Authors: John Buntin
The city council seems to have taken this request calmly. On August 14, 1934, its members agreed to present the Fire and Police Protective League proposal to voters as Amendment No. 12-A.
The public was not highly attuned to the issue of police discipline. Surveys conducted during the mid-1930s show that the public wanted the police to be disciplined, effective, and nonpolitical. They should be “neat and military” in their appearance; they should take “a professional interest” in their work and be of at least average intelligence; and they should treat “normal” citizens with courtesy. When it came to less “normal” citizens, it was no holds barred. A majority of voters consistently endorsed
harsher
treatment for “ex-convicts, Negroes, aliens, radicals, and gangsters.”
Some observers did pick up on what Parker and Cooke were trying to do. The liberal
Los Angeles Daily News
was one, correctly noting that in claiming the right to police itself the LAPD was effectively removing that right from the city’s politicians. Notwithstanding the record of corruption that Los Angeles politicians had compiled, a significant number of Angelenos were hesitant to grant the department such sweeping protections. When Amendment No. 12-A went before voters on September 27, 1934, it passed by a mere 676 votes, with 84,143 in favor and 83,467 opposed. However, a narrow victory is still a victory. It was the beginning of Bill Parker’s wider reputation in the department. Years later, an article in the newsletter of the LAPD’s American Legion chapter would describe the (amended) Section 202 of the city charter as “our most priceless possession,” and credit “Comrade Bill” as the measure’s “co-author.”
UNION ACTIVISM is not always the swiftest path to a police executive’s affection, but Parker’s legal work seems to have impressed Chief James Davis. Two more different personalities are hard to imagine. Parker was cerebral and wry. Davis was a peacock. Handsome (in a slightly puffy, heavily pomaded way), the chief loved uniforms, hats (particularly sombreros), braiding, and decorations. The Rev. Bob Shuler, a frequent critic, described him as “a man with pink complexion who looks like he had a massage every morning and his fingernails manicured.” However, few voiced such criticisms directly. Manicured or not, the 240-pound Texan looked as if he could snap most of his critics in half. A close observer of
the Los Angeles political scene would later describe him as “a burly, dictatorial, somewhat sadistic, bitterly anti-labor man who saw communist influence behind every telephone poll.” He was also, arguably, insane. One of Davis’s favorite ways to entertain dignitaries visiting the department was to have a member of his beloved pistol-shooting team shoot a cigarette out of his mouth, a la William Tell.
Davis’s tactics were rough. One of his favorites was “rousting,” described thusly in an admiring 1926
Los Angeles Times
profile by police reporter (and Chandler hatchet man) Albert Nathan:
First the word goes out of the chief’s office that the “rousting” is to begin and is to be kept up for a week.
Then all of the liquor squads take to the street, armed with pictures of the best known rum runners and the various members of their “mobs,” and begin looking for them.
As fast as any of the wanted men are located they are seized, handcuffed, loaded into a patrol wagon and escorted to jail. They are then locked up on charges of vagrancy or any other charge which may come to the mind of the arresting officer. In a few hours attorneys appear, writs are secured through the local courts and the prisoners are released…. One by one they are released and then arrested again and again. During a “rousting” a man may be arrested as many as six times, and each time has to stay in jail for one hour to two days before he gets out. After awhile the wanted men learn that every time they saunter up Spring Street they will be arrested and that they are not even safe in their homes.
Even at the time, this struck many as unlawful. “The rousting system may, as many contend, be unlawful,” the
Times
conceded, but no matter: “[T]his is known and records provide it: The system works.”
Nor were regular citizens exempt from his scrutiny. In 1936, Chief Davis dispatched 126 officers to sixteen highway and rail entry points on the California border to prevent “Okies” fleeing the dustbowl—he called them “the refuse of other states”—from entering California. The Los Angeles papers dubbed it (approvingly) the Bum Blockade. Inspectors from the State Relief Administration reported that officers were “exercising extra-constitutional powers of exclusion, detention, and preemptive arrest” that “seemed more like the border checkpoints of fascist Europe than those of an American state.” Davis responded that 48 percent of the people turned back had criminal records.
“It is an axiom with Davis that constitutional rights are of benefit to nobody but crooks and criminals, and that no perfectly law-abiding citizen ever has any cause to insist on ‘constitutional rights,’” reported the
Los Angeles Record
sarcastically. “Chief Davis honestly and sincerely believes that the whole country would be better off if the whole question
of constitutional rights was forgotten and left to the discretion of the police.”
But as implausible as it may seem, Chief Davis was also something of a reformer.
*
One of Davis’s first steps was to reinstitute rules against accepting gratuities and soliciting rewards that had lapsed under his predecessor. During his first forty-five months in office, Davis discharged 245 officers for misconduct. However, the strongest evidence for the proposition that Chief Davis was a reformer comes from his treatment of Bill Parker.
In 1934, Chief Davis turned to Parker to draft the bylaws for his beloved training facility in the hills of Elysian Park, today’s Los Angeles Police Academy. Yet despite this interaction with Chief Davis, Parker’s promotional path continued to be a rocky one. On June 5, 1935, Parker took the examination for lieutenant. He scored sixth on the written test, lower on the more subjective oral test, and ended up in the number ten position on the promotional eligibility list. Not until January 18, 1937, was he promoted to the position of lieutenant—and then only after two officers with lower scores had been promoted before him.
Then, suddenly, his career took off. In early 1937, Parker became Chief Davis’s executive officer. In this position, he served as Chief Davis’s scheduler, advisor, and gatekeeper, granting and withholding access to the chief and maintaining relationships with politicians from the mayor to city council members. He also headed the small bureau of public affairs. Work relations between the two men were formal: Parker was always “Lieutenant,” never “Bill.” Davis was simply “Chief.” In private, however, the two men became friends. Parker (and sometimes Helen) frequently joined Davis for hunting and fishing trips with Davis’s sons. Observers of departmental politics soon noted young Bill Parker’s all-too-obvious ambitions. The reluctant police officer, the young man who had barely bothered with his entrance exam, now clearly aspired to one day become chief.
Soon after Parker joined the chief’s staff, Davis made him an acting captain—a move that no doubt raised hackles in the department. Davis probably didn’t care. He needed Parker for something big.
IN 1933, voters had replaced Mayor Porter with county supervisor Frank Shaw. Shaw was not Harry Chandler’s kind of candidate. For one thing, although he was ostensibly a Republican, Shaw embraced the agenda of the newly elected Franklin Delano Roosevelt. For another, Shaw had gotten his start in politics as a city council member backed by Kent Parrot, with whom he maintained close (if vague) ties. Chandler’s suspicions proved to be well founded. After taking office, Frank Shaw turned to his brother Joe, recently discharged from the U.S. Navy, to help him oversee municipal affairs. Joe’s title was personal secretary; however, he soon took control of every potential patronage and profit center in the city. Not surprisingly, “The Sailor” (as Joe was known) took a particular interest in the LAPD and in the Los Angeles underworld.
During the 1920s, Kent Parrot and Charlie Crawford had controlled Los Angeles. Joe was determined to revive the old police-underworld arrangements, but this time with himself on top. Where Parrot and Crawford had sought to impose a monopoly, Shaw was willing to tolerate a variety of players—as long as they all paid up and their operations didn’t attract too much attention. Remnants of the Combination soon resurfaced. So did new players such as Jack Dragna, a Sicilian crime boss who focused primarily on traditional activities like extortion, prostitution, and bootlegging. (He also had a legitimate sideline as a banana importer and often referred to himself as a banana merchant.) There was plenty of money to go around. The
Hollywood Citizen-News
estimated that the L.A. underworld was generating roughly $2 million a month (20 percent of which went to selected policemen, politicians, and journalists).
Daily News
columnist Matt Weinstock put the figure even higher. His sources figured the Combination at its height was grossing about $50 million a year.
The key to it all was control of the police department. Joe Shaw was determined to make sure he had it. In principle, Chief Davis answered to the Police Commission. In practice, Shaw placed the police department’s most important operations under his close supervision by insisting on making Shaw campaign manager James “Sunny Jimmy” Bolger Chief Davis’s secretary. The fact that the chief’s office was located in City Hall, just around the corner from the mayor’s office (an arrangement instituted by Mayor Porter), further shortened Davis’s leash. Bill Parker’s job was to help him escape it.
IN EARLY 1937, working once more through the Fire and Police Protective League, Parker launched an effort to amend section 1999 of the city charter—this time, to extend civil service protections to the chief of
police. The ballot initiative Parker drafted consisted of a single sentence: “Shall proposed charter amendment No. 14-A, amending section 1999 of the Charter clarifying the civil service status of the Chief of Police, providing that he shall not be removed except for cause and after hearing before the Board of Civil Service Commissioners, be ratified?” It seemed a modest change, but its potential consequences were immense. If it passed, the position of chief of police would no longer serve at the pleasure of the Police Commission (and the mayor who appointed its members). Instead, once sworn in, the chief of police would have a “substantial property right” in his position. The chief of police could be suspended or fired only if found guilty of a specific set of publicly aired charges after a “full, fair and impartial hearing” before the city’s Board of Civil Service Commissioners. Needless to say, in a city as corrupt as Los Angeles, a full hearing was something that Mayor Shaw would never be prepared to risk. In short, Proposition 14-A would dramatically strengthen Chief Davis’s position vis-a-vis the Shaws. On Tuesday, April 6, 1937, the electorate of Los Angeles approved it by a vote of 79,336 to 69,380.
It was an amendment that would change the history of Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Police Department, long subordinate to some combination of the mayor, the underworld, or the business community (or sometimes all three), now had the legal protection it needed to emerge as a power in its own right.
It also had a potent new adversary. The same year Bill Parker was attempting to erect a ring of legal protections around the chief’s office that neither corrupt politicians nor the remnants of the Combination could breach, one of the most formidable figures in the history of American organized crime arrived in Los Angeles. His name was Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel. Mickey Cohen was his muscle.
*
It was also something of a racket. According to historian Gerald Woods, wealthy Angelenos purchased $1,000 memberships that brought with them preferential treatment for parking and speeding violations. (Woods, “The Progressives and the Police,” 324.)
*
In truth, when viewed in the context of the time, the tactics championed by Chief Davis are not as outrageous as they first appear. Most police reformers believed that improving police officers’ shooting skills was an effective deterrent to the gangsterism that plagued urban America. “Rousting” was a standard law enforcement tool. The Bum Blockade was less extreme than the transient forced labor camps proposed by the city’s Committee on Indigent Alien Transients one year earlier. Advocates of wholesale fingerprinting were common too. August Vollmer, a Berkeley police chief and professor who became a hero to progressives in the 1920s, openly endorsed “a system of checking the movements of persons traveling from one state to another.” (Vollmer,
The Police and Modern Society
, 24.)
“Booze Barons of other climes are just bootleggers in Los Angeles. Gangsters can never build another Chicago here.”
—LAPD statement, 1931
BY 1937, Bugsy Siegel was one of the most important men in organized crime. During the 1920s, Siegel and his partner, Meyer Lansky, had made names for themselves in the New York City underworld as fearless stickup men, bootleggers, and muscle-for-hire. In 1927, Siegel participated in one of the earliest efforts to coordinate bootlegging on the Atlantic seaboard. Two years later, Lansky helped organize a national crime “syndicate” at a meeting of the nation’s top crime bosses in Atlantic City. In 1931, Siegel reputedly took part in the successful hit on Joe “the Boss” Masseria—the man young Mickey Cohen had seen in the bleachers at Stillman’s—at a restaurant on Coney Island. The assassination made Charles “Lucky” Luciano (a longtime Lansky friend) the boss of New York and made the loose group organized by Lansky, which would soon come to be known as the Syndicate, the underworld’s preeminent institution.
*
In short, Siegel was a figure the likes of which the L.A. underworld had never seen before. Yet Siegel did not originally move west to play the heavy. Instead, like generations of migrants before and since, he came west with dreams of health, wealth, and leisure.