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Authors: Jeffrey D. Simon

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There is, however, a great deal of uncertainty regarding how exactly a bioterrorist attack will unfold. Bioterrorism is characterized by much more uncertainty regarding tactics, targets, weapons, and scenarios than is the case for conventional terrorism, the terrorism that we are all more familiar with because it has happened so many times before. Conventional terrorism includes tactics such as hijackings, bombings, shootings, kidnappings, barricade/hostage incidents, suicide airplane attacks, and the like. The targets of conventional terrorist attacks include governments, militaries, businesses, and society, while the weapons used by conventional terrorists are, among other things, explosives, guns, knives, and rocket-propelled grenades. And with many different types of conventional terrorist attacks occurring over the years, ranging from simultaneous car and truck bombings to assassinations and hijackings, we know of thousands of different scenarios that may occur.

But it is an entirely different story when we look at the world of bioterrorism. Since there has never been a bioterrorist attack with large numbers of casualties, perpetrated either by a lone wolf or a terrorist group, there is no substantial track record of previous major
bioterrorist incidents to guide us in planning for this threat. We really don't know what tactics, targets, weapons, or scenarios will be associated with current and future bioterrorists. In terms of tactics, lone wolves could disperse anthrax spores from a low-flying airplane or crop duster, or they might release a biological agent from the ground in an aerosol device such as a spray can. They could place ricin in the heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC) system of a building, or they could infect somebody with smallpox and watch it spread around the world. The targets could be the usual suspects, such as governments, militaries, businesses, and the general public, or it could be the economy. A viable target could be agriculture, for example, in the form of destroying crops and livestock. The weapons for a lone wolf bioterrorist attack could be any one biological agent or a combination of several different biological agents, including anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, ricin, and/or new, novel agents that are genetically engineered. And when it comes to scenarios, we are confronted with basically a blank slate. We know of the anthrax letter attacks, but almost everything else when assessing what terrorists are likely to do with bioweapons is pure speculation, since we just do not have a database or history of major incidents to analyze. All this works to the advantage of the lone wolf perpetrating a bioterrorist attack. Furthermore, since biological agents are invisible, odorless, and tasteless, and symptoms of a biological-agent attack may not appear for hours or even days, a lone wolf could thus unleash these agents without raising suspicions at the scene of the attack.

The technological barriers for a lone wolf interested in producing and disseminating a biological agent are not insurmountable. As one microbiologist writes:

Today, anyone with a high school education can use widely available protocols and prepackaged kits to modify the sequence of a gene or replace genes within a microorganism; one can also purchase small, disposable, self-contained bioreactors for propagating viruses and microorganisms. Such advances continue to lower the barriers to biologic-weapons development.
54

Former secretary of the navy Richard Danzig agrees, noting:

Compared to working with nuclear materials, the challenges of developing the requisite know-how and obtaining the required equipment for bioterrorism are modest. The hurdles that impede obtaining an effective biological weapon will vary from pathogen to pathogen, according to the mode of distribution and the efficiency desired by an attacker. But all these hurdles are being lowered by the dissemination of knowledge, techniques, and equipment.
55

The most difficult, and therefore least probable, of the weapons of mass destruction that could be used by a lone wolf is a nuclear weapon. The appeal of such a weapon to a terrorist lies in its killing potential. Nuclear weapons “can be more than a million times more powerful than the same weight of conventional explosives, create shock waves, high pressures, flying debris, and extreme heat—the same mechanisms by which conventional explosives injure and kill, albeit at vastly increased scale.”
56
Nuclear explosions also create radiation, which can kill or injure exposed people at the instant of detonation. There is also the risk of fallout, which can spread over an area much greater than that affected by the bomb's immediate radius. Fallout can also lead to long-term, delayed medical problems, including cancer and genetic abnormalities.
57

Yet the technological, logistical, and financial obstacles involved in acquiring or building and using nuclear weapons would seem to be too much for a lone wolf to overcome. Nuclear weapons are much more expensive to produce than chemical or biological weapons, and the technology needed to devise such weapons is not widely available. It is also much more difficult for a lone wolf to transport a nuclear device to a target site without being discovered through radiation detectors and other security devices than it would be for a lone wolf to transport a chemical or biological weapon. While a lone wolf could attempt to attack a nuclear power plant with a conventional explosive, the tight security in place at most nuclear plants would be difficult for a lone wolf to penetrate. Furthermore, a conventional
explosive is unlikely to do much damage to nuclear-reactor plants because they are built to resist damage by explosives and even the impact of commercial aircraft.
58

There has been much discussion in policy and academic circles regarding terrorists building a crude nuclear device or stealing a nuclear weapon. Distinguished political scientist Graham Allison observed that “nuclear terrorists are most likely to use a small weapon stolen from the arsenal of one of the nuclear states.”
59
However, one of the world's leading terrorism experts, Brian Michael Jenkins, disputes this argument, noting, “While the possibility that some talented team of terrorists conceivably might someday design and build a crude nuclear device cannot be entirely dismissed, no terrorist group, not even those with potential access to poorly guarded nuclear sites like Russia's Chechens or those with hundreds of millions of dollars to spend like al Qaeda, has come close.”
60
Both Allison and Jenkins were referring to groups or cells of terrorists and not to lone wolf operatives, for which obtaining and using a nuclear weapon would be even more difficult. Lone wolves are, however, capable of setting off a “dirty bomb,” which is not a nuclear bomb but rather a conventional explosive filled with radioactive material. While such an attack would not kill large numbers of people, except for those killed by the initial blast, it would still cause widespread panic and health problems related to airborne radiation.

Given how dangerous lone wolves can be, their creativity and innovation make them difficult to ignore. Yet there is a missing link in the story of lone wolf terrorism. Unlike many terrorist groups that have female members or even female leaders, the majority of lone wolves have been male. Why, then, have we not had many female lone wolves, and should we expect this to change in the coming years?

When it comes to explaining lone wolf terrorism, the absence of women is one of the more perplexing issues. After all, women have played significant roles in terrorist groups throughout history, and a few have ascended to leadership positions. Terrorists as diverse as the Russian revolutionary group Narodnaya Volya, the German leftist Baader-Meinhof Gang, the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the Palestinian al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, to name just a few, have all had women in their ranks. Women have been used in various roles within terrorist organizations, including providing logistical support, joining their male comrades in violent attacks, and even becoming suicide bombers themselves. Women have been involved in virtually every type of terrorist tactic used by a group, ranging from hijackings and midair plane bombings to armed assaults and kidnappings.

Yet with only a few exceptions, all lone wolf terrorists have been male. It is not as though women are excluded from becoming lone wolves. This form of terrorism is an equal-opportunity employer. No barriers would seem to exist in preventing a woman from venturing out on her own to blow up a building, hijack a plane, or initiate a mass shooting. Why, then, has lone wolf terrorism been a male-dominated activity? In order to answer this question, we have to first examine the role of women in various terrorist groups both today and in earlier periods for any clues as to why women have not acted as lone wolf terrorists.

FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST GROUPS

When women began embarking on suicide operations in recent years as members of various terrorist movements, people were understandably shocked. The public had grown accustomed to male suicide bombers, but the idea that a woman would also blow herself up in order to kill innocent victims was mind-boggling. The concept of a female terrorist was still something most people had a hard time grasping, despite the fact that women had participated in terrorist groups for a long time. Beginning with the Russian terrorists in the late-nineteenth century and continuing today with both Islamic and non-Islamic militant groups, women have consistently been integral players in the world of terrorism.

Terrorism was rampant in Russia in the 1880s, as the first modern terrorist group, Narodnaya Volya (“The People's Will”), waged a relentless campaign of dynamite bombings against government officials, culminating in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Dynamite, which was invented in 1867 by Swedish chemist Alfred Nobel, was a godsend for anarchists and other militants, since it was a powerful weapon that was easy to conceal. Nobel was so dismayed to see his invention used for violent purposes—he had intended it to be used for peaceful endeavors such as construction—that he left millions of dollars in his will to establish the annual Nobel Prizes, including the Nobel Peace Prize. The Russian terrorists embraced dynamite because, in addition to its wide availability and easy use, it had an important symbolic value. Since the assailant was usually killed along with the targeted person, it separated the terrorists from common criminals, who would be afraid to use such a weapon.
1
It also inspired admiration among some segments of the public, since the perpetrators were basically sacrificing their lives in the attacks.

Women were quite prominent in Narodnaya Volya. There were ten females among the twenty-nine members of the original executive committee.
2
Throughout the 1880s, women participated directly in the group's operations.
3
Nearly a quarter of all Russian terrorists
during this period were women.
4
It was a woman, in fact, who inspired the Russian terrorist movement. As I noted in
chapter 1
, Vera Zasulich's proclamation that she was a “terrorist, not a killer” after shooting a police commander in 1878 made her a heroine throughout Russia. Narodnaya Volya was eventually crushed by the new regime of Tsar Alexander III, after the assassination of his father, Tsar Alexander II. This led to a reduction in terrorist attacks. Terrorism, however, was revived in Russia in the early 1900s by the Socialist Revolutionary Party, with women once again being very active. In fact, from 1905 to 1908, there were eleven terrorist attacks committed by Socialist Revolutionary women.
5

It would be several decades, however, before women once again became prominent in terrorist activities. The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a surge in terrorism around the world, with many spectacular incidents captivating public attention. Palestinian militants were at the forefront of this violence. In July 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al plane on a flight from Rome to Tel Aviv and diverted it to Algeria. Later that same year, the PFLP attacked an El Al plane at the Athens airport, killing one passenger. There were more attacks on El Al airliners in 1969, including a hijacking in August, in which two PFLP terrorists seized the plane on a flight from Rome to Athens and diverted it to Damascus. After allowing the passengers and crew to disembark, the two terrorists blew up the plane's cockpit. One of the terrorists was a woman, and she quickly gained notoriety and, in some places around the world, admiration. Leila Khaled instantly became the most famous female terrorist of her time. People were mesmerized by the concept of women seizing and blowing up planes or doing other dangerous things thought to be the sole province of men.

It didn't hurt that Leila Khaled was beautiful, smart, and daring. As one observer noted, “She became a sex symbol for her violence; she shattered a million and one taboos overnight; and she revolutionized the thinking of hundreds of other angry young women around
the world.”
6
Her value to the PFLP was so high that when she was captured during another hijacking less than a year later, the PFLP went all out to gain her release. Khaled and another PFLP member hijacked an El Al plane bound for New York on September 6, 1970. (The PFLP also hijacked three other planes [from Pan American World Airways, Trans World Airlines, and Swissair] bound for New York from European cities on that same day, making it the most spectacular hijacking in terrorism history until the 9/11 hijacking-suicide attacks in the United States.) Israeli security guards on the plane were able to kill Khaled's fellow hijacker and capture her while the plane was still airborne. The plane then landed in London, where British authorities arrested Khaled. The PFLP wanted her released but didn't feel that the British hostages they were holding from the three other hijacked planes would be enough to use as bargaining chips. They wanted something more important, so they came up with a simple solution—hijack a British plane! They did that a few days later and then used the hostages from the British Overseas Airlines Corporation airliner to eventually win Khaled's release.
7

Another female hijacker who gained publicity around the world was Julienne Busic, who, along with her husband, Zvonko, and three other Croatian extremists, seized a Trans World Airlines plane flying from New York to Chicago in September 1976. They demanded that a manifesto promoting the cause of Croatian independence from the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav federation be published in several newspapers and that pro-Croatian independence leaflets they had carried with them be dropped by helicopters flying over cities across the United States and Europe. To demonstrate their willingness to kill passengers if their demands weren't met, they told the authorities that they had a bomb aboard the plane and that another explosive device, as well as the manifesto that they wanted published, could be found in a locker across the street from Grand Central Station in New York City. The police located the bomb and took it to a demolition area, where they attempted to trigger it by remote control. When nothing happened after fifteen minutes, the bomb
experts approached the device without wearing protective gear, and it exploded, killing one officer and injuring three others.

Meanwhile, the hijacked plane embarked on a long odyssey that included stops in Montreal, Gander, Newfoundland, Reykjavík, and finally Paris, where French authorities shot out the tires from the plane so it could not take off again. Before the ordeal was over, the Croatian independence manifesto was published in the
New York Times
, the
Washington Post
, the
Chicago Tribune
, and the
Los Angeles Times
. Leaflets were also dropped over North American cities as well as London and Paris. The hijackers surrendered in Paris and were sent back to the United States. The most remarkable aspect of the hijacking was that the terrorists had no weapons onboard. The “bombs” they claimed they had turned out to be fake, some of them made from clay.
8

Just like Leila Khaled after her first hijacking, Julienne Busic, who was born in the United States, was viewed as a heroine by many people in Croatia and other parts of the world. This was yet another example of the famous slogan: “One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter.” Busic had poets write to her, and Croatian television, newspapers, and magazines interviewed her after her release from prison.
9
Interestingly, both she and Khaled did not consider themselves to be terrorists. Khaled told an interviewer, “My work as a freedom fighter has given me happiness; you identify yourself with the struggle. It is the difference between a freedom fighter and an ordinary person. As a Palestinian I wouldn't be happy with myself unless I was a freedom fighter. I am glad I have done so much.”
10
Busic said, “I could never consider myself a terrorist. I'm just not a terrorist. I'm not a criminal, I mean in so far as I have no criminal nature, no criminal mind.”
11

There is another similarity between these two female hijackers who had very different backgrounds and causes for which they were fighting. Both Khaled and Busic fell victim to a variation of the “Stockholm Syndrome.” The term originated with a bank robbery and hostage incident in Stockholm, Sweden, in August 1973. The hostage episode lasted five days, with the hostages gradually viewing
their captors as their protectors, fearing that a police rescue attempt might result in their deaths. When the gunmen finally surrendered, the hostages were afraid that the police might shoot the gunmen, so the hostages formed a protective shield around them as they all came out of the bank. Some of the hostages said later that they felt no hatred toward their captors. They felt that their captors, by not killing them, had given them their lives back. And one of the hostages actually wound up marrying one of the gunmen while he was serving his prison sentence. Therefore, whenever there is a hostage situation and the hostages, after the ordeal is over, do not condemn their captors, they are described by the media and other observers as having fallen victim to the Stockholm Syndrome. However, this syndrome can affect both the hostages
and
the hostage takers. The three basic phases of the Stockholm Syndrome are positive feelings of the hostages toward their captors, negative feelings of the hostages toward the police or other government authorities, and the reciprocation of the positive feelings by the captors.
12

Julienne Busic had positive feelings for those she was holding captive on the plane. “I felt like I was experiencing sort of a reverse Stockholm Syndrome,” she recalled years later. “It was like I identified with the passengers, too, to the extent that I believed that we were all on the same side.” One former hostage told reporters that Busic “acted almost like a stewardess walking up and down the aisle talking politely to people and calming them.”
13
After she was arrested and was in the airport control tower in Paris, she realized that she had in her possession her husband Zvonko's address book. She did not want the authorities to discover this, but she didn't know how to dispose of it. When she saw the released passengers and crew walk by her in the tower, she came up with an idea. “I go up to the steward…and I said, ‘Listen, you've got to hide this for me! Because this is Zvonko's address book!' And he looked at me like I was crazy. And I was so upset. Because you know we had gone through all this and we were all one big happy family. And now he wouldn't do that.”
14

Khaled also identified with her captives. Before she hijacked her
first plane in 1969, she was waiting in the lounge to board the aircraft when she saw a little girl playing with her sister. “For the first time I realized that I would be endangering her life,” Khaled said. “If the plane blew up during our hijack, or if it was shot down by Israeli anti-aircraft fire, then those innocent children would die.”
15
Khaled was also troubled by a conversation she had with a Greek man before she boarded the plane. He told her that he lived in the United States and was returning to Greece for the first time in many years to visit his mother. This reminded her of separations in her own family when she was growing up. “I knew very well what it meant to be away from home, from your mother and sisters, and I was thinking about this while this man talked to me.” After the hijacking was over, she saw him sitting and crying. She told him, “Now you are OK. We will send your mother a telegram, and she can meet you.”
16

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