Nineteenth Century Thought (13 page)

Accordingly,
the Secretary of State had to say that although the lecturer's language was
"only fit to be addressed to thieves or murderers," yet, "I do
not think he is to be deprived, I do not think that anything I have said could
justify the inference that he is to be deprived, of the right of protection in
a place built by him for the purpose of these lectures; because the language
was not language which afforded grounds for a criminal prosecution." No,
nor to be silenced by Mayor, or Home Secretary, or any administrative authority
on earth, simply on their notion of what is discreet and reasonable! This is in
perfect consonance with our public opinion, and with our national love for the
assertion of personal liberty. *
 
*
 
*

*
* * Sweetness and light evidently have to do with the bent or side in humanity
which we call Hellenic.
 
Greek
intelligence has obviously for its essence the instinct
¹⁸
for what
Plato calls the true, firm, intelligible law of things; the law of light, of
seeing things as they are. Even in the natural sciences, where the Greeks had
not time and means adequately to apply this instinct, and where we have gone a
great deal further than they did, it is this instinct which is the root of the
whole matter and the ground of all our success; and this instinct the world has
mainly learnt of the Greeks, inasmuch as they are humanity's most signal
manifestation of it. Greek art, again, Greek beauty, have their root in the
same impulse to see things as they really are, inasmuch as Greek art and beauty
rest on fidelity to nature-the best nature-and on a delicate discrimination of
what this best nature is.

ANNOTATIONS

17.
   
Porro
Unum
Est
Necessarium:
'But
one thing is needful.' The reference here is to the religious person for whom
all follows from the principle of duty and moral need. Arnold is unambiguously
critical of this.

18.
   
The
instinct:
The "impulse to see things as they really
are." The word is carefully chosen to keep distance from both insistence
and argument.

To
say we work for sweetness and light, then, is only another way of saying that
we work for Hellenism
¹⁹
. But, oh!
cry
many
people, sweetness and light are not enough; you must put strength or energy
along with them, and make a kind of trinity of strength, sweetness and light,
and then, perhaps, you may do some good. That is to say, we are to join
Hebraism
²⁰
, strictness of the moral conscience, and manful walking
by the best light we have, together with Hellenism, inculcate both, and
rehearse the praises of both.

Or,
rather, we may praise both in conjunction, but we must be careful to praise
Hebraism most
²¹
. "Culture," says an acute, though
somewhat: rigid critic, Mr.
Sidgwick
, "diffuses
sweetness and light. I do not undervalue these blessings, but religion gives
fire and strength, and the world wants fire and strength even more than
sweetness and light." By religion, let me explain, Mr.
Sidgwick
here means particularly that Puritanism on the insufficiency of which I have
been commenting and to which he says I am unfair. Now, no doubt, it is possible
to be a fanatical partisan of light and the instincts which push us to it, a
fanatical enemy of strictness of moral conscience and the instincts which push
us to it.
 
A fanaticism
²²
of
this sort deforms and vulgarizes the well-known work, in some respects so
remarkable, of the late Mr. Buckle. Such fanaticism carries its own mark with
it, in lacking sweetness; and its own penalty, in that, lacking sweetness, it
comes in the end to lack light too. And the Greeks-the great exponents of
humanity's bent for sweetness and light united, of its perception that the
truth of things must be at the same time beauty-singularly escaped the
fanaticism which we moderns, whether we Hellenize
²³
or whether we
Hebraize
²⁴
, are so apt to show.

ANNOTATIONS

19.
   
 
Hellenism:
The spirit of ancient Greek
writers and philosophers aiming for “sweetness and light" as well as
"fidelity to nature."

20.
   
Hebraism:
 
Connected with Hebrew people. The
Hebrew system of thought. Arnold defines it as "strictness of moral
conscience."

21.
   
We
must be careful to praise Hebraism most:
Under the concept of
the middle path, however, Arnold is particularly against strict moral
conscience.

22.
   
Fanaticism:
For
Arnold, culture is gentle whereas fanaticism is aggressive and blind.

They
arrived-though failing, as has been said, to give adequate practical
satisfaction 25 to the claims of man's
 
moral
 
side-at the idea of a
comprehensive adjustment of the claims of both the sides in man, the moral as
well
 
as
 
the
 
intellectual,
 
of
 
a
 
full
 
estimate
 
of
 
both,
 
and
 
of
 
a reconciliation
 
of both;
 
an
 
idea which
 
is
 
philosophically
 
of
 
the greatest value, and the best of lessons
for us moderns. So we ought to have no difficulty in conceding to Mr.
Sidgwick
that manful walking by the best light one has-fire
and strength as he calls it-has its high value as well as culture, the
endeavour to see things in their truth and beauty, the pursuit of sweetness and
light. But whether at this or that time, and to this or that set of persons,
one ought to insist most on the praises of fire and strength, or on the praises
of sweetness and light, must depend, one would think, on the circumstances and
needs
 
of that
 
particular
 
time
 
and
 
those particular persons. And all that we
have been saying, and indeed any glance at the world around us, shows that with
us, with the most respectable and strongest part of us, the ruling force is
now, and long has been, a Puritan force-the care for fire and strength,
strictness of conscience, Hebraism, rather than the care for sweetness and
light, spontaneity of consciousness, Hellenism.

Well,
then, what is the good of our now rehearsing the praises of fire and strength
to ourselves, who dwell too exclusively on them already? When Mr.
Sidgwick
says so broadly, that the world wants fire and
strength even more than sweetness and light, is he not carried away by a turn
for broad generalization?
does
he not forget that the
world is not all of one piece, and every piece with the same needs at the
same
 
time? It may be true that the Roman
world at the beginning of our era, or Leo the Tenth's Court at the time of the
Reformation, or French society in the eighteenth century, needed fire and
strength even more than sweetness and light.

ANNOTATIONS

23.
   
Hellenize:
To
overemphasize the Greek idea of beauty. The difference between 'Hellenism' and
'Hellenize' is subtle though necessary.

24.
   
Hebraize:
To
overemphasize the Hebrew idea of discipline.

1. Adequate practical satisfaction:
   Here, the struggle towards blending and harmonizing is clear. In
   the sentences that follow, mark words such as "comprehensive
   adjustment" "full time estimate of both," "high value
   as well as culture," etc.
   

But
can it be said that the Barbarians who overran the empire needed fire and
strength even more than sweetness and light; or that the Puritans needed them
more; or that Mr. Murphy, the Birmingham lecturer, and the Rev. W. Cattle
²⁶
and his friends, need them more?

The
Puritan's great danger is that he imagines himself in possession of a rule
telling him the
unum
necessarium
²⁷
,
or one thing needful, and that he then remains satisfied with a very crude
conception of what this rule really is and what it tells him, thinks he has now
knowledge and henceforth needs only to act, and, in this dangerous state of
assurance and self-satisfaction, proceeds to give full swing to a number of the
instincts of his ordinary self. Some of the instincts of his ordinary self he
has, by the help of his rule of life, conquered; but others which he has not
conquered by this help he is so far from perceiving to need subjugation, and to
be instincts of an inferior self, that he even fancies it to be his right and
duty, in virtue of having conquered a limited part of himself, to give
unchecked swing to the remainder. He is, I say, a victim of Hebraism, of the
tendency to cultivate strictness of conscience rather than spontaneity of
consciousness. And what he wants is a larger conception of human nature,
showing him the number of other points at which his nature must come to its
best, besides the points which he himself knows and thinks of. There is no
unum
necessarium
,
or
one thing needful, which can free human nature from the obligation of trying to
come to its best at all these points. The real
unum
necesarium
for us is to come to our best at all
points. Instead of our "one thing needful," justifying in us
vulgarity, hideousness, ignorance, violence-our vulgarity, hideousness,
ignorance violence are really so many touchstones which try our one thing
needful, and which prove that in the state, at any rate, in which
we
ourselves
have it, it is not all we want.

ANNOTATIONS

26.
   
Mr.
Sidwick
...
the Roman world...Leo the
Tenth's Court ...Reformation
...
Reformation
...
Barbarians ...Rev.
W. Cattle...
: All these point towards the periods of change in European
history with focus, rightly, on the Puritan ism of Arnold's time. The range of
discussion makes the point difficult to follow since moments of crisis do not
leave open behaviour options. Arnold understands the problem and yet brackets
Puritanism with Barbarians.

27.
   
Unum
necessarium
:
The reference is to the title of
this piece and Hebraism.

And
as the force which encourages us to stand staunch and fast by the rule and
ground we have is Hebraism, so the force which encourages us to go back upon
this rule, and to try the very ground on which we appear to stand, is
Hellenism--a turn for giving our consciousness free play and enlarging its
range. And what I say is, not that Hellenism is always for everybody more
wanted
²⁸
than
Herbraism
but that for the
Rev. W Cattle at this particular moment, and for the great majority of us his
fellow countrymen, it is more wanted.

*
 
*
 
*

The
newspapers a short time ago contained an account of the suicide of Mr. Smith,
secretary to some insurance company, who, it was said, "labored under the
apprehension that he would come to poverty, and that he was eternally
lost." And when I read these words, it occurred to me that the poor man
who came to such a mournful end was, in truth, a kind of type-by the selection
of his two grand objects of concern, by their isolation from everything else,
and their juxtaposition to one another-of all the strongest, most respectable,
and most representative part of our nation. "He labored under the
apprehension that he would come to poverty, and that he was eternally
lost." The whole middle class have a conception of things-a conception
which makes us call them Philistines-just like that of this poor man; though we
are seldom, of course, shocked by seeing it take the distressing, violently
morbid, and fatal turn, which it took with him. But how generally, with how
many of us, are the main concerns of life limited to these two: the concern for
making money, and the concern for saving our souls? And how entirely does the
narrow and mechanical conception of our secular business proceed from a narrow
and mechanical conception of our religious business?

ANNOTATIONS

28.
   
More
wanted:
This amounts to over-insistence, something that Arnold
has himself attacked all through the passage. Do words such as "vulgarity,
hideousness, ignorance, violence" used (and repeated in full in the same
sentence) not reflect upon Arnold's own 'Hebraism'?

What
havoc do the united conceptions make of our lives? It is because the second-named
of these two master-concerns
²⁹
presents to us the one thing needful
in so fixed, narrow, and mechanical a way, that so ignoble a fellow
master-concern to it as the first-named becomes possible; and, having been once
admitted, takes the same rigid and absolute character as the other.

Poor
Mr. Smith had sincerely the nobler master-concern as well as the meaner-the
concern for saving his soul (according to the narrow and mechanical conception
which Puritanism has of what the salvation of the soul is), as well as the
concern for making money. But let us remark how many people there are,
especially outside the limits of the serious and conscientious middle class to
which Mr. Smith belonged, who take up with a meaner masterconcern
³⁰
-whether
it be pleasure, or field sports, or bodily exercises, or business, or popular
agitation-who take up with one of these exclusively, and neglect Mr. Smith's
nobler master-concern, because of the mechanical form which Hebraism has given
to this noble master-concern. Hebraism makes it stand, as we have said, as
something talismanic, isolated, and all-sufficient, justifying our giving our
ordinary selves free play in bodily exercises, or business, or popular agitation,
if we have made our account square with this master-concern; and, if we have
not, rendering other things indifferent, and our ordinary self all we have to
follow, and to follow with all the energy that is in us, till we do. Whereas
the idea of perfection at all points , the encouraging in ourselves spontaneity
of consciousness, the letting a free play of thought live and flow around all
our activity, the indisposition to allow one side of our activity to stand as
so all-important and all-sufficing that it makes other sides
indifferent-this
 
bent
 
of mind
 
in
 
us may not only check us in
following unreservedly a mean master-concern of any kind, but may even, also
bring new life and movement into that side of us with which alone Hebraism
concerns itself, and awaken a healthier and less mechanical activity there.
Hellenism may thus actually serve to further the designs of Hebraism.

ANNOTATIONS

29.
   
Master-concerns:
Used
ironically. Apparent and superficial concerns.

30.
   
Meaner concern:
The
actual concern for money and individual interest. Here, Arnold draws attention
to the merging (in Puritanism) of Hellenism and Hebraism with "something
talismanic, isolated and all-sufficient." Arnold's anger as well as
passion is unmistakable in the conclusion: "Hellenism may thus actually
serve to further the designs of Hebraism."