Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 (47 page)

Following the pogrom, and certainly in part as a result of it, an opposition group was formed at Freiburg University. The Freiburg Circle (
Freiburger Kreis
) was composed mainly of university members close to the Confessing Church (and also of some Catholics); Gerhard Ritter, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Adolf Lampe, and Constantin von Dietze were its leading figures.
¹⁰⁴
The group’s discussions resulted in the drafting of the “Great Memorandum,” which offered a social, political, and moral basis for a post-National Socialist Germany. The fifth and last appendix to the Memorandum, completed by Dietze in late 1942, listed “Proposals for a Solution of the Jewish Question in Germany.”
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Present-day German historians still find it hard to explain these proposals, and refer to the “schizoid atmosphere” that engendered them.
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The Freiburg group—which had come into being after the pogrom and by the time of this last appendix was also fully aware of the extermination of the Jews (which is mentioned explicitly in Dietze s “Proposals”)—suggested nonetheless that after the war the Jews be internationally subjected to a special status. Moreover, although the “Proposals” rejected the Nazis’ racial theories, they recommended caution regarding close contacts and intermarriage between German Christians and other races—the allusion to the Jews is clear.
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It seems that even in one of the most articulate groups of anti-Nazi academics, there was explicit and deep-seated anti-Jewish prejudice. One of the best-informed historians on the subject of the Freiburg Circle, Klaus Schwabe, rejects the conclusion that Dietze was motivated by anti-Semitism.
¹⁰⁸
Yet, in his program, Dietze accepted and recommended some of the traditional German conservative anti-Semitic positions, despite what he knew of the Jews’ fate. The logical corollary is obvious: If a university resistance group, consisting mostly of members of the Confessing Church or the Catholic Church, could come up with such proposals even though they had knowledge of the extermination, the evidence of prevalent anti-Semitism among Germany’s elites must be taken into account as a major explanation of their attitudes during the Third Reich.

In an indirect way, however, the pogrom created further tension between the German Catholic Church and the state. On November 10 the National Socialist Association of Teachers decided not only to expel all remaining Jewish pupils from German schools but also to stop providing (Christian) religious education—as had been the rule until then—under the pretext that “a glorification of the Jewish murderers’ nation could no longer be tolerated in German schools.” Cardinal Bertram sent a vigorous protest to Rust in which he stated that “whoever has the least familiarity with the Catholic faith and certainly every believing teacher knows that this assertion [that the Christian religion glorified the Jews] is false and that the contrary is true.”
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IV

“The foreign press is very bad,” Goebbels noted on November 12. “Mainly the American. I receive the Berlin foreign correspondents and explain the whole issue to them…. This makes a big impression.”
¹¹⁰
Press comments were scathing indeed. “There happen in the course of time,” said the Danish
Nationaltidende
on November 12, “many things on which one must take a stand out of regard for one’s own human dignity, even if this should involve a personal or national risk. Silence in the face of crimes committed may be regarded as a form of participation therein—equally punishable whether committed by individuals or by nations…. One must at least have the courage to protest, even if you feel that you do not have power to prevent a violation of justice, or even to mitigate the consequences thereof…. Now that it has been announced that after being plundered, tortured and terrorized, this heap of human beings [the Jews of Germany] will be expelled and thrown over the gate of the nearest neighbor, the question no longer remains an internal one and Germany’s voice will not be the only one that will be heard in the council of nations.”
¹¹¹

The American press was particularly vehement. “In the weeks following
Kristallnacht
, close to 1,000 different editorials were published on the topic…. Practically no American newspaper, irrespective of size, circulation, location, or political inclination failed to condemn Germany. Now even those that, prior to
Kristallnacht
, had been reluctant to admit that violent persecution was a permanent fixture in Nazism criticized Germany.”
¹¹²
President Roosevelt recalled Ambassador Hugh Wilson for consultation.

But despite such emotional outpourings, basic attitudes and policies did not change. In the spring of 1939, Great Britain, increasingly worried by the pro-Axis shift in the Arab world—a trend with possibly dire consequences for Britain in case of war—reneged on its commitments and for all practical purposes closed the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration. No alternative havens were even envisaged by the British colonial authorities. As A. W. G. Randall of the Foreign Office stated on June 1: “The proposed temporary solution of Cyprus has, I understand, been firmly rejected by the Governor, it is unthinkable that a miscellaneous crowd of Jews could be admitted to any other part of the Empire.”
¹¹³

After slightly liberalizing its immigration policy in 1937, the United States did not even fill the quotas for Germany and Austria in 1938.
¹¹⁴
In July 1939 the Wagner-Rogers Child Refugee Bill, which would have allowed twenty thousand Jewish refugee children to enter the country, was not passed by the Senate,
¹¹⁵
and, at the same time, despite all entreaties, the 936 hapless Jewish emigrants from Germany who had sailed on the soon-to-become-notorious
St. Louis
, after being denied entry to Cuba, their destination, were not admitted into the United States.
¹¹⁶
Their voyage back to Europe became a vivid illustration of the overall situation of Jewish refugees from Germany. After Belgium, France, and England finally agreed to give asylum to the passengers, the London
Daily Express
echoed the prevalent opinion in no uncertain terms: “This example must not set a precedent. There is no room for any more refugees in this country…. They become a burden and a grievance.”
¹¹⁷

By then even some relatively well-known Jews had not the least certainty of reaching the the United States. In February 1939 Thomas Mann intervened in favor of Kafka’s friend and biographer Max Brod with H. M. Lyndenberg, the director of the New York Public Library: “Dr. Max Brod, the German-Czechoslovakian novelist and dramatist…is anxious to leave Czechoslovakia and come to the United States. He fears he will not survive the period of fifteen months to two years which he would have to wait to enter this country as an ordinary immigrant…. He writes that he is willing to give his collection of books and manuscripts of Franz Kafka to any institution of repute which would accept it and in return offer him a position to act as assistant or curator of the collection, and so make possible his entry into this country…. Perhaps you will agree with me that the possibility of acquiring the manuscripts and books of so well known a writer as Franz Kafka is an opportunity deserving of consideration quite apart from the human tragedy of the individual for whom the collection represents the one real chance of escape from an intolerable situation.”
¹¹⁸
Ultimately Brod managed to escape to Palestine.

France was neither more nor less inhospitable than other countries, but it did not volunteer even a symbolic gesture of protest against the anti-Jewish pogrom. It was the only major democratic country that did not react.
¹¹⁹
Most newspapers expressed their outrage, but neither Prime Minister Édouard Daladier nor Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet did so. On the contrary, Bonnet continued with the planning for Ribbentrop’s visit to Paris, which was to lead to a Franco-German agreement.

In a way the official French attitude demonstrated that Hitler did not have to worry too much about international reactions when he unleashed the pogrom. But the outcry that immediately followed the events of November and the criticism now directed at the French attitude confirmed that the Munich atmosphere was quickly dissipating. No less a supporter of appeasement than the London
Times
was taken aback by Bonnet’s eagerness to go ahead with the agreement, the pogrom notwithstanding. The American secretary of state rejected Bonnet’s request that the American government express its approval of the agreement, even if only in the form of a press statement. In view of the strained United States-German relations following Kristallnacht, the secretary deemed such approval entirely inappropriate. Even the Italian government expressed surprise that “the recrudescence of anti-Semitic persecutions in Germany did not lead to the ruin of the project of Franco-German declaration.”
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The German foreign minister arrived in Paris on December 6. According to the German version of the second discussion between Ribbentrop and Bonnet, which took place on December 7, the French foreign minister told Ribbentrop “how great an interest was being taken in France in a solution of the Jewish problem,” and he added that “France did not want to receive any more Jews from Germany.” Bonnet then supposedly asked whether Germany could not take measures to prevent further German Jewish refugees from coming to France, since France itself would have to ship ten thousand Jews somewhere else. (They were actually thinking of Madagascar for this.) Ribbentrop then told Bonnet, “‘We all wish to get rid of our Jews,’ but the difficulty lay in the fact that no country wished to receive them and, further, in the shortage of foreign currency.”
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Bonnet’s oft-quoted remarks to Ribbentrop were not an isolated occurence. In fact, less than two weeks before the Franco-German meeting, on November 24, the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Great Britain and France met in Paris in order to coordinate their countries’ policies. The problem of the Jewish refugees from Germany was raised. Daladier complained that there were some forty thousand of them in France and that no more could be taken in. The possibility of sending the refugees to the colonies was discussed. It was agreed that the French would ask Ribbentrop if the German measures making it almost impossible for the refugees to take along some of their belongings could be alleviated.
¹²²
Whether this issue was mentioned at all during Ribbentrop’s visit to Paris is unclear.

Yet another sequel to the events of November took place—at least for a time—in the French capital: preparations for the trial of Herschel Grynszpan. The forthcoming event attracted worldwide attention. Hitler dispatched Professor Friedrich Grimm to Paris in order to follow the work of the prosecution, while an international committee headed by the American journalist Dorothy Thompson collected money to pay for Grynszpan’s defense. Grynszpan’s lawyer, Vincent Moro-Giafferi, was one of the most respected criminal lawyers in France and an ardent antifascist.
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The beginning of the war interrupted the preparations of both prosecution and defense. When the Germans occupied France, the Vichy government duly delivered to them the young Jew they were searching for. Grynszpan was incarcerated in Germany, and Goebbels started to plan a huge show trial in which Herschel Grynszpan would have stood for “international Judaism.” Nothing came of it, as in 1942 the accused suddenly announced that he had had a homosexual relationship with Rath. Such a line of defense, if presented in public, would have been disastrous in the eyes of the Nazis. Grynszpan did not survive the war; the circumstances of his death remain unknown.
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During these early months of 1939, the expulsion of the Jews from the Reich continued to follow the pattern inaugurated in 1938; the Jews were sent over the borders, but usually to no avail. In February 1939 a SOPADE report described a scene witnessed in the west of the country, near the border with France. The Jews were taken from their homes and herded together in the city square. In the evening they were transported to the border, only to be brought back the next day, as the French would not let them through. Later they were shipped off to Dachau.

The report described the jeering and the insults coming from youths and “hysterical women.” But “most of the older people who accidentally came upon this scene could not hide their indignation over this spectacle. Words were exchanged with people who wanted to defend the measures against the Jews. People said: ‘They [the Jews] are no worse than other businessmen; and those who took over their businesses are more expensive and have poorer quality goods.’ The excitement was so great that nothing could be undertaken [by the authorities] against these dissidents. A large segment of those previously transported are here again, and have been received kindly by the public. People ask them sympathetically if they have no possibilities of emigrating. Some answer that they are trying, and others point to the great difficulties. Now it has reached the point where children confront Jews and demand money. Some give it to them and create the impression that they themselves have become childish.”
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On December 23, 1938, very strict orders had been issued by Gestapo headquarters to all stations on the western borders of the Reich to prevent illegal crossings of Jews into neighboring countries, due to increasing complaints. However, as the SOPADE report indicates, and as a further Gestapo order of March 15, 1939, confirms, such illegal crossings, mostly initiated, it seems, by local authorities, must have continued well into the spring of that year.
¹²⁶
On exceptionally rare occasions, officials on the non-German side of the borders took the risk of aiding the illegal entry of Jews into their countries, whether the refugees were pushed over the frontier by the Germans or were trying to cross on their own. Such was the case of Paul Gruninger, the commander of the border police in the Swiss canton Saint Gall. By predating visas and falsifying other documents, he helped some 3,600 Jewish refugees to enter Switzerland in late 1938 and early 1939. Gruninger’s activities were discovered. In April 1939 he was dismissed and, later, sentenced to a heavy fine and to the loss of his pension rights.
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As the result of a lengthy public campaign, Gruninger was rehabilitated—fifty-four years after his sentencing, twenty-three years after his death.
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