Authors: Leonard Peikoff
Tags: #Europe, #Modern, #International Relations, #German, #Philosophy, #Political, #Modern & contemporary fiction (post c 1945), #Modern fiction, #United States, #History & Surveys - Modern, #American, #Germany, #National socialism, #General & Literary Fiction, #Politics, #History & Surveys, #History
The liberals of Weber’s kind, equating absolutism with fanaticism, believed that the precondition of freedom is skepticism. To restrain mob violence and induce respect for reason, they believed, one should tell the mob that reason is helpless and that man must act on feeling. To slow the march of the all-powerful state, they believed, it was proper to endorse it in principle, so long as one added that Germans should not act on principle, i.e., go to extremes. To discredit the totalitarians, to silence the noisy cry that
they
had the answer to Germany’s crisis—these men believed—one should tell a desperate country, in weary, muted tones, that sane men have no idea what to do and never will.
This was the contest in the Weimar Assembly: the romanticist-nationalist groups (along with a transitional party of Independent Socialists, who sought a proletarian dictatorship) against the groups widely identified as the exponents of
reason.
These exponents were a coalition of halfhearted Marxists, dogmatic Catholics, and quaking skeptics.
The debate on the Constitution began on February 24, 1919. The final draft was approved by a vote of 262 to 75 on July 31 and took effect as the country’s fundamental law on August 14. The conservative parties (and the Independent Socialists) voted against the draft on the grounds that it offered the country too much freedom. The members of the Weimar coalition voted yes unanimously. They recognized in the document not a partisan viewpoint, but the common base on which Germany’s republicans were prepared to stand in their battle to win the allegiance of the country.
The Weimar Constitution is not a traditional Western charter of liberty. It is a distinctively twentieth-century document.
Article 7 alone, for instance, confers on the Federal government unlimited power to legislate on twenty subjects, including : “The press ... Public health ... Labour laws ... Expropriation ... banking and exchanges ... Traffic in foodstuffs and articles of general consumption or satisfying daily wants ... Industry and mining ... Insurance ... Railways ... Theatres and cinemas.” In subsequent articles, the state is assigned further powers. Some of these are: the power to lay down “general principles” concerning “The rights and duties of religious bodies ... Public education, including the universities ... housing and the distribution of the population ...”; the power to preserve “the purity and health and the social furtherance of the family ...”; and the task of supervising “the whole of the educational system.”
19
Having established its basic approach to government, the Constitution, striking a more traditional note, goes on to guarantee the protection of man’s “fundamental rights.” It promises to protect the freedoms of expression, association, movement, emigration, the ownership of property, the inviolability of a man’s home, and several other rights. In every essential case, however, the document makes its priorities clear: it reserves to the government unlimited power, at its discretion, to attach conditions to the exercise of these rights. The promise of freedom of movement, for instance, concludes with the words: “Restrictions can be imposed by federal law only.” The promise of the secrecy of correspondence concludes: “Exceptions may be admitted by federal law only.” There is to be “no censorship”—except in the case of movies or “for the purpose of combating base and pornographic publications....” The education of their children is “the natural right of the parents”—but “the state has to watch over their activities in this direction.” “Personal freedom is inviolable,” sums up Article 114, which continues directly: “No restraint or deprivation of personal liberty by the public power is admissible, unless authorised by law.”
20
The most famous statement of this kind is Article 48, which was invoked by the German government in 1930 to justify the establishment of a Presidential dictatorship. “If public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered... ,” the article says, without further definition, the President “may take all necessary steps ... he may suspend for the time being, either wholly or in part, the fundamental rights” recognized elsewhere.
21
The Founding Fathers of the United States accepted the concept of
inalienable
rights. The public power, they said in essence, shall make no law abridging the freedom of the individual. The Founding Fathers of the Weimar Republic rejected this approach as rigid and antisocial. The public power, their document says, shall make no law abridging the freedom of the individual—except when it judges this to be in the public interest.
As a rule, the German moderates held,
political
freedom works to benefit the public and therefore it should not often be abridged. Besides, they felt, such freedom pertains primarily to man’s inner life or spiritual concerns, which can safely be left to the decisions of the individual.
Neither of these points, they held, applies in any comparable degree to
economic
freedom. A businessman, they said, works for his own welfare, not the public’s. Besides, he is up to his neck in “materialistic concerns.” This, the more religious republicans felt, is a realm that involves the lowest side of man, which must be firmly controlled by the authorities. This, the skeptics felt, is a realm vital to human survival, in which there can be no excuse—not even skepticism—for government inaction. This, the Marxists said, is the realm which counts in history and, therefore, which belongs to the people.
In the Weimar Assembly debates, the delegates never considered the possibility of extending freedom to the realm of production and trade. The moderates demanded that the government give up (much of) the Kaiser’s control over the minds of the citizens; but they took it for granted that the government must never relinquish its grip over the citizens’ productive actions.
Imperial Germany had not been a purely statist economy, but a mixture of controls and an element of economic liberty, with the emphasis on the controls. The Social Democrats in 1919 wanted just such a compromise as a transition measure. The liberals in the various groups wanted it as an end in itself. The conservatives wanted it in the name of tradition. Whatever their differences, the moderate consensus was: We do not want socialism (at least not now); we do not want capitalism (ever); we want a
mixed economy.
They got it, along with everything to which it leads.
The essence of Weimar economics is stated in Article 151 of the Constitution. “The organisation of economic life,” it says,
must accord with the principles of justice and aim at securing for all conditions of existence worthy of human beings. Within these limits the individual is to be secured the enjoyment of economic freedom.
Legal compulsion is admissible only as far as necessary for the realisation of threatened rights or to serve overriding claims of the common weal.
22
“Property is guaranteed,” says Article 153, but “Property entails responsibilities. It should be put to such uses as to promote at the same time the common good.” Property, therefore, may be expropriated “in the public interest.” For the same reason, “the distribution and the use of land are under state supervision....” In addition, the government may “convert into social property such private economic undertakings as are suitable for socialisation,” or it may demand the merger of such undertakings “in the interests of collectivism.”
The Weimar Constitution concludes by mandating the programs of the welfare state, and by promising that the government will take special steps to protect the interests of “the independent middle class” and of “the labouring classes ev erywhere.”
23
The German Republic has been called “the freest republic in history.” It is often described as an experiment in freedom which tragically failed. If so, it was a special kind of experiment, one that proved to be a pacesetter for the rest of the world.
The German Republic was an experiment in political freedom combined with economic authoritarianism and defended by reference to the ethics of altruism.
The country’s republicans did not wish to choose between freedom and altruism. They thought that they could have both. “Every German,” says Article 163, “is under a moral obligation, without prejudice to his personal liberty, to exercise his mental and physical powers in such a way as the welfare of the community requires.”
24
In fact, however, it is either-or, and the moderates did have to choose; and they wrote their priorities all over their founding document.
The transition from document to reality did not take long.
While the contest between socialists and nationalists was taking place in the form of solemn debates at Weimar, a different version of the same contest was taking place in the streets of Berlin, Munich, and other German cities. In this arena, the contending forces were the
Communists
and the
Free Corps.
During the war, a faction of young Marxists had broken away from the Social Democrats, denouncing the party’s pro-war policy as a betrayal of the class struggle. These youths soon formed themselves into the Spartacus League (named after the rebellious Roman slave), then, after the war, reorganized the group as the Communist party of Germany. The party’s support came from two sources: a militant minority of workers, and an influential elite of middle-class intellectuals centered in Berlin.
In contrast to the Social Democrats, whom they despised as “social Fascists,” the Communists experienced no ideological conflicts; they were not tempted to dilute their fundamental approach by mixing into it remnants of an opposite viewpoint. They did not vacillate over the issue of individual rights; they dismissed the concept as a rationalization designed to justify “bourgeois privilege.” They did not try simultaneously to uphold liberty and economic equality; they rejected the idea of liberty. Until we reach the classless society, they held, there can be no such thing as a society without rulers; until the state withers away, the absolute state is an absolute—and now it is the turn of the workers. The workers, they said, echoing the words of Lassalle, will offer the nation a “social dictatorship, in contrast to the egotism of the bourgeois society.”
25
Unlike their former colleagues among the Social Democrats, the Communists were not willing to postpone the socialist revolution; they were impatient to have their ideal now. It is pointless, said party leaders, to spend time trying to persuade or educate the “class enemy”; since men’s thought is a mere by-product of economic factors, they claimed, and since proletarian logic is beyond the grasp of the bourgeoisie, enemy ideas cannot be dealt with by argument or discussion; they can be answered effectively only by the forcible overthrow of the existing social system. For the same reason, the leaders said, the party refuses, even as a transition measure, to participate in any parliamentary form of government. The alleged political equality of men under such a government, declared Rosa Luxemburg, the top Spartacist theoretician, “is nothing but lies and falsehoods so long as the economic power of capital still exists.” “[T]he idea that you can introduce socialism without class struggle and by parliamentary majority decisions is a ludicrous petty-bourgeois illusion.”
“Socialism,” said Rosa Luxemburg, “does not mean getting together in a parliament and deciding on laws. For us socialism means the smashing of the ruling classes with all the brutality that the proletariat is able to develop in its struggle. ”
26
The Russian Bolshevists, who were turning Moscow at the time into the world center of Marxist ideology, were eager to support those who shared their viewpoint. They supplied their German counterparts unstintingly with every necessity, including trained organizers, strategic guidance, literature, funds, and weapons.
The German Communists’ first demand after the war was “All power to the Soviets,” i.e., not to a representative national assembly, but to the (unelected) councils of workers and soldiers that had sprung up across Germany in the wake of the Kaiser’s collapse. The radicals
come in from the street [said one Social Democrat at the time] and hold placards under our noses saying: All Power to the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils! At the same time, however, they let you understand: If you do not do what we want, we will kick you out.... They can only represent a force as long as they are in possession of the majority of machine guns.
27
In December 1918, a general congress of such councils convened in Berlin. By a large majority, the delegates backed the movement for a parliamentary republic and rejected the idea of a workers’ dictatorship. The will of “the people,” it seemed, was unmistakable. The Spartacists, however, had grasped the lesson of Hegel and were undeterred: they understood that the people does not know what it wills.
For six months, through the summer of 1919, the Communists proceeded to act as the people’s vanguard: the party staged a nationwide campaign of violence designed to precipitate a civil war and overthrow the Republic. These months were filled with Communist-instigated riots, insurrections, putsches, marches on Berlin, seizures of buildings, angry mass strikes, and bloody street fighting—all of it adding up to an orgy of anarchy and murder. The chaos in the country may be glimpsed from the fact that Bavaria in April 1919 had three competing governments: an elected one, which was ousted by a “Soviet Republic” announced by a group of left-wing (but non-Communist) intellectuals, which was challenged by another “Soviet Republic” led by the Communists.