No Lack of Courage (30 page)

9
.    See, for instance, Ahmed Rashid, “How to End the War in Afghanistan,”
BBC News
,
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8490710.stm
, accessed 17 April 2010. Rashid noted, “There is broad agreement that talking to the Taliban is the only way to bring the insurgency to an end. No longer are the U.S., Nato or Afghanistan's neighbours talking about militarily defeating the Taliban, rebuilding the country from top to bottom or promoting democracy. Instead there is a single purpose in mind—how to provide sufficient security for development while at the same time allowing foreign forces to leave.”

10
.  David Pugliese, “It Was the Charge of Charlie Company,”
Ottawa Citizen
, 6 September 2007, A1.

11
.  Mitch Potter, “General Frets About Home Front,” Middle East Bureau, 1 October 2006.

12
.  
Ibid
.

13
.  Canadian High Commission, “Cause for Celebration on ‘Independence Day,'”
Canada Focus
, 21 September 2007, 1–2; and “NATO's Steps to an Afghan Win: Defence, Development, Diplomacy,”
Globe and Mail
, 28 November 2006, A25. Importantly, the ANA desertion rate was reduced from a high 43 percent in 2006 to only 13 percent the following year with the assistance of the operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLT). Brigadier-General David Fraser, Presentation, Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, 25 May 2007.

14
.  General James L. Jones and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering,
Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing our Efforts Rethinking our Strategies
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 30 January 2008), 17.

15
.  To many, Operation Medusa actually demonstrated NATO weaknesses, particularly the myriad of national caveats. Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber commented, “I think if you peek beneath the surface it was actually a failure for NATO because no other NATO nations showed up and nobody else wanted a piece of this,” Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, interview with author, 18 October 2006. More telling was the comment by the CDS at the time: “A year and a half ago we fought Medusa and we were there essentially alone,” Interview, General Rick Hillier, CDS by Adam Day,
Legion Magazine
, 29 February 2008. Interview
transcript by Media Q, Inc. The fact of the matter was that despite appeals at all levels, most European allies backed away from participating. The actual combat portion of Medusa was borne by Canadians, with assistance from the Americans and a small number of ANA. The British were heavily engaged in combat operations in Helmand. No one else showed up to fight.

16
.  Podcast, “Audio Report by Mark Laity, NATO's Civilian Spokesman in Afghanistan,” NATO Speeches 22 Nov 06, NATO Library online,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060922b.htm
, accessed 26 November 2006.

17
.  Michael Tutton, “Rice Gives Nod to Military,”
Kingston-Whig Standard
, 13 September 2006, 11.

18
.  Mike De Souza, “Focus on Our Goals, Not Our Departure,”
Ottawa Citizen
, 12 September 2007,
www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=dfc65e-e3ab-49d3-8e4d-6490cb2945a5
, accessed 14 November 2007.

19
.  David McCandless, “Information Is Not Beautiful: Afghanistan,”
The Guardian
, 13 November 2009,
www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/nov/13/information-beautiful-afghanistan
, accessed 28 February 2010.

20
.  Canadian High Commission, “New Wave of Rebuilding in Afghanistan,”
Canada Focus
, 16 February 2007, 1–2.

21
.  “Karzai Praises Canadian Heroes,”
ISAF News
, Issue No. 116, 1.

22
.  Captain Tim Button, interview with author, 9 January 2009. Button also commented, “Medusa also drove the expectations of Canadian troops. Expectations were based on war stories from 1 RCR from Medusa, namely a dug in, concentrated enemy. Guys arrived looking for something to shoot. But instead, we're losing guys by covert acts of violence (i.e., IEDs) and all the technology in the world has not defeated it yet.”

23
.  Master Warrant Officer Keith Olstad, interview with author, 11 January 2009. As of 21 January 2009, 2,700 Canadian troops were deployed at any one time, 107 had been killed, and $18.1 billion were spent in seven years of operations. Interestingly, 71 percent of Canadians said “no” to any extension of the mission in Afghanistan
and bring the troops home on schedule in 2011. Ipsos-Reid/CanWest Global, Afghanistan Mission, January 2009. DND, “Public Opinion Research,” Presentation to PAPCT, 28 January 2009. A Decima-Harris poll in October 2009 indicated that 56 percent of Canadians opposed the military mission with only 36 percent in favour of it. The latest poll indicated that only 10 percent of Canadians felt the mission should be extended, 45 percent believed the “troops should stay” until 2011 when Parliament decided the Canadian military mission would end, and 41 percent wanted the troops to be pulled out early.
CTV News
, 26 October 2009.

T
HIS BOOK HAS BEEN
in the works for far too long, however, it would have taken even longer to complete had it not been for the assistance and efforts of a multitude of people who graciously and freely gave time, thought, and effort to help me. I wish to thank all those who directly and indirectly, whether through the contribution of materials, time, a piece of their memory, or simply through their moral support, assisted me in the completion of this volume. Particularly, I wish to thank those in uniform who shared their experiences and relived the triumphs as well as the sadness that surrounds Operation Medusa.

As always, there are some who assisted more than others, and whose efforts warrant special mention. In that vein I wish to thank General (retired) Rick Hillier for his consideration in drafting the foreword and Colonel Omer Lavoie for his many candid interviews and detailed explanations of the actual battle and its aftermath. I need to acknowledge Chris Johnson for his patience and expertise in developing and continually tweaking (every time I came up with yet another modification) the detailed maps and sketches that accompany the book. I also wish to pass my gratitude to Graeme Smith who so kindly allowed me to use his dramatic photographs of the actual operation.

There are a number of others who gave generously of their time to assist with research, philosophical discussion, editorial advice, and/or proofing. I would like to thank Major Tony Balasevicius, Adam Day, Brigadier-General David Fraser, Denise Kerr, Captain Piers Pappin, and
Dr. Emily Spencer. Your efforts were greatly appreciated. I would be remiss if I did not thank Michael Carroll and Cheryl Hawley as well as the Dundurn design team for creating the polished finish product that lies before you.

Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my wife, Kim, and my daughters, Calli and Katie, for their continuing tolerance of my writing and historical projects.