,
namely, those who kidnapped and assassinated American collaborators, participated in the guerrilla’s shadow government that
operated in American-occupied towns, or fought without belonging to an orga nized military unit. MacArthur pledged to counter
their deeds with exemplary punishments as determined by American military tribunals. He noted that the excuse that someone
was acting because of intimidation by the insurgents would rarely be accepted.

Prior to MacArthur’s proclamation to the Filipino people, many American officers such as Matt Batson had already regarded
General Order 100 as justification for burning crops and buildings, incarcerating suspects, imposing curfews that authorized
shooting on sight anyone found near a telegraph line, and executing prisoners. In one sense, MacArthur was merely providing
official ac knowledg ment for practices already widely employed. However, most American military men had a different sense
of what MacArthur’s new policy implied. They understood that going forward they had official sanction for waging a much harder
war. General Samuel S. Sumner explained, “I am aware that this is a severe and stringent measure and will entail hardships
and suffering on the inhabitants, but it seems the only practical means at hand.”
¹³

MacArthur’s new counterinsurgency strategy coincided with a surprising decline in American popular support for the war. The
anti-imperialists were enraged that first the McKinley administration had waited until after the election to acknowledge the
extent of the Philippine insurgency and then implemented a much harsher policy. Anti-imperialist headlines announced that
MacArthur intended to show no mercy, telling Filipinos to “Be Good or Be Shot.”
¹⁴
As discouraging reports of violence and killing continued, opposition to the war spread beyond the anti-imperialists. On
the second day of 1901, the formerly supportive
New York Times
presented an opinion that spoke for many:

The American people are plainly tired of the Philippine War. The administration must be aware that the case of its enemies
is not weakened nor the confidence of its friends augmented by the daily reading about all this cost and killing. To kill
rebellion by inches and trust to patience and slow time to bring back peace and contentment is not a humane or wise policy.
It cannot be the lack of money. Is it the lack of troops, supplies, transportation, ammunition, artillery? Is it the lack
of a competent commander? The public simply does not know where the trouble lies. It does know that there is trouble somewhere.
Where is it? How long is this Philippine War going to last?
¹⁵

The continuing insurgent re sistance bemused some: “It seems strange to Americans that the Filipinos—or so many of them—are
bitterly opposed to our sovereignty. They must know it is likely to be a great improvement over former conditions . . . Nevertheless
they fight on.” Critics of the administration asked, “Is it not time to confess the whole policy a hideous blunder?”
¹⁶

The Federal Party

MacArthur’s decision for sterner war coincided with the peak of U.S. troop strength during the entire war. Freed from political
worries and with the rainy season over, MacArthur began 1901 by committing 70,000 veterans to an offensive. His focus was
the main island of Luzon. Win there, he argued, and the rest of the islands would fall into place. For the next seven months
elite task forces conducted lightning assaults on insurgent bases. Conventional forces made larger sweeps through the jungles,
swamps, and mountains that shielded the insurgents. In the countryside, American soldiers burned crops and buildings owned
by suspected insurgent sympathizers. In the towns, the Americans made mass arrests, paraded the suspects in front of collaborators
who identified the insurgents, and incarcerated the betrayed. Using investigative methods developed in La Union by William
Johnston, the Americans purged the civil administration of insurgent sympathizers and broke up the shadow governments.

Simultaneously, an important segment of the local population decided to put their lives on the line in support of the American
cause. They called themselves the Federal Party. With the support of MacArthur and Taft, a prominent group of Manila
ilustrados
and former revolutionary officials formed the party in December 1900. The party’s basic plank was recognition that the Philippines
was under U.S. sovereignty and belief that this was only a temporary state of affairs leading to eventual in dependence. Of
course, their decision had a strong component of self-interest. The found-ers of the Federal Party had concluded that after
McKinley’s reelection the Americans were in the Philippines for the indefinite future. Prolonged warfare would tear the islands
apart, which was good neither for the nation nor for themselves. If against all odds the insurgents ultimately triumphed,
the status of the
ilustrados
in society was still likely to change for the worse because the underclasses would demand more change. On the other hand,
if the Americans triumphed, then those who had supported them would have a seat at the table during the national restructuring.

While the Federal Party may not have been dominated by selfless patriots, its ranks included hundreds of very brave individuals.
They traveled around the islands to speak out in favor of U.S. policies. They also used their contacts with the insurgency
to try to convince insurgent leaders to give up. Increasing numbers of guerrillas, including some prominent senior officers,
heeded the call of the Federal Party and came down from the mountains to surrender. They did all of this at considerable personal
risk. Aguinaldo reacted to the rise of the Federal Party and the emergence of other collaborators by ordering their capture
and trial by drumhead court-martial followed by execution.
¹⁷
More broadly, anyone who held a position in the American civil administration continued to face punishment ranging from a
$100 fine to death.

A Spectacular Raid

Starting in the autumn of 1899, the time Aguinaldo decided to inaugurate guerrilla war, the Filipino leader became a marked
man. American units vied with one another for the glory of capturing the insurgent leader. None surpassed the zeal of Batson’s
Macabebe Scouts. “I hunted one of his Generals to his hole the other night,” Batson wrote his wife, “and captured all his
effects as well as his two daughters.”
¹⁸
Such relentless pursuit forced Aguinaldo to keep on the move. He and his small band of loyal staff endured exhausting treks
across rugged terrain. They were often hungry, reduced to foraging for wild legumes supplemented by infrequent meat eaten
without salt. Sickness and desertion reduced their ranks. Aguinaldo’s response was periodic exemplary punishments, drumhead
courts-martial, firing squads, and reprisal raids against villages that either collaborated with the Americans or failed to
support the insurgents. “Ah, what a costly thing is in dependence!” lamented Aguinaldo’s chief of staff.
¹⁹

Aguinaldo took solace from the occasional contact with the outside. In February 1900 he received a bundle of letters including
a report that the war was going well with the Americans suffering “disastrous” political and military defeats. A correspondent
in Manila affirmed that the people “were ready to drink the enemy’s blood.”
²⁰
The high command’s ignorance of outside events was startling. For example, Aguinaldo and his party learned from a visitor
that five nations had recognized Philippine independence. However, his chief of staff reported that “we do not know who these
five nations are.”
²¹
Indeed, the chief of staff candidly recorded that since fleeing into the mountains “we have remained in complete ignorance
of what is going on in the present war.”
²²

During his exodus Aguinaldo was unable to exercise effective command of his far-flung forces. This did not change after he
sought refuge in the remote mountain town of Palanan in northern Luzon. All Aguinaldo could do was write general instructions
to his subordinates and issue exhortations to the Philippine people. His efforts had scant effect on the war. What was important
was his mere existence. He was the living symbol of Filipino nationalism. In addition—and this mattered to the
ilustrados
who managed the war at the regional and local levels—as long as he remained free the insurgents could say that they fought
on behalf of a legitimate national government.

Funston interviewed Sigismundo to learn details about Aguinaldo’s headquarters (and, according to Aguinaldo, subjected him
to the “water cure,” an old Spanish torture whereby soldiers forced water down a prisoner’s throat and then applied pressure
to the distended stomach until the prisoner either “confessed” or vomited; in the latter case the pro cess started again).
²³
Palanan was ten miles from the coast, connected to the outside world by a single jungle trail. Although Americans had never
operated in this region, obviously the trail would be watched. Funston conceived a bold, hugely risky scheme to capture the
insurgent leader. He selected eighty Tagalog-speaking Macabebes who disguised themselves as insurgents coming to reinforce
Aguinaldo. Funston armed them with Mauser and Remington rifles, typical weapons for the undergunned insurgents. To make the
reinforcements seem more believable, four Tagalog turncoats performed the role of insurgent officers. To make the bait even
more enticing, five American officers acted as prisoners and accompanied the column. Nothing if not personally brave—he had
earned the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1899—Funston was one of the five.