Operation ‘Fox-Hunt’ (17 page)

DG-Security spoke next, “We will have an ARC C-130 on standby at the Chakrata airbase; 117 Helicopter Unit will provide a Dhruv chopper for reconnaissance patrols and close support.”

“Since both units train together, they will have interoperability,” DG-S continued. “So it is fixed, we will swoop on them in India. By that time, we should have also tracked and neutralised Major Shezad’s group. The electronic intelligence people are trying to track down the cell phone and see where it leads us while the ARC is processing the satellite photos of the mock-up airfield at Sargodha to arrive at the identity of the target.”

12

RAW HQ, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 13 December: 1000 hours

T
he field officer at the Technical section got off the line and ran to Sanjay’s office. “I just spoke to the folks at Vodafone, the number is registered to a Swaminarayan Aghnihotri. It’s a pre-paid connection and we have an address and ID from the form. It had been activated 60 days back in Lower Parel area of Mumbai. The address on the form is also of a nearby apartment. I have spoken to the people at Mumbai office; they are dispatching a police unit to the address. The cellphone is currently switched off so we can’t get a bearing right now. The technical people at Vodafone are now sitting down with our guys to track the tower from which the transmission was made last evening. Rather than the SIM card registration address, it’s the triangulation and tracking of the cell phone that is more likely to come through. Besides, the local police are trying to find out the shop it was purchased from.”

The field officer explained how the system at the operator end could track the approximate location of the phone call using the tower. The method was not too accurate as the towers could be skipped if traffic was high on a certain tower. Especially in a city like Mumbai, it was difficult due to the density.

“We have a general idea. It’s somewhere in the Kandivali-Goregaon area. Eastern side, I am sure. We are tracking all the towers in the area; if the cell phone starts transmitting again we will try and triangulate the exact location.”

Sanjay nodded his thanks to the field officer and called Dubey at the NIA. He wanted to make sure that the local police were clear about the importance of the case. “Don’t worry, the Home Secretary just called the DGP. They are sending a Force One (F1) unit. Time for them to play with the new toys,” Dubey chuckled.

F1 was a special response unit created by the Mumbai police for counter-assault action after the 26/11 attack. In that particular incident, the police force of the city lost many officers in the first few hours itself. International agencies had blamed poor training and morale of the forces for the damnable performance. Unknown to the policemen, for the first time since that day in November 2008, they had a real chance to extract revenge.

Sanjay disconnected the call and walked down a floor to the ARC analysis division. “They better have something”, he muttered under his breath as he walked in.

“We have been able to identify the airfield. It’s Pune. We have worked through around 40 small airfields; it has to be Pune. I can say that with 98 percent accuracy on the basis of the data,” the analyst claimed.

He pointed at the screen of his iMac computer. Using the mouse and keyboard he placed gridlines of the satellite photograph of the structure at Sargodha airfield and superimposed it on the satellite photo of the Pune civil airfield.

“Are you sure? I mean is there a chance that you are wrong?” Sanjay asked, earnestly. He could not afford a mistake.

The technician glared back, “Look, I told you I am sure, unless there is exactly the same airport structure somewhere else. We know our job, okay? We took time to be sure.”

Sanjay called Secretary-R and communicated the findings. Secretary-R called the Home Secretary and the NSA about the conclusion. The NSA listened quietly and then spoke, “I am ordering that a team of NSG be flown to Mumbai immediately. In case we have a contact with the terrorists, they will be required. Also ask Rathore to get those two pongos of his on the plane; they can positively identify the Fox. The Air Force is arranging for a C130 to leave by 1200 hours. The Home Minister will speak to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. I want you to reach the Prime Minister’s residence immediately. I am requesting a meeting of CCS.”

Sanjay went down to the conference room and explained the situation to Rathore. Ankush and Nair found themselves being rushed from the mess to the Indira Gandhi International (IGI) airport in a Military Intelligence Gypsy at full-speed with a Delhi police escort.

At the IGI, they were taken to the airside directly. Inside a hangar, a huge C130 aircraft was being serviced for take-off. As Ankush and Nair looked on at the beehive-like activity around the newly inducted American plane, a bus and a two-ton truck pulled into the hangar. Twenty Black Cat commandos jumped out and lined up for inspection. Another five support-staff members alighted from the truck. While the commandos loaded their equipment, their team leader, Captain Sukhjeet Singh came and shook hands with the two officers. They made small talk, discussing general topics and steering clear of any mention of the mission. While Ankush and Nair had known action in the counter-insurgency affected areas in Kashmir and the restive North East, respectively, the twenty men who they were
travelling with were a part of India’s premiere counter-terrorist unit, the NSG. Based out of Manesar, the NSG is a paramilitary unit under the operational command of the home ministry. The NSG’s strength of around ten thousand men is divided between the Special Action Group (SAG) and the Special Rangers Group (SRG). The SAG is the strike arm, with the combatants drawn from the Indian Army. The SRG or the Rangers, as they are known, with members from central police organisations like CRPF, BSF and ITBP support the SAG in isolating target areas. The police-army combination of the force helps create a unique culture which reduces collateral damage during operations while eliciting cooperation from civilian forces in the operation zone, at the same time maintaining the lethality of a military force. Captain Sukhjeet Singh was from the Army. A career specialist in urban warfare, he belonged to 51 SAG. The tall Sikh had had his baptism of fire during his tenure in Kashmir. His SRG counterparts would be officers from national police organisations.

“So you are travelling from Delhi? I thought there was a NSG centre in Mumbai already?” Ankush asked as they awaited take off.

“It’s partly ready and we have a Rangers unit present there. We will connect on ground with them.” He answered as he overlooked the loading of the aircraft. Ankush eyed his M4 carbine enviously.

NSG was established following the 1984 Operation Bluestar. The government had realised that it needed a force which would be able to operate in close-quarter combat in civilian areas, especially urban surroundings with specific anti-terrorist operation competencies. This would also spare the army the bad odour of intervening in politically sensitive operations. The NSG was the counter assault force during 26/11 Mumbai attack. It not only had to neutralise suicidal terrorists but also rescue
hundreds of innocent hostages. The C130 took off an hour later. It’s destination: Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai.

Prime Minister’s residence

Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), 13 December: 1400 hours

The NSA, the Defence Minister, Home Minister, top civil servants and the service chiefs were all present. Also present were the Chief Minister and the DGP of Maharashtra along with the Home Minister of the state. They had been flown in secretly earlier in the day to avoid a media circus. Secretary-R was presenting the developments of the case. He went through the details and then took the quorum through the operational details.

“We have identified the locations of both groups and the target. It’s Pune airport. The team is suggesting that we don’t jump the gun by suddenly increasing the security. We have reasons to believe that we may spook the second Fedayeen group whose location now we guess is Mumbai. If we react now, they may go ahead and execute a hurried operation and thus cause some damage and still get the media response they want. We have another twenty-four hours; let us not hurry. We are sure now that the attack is to take place on 16 December, the liberation day of Bangladesh. As we speak, a police team is heading towards the address of the cell phone customer. Alternatively, we may get lucky and get the exact location when the terrorist uses the cell phone again.”

The DGP of Maharashtra also had something to report.

“The crime branch has been investigating the number given to us by the home ministry. It has been bought on fake identity
papers. Our investigators are checking out other related lines of investigation. Also we have placed six cars with plain-clothed surveillance specialists from the IB in the Kandivali-Goregaon area. If we are able to track the cell phone signal once the phone is switched on, then the nearest team can quickly identify the building and set-up surveillance until the main force arrives.” The Home Minister nodded his approval.

The Air Chief had a comment. “While I understand your concerns to get these terrorists, we can quietly increase the security of the airbase. I will fly in a team of Garud commando force to the base from Bangalore tonight. They will secure the airfield on the airside and the military installations and be quiet about it. I don’t think we can risk having the militants attack the base.” Secretary-R agreed.

The Prime Minister had a question, “How do you think the terrorists from Bangladesh are going to get to Pune if the date is 16 December?”

Before Secretary-R could reply, the Home Minister looked at his notes−IB had reported to him−and replied, “We believe they plan to fly into Pune on 16th morning by a GoAir flight. IB has been able to isolate five passengers whom they can’t place as per addresses and credit cards used. We are keeping quiet about it. There is a surveillance team from RAW which is tracking the terrorists in Bangladesh; we are getting live voice-feed here from the team. In case they leave the compound, we will have a six-to eight-hour warning. I have been told that that is enough for us to intercept them at our end.”

Secretary-R looked at the file, cleared his throat and added, “Thank you, sir. In fact, we believe that they would have planned to cross the border between 0100 hours and 0400 hours. It is usually the time at which border guards are least alert and the flight is scheduled for 1100 hours so it gives them enough time
to reach the airport. We believe that if we are able to track the cell phone used by the Mumbai team, we can coordinate the operations on both locations together. In case we have to launch the Mumbai operation before the Bangladesh strike team crosses over, then we will pass the information on to Dhaka and assist them in neutralising the threat within their borders. I would prefer that we catch them inside Indian territory.”

“How can we be sure that the Bangladesh government will take immediate action? They may let the terrorists go under Pakistani pressure. How can we be sure of their cooperation?”

“The Secretary-R has already spoken to his Bangladeshi counterpart; he has not shared key details, but it seems that their secret service is very interested in one of the photographs we shared. One of the local associates helping the terrorists there is a man named Mehboob and the Bangladesh authorities are very interested in getting their hands on him. IB confirms that he is one of the men suspected of being a part of an assassination team which targeted the Bangladeshi Prime Minister last year. They have been looking for him ever since. If we are able to supply the exact location of this person, they will be very pleased. We also know that a detachment of Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS) is on a 24-hour standby at the Jahanabad Cantonment, just in case. So on that account I am sure we will get some help. But that’s the last resort. We want them on our soil,” the NSA explained.

The Bangladeshi SWADS is the equivalent of the US Navy SEALs and the Indian Marine Commandos (MARCOS); the unit has a special anti-terrorist squad trained by the South Korean and US Navy SEALs.

The Prime Minister turned to the Defence Minister and the service chiefs, “Gentlemen, if we don’t stop them, I want the armed forces to prepare for retaliation within twenty-four hours
of the attack. We will hurt them and hurt them bad. It’s an election year and I do not want to face the citizens as a weakling. Please activate your Cold Start Doctrine at 2300 hours on 16 December; an illustrious prime minister ended a war on 16 December, we might find ourselves starting one this year.” The tone of his voice brought a level of seriousness seldom seen in these meetings.

He turned to the Defence Minister, “I don’t want you taking forever to deploy your men. I want a hard, fast response. I don’t want us baring our teeth and then pulling back, do you understand?”

He was referring to the situation following two earlier terror attacks, following which despite political will to retaliate it had taken Indian forces too long to deploy; long enough for the international community to step in and defuse the situation. The meeting ended with the NSA giving out final instructions to the service and intelligence heads present. Then he gestured quietly to Secretary-R to follow him.