Operation Mercury (3 page)
Authors: John Sadler
This passionate plea touched a continuing chord in the president and became the inspiration for the subsequent Lease-Lend scheme. More immediately, and within a couple of days, Roosevelt had dispatched his personal representative, Colonel William Donovan, to liaise directly with Churchill.
âBig Bill' was a larger than life character; latterly a successful Wall Street lawyer, he had abandoned the brief for the sword at his president's request even though their politics were, in many areas, incompatible. A much decorated veteran of the Western Front, Donovan had maintained a finger in the counterintelligence pie and was a firm advocate of the Allied cause. He would go on to found the US equivalent to Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) which would, in due course during the emergence of the Cold War, grow into the omnipotent Central Intelligence Agency.
Having met and conferred with Churchill in London, Donovan proceeded on a grand tour of Eastern Europe, including the Bulgarian capital of Sofia, Belgrade, where he spoke with Prince Paul and then to North Africa for discussions with the representatives of Vichy.
His message to the War Cabinet was a simple one and typically forthright. If Britain wished to restore and maintain its foundering credibility with the Americans then some form of successful military venture had to be undertaken on the European mainland. Clearly France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia were beyond the Empire's much depleted resources; this left the Balkans, the deadly melting pot and graveyard of spent alliances.
It was this need, coupled with the spectre of an Italian offensive, that triggered Churchill's interest in Greece. If Britain, for a limited military commitment, could facilitate the defeat of Il Duce's strutting legions then this might achieve the necessary resonance across the Atlantic.
Mussolini's designs were scarcely secret. Since the annexation of Albania in 1939, the Italians shared a common border with the Greeks and there had been an escalating tide of provocation since. In addition to a series of stage-managed border âincidents', the Greek cruiser
Helle
had been brazenly torpedoed in an utterly unprovoked attack.
Hitler had met his Italian counterpart in October 1940 at the Brenner Pass in the wake of the German defeat over the skies of southern England. Mussolini was in high good humour as their talk ranged over a sweeping agenda. He might have been less jovial had he realised that the Führer had already taken the decision to beef up the German presence in Romania, to the extent that the whole country became an occupied territory; a key shift of policy he chose not to share. Some two weeks prior to the summit Hitler had issued a directive setting out the defined objectives:
To the world their [the military mission's] tasks will be to guide friendly Romania in organising and instructing her forces.
The real tasks â which must not become apparent either to the Romanians or to our own troops â will be:
To protect the oil district â¦
To prepare for deployment from Romanian bases ⦠in case a war with Soviet Russia is forced upon us.
15
Il Duce roared with impotent rage when he finally learnt of the order and he blazed that he would behave in like manner â that Hitler would read of his projected invasion of Greece in the newspapers! He then gave orders for the invasion plans to be put in hand immediately.
Consequently General Metaxas, de facto dictator, was awoken in the early hours of 29 October 1940 to be presented with an Italian ultimatum. He was accused by the ambassador, Count Grazzi, of aiding and abetting the British, Italy's enemy â as quid pro quo Mussolini now demanded free access to and passage over Greece sovereign territory for his troops. Anything less than complete acquiescence would be considered an act of war. Inevitably, as anticipated, Metaxas refused to see his country so summarily shorn of nationhood. Within a couple of hours Italian troops had crossed the frontier.
That same morning Hitler arrived for a further summit in Florence to be met by Mussolini who, grinning like a mountebank, promptly postured âFührer, we march.'
It was at this point that the Battle for Crete most probably became inevitable.
A New Thermopylae
As Mr. Churchill stated in his review of the campaign, the military authorities considered that there was a line which, given certain circumstances, could be successfully defended. The Greek campaign was not undertaken as a hopeless or suicidal operation. It turned out to be a rearguard action onlyâ¦
1
Given certain circumstances; the Official History does not define what these circumstances might have been and there has, with the inestimable benefit of hindsight, been a common perception amongst historians that the Greek adventure was a hare-brained notion from the start:
The decision to go to Greece was a political one, and from the point of view of a professional it was a military nonsense ⦠the diversion of resources to Greece including 6th and 7th Australian divisions, the New Zealand division, and part of the 2nd Army took away from General Wavell in Africa practically the whole of the fighting formations which were ready and equipped for operations, and therefore by going to Greece we endangered our entire position in the Middle East.
2
General Archibald Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief of British and Imperial forces in the Middle East, was far from sanguine about Allied prospects in Greece. He was rightly concerned that the Italian build up in Libya where Marshall Graziani's huge army dwarfed his own, represented the major threat. The General was, whilst a consummate professional, not imbued with the gift for dealing with awkward political masters. He seems to have, unfairly, been held in low esteem by Churchill whose swashbuckling approach, often totally unrelated to logistical constraints, was at odds with Wavell's caution and natural reserve.
Under his command he had some 70,000 troops, rather ill assorted and, with two of his potentially best contingents, the Australians, under General Thomas Blamey and the New Zealanders, under General Bernard Freyberg, reporting to their national governments rather than directly to the commander-in-chief.
The Italians had some 280,000 men, supported by 1,500 aircraft; Wavell's RAF support, headed by Sir Arthur Longmore, could barely muster 200 airworthy machines, many of these obsolete. Supply was by convoy taking the long route around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Red Sea, prone to attack by swift Italian destroyers and submarines. An overland air supply route over the trackless wastes of the Sahara was opened from Takoradi, each run an epic in itself.
In his directive of 16 August 1940 the Prime Minister stressed the vital importance of defending Egypt. Wavell certainly would not demur but he identified the overriding need, not for men but matériel, aircraft, trucks and tanks. Quite correctly he had judged that the war in the desert would be one that was decided by firepower and mobility, supported by superiority in the air. The General's conclusions were accepted and the supply of equipment stepped up accordingly. Churchill's bold idea of sending a convoy through the Axis-infested waters of the western Mediterranean, whilst extremely risky, paid off.
In Greece a great surge of patriotic fervour, sufficient to unite the many disparate factions, even under the leadership of a despised autocrat such as Metaxas, rallied and took on the Italian invaders. Despite a shortage of just about everything and a haphazard supply chain, the ill-armed Greek conscripts swiftly brought Mussolini's seemingly irresistible juggernaut to an abrupt halt. The Italian troops were not equipped for an autumn campaign, their morale proved illusory and a determined counter-attack, launched in mid-November, began, very swiftly, to assume the proportions of a rout.
Although Hitler was quick to criticise his hapless ally for the severity of the defeat, he was not perhaps as opposed to the idea of a Balkan involvement as he might have appeared. The idea of a coordinated attack on Greece and an offensive in North Africa, aimed at the capture of Suez and thereby, imperilling Britain's entire position, was not unattractive.
As early as the summer of 1940 German planners at both OKH
3
and OKW
4
, the top tiers of the Nazi command structure, had considered the possibility of supporting an Italian invasion of the Greek mainland with a simultaneous airborne assault on Crete. This would only be launched when Graziani's legions had succeeded in capturing Mersa Matruh in the second leg of the proposed desert offensive thus providing the Axis with forward airstrips and bringing the British fleet anchorage at Alexandria within bombing range.
The naval base at Souda Bay on the north coast of Crete, just east of the island's administrative capital, Chania, would be an invaluable asset in the war at sea, one which was presently available to the British. The scheme for proposed cooperation did not find favour with Il Duce who saw his dreams of imperial conquest coming to fruition purely as a result of Italian efforts, without the need for German intermeddling. As General Franz Halder sourly remarked, the Italians âdo not want us'.
5
As the Germans were tentatively touting the idea of a combined Balkans operation, in August the Greeks, already alarmed by Italian sabre rattling and overt provocation, had approached the British ambassador requesting assistance in the event, as now appeared likely, of an invasion.
The subsequent report prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and delivered to the War Cabinet on 9 September was unequivocal:
Even with the reinforcements at present contemplated, our land and air forces in the Middle East will be no more than sufficient to withstand a determined attack by Italian and German forces. Until the attack on Egypt has been finally defeated no forces will be available for assistance to Greece ⦠no forces can be made available for assistance to Greece until the present threat to Egypt has been liquidated.
6
The overwhelming weight of military advice was therefore, from the outset, against any intervention in Greece. Britain's stock of military capital was simply too slender to face a fresh division of resources. Despite having guaranteed Greek neutrality and despite the need to impress the Americans, the generals both at home and in the Middle East were opposed to sending troops.
The cold logic of this conclusion is inescapable, Britain had suffered too many reverses and now faced a major threat to her Empire. Greece must fight alone. Should the Germans intervene to support their failing ally then the result would not be in doubt. General Metaxas remained confident his raw levies could see off the Italians but the advance of the Panzers would finish them.
Churchill, writing later, and with a fine eye for the useful benefits of hindsight, gives the wider political view:
We often hear military experts inculcate the doctrine of giving priority to the decisive theatre. There is a lot in this. But in war, this principle, like all others, is governed by facts and circumstances; otherwise strategy would be too easy. It would become a drill book and not an art; it would depend upon rules, and not on an ever changing scene.
7
1940 had been a year of defeats for Britain, her battered defences bolstered only by those brave fighters who had escaped from the occupied territories. Despite this, the overall strategic position seemed set to improve. The Greeks were busily trouncing the Italians; it seemed as though Albania could fall and British Fleet Air Arm Swordfish torpedo bombers scored a signal success against Il Duce's navy at harbour in Taranto. In the second week of December Wavell unleashed his desert offensive and inflicted a series of dramatic defeats on Graziani's army, to the extent that the whole Italian position in North Africa began rapidly to unravel.
8
The earlier confidence of the Axis leaders, preparing to act as receivers of a bankrupt British Empire, evaporated. In December both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia declined to join the Tripartite Alliance; worse the Russian attitude began to harden. In the course of a conference in Berlin, Molotov displayed both caution and suspicion, even presuming to grill the Führer himself. A timely air raid by the RAF served to underline the fact of Britain's continuing defiance.
When Stalin later confirmed his foreign minister's demands and intransigence Hitler realised that the time for âBarbarossa'
9
was at hand. From now on German strategic considerations were to be driven by the need to plan and prepare for the invasion of Russia; the Balkans would thus be a sideshow only, a necessary sideshow and one which had the advantage of providing a cover for the German build up.
The collapse of the Italian position in both Greece and North Africa removed any argument over the question of German involvement. Hitler had to secure this southern flank before committing his forces to an all out attack on the Soviets. Thus, the Wehrmacht was being drawn into a Balkan campaign not by policy but as a consequence of diplomatic failure and, on Il Duce's part, military bungling. After a further, unsuccessful effort to interest Franco in an attack on Gibraltar, Hitler was convinced of the need to intervene in Greece.
Churchill also had a fascination with the Balkans and the autumn successes against the Italians fuelled his interest in Greece where it might yet be possible to strike a blow against the Axis; such a blow as might serve to significantly bolster American enthusiasm for the Allied cause. The Prime Minister had convinced the Chiefs of Staff that a descent upon Rhodes, Mussolini's last Aegean bastion, might be accomplished by a mixed force of marines and commandos. In the event, this did not proceed.
10
The idea of providing support for Greece, a small, poor nation that was fighting heroically and with success against the weaker arm of the Axis, was naturally appealing and carried the weight of moral imperative. Alan Clark quite rightly points out that, in the first four years of war, Greece was the only European power to defeat the fascists on the continent. The political will was therefore present but could the necessary military resources, planning and deployment be achieved?
When the Italians launched their invasion, Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, was already in Cairo where Churchill badgered him with the feasibility of providing military aid. At this stage Eden appeared to share Wavell's view that such a division of resources would fatally weaken the planned offensive in the western desert. Only partially deflected, the Prime Minister then issued orders for further aircraft to be sent. This was done without the knowledge or acquiescence of Middle East Command and seriously weakened the RAF's position overall.
The Commander-in-Chief had already reiterated his earlier misgivings in a cable dated 2 November:
As hostilities develop between Italy and Greece we must expect further, persistent calls for aid. It seems essential that we should be clear in our minds on this main issue now. We cannot from Middle East resources send sufficient air or land reinforcements to have any decisive influence on the course of the fighting in Greece. To send such forces from here or to divert reinforcements now on their way or approved would imperil our whole position in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for offensive operations. It would surely be bad strategy to allow ourselves to be diverted from this task and unwise to employ our forces in fragments in a theatre of war where they cannot be decisiveâ¦. [and later in a further communication of the following day]⦠in general all Commanders-in-Chief are strongly of the opinion that the defence of Egypt is of paramount importance to our whole position in the Middle East. They consider that from the strategical point of view the security of Egypt is the most urgent commitment and must take precedence of attempts to prevent Greece being overrun.'
11
Buoyed by the sweeping successes of the December offensive, Eden, by January 1941, appeared far more willing to consider a deployment in the Balkans. Indeed Churchill now felt the Italians should not be pursued beyond the vital bastion of Tobruk and that, with the campaign, as he saw it, virtually over, a view that was supported by the South African General Smuts, attention could revert to the Balkans.
Wavell remained obdurate but he based his objections on the view that the German threat was more apparent than real. He might have been wiser to simply reiterate that Britain lacked the necessary resources to embark on a Greek expedition. This flaw earned an immediate rebuke from Churchill who sharply reminded the Commander-in-Chief that his obligations were to carry out orders rather than determine policy. Thus chastened, Wavell seems to have taken the view that he had no choice but to comply with his instructions regardless of his misgivings.
Consequently both he and Air Marshal Longmore were dispatched to Athens for a high level meeting with the Greek commanders. Wavell would not be disappointed to discover that the Commander-in-Chief, General Papagos, was far from enamoured of the concept of British intervention. He believed that a modest deployment of troops would achieve nothing and possibly only worsen the situation. Wavell was thus able to report a negative outcome and press on with his plans, already in hand, to pursue the beaten Italians as far as Benghazi.
Though Churchill concurred, he did not abandon the Greek venture and the sudden death of General Metaxas, who succumbed to a heart attack on 29 January, raised fresh possibilities. Anthony Eden, with the zeal of the convert and a desire to please, conceived the notion of a grand Balkan alliance, a united front that would be strong enough to thwart any Axis attempt to intervene further in Greece, who would join with Britain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
If such a grouping could be brought into being then the number of divisions available would outnumber those which the Wehrmacht could hope to deploy in the Balkan sector. Noble in concept this grand strategy disregarded both political and military realities. Divisions which might exist on paper would seldom materialise in the flesh and the morass of Balkan politics generally proved bottomless.