On Wings of Eagles (12 page)

be necessary. "You might be right," he said to T.J. "We have

so many things going in the area of negotiation --- only one of

them has to work. I won't go to Tehran. Yet."

    4-

Henry Precht was probably the most harassed man in Washington. A long-serving

State Department official with a bent for art and philosophy and a wacky

sense of humor, he had been making American policy on Iran more or less by

himself for much of 1978, while his superiors---right up to President

Carter-

    70 Ken Follett

focused on the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel.

    Since early November, when things had really started to warm up in Iran,

    Precht had been working seven days a week from eight in the morning until

    nine at night. And those damn Texans seemed to think he had nothing else to

    do but talk to them on the phone.

    The trouble was, the crisis in Iran was not the only power struggle Precht

    had to worry about. There was another fight going on, in Washington,

    between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance--Precht's bos&-and Zbigniew

    Brzezinski, the President's National Security Advisor.

    Vance believed, like President Carter, that American foreign policy should

    reflect American morality. The American people believed in freedom,

    justice, and democracy, and they did not want to support tyrants. The Shah

    of Iran was a tyrant. Amnesty International had called Man's human-rights

    record the worst in the world, and the many reports of the Shah's

    systematic use of torture had been confirmed by the International

    Commission of Jurists. Since the CIA had put the Shah in power and the

    U.S.A. had kept him there, a President who talked a lot about human rights

    had to do something.

    In January 1977 Carter had hinted that tyrants might be denied American

    aid. Carter was indecisive-later that year he visited Iran and lavished

    praise on the Shah-but Vance believed in the human-rights approach.

    Zbigniew Brzezinski did not. The National Security Advisor believed in

    power. The Shah was an ally of the United States, and should be supported.

    Sure, he should be encouraged to stop torturing peopl"ut not yet. His

    regime was under attack: this was no time to liberalize it.

    When would be the time? asked the Vance faction. The Shah had been strong

    for most of his twenty-five years of rule, but had never shown much

    inclination toward moderate government. Brzezinski replied: "Name one

    single moderate government in that region of the world."

    There were those in the Carter administration who thought that if America

    did not stand for freedom and democracy there was no point in having a

    foreign policy at all; but that was a somewhat extreme view, so they fell

    back on a pragmatic argument: the Iranian people had had enough of the

    Shah, and they were going to get rid of him regardless of what Washington

    thought.

    ON WINGS OF EAGLES 71

    Rubbish, said Brzezinski. Read history. Revolutions succeed when rulers

    make concessions, and fail when those in power crush the rebels with an

    iron fist. The Iranian Army, four hundred thousand strong, can easily put

    down any revolt.

    The Vance faction--4ricluding'Henry Precht-

    Brzezinski Theory of Revolutions: threatened tyrants make concessions

    because the rebels are strong, not the other way around, they said. More

    importantly, they did not believe that the Iranian Army was four hundred

    thousand strong. Figures were hard to get, but soldiers were deserting at

    a rate that fluctuated around 8 percent per month, and there were whole

    units that would go over to the revolutionaries intact in the event of

    all-out civil war.

    The two Washington factions were getting their information f1rom different

    sources. Brzezinski was listening to Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah's

    brother-in-law and the most powerful proShah figure in Iran. Vance was

    listening to Ambassador Sullivan. Sullivan's cables were not as consistent

    as Washington could have wished--perhaps because the situation in Iran was

    sometimes confusing-but, since September, the general trend of his reports

    had been to say that the Shah was doomed.

    Brzezinski said Sullivan was running around with his head cut off and could

    not be trusted. Vance's supporters said that Brzezinski dealt with bad news

    by shooting the messenger.

    The upshot was that the United States did nothing. One time the State

    Department drafted a cable to Ambassador Sullivan, instructing him to urge

    the Shah to form a broad-based civilian coalition government: Brzezinski

    killed the cable. Another time Brzezinski phoned the Shah and assured him

    that he had the support of President Carter; the Shah asked for a

    confirming cable; the State Department did not send the cable. In their

    frustration both sides leaked information to the newspapers, so that the

    whole world knew that Washington's policy on Iran was paralyzed by

    infighting.

    With all that going on, the last thing Precht needed was a gang of Texans

    on his tail thinking they were the only people in the world with a problem.

    Besides, he knew, he thought, exactly why EDS was in trouble. On asking

    whether EDS was represented by an agent in h-an, he was told: Yes--t&.

    Abolfath Mahvi. That explained everything. Mahvi was a well-known Tehran

    middleman, nicknamed "the king of the five percenters" for his dealings in

72 Ken Follett

military contracts. Despite his high-level contacts the Shah had put him on

a blacklist of people banned from doing business in Iran. This was why EDS

was suspected of corruption.

    Precht would do what he could. He would get the Embassy in Tehran to look

    into the case, and perhaps Ambassador Sullivan might be able to put

    pressure on the Iranians to release Chiapparone and Gaylord. But there was

    no way the United States government was going to put all other Iranian

    questions on the back burner. They were attempting to support the existing

    regime, and this was no time to unbalance that regime further by

    threatening a break in diplomatic relations over two jailed businessmen,

    especially when there were another twelve thousand U.S. citizens in Iran,

    all of whom the State Department was supposed to look after. It was

    unfortunate, but Chiapparone and Gaylord would just have to sweat it out.

Henry Precht meant well. However, early in his involvement with Paul and

Bill, he-like Lou Goelz--made a mistake that at first wrongly colored his

attitude to the problem and later made him defensive in all his dealings

with EDS. Precht acted as if the investigation in which Paul and Bin were

supposed to be witnesses were a legitimate judicial inquiry into allegations

of corruption, rather than a barefaced act of blackmail. Goelz, on this

assumption, decided to cooperate with General Biglari. Precht, making the

same mistake, refused to treat Paul and Bill as criminally kidnapped

Americans.

    Whether Abolfath Mahvi was corrupt or not, the fact was that he had not

    made a penny out of EDS's contract with the Ministry. Indeed, EDS had got

    into trouble in its early days for refusing to give Mahvi a piece of the

    action.

    It happened like this. Mahvi helped EDS get its first, small contract in

    Iran, creating a document-control system for the Iranian Navy. EDS, advised

    that by law they had to have a local partner, promised Mahvi a third of the

    profit. When the contract was completed, two years later, EDS duly paid

    Mahvi four hundred thousand dollars.

    But while the Ministry contract was being negotiated, Mahvi was on the

    blacklist. Nevertheless, when the deal was about to be signed, Mahvin-who

    by this time was off the blacklist againdemanded that the contract be given

    to a joint company owned by lum. and EDS.

    ON WINGS OF EAGLES 73

    EDS refused. While Mahvi had earned his share of the navy contract, he had

    done nothing for the Ministry deal.

    Mahvi claimed that EDS's association with him had smoothed the way for the

    Ministry contract through the twenty-four different government bodies that

    had to approve it. Furthermore, he said, he had helped obtain a tax ruling

    favorable to EDS that was written into the contract: EDS only got the

    ruling because Mahvi had spent time with the Minister of Finance in Monte

    Carlo.

    EDS had not asked for his help, and did not believe that he had given it.

    Furthermore, Ross Perot did not like the kind of "help" that takes place in

    Monte Carlo.

    EDS's Iranian attorney complained to the Prime Minister, and Mahvi was

    carpeted for demanding bribes. Nevertheless, his influence was so great

    that the Ministry of Health would not sign the contract unless EDS made him

    happy.

    EDS had a series of stormy negotiations with Mahvi. EDS still refused

    point-blank to share profits with him. In the end there was a face-saving

    compromise: a joint company, acting as subcontractor to EDS, would recruit

    and employ all EDS's Iranian staff. In fact, the joint company never made

    money, but that was later: at the time Mahvi accepted the compromise and

    the Ministry contract was signed.

    So EDS had not paid bribes, and the Iranian government knew it; but Henry

    Precht did not, nor did Lou Goelz. Consequently their attitude to Paul and

    Bill was equivocal. Both men spent many hours on the case, but neither gave

    it top priority. When EDS's combative lawyer Tom Luce talked to them as if

    they were idle or stupid or both, they became indignant and said they might

    do better if he would get off their backs.

    Precht in Washington and Goelz in Tehran were the crucial, ground-level

    operatives dealing with the case. Neither of them was idle. Neither was

    incompetent. But they both made mistakes, they both became somewhat hostile

    to EDS, and in those vital first few days they both failed to help Paul and

    Bill.

    THREE

A guard opened the cell door, looked around, pointed at Paul and Bill, and

beckoned them.

Bill's hopes soared. Now they would be released.

    They got up and followed the guard upstairs. It was good to see daylight

    through the windows. They went out the door and across the courtyard to the

    little one-story building beside the entrance gate. The fresh air tasted

    heavenly.

    It had been a terrible night. Bill had lain on the thin mattress, dozing

    fitfully, startled by the slightest movement from the other prisoners,

    looking around anxiously in the dim light from the all-night bulb. He had

    known it was morning when a guard came with glasses of tea and rough hunks

    of bread for breakfast. He had not felt hungry. He had said a rosary.

Now it seemed his prayers were being answered.

    Inside the one-story building was a visiting room furnished with simple

    tables and chairs. Two people were waiting. Bill recognized one of them: it

    was Ali Jordan, the Iranian who worked with Lou Goelz at the Embassy. He

    shook hands and introduced his colleague, Bob Sorenson.

    "We brought you some stuff," Jordan said. "A battery shaver -you'll have to

    share it--and some dungarees. "

    Bill looked at Paul. Paul was staring at the two Embassy men, looking as if

    he were about to explode. "Aren't you going to get us out of here?" Paul

    said.

"I'm afraid we can't do that."

"Goddammit, you got us in here!"

Bill sat down slowly, too depressed to be angry.

    "We're very sorry this has happened," said Jordan. "It came as a complete

    surprise to us. We were told that Dadgar was

    74

    ON WINGS OF EAGLES 75

favorably disposed toward you ... The Embassy is filing a very serious

protest. "

"But what are you doing to get us out?"

    "You must work through the Iranian legal system. Your attorneys-"

"Jesus Christ," Paul said disgustedly.

    Jordan said: "We have asked them to move you to a better part of the jail."

"Gee, thanks.

Sorenson asked: "Uh, is there anything else you need?"

"There's nothing I need," Paul said. "I'm not planning to be

here very long."

    Bill said: "I'd like to get some eye drops."

    "I'll see that you do," Sorenson promised.

    Jordan said: "I think that's all for now . He looked at the

guard.

    Bill stood up.

    Jordan spoke in Farsi to the guard, who motioned Paul and Bill to the door.

    They followed the guard back across the courtyard. Jordan and Sorenson were

    low-ranking Embassy staff, Bill reflected. Why hadn't Goelz come? It seemed

    that the Embassy thought it was EDS's job to get them out: sending Jordan