Nelson: Britannia's God of War (38 page)

Hyde Parker had favoured waiting for the Baltic fleets to come out into the Skaw for a battle, while Nelson was anxious to get at the Russians, whom he saw as head and heart of the conspiracy – he understood Russian aims and their seamanship from his time in the
Mediterranean. Nelson pressed Parker to move. Time was of the essence, and he was in no doubt that the fleet should pass the Sound, anchor before Copenhagen and support the efforts of the diplomats to find a peaceful solution. War or peace, it must be quick.
⁴⁶
The diplomatic mission of Nicholas Vansittart and William Drummond was not going well, however. The Danish Foreign Minister Count Bernstorff, whom they met on 14 March, proved immovable, despite their promises and threats: ‘The Count answered that the appearance of a British Fleet would make no difference in their resolutions.’
⁴⁷
He also refused to accept their credentials unless the British embargo of Danish trade was removed. Their mission ended with Bernstorff’s note of 16 March, so offensive in language and principles ‘as to leave little doubt of the hostile determinations of the Danish Government ’.
⁴⁸

On 19 March the fleet arrived in the Skaw to find Vansittart had been dismissed. It was time for war. On the 21st and 22nd gales forced the fleet to anchor. Late on the 22nd, Vansittart and Drummond joined the fleet from Copenhagen on HMS
Blanche
. Parker realised Bernstorff’s letter was a declaration of war, and learnt of the preparations in hand at Kronborg and Copenhagen. He informed the Admiralty that the moment the wind allowed, the fleet would enter the Sound and ‘put their orders into execution’.
⁴⁹
Reports of two hundred cannon at Kronborg and floating harbour defences and batteries at Copenhagen shook Parker. He had expected to support the Danes against the Russians, and now decided to go direct to Revel through the Great Belt ‘to attempt the destruction of the Russian ships at Revel which are expected’. If necessary he could attack Copenhagen from the south. However, the wind was against him, and he anchored. It appeared to him that the Danish defences were very strong: ‘from the depth of water it will be very difficult to dislodge them without vessels of force, of a less draught of water than the ships of the line.’
⁵⁰

Nelson, appalled by Parker’s procrastination, quickly compiled a sermonising letter, setting out the issues as he saw them and stressing the need to act immediately. The enemy was daily growing stronger; the British would never be better placed than they were at the present moment. The Government expected him to attack Copenhagen if the Danes would not negotiate. He had the honour and safety of England in his hands: ‘never did our Country depend so much on the success of any fleet as on this’. Anxious to attack Russia, he was ready to lead a detachment to Revel, going through the Sound, or the Great Belt, as
long as they acted now.
⁵¹
Perplexed and uncertain in the face of such tremendous responsibility, Parker called Vansittart and Nelson to the flagship on 24 March.
⁵²
In view of the preparations at Kronborg and Copenhagen, they agreed to proceed through the Great Belt. Colonel Stewart, convinced the real object of Government policy was to strike the Russians, considered that attacking Copenhagen via the Belt was wrong, and a waste of time.
⁵³
On 25 March, the fleet weighed at 3 a.m., but Nelson and George Murray of the
Edgar
went to Parker and persuaded him to go back to the previous anchorage near the Sound and resume the original plan. A squadron led by Nelson and Rear Admiral Graves would attack the defence line at Copenhagen.

The fleet sailed for the Belt, but Parker’s staff persuaded him to return to the Sound route. The Belt was a longer, and more difficult passage: only Murray had navigated it in a battleship, and it would not be ideal for an attack on Copenhagen. On 26 March Nelson shifted his flag into the seventy-four, HMS
Elephant
, commanded by Foley. The name of this ship, while hardly euphonious to English seamen, was carefully chosen. The Danish royal badge was an elephant.

Lying at anchor, Nelson continued to bemoan the loss of time: now that there was no hope of reconciliation it would be best to go to Copenhagen. Hyde Parker’s ‘diffidence’ and ‘hesitation’ over the past four days could not be justified.
⁵⁴
Captain of the Fleet Domett, too, observed on 26 March that ‘this delay is ruin to us, I hope the wind will soon be to the southward’.
⁵⁵
He had to wait three more days. Nelson considered Domett the root of Parker’s indecision but pitied them both for being placed in a situation that neither was equipped to handle, in which ‘the spur of the moment must call forth the clearest decision and the most active conduct’. Now they were out of their depth Domett was indecisive, while Parker suddenly abandoned the high-handed and haughty tone he had presumed since Yarmouth.
⁵⁶

When the wind finally shifted on 29 March, Parker ordered George Murray of the
Edgar
to place the bomb vessels to fire on Kronborg and the town of Elsinore while the fleet passed. The impressive baroque fortress of Kronborg, associated with
Hamlet
and the scene of more than one memorable performance of the tragedy, was more symbol than substance. Although it served as a statement in stone of the Danish claim to collect Sound Dues – a tax on ships entering or leaving the Baltic, levied since the Middle Ages – it was in reality perfectly impotent. The sound was more than three thousand yards wide,
and even if the Swedish batteries at Helsingor fired, ships could pass down the centre of the channel with impunity. It is revealing that Parker and Nelson did not know this: with this information Parker’s indecision could have been avoided, and the attack mounted sooner.

On 30 March, Nelson’s division led the fleet past the fortress, with the bomb vessels providing supporting fire. They were through the Sound by 9 a.m. without damage: as the Swedes did not fire the fleet shifted to the eastern side of the channel, far beyond the range of Danish guns. Some of the British bombs reached the target, and one remains stuck in the ceiling of St Olaf’s Cathedral in Elsinore as a reminder of passing greatness. The fleet then anchored north-east of Copenhagen while Nelson led the reconnaissance on board the frigate HMS
Amazon,
Captain Edward Riou’s ship-handling and insight made him an instant favourite. Nelson reported that the fire from the Kronborg had been a tremendous waste of powder and shot, and his opinion of the Danish defence line was no more complimentary: ‘It looks formidable to those who are children at war, but to my judgement with ten sail of the line, I think I can annihilate them; at all events I hope to be allowed to try.’
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Parker remained pessimistic, findng  the defences ‘far more formidable than we had reason to expect’, but accepted Nelson’s offer to command the attack, and gave him two more ships than he had requested.
Defence,
Ramillies
and
Veteran
would move down from the main fleet to menace the northern part of Danish line and assist any disabled ships.
⁵⁸

The purpose of the attack was to clear away the Danish floating defences, exposing the dockyard, arsenal and the city to the fire of the fleet’s seven bomb vessels. The Royal Artillery officers directing the mortar fire reported that:

A Council assembled on the
Elephant
after dinner on 31 March, including Nelson, Parker, Domett, Foley, Fremantle, Riou, Graves and Murray. The next day, Nelson’s division shifted to the starting position for the attack, the wind failing as the last ships reached position, just as Nelson had anticipated.
⁵⁹

That evening Nelson wrote his instructions for the attack on the Danish defence line. They were very detailed, and left little or nothing
to the initiative of his captains. The navigational difficulties, the nature of the task and the importance of clearing the entire Danish line made ‘mission-analysis’ inappropriate. He arranged his forces to achieve a real firepower superiority, certain his ships could overwhelm the static Danish line. Yet as Clausewitz observed, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. When three ships went aground and the plan began to fall apart, he had the mental resources to reorganise and carry on.

Even with the wind in his favour, Nelson was still entirely dependent on navigating intricate shoals to get into the King’s Deep. Only at 10 a.m. on 2 April did he find a willing pilot, who led the fleet from Murray’s
Edgar
. Once Murray was under way, Nelson signalled the rest to follow. Firing began around 10.30. Soon afterwards his old favourite the
Agamemnon
failed to clear the Middle Ground shoal, spending the rest of the battle as a spectator. Other ships spent the entire day getting into position, and most of the flotilla were not ready until after the fighting. Nelson reacted quickly, signalling the
Polyphemus
to replace her classical sister. He also saw that the
Bellona
was too close to the shoal, but his signal was too late: she grounded, and was followed by the
Russell
, which lost her bearings in the gunsmoke. By word of mouth and flag signals, Nelson shortened and tightened his line of battle, to ensure he maintained a clear firepower advantage over the Danes, at the expense of leaving the Trekroner battery to be masked by Riou’s frigates. To the consternation of his captains, Riou used his five frigates to extend the battleline north, and fill the space left by the missing battleships. This was Nelson’s reward for an instant rapport with the brilliant frigate captain: Riou trusted Nelson, and acted like him. By the time all the battleships had anchored Nelson had redrawn his battle plan, concentrating on the south and centre of the Danish line, and maintained his superiority in numbers of guns. He was rather further away than he had hoped, as nervous officers feared the enemy were inside the shoal. In fact they were outside it, and the intervening waters were deep.

To the north, Parker’s division was under way, but with the wind dead ahead the three supporting ships would be hard pressed to work up into action. Nelson’s leading ship – appropriately named the
Edgar
, after the Saxon King who first established England’s Sovereignty of the Seas – took up her position under sail, and under fire from the Danish ships. The other battleships followed. The range was short, around four hundred yards, and the Danish guns soon
scored damaging hits. Captain Mosse was killed on his own quarterdeck as the
Monarch
dropped anchor. By 11 a.m. all the British ships were in action,
Elephant
flying Nelson’s favourite signal, No. 16: ‘Engage the Enemy more closely.’

For Nelson the tension was almost unbearable. He paced the quarterdeck, often talking with Colonel Stewart, who had seen nothing like the combat, or the admiral. ‘I never passed so interesting a day in the course of my life or one that so much called for my admiration of
any
officer.’ From a Peninsula War veteran that was high praise. Nelson was philosophical about the danger. When a round shot smashed into the mainmast, sending a shower of splinters across the upper deck, he turned to his companion and observed drily, ‘It is warm work, and this day may be the last for any of us at any moment. But, mark you, I would not be anywhere else for thousands.’ Who would not be inspired by such resolve? It is also, and perhaps more authentically, recorded that he declared: ‘Well Stewart, these fellows hold us a better jig than I expected. However, we are keeping up a noble fire, and I’ll be answerable that we shall bowl them out in four if we cannot do it in three hours.’ Suitably prompted, Stewart noted that the British were firing faster, and as they also had more guns in action the result, as Nelson well knew, was inevitable. Brave as they were, the inexperienced Danes must be beaten – it was a question of time. A few weeks earlier Nelson had explained his views on gunnery to Berry:

He had secured just such a position, and the Danes, be they men or Devils, would soon discover the truth of his remark.

Nelson’s opposite number, Commodore Olfert Fischer on the old seventy-four
Dannebrog
,
was well aware of the superior British fire. He faced the
Elephant
and William Bligh’s
Glatton
,
armed with sixty-eight- and forty-two-pounder carronades, firing shells. At four hundred yards every shot told: inside half an hour Fischer had to shift his pendant. Nelson had destroyed the enemy’s flagship, and with it their cohesion. Soon the
Dannebrog
was on fire, while her gun crews were remorselessly scythed down. At 14.30 her flag came down, and the
survivors went ashore. Her cable burnt through: she drifted north past the Trekroner fort, still ablaze, and at 16.30 she blew up, just like
L
’
Orient
.
Long before that, several of the smaller Danish vessels had left the scene, unable to sustain the unequal combat with such powerful foes. By 14.30 the south and centre of the Danish line was beaten, but the ships were still in Danish hands. They could fire on the bomb vessels and had to be cleared away. To the north Commodore Fischer had to abandon his second ship of the day, the
Holsten
,
at 14.15, taking his pendant ashore to the Trekroner before the ship surrendered.