Kelly (17 page)

The Air Force in this country was considering development of two new fighters, the F-14 and F-15.

Back in 1969, I questioned publicly whether these aircraft actually would be competitive with the best Russian fighters. Specifically, I said that I thought the cost of the proposed F-15 would be more expensive than necessary, that a smaller, less-expensive airplane could do the job, just as well.

Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force, then Senator from Missouri, very much wanted that F-15 contract for his state. He called in Dan Haughton, then Lockheed board chairman, and me and announced that whether we liked it or not that contract for the F-15 would be awarded to McDonnell. Kelly Johnson was not to give any more argument. Haughton was under the gun and promised that he’d see that I didn’t. I did not promise in my own right.

We, Lockheed, had made an unsolicited proposal to the USAF for an advanced, highly-maneuverable lightweight fighter that we could have had flying within a year at absolute minimum cost. We had lined up a dozen of our vendors with whom we were then working on another project, including Pratt & Whitney for the jet engines, other suppliers for armament, gunsights, wheels, tires—the whole package. It was a darn good airplane. The X-27, later designated X-29, was basically a new airplane, but it utilized the nose design of the F-104 which by that time had fired millions of rounds of ammunition. We even proposed firing tests on the first flight to prove we had a fighting airplane.

David Packard, then Deputy Defense Secretary, was very much impressed with the proposal. But Robert Seamans, Jr., Air Force Secretary, did not like the idea of buying a fighter in that manner. He preferred the conventional method—an experimental model first, production plans later.

I disagreed with the USAF on procurement policy.

“This airplane is not so advanced that you cannot develop the ‘X,’ the experimental airplane, into a production prototype,” I argued. “I don’t want to draw a line on paper that does not consider production. Why go to double prototyping?”

We came close to receiving a contract for that airplane, but what eventually killed any prospect for our producing the lightweight fighter were the financial problems that Lockheed encountered in 1971—first, losses from several fixed-price contracts for the U.S. military, then the threatened loss of the company’s new L-1011 commercial transport program with the unexpected bankruptcy of Great Britain’s Rolls-Royce, manufacturer of the engine. The very future of Lockheed was in question, and the Air Force reasoned understandably that they should not risk awarding the contract to the company.

Our proposal did, I believe, result in the USAF’s eventual design competition for a lightweight fighter. The plane they got at least ten years later, after double prototyping by General Dynamics and at nearly three times the cost, was comparable in performance. That was the F-16.

If the military would spend one or two percent of the cost of developing an experimental airplane in planning production at the same time, it would come back in savings many, many times over.

The Skunk Works method of developing the F-104, for example, could save a considerable amount of money if applied to procurement of new aircraft.

On that airplane, every time we released an engineering drawing to our manufacturing director, Art Viereck, to build a part for the experimental airplane, we also released it to a group of production engineers with these instructions: “Find every alternative way of making this, ruling out adverse effect on drag, maintenance, or cost. You can affect them all favorably.”

When we finished building the prototype, we had a thick report on how to build a production model. We sat down for three days with that book to choose the best way to build the airplane from every point of view. It saved from $10,000 to
$20,000 for every airplane built, by my estimate. Total production worldwide was about 2,500.

Kelly with the first JetStar, which critics declared would never attain commercial success
.

Costs must be considered. Aircraft are getting to be so expensive they hardly are worth it for what they can do. With the price of fighter aircraft now running more than $30 million per plane with all the equipment, not including pilot costs, I can foresee the day when the fighter pilot will be on the ground, flying an unmanned fighter with a missile in it. With the latest electronic advances, I think this can be done remotely at a great saving in aircraft costs—and, of course, great saving in manpower, to say nothing of the greater safety for the pilot. It’s worth considering.

W
HATEVER ELSE IT HAS DONE AND EVER WILL DO
, the U-2 is indelibly identified in the public mind as the “Spy Plane” in which Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Russia on May Day of 1960 while on a photo reconnaissance mission for the CIA.

The plane has been used for high-altitude weather research, earth resources survey, communications satellite, and aerial mapping—as well as reconnaissance.

It came into being for that purpose—reconnaissance—though this was disguised in first public announcements of its existence.

In a press release for Monday, May 7, 1956, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) announced “Start of a new research program” and a “new airplane, the Lockheed U-2 … expected to reach 10-mile-high altitudes as a matter of routine.”

“Tomorrow’s jet transports will be flying air routes girdling the earth … at altitudes far higher than presently used except by a few military aircraft,” NACA Director Dr. Hugh L. Dry den explained. “The availability of a new type of airplane … helps to obtain the needed data … about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude … in an economical and expeditious manner.”

The NACA release identified the plane with specific high-altitude research work in clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind sheer, and jet stream. Also to be studied were
cosmic rays and concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere including ozone and water vapor.

“As a result of information so to be gained, tomorrow’s air travelers might expect a degree of speed, safety and comfort beyond present hope of the air transport operators,” the announcement continued.

“A few of the Lockheed airplanes are being made available for the expanded NACA program by the USAF.

“The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area, are being obtained from flights from Watertown Strip, Nevada.”

All true—in time.

An internal Lockheed memo issued at the same time to corporate executives from Courtlandt Gross described the plane as “of conventional, straight-wing design … with light wing loading to enable routine flight in the 50,000- to 55,000-foot altitude range … powered with a single Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine.

“We built a prototype with our own funds, and its high-altitude capabilities quickly attracted sufficient military interest to earn us an Air Force contract for a limited number.…

“Its development has been … under the direction of C. L. Johnson, who last month assumed the new positions of vice president research and development, and director of special projects for the California division.…

“The Air Force found the U-2 to be a good, economical flight platform for use in a joint test program with the Atomic Energy Commission. For this reason, and because of the experimental nature of the aircraft and its test equipment, further details are classified.”

On July 9, another NACA press release covered the U-2’s assignment overseas.

“High Altitude Research Program Proves Valuable,” was the headline.

“Initial data about gust-meterological conditions to be found at 10-mile-high altitudes which have been obtained to date by the relatively few flights of Lockheed U-2 airplanes have
already proved the value of the aircraft for this purpose.…

“… Within recent weeks, preliminary data-gathering flights have been made from an Air Force base at Lakenheath, England, where the Air Weather Service of the USAF is providing logistical and technical support. As the program continues, flights will be made in other parts of the world.”

The six-page news release went on to list and describe the atmospheric data-gathering instrumentation carried in the airplane.

Design of the U-2 had begun several years earlier. In 1953, we at Lockheed had been made aware of this country’s desperate need for reconnaissance of Soviet missile and other military capabilities. A requirement existed for an airplane that could safely overfly the USSR and return with useful data. The plane was needed “now.”

My first thought was to explore the proven F-104 design for possible application to this mission. Phil Colman and Gene Frost of our preliminary design department were assigned this task. It soon became obvious that the only equipment we might retain from the F-104 might be the rudder pedals. We initiated an entirely new design.

These were the requirements. The airplane would have to fly at an altitude above 70,000 feet so vapor trails would not give away its presence, have a range better than 4,000 miles, have exceptionally fine flight characteristics, and provide a steady platform for photography with great accuracy from this high altitude.

It would have to be able to carry the best and latest cameras as well as all kinds of electronic gear for its own navigation, communication, and safety.

Our first presentation was to the Air Force, where it was turned down as too optimistic. They questioned that any engine even would operate at the altitude we were proposing. They were correct in that there was not proof at that time that this was possible. And the Air Force already had an airplane in development with the Martin company—an airplane with two engines which was preferred to our single-engine design.

But our proposal reached Trevor Gardner, then Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, and a brilliant engineer in his own right. Late in 1953, he invited me to come to Washington to discuss it. He had assembled a committee of scientists and engineers, and for three days they put me through a grilling as I had not had since college exams. They covered every phase of the aircraft design and performance—stability, control, power plants, fuels—everything.

Later I met and lunched with Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and his right-hand man, Larry Houston, among a distinguished group. When I was asked why I thought Lockheed could do what I proposed—build 20 airplanes with spares for roughly $22 million and have the first one flying within eight months, Gen. Donald Putt graciously volunteered, “He has proven it three times already—on the F-80, F-80A, and F-104.”

The secrecy of this project was impressed on me by Gardner. I understood that I was essentially being drafted for the job—becoming a “spook”—the intelligence community’s label for their agents. I returned to Burbank with instructions to talk only with Robert Gross and Hall Hibbard. Despite the fact that they had sent me to Washington with instructions not to commit to any new projects because the plant already had several military programs in engineering, they agreed that we must cooperate with this important work. Trevor Gardner himself later met with Gross and Hibbard to confirm formally the contract.

I organized the project with 25 engineers including myself in the experimental department and with Art Viereck again in charge of the shop, with a staff that gradually grew to 81 people.

It had been decided in Washington that the project could best be handled under the CIA’s direction and funding, with the Air Force providing the engine. We had been working with Pratt & Whitney on developing the J-57 for this purpose. There was no time to develop a new engine; we had to use existing equipment.

Richard Bissell, “special assistant” to Dulles, was selected
to direct the program. Bissell, an economist, quickly became very knowledgeable on engineering matters. He has described his introduction to the program:

“I was summoned one afternoon into Allen’s office; and I was told with absolutely no prior warning or knowledge that one day previously President Eisenhower approved a project involving the development of an extremely high-altitude aircraft to be used for surveillance and intelligence collection over ‘denied areas’ in Europe, Russia, and elsewhere. I was to go over to the Pentagon, present myself in Trevor Gardner’s office and there with Gardner, Gen. Donald Putt of the Air Force, Gen. Clarence Irvine and others, we were to decide how the project was to be organized and run.

“The first time I heard Kelly’s name mentioned was in a call put through by Trevor Gardner to Kelly in which he gave him a go-ahead to develop and produce 20 U-2 aircraft. We had an almost impossible schedule to meet.”

First program manager for the USAF was Col. O. J. “Ozzie” Ritland, special assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, USAF Headquarters. He was followed by Col. Leo P. Geary, USAF.

One of our first tasks was to find a base from which to operate. The Air Force and CIA did not want the airplane flown from Edwards AFB or our Palmdale plant in the Mojave Desert. So we surveyed a lot of territory. There are many dry lakes in and around Nevada, and the lakebeds are generally quite hard, even under water in the rainy season. A site near the nuclear proving grounds seemed ideal, and Bissell was able to secure a presidential action adding the area to the Atomic Energy Commission’s territory to insure complete security.