One Hundred Victories (54 page)

{148}
Author phone interview with Major John Bishop, US Special Operations Task Force–East, March 30, 2013.

{149}
The chief public affairs officer of NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Bryant, said in an email on April 28, 2013, in response to the author’s query, that the ISAF investigation had found that “there were no US Special Forces involved in any way with misconduct or any other alleged misdeeds that may or may not have occurred in Nerkh district.” Janan’s role was also reported by Ben Brumfield and Thom Patterson in “ISAF Begins Pulling Out of an Afghan Province with a Legacy,” CNN, March 20, 2013.

{150}
Mirwais Harooni and Phil Stewart, “Afghan’s Karzai Blasts U.S., Marring Hagel Visit,” Reuters, March 10, 2013.

{151}
Ibid.; author phone interview with Bishop, March 30, 2013.

{152}
Ibid.; Bryant email exchange.

{153}
Author phone interview with Bishop, March 30, 2013.

{154}
See Lester W. Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
20, no. 2 (2007): 10; Brian Glyn Williams,
Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 64; Barnett Rubin,
Afghanistan in the Post–Cold War Era
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 87–88.

{155}
Qari Ziaur Rahman, quoted in interview with
Syed Saleem Shahzad
{155}
, “At War with the Taliban: A Fighter and a Financier,”
South Asia Times
, May 23, 2008. QZR also acknowledged how the terrain of upper Kunar and Nuristan put the Americans at a great disadvantage, fixing them in bases that the guerrillas then attacked. He said, “Thank God that this is a mountainous region. NATO has a presence in the bases only, other than that they do not control anything. The mujahideen patrol everywhere and they carry out attacks freely.
…
Koranghal is our main operation theater in Kunar. It is a slaughterhouse for the Americans. Many Americans have been killed there. Kamdesh in Nooristan is our main operation front. We killed many Americans there as well. Similarly, we are very active in Sarkano, beside many other areas.”

{156}
This account is based principally on author interviews with Gant’s superior officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson, Colonel Mark Schwartz, and Brigadier General Chris Haas. In addition, the author was provided with email communications between senior US Army officers regarding the detailed allegations about Gant and the events in Kunar.

{157}
Comment made to author by general officer at Fort Bragg.

{158}
Author phone interview with Nur Mohammed, March 21, 2012.

{159}
Captain Rick Holahan and other members of Major Kent Solheim’s company staff provided a detailed briefing on, among other things, the plotting of the battle on Google Maps, in Jalalabad, March 22–23, 2012.

{160}
This section is based on author interviews with members of ODA 3436, Waliulah Hamidzai, and other Afghans, Kunar, March 21–22, 2012, and Major Kent Solheim, Nangahar, March 22, 2012.

{161}
This section is based primarily on the author’s direct observations during a November 2012 visit to Kunar and author interviews with members of ODA 3131, Afghan Local Police commanders, and other Afghans.

{162}
Author interviews with Afghans and members of ODA 3131, November 2012, and personal observations.

{163}
Information on Qari Zia Rahman can be found in NATO ISAF press releases and
Long War Journal
articles by Bill Roggio. See “Afghan, ISAF Forces Secure Eastern Afghan Town,” International Security Assistance Force, press release, July 20, 2010; Bill Roggio, “Afghan, US Forces Hunt Al Qaeda, Taliban in Northeast,”
Long War Journal
, August 2, 2010; Bill Roggio, “US Hunts Wanted Taliban and Al Qaeda Commander in Kunar,”
Long War Journal
, July 20, 2010; “Several Insurgents Killed, Two Detained by Afghan and Coalition Force in Kunar,” August 2, 2010, www.dvidshub.net/news/53811/several-insurgents-killed-two-detained-afghan-and-coalition-force-kunar#.UZvKhqJJOAg.

{164}
Operation Strong Eagle I is recounted in the three-part series “Fight and Flight,” by Dianna Cahn, in
Stars and Stripes
, September 20–21, 2010. Operation Strong Eagle II was reported in several press releases issued by US Army public affairs, including “Marawara District Shura After Operations Strong Eagle II,” July 22, 2012. Operation Strong Eagle III details were reported in “Forces Conclude Operations Near Pakistan Border,” American Forces Press Service, April 7, 2011.

{165}
Author interviews with Captain Tim Ambrose, November 7–8, 2012, and with OTI official in Kabul, November 15, 2012. USAID OTI subsequently provided additional information about its projects.

{166}
Author’s personal observation of events in Marawara, November 7, 2012.

{167}
Vladimir Grigoriev, “Facts of the War History: Marawara Company,” June 23, 2006, Art of War, http://artofwar.ru/g/grigorxew_w_a/text_0080.shtml.

{168}
Author interview with Major Ben Hauser, November 9, 2012.

{169}
Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Chris Fox and his command staff at Camp Montrond, November 14, 2012.

{170}
Author interview with Colonel Tony Fletcher at Camp Vance, November 14, 2012. I also interviewed his operations and plans officers.

{171}
Rod Nordland, “After Airstrike, Afghan Points to C.I.A. and Secret Militias,”
New York Times
, April 18, 2013. In another account, Faizi told a reporter that a decree Karzai had issued in late February 2013, following another civilian casualty incident caused by the CIA-led force in the same district, abolishing parallel structures, “was aimed primarily at dismantling CIA-controlled teams.” See Emma Graham-Harrison, “Hamid Karzai Seeks to Curb CIA Operations in Afghanistan,”
The Guardian
, April 19, 2013. A press release on Karzai’s February order is posted on the Afghan presidential office website; see “President Karzai Assigns Delegation to Merge All Armed Units Outside Government Structure into Afghan Security Institutions,” February 28, 2013, http://president.gov.af/en/news/17849. It reads, in part: “President Hamid Karzai has issued an executive order assigning a delegation tasked to bar operation by any armed grouping or units outside the formal government security structures and to completely merge them into government security institutions. The delegation chaired by National Security Advisor Dr. Spanta shall be responsible to identify and merge into government structures all those armed units and groups run and operated by international coalition forces as local security units. The delegation will be responsible to demand from the international coalition to hand over all such armed groupings to Afghan security institutions within three months.” See also Kate Clark, “What Exactly Is the CIA Doing in Afghanistan? Proxy Militias and Two Airstrikes in Kunar,” April 28, 2013, Afghanistan Analysts Network, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3370.

{172}
Author interview with Gudjer, November 7, 2012.

{173}
An argument for such small combined civil-military teams is made in Carter Malkasian and J. Kael Weston, “War Downsized: How to Accomplish More with Less,”
Foreign Affairs
91, no. 2 (2012): 111–121. The inflated role assumed by regional security officers at US embassies often overrides the ambassador’s intent, and in any event prevents civilians from operating freely throughout the countries to which they are assigned. Without a revised approach, the military-intelligence-civilian triad model outlined here cannot be realized. It was a key feature of the CORDS program in Vietnam and subsequent Cold War conflict zones. In the wake of the Benghazi fatalities and subsequent recriminations, however, the trend toward more restrictive policies for civilians may increase rather than decrease.

{174}
Information on OTI provided by USAID OTI officials, March 18, 2013.

{175}
Author interview, November 12, 2012.

{176}
Quotations by Tony Thomas are from author interviews, Kabul, November 6 and 15, 2012. “Task force” is special ops’ shorthand for special mission units; although many military formations are task-organized, the term refers to those special mission units organized for rescuing hostages or hunting terrorist leaders. This task force has been given different numbers over the past decade, so to minimize confusion this account will simply refer to special mission units. When commanded by General Stanley McChrystal, it was Task Force 714; it was later renamed Task Force 535. A subordinate task force is Task Force 310. See Stanley A. McChrystal,
My Share of the Task: A Memoir
(New York: Portfolio, 2013), 92; Donald C. Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,”
Special Warfare
24, no. 4 (2011): 22–28.

{177}
Brigadier Mark Smethurst, National Defense Industrial Association conference, Washington, DC, January 28, 2013; author interview with Colonel Duke Christy, deputy commander of ISAF SOF, Kabul, April 7, 2012.

{178}
Major Michael E. Gates, “Creating SOF Networks: The Role of NATO Special Operations as a Testing Ground for SOF Integration” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011); Lieutenant Colonel Buck Dellinger, “Special Operations Command Europe: Strengthening Partnerships for Global Security,”
Special Warfare
, April–June 2012, 12–15. One of McRaven’s initiatives as commander of the US special operations command in Europe in the mid-2000s had been to found a NATO SOF headquarters to provide a permanent venue for common education and training of NATO special operators.

{179}
McChrystal,
My Share of the Task
, 367.

{180}
In
My Share of the Task
, McChrystal describes his relationship with Thomas but uses his initials instead of his name (p. 99). Thomas’s profile on the networking site LinkedIn includes the titles and dates of his command and staff assignments. Some of his positions are also described in his “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Thomas from the Pentagon,” May 15, 2013, the transcript of which is posted at www.defense.gov.

{181}
Author interviews with Colonel Tony Fletcher, November 14, 2012, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Navarro, August 18, 2012.

{182}
Email exchange with the author, May 3, 2013.

{183}
Comments attributed to Bolduc are from author interviews in Kabul, November 6 and 15, 2012, and subsequent emails, and two unpublished, unclassified documents from the command, “ALP Information Paper & Talking Points” (undated), and the ALP Map weekly tracker, January 28, 2013.

{184}
Meeting with RAND, December 19, 2012, Arlington, Virginia, and briefing deck.

{185}
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
(Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA], 2013), 9, 42–47; author interview with Ali Shah Ahmadzai, Kabul, April 7, 2012. The UNAMA report noted that the Afghan Interior Ministry had acted promptly to investigate and detain Afghan Local Police officers accused of murder in Zhari, but the suspects were subsequently released by local officials.

{186}
The statistics are from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam–Studies and Observations Group website, www.macvsog.cc.

{187}
Email communication with senior special operations commander, January 10, 2013.

{188}
The official US military definition of unconventional warfare is: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” See Joint Publication 3-05, “Special Operations,” and Joint Dictionary 1-02. For comparative historical research on transition of civil defense, see Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, and Todd C. Helmus,
Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND/National Defense Research Institute, 2012). In an April 3, 2012, interview with the author, Brigadier General Christopher Haas, then commander of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan, observed that the planned growth of the Afghan Local Police would test the special operations forces’ span of control.

{189}
A good description of ALP in Baghlan is in Luke Mogelson, “Bad Guys vs Worse Guys,”
New York Times Magazine
, October 19, 2011.