NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century (8 page)

India has been an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of united Europe, seeing in European integration a trend towards the multipolarity that India has instinctively
favoured over the past several decades. Europe is an undervalued and neglected target of Indian engagement. Despite its current economic weakness and diminished security consensus, Europe is, and will remain, a major political actor and economic and technological powerhouse. The European Union is, like India, a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual plural democracy. Both sides have a mutual stake in each other’s success so as to firmly anchor democratic and liberal values in a world increasingly threatened by extremist and exclusivist tendencies. There is a much higher level of comfort in pursuing closer engagement and collaboration with Europe even in sensitive areas such as defence. Europe is and will remain a major source of high-end technologies and a partner for capacity-building and skill development in India. Therefore, policy towards Europe must remain an indispensable part of any long-term Indian strategy.

While upgrading its relationship with the European Union, India has maintained close bilateral links with each of the major actors in the region, in particular, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The focus on these major European powers has led to the neglect of the smaller countries in Europe, in particular the new members of the erstwhile socialist bloc of East European nations. These countries retain their goodwill and positive sentiments
for India from the days of our privileged relations with the socialist bloc. We have not been able to leverage this asset to our advantage. Our policy towards Europe could benefit from a renewed focus on these countries, which have much to offer to India in terms of trade, investment as well as technology. For example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia could be tapped as suppliers of several defence-related technologies without the conditionalities that other suppliers may impose.

The current economic turmoil in Europe is a matter of grave concern to India. The weakening of integrated Europe, its possible fragmentation and its economic decline will have far-reaching geopolitical consequences. As a force for stability and as a bastion of democratic and liberal values, the European Union is of great value to India. Its weakening will have adverse consequences for India as well. Europe is preoccupied with dealing with its ongoing crisis and has lately become more inward-looking. India should support the strengthening of the European Union both as an economic and as a political entity as the preferred means for dealing with the crisis. The survival of the euro as a strong alternative reserve currency to the US dollar is also in India’s interest.

The balance of power within the European Union is changing. Germany is emerging unmistakably as the most
powerful and influential member of the union. The United Kingdom is likely to see its own role progressively diluted, whether it accepts the discipline of a stronger European Union or if it decides to loosen its links with continental Europe. It is clear that Germany must enjoy greater priority and attention in our European policy, even while we continue to maintain our traditionally strong links with the United Kingdom and France.

It would be fair to say that India and the then Soviet Union enjoyed a strategic partnership between 1960 and 1990, despite being very different political systems. The strategic glue was the shared perception of threat from China, but there were other motivations driving the relationship as well. The Soviet Union valued the Non-Aligned Movement and India’s leading role in the movement as preventing the strategic encirclement of the Soviet Union through a ring of US-led alliance systems. For India, the Soviet Union’s support on the Kashmir issue, the extension of Soviet assistance to India’s economic development and, significantly, its willingness to share defence hardware and technology with India at a time when the West had virtually turned off the taps were of critical importance.

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of Russia as a more diminished power, there has been a significant change in the nature of India–Russia relations. Trade has become insignificant, the China factor is no longer a driving force in the relations, but the defence hardware relationship remains robust, though India is beginning to diversify its sources of supply. The political relationship continues to be nurtured by regular summits between the leaders; and Russia, it is hoped, will also become a significant energy partner for India. The Russian connection is useful in terms of India’s efforts to build broad coalitions of emerging powers to pursue convergent objectives. Thus, India should embrace the opportunity to work together with Russia in BRICS, in the India–China–Russia trilateral, in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in the G-20. However, there is little prospect of a return to the strategic partnership that endured for three decades during the Cold War. The world that gave rise to that partnership no longer exists.

Africa is the continent of the future. No long-term strategy formulated by any major power can neglect the opportunities offered by a vast, resource-rich continent,
which has lately been undergoing a significant and sustained political and economic transformation. In the midst of deepening economic gloom across the globe, Africa as a whole has been able to sustain an overall GDP growth rate of over 6 per cent per annum. As the process of national consolidation and infrastructure development continues apace, African countries may well emerge as ‘emerging economies’ of tomorrow.

China has made deep inroads into Africa but its focus has been on resource exploitation and raw material extraction. India’s engagement has been more broad-based and has covered a wide spectrum of trade, investment, capacity development and infrastructure assistance. However, while this has generated widespread goodwill for India, political exchanges have not kept pace with the level and potential of economic engagement. This has created a perception of India’s lack of interest and even neglect of African countries compared to its focus on other regions of the world. This needs to be remedied.

Currently, there is inordinate focus on relations with South Africa, while neglecting other major actors such as Nigeria and Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The engagement with French-speaking Africa is particularly weak, as it is also with lusophone Africa—whose countries possess resources of significant interest to India. It is
necessary therefore to pursue a more diversified and well-balanced policy towards Africa, recognizing the differential potential that each country represents.

The Latin American continent currently lies outside the strategic footprint of India, but it is gaining in importance as a source of key resources, in particular energy supplies. It is also an expanding market for Indian goods and services. The information technology (IT) industry has made notable inroads into the continent.

Brazil has emerged as India’s most privileged partner in Latin America. Bilateral trade and investment have been increasing steadily. They are pursuing an energy partnership, with India seeking a stake in offshore hydrocarbon exploration in Brazilian waters. Defence and nuclear energy are other areas where the potential for bilateral cooperation is significant. It is a relationship that has a dimension beyond a bilateral level. The two countries have drawn closer together as emerging economies with similar aspirations, including their claim to permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Along with South Africa, they have consolidated the IBSA group of democratic nations. They work together in multilateral
forums like the WTO, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the G-20.

India has pursued closer relations with other major countries in Latin America, including Mexico, Argentina and Chile. In these cases too the bilateral relationship is reinforced by their cooperation in multilateral forums.

The outlook for the future is a steady growth in India’s engagement with Latin America, with relations with Brazil remaining its centerpiece.

Engagement with international institutions has been integral to India’s foreign and strategic policy. But India will now have to engage with, and respond to, these institutions in new contexts that are themselves shifting.

The first element of this new context is the sheer number of institutions. There has been an exponential growth in new institutions, summit processes and interstate groupings. Stretching across the world today is a thicket of regional, global and functional institutions. Servicing the commitments entailed by participation in these international institutions requires an outlay of resources and the ability to draw on appropriate expertise. In fact, making full strategic use of the opportunities
afforded by these institutions depends to a great extent on capacity. And India’s capacities are currently lagging well behind its commitments.

What is, of course, driving the proliferation of new institutions is the fact that our inherited global bodies like the UN or the Bretton Woods institutions, all creations of the post–Second World War political settlements, are constricted by the circumstances of their origins. They are the creatures of an era still dominated by the West, and quite inappropriate for a world that has seen the end of the European empires and the rise of Asia’s economic dynamism. These institutions require fundamental reform to reflect the new distribution of power in the world. India must actively pursue a more influential role in these institutions—a position commensurate not just with its growing power but also with its expanding range of global interests. India’s claim to active participation in these institutions will importantly rest on the fact that its own interests are impinged upon by the decisions of these institutions and therefore it must have a full voice in decision-making. We can expect the reform process to be gradual, but we should continue to push it along.

The third major change in context is that different institutions are actively competing for legitimacy. And in turn there is competition among nations for entry into
several of these new institutions and groupings. Faced with the proliferation of international clubs, India will have to take some important decisions as to which institutions to lend its weight and commitment: whether at the regional, trans-regional or global level.

It is right that as India’s stature rises, it should seek to reshape the global order by influencing and reshaping international institutions. But we will also face a basic dilemma—which all rising and great powers have faced. Should such powers lend their weight to global institutions, even if it means occasionally adverse consequences for themselves? Or should they practise a politics of great power exceptionalism, where multilateral institutions matter only in so far as they are a medium of projecting national power? In practice the choices are not so stark. But there are occasional trade-offs between a single-minded pursuit of national interest and investment in the legitimacy of global institutions. We will have to protect our core national interests. But the world will be looking to see how much we choose to invest in strengthening the legitimacy and authority of international institutions. Handling this altered context will require India to make some wise choices, about where to apportion political capital.

India will continue deep engagement with the UN. A permanent seat on the UN Security Council is a desirable
objective. India should recognize that time is on its side in this matter. As the structure of global power shifts, India’s case inevitably becomes stronger. But India will also, in the interim, have to demonstrate a leadership capacity to propose solutions to and artfully handle some of the difficult challenges facing the world.

India’s engagement with the UN will continue to be at several levels, and will also pose new questions for our policies. There is, for instance, often a trade-off between investment in bilateral engagements and the commitment of resources to multilateral institutions. On the one hand, bilateral aid is usually more flexible, and the donor is also more clearly identifiable and visible to the recipient. On the other hand, multilateral institutions like the UN are often less flexible, and donor identity is not highlighted, but participation in their programme budgets can enable India to shape the global agenda. While there are real tradeoffs, particularly in terms of beneficial use of resources, India’s best option is to engage at different levels, and to use different levers.

International engagement can have real impact on domestic capabilities. India’s human resources receive exposure to best international practices, and these can feed back into domestic governance structures and cultures. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s participation in
UN audit processes, has, for example, enhanced its own capacities.

India will also need to recognize more fully that much of today’s global norm-setting is not done by formal institutions, but rather by informal networks of professionals: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), lawyers, bankers, heads of industry. These informal networks are beginning to have a profound impact on the functioning of formal institutions. We will, at the level of the Indian state, need to find ways of interacting with these informal networks, playing a role in their debates and working to influence outcomes.

India is operating in a context where rapidly growing economies like China have become substantial bilateral donors. Such new donor states have also got the ability to invest immense resources in the creation of new institutions. The entrance of new donor states, and donor competition between them and the old donor states, is a feature of the new global economic landscape. While India is now bulking up and systematizing its aid programme, more attention and resources will need to be devoted to this. This aid could potentially open strategic opportunities and spaces.

For India, G-20 will remain an important new institution. It is true that the future of G-20 is very much
in the balance. After playing a powerful role in response to the financial crisis, it has been ‘missing in action’. It is an open question whether this is because of a particular conjuncture in world and domestic political cycles, where almost all leaders are burdened with domestic problems. At one level, this has led to a less effective G-20. But at another level, this could be an opportunity for India to show some leadership. And G-20 may be the right forum to do it—even if it proves to be a transitional one, it provides a platform for India to show some of its capacities to shape and define agendas.