Patrick McLanahan Collection #1 (103 page)

“Even though it obviously means greater civilian casualties?”

“We don't specifically target civilians. We don't attack cities or towns indiscriminately,” Venti said.

“What other nuclear forces do we have left that we know about?” the president asked.

“We have fifteen heavy bombers that can be generated for nuclear strike missions, plus two more undergoing depot-level maintenance and one in extended local-level maintenance status—meaning it's the ‘hangar queen,' being used for spare parts until more come in.

“
Fifteen bombers?
That's it?” the president exclaimed. “My God!”

“And the thirty surviving B-1s are not nuclear capable,” Venti reminded him. “The only long-range nuclear air-attack forces left are the eighteen B-52s left at Barksdale, plus any other bombers that were airborne or deployed during the attack. We think only two B-2 stealth bombers survived. That could leave us with about twenty nuclear-capable long-range bombers.

“We do have other forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons, but it will take time to generate those forces, and they're not as survivable as the heavies,” Venti went on. “As I mentioned, there are about thirty B-1B bombers that can be converted back to carrying nuclear weapons. The Air Force also has about one hundred and seventy-five F-15E Strike Eagle tactical fighter-bombers that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, based at six locations in the continental U.S. and Alaska—unfortunately, we closed the F-15E base at RAF Lakenheath in England and brought all of the nuclear weapons stored in Europe back to the U.S. Although no warships except the ballistic-missile subs carry nuclear weapons, ships can be quickly supplied with nuclear cruise missiles and gravity bombs—the F/A-18 Hornet carrier-based fighter can deliver nuclear weapons.”

“I think it would be wise to disperse those bombers and any other bombers that survived around the country,” Secretary of Defense Goff said, “to make it harder for the Russians to attack them. If they want to go after bomber bases, they'll be next.”

“I sent a message to Air Combat Command to suggest exactly that,” Venti said. “We can phone or instant-message all the commanders from the NAOC, just as you can from your phones and computers aboard Air Force One. General Muskoka of ACC is on his way back to Langley. He
was
en route to Offutt Air Force Base for a meeting with STRATCOM, NORAD, Space Command, First Air Force, and Eighth Air Force commanders to discuss reestablishing a tighter air-defense network in the continental U.S. and perhaps putting the bomber force back on twenty-four/seven alert.” He paused, swallowed, then added, “I've received no response from General Samson of Eighth Air Force, who is the commander of the bomber forces. His staff thinks he had just arrived at Offutt when the attack took place. Air Force has also not heard from General Shepard of NORAD, General Wollensky of Space Command, General Craig of First Air Force, and General Houser of Air Intelligence Agency. They may have been at Offutt as well.”

“Oh, Christ,” Goff breathed. “That's most of the Air Force's senior commanders.”

“We need replacements for the dead and missing generals, and we need them
fast,
” the president said. “Then I need to talk to them right away. I can't even begin to try to plan a response to this attack before I know what we have and what
they
have.”

“My staff is working on all that as we speak, Mr. President,” General Venti said. “I've already been in contact with the deputy commander of the Nine-sixty-sixth Information Warfare Wing, Colonel Trevor Griffin. He's taking a military jet from San Antonio and will be at the Pentagon in a few hours. The STRATCOM ops detachment here at the Pentagon can brief us on the status of strategic forces anytime you're ready.”

“Have Griffin contact me as soon as he's briefed, General,” Thorn said. “What about civil defense and securing the blast sites?”

“The governors of each affected state and several of the neighboring states have activated their national guards,” Secretary Goff responded, “and we're working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. Northern Command to secure the impact sites and provide relief services. It's too early to tell the extent of contamination—the weapons were detonated underground but were extremely small, so the hazard of radioactive fallout might be minimal.”

“Thank God,” the president murmured. He rubbed his eyes wearily. “All right, everyone, my first order of business is to find out what we lost and what we have left. I can't say much of anything to the American people or to the world right now, except that I'm alive and our capital and government are still functioning. But very soon everyone's going to wonder what our first move will be. That's what I need to figure
out. We'll talk again in one hour, or sooner if conditions warrant.” And the connection was broken.

A short time later

N
ice to see you again, Tagger,” Patrick McLanahan said. He was in the Battle Management area of the command center, speaking to Colonel Trevor Griffin at Air Intelligence Agency headquarters via a secure video teleconference. Patrick McLanahan was busily checking the streams of data being fed to Battle Mountain from the Seventieth Intelligence Wing, Fort Meade, Maryland, which had several technicians and experts poring over intelligence-satellite imagery recently received from space. “Glad to have you running the show there now.”

“I just wish it hadn't happened because of a damned Russian sneak attack,” Griffin said.

“We'll take care of that problem shortly, Tagger,” Patrick said. “I damned well guarantee it.” There was then a brief moment of silence as they thought about the devastation that had come down on Offutt, Minot, Ellsworth, Whiteman, and all the other targets of Russian cruise missiles. America had suffered its worst-ever attack on its own soil—and now it was their job to find a way to give the president of the United States some options other than initiating a nuclear response.

“The data feed is looking good,” Patrick said to break the reverie.

“This stuff is hot off the presses,” Trevor Griffin said. “The last NIRTSat overflight was just five minutes ago. Man, you guys have the best toys.”

They did indeed, Patrick thought. The four-satellite NIRTSat—“Need It Right This Second” satellite—constellation launched just a few hours ago by Jon Masters was speeding over southern Siberia, photographing hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory with ultrabroadband radar and high-resolution imaging infrared cameras every twenty minutes, then instantly beaming any returns back to Battle Mountain. The images were analyzed by comparing their size, density, and heat signatures to a catalog of known military objects.

“Okay, guys, here's what we got,” Tagger began. “Let's start with the bombers. The Russians took some serious hits with their bomber fleet on their attack, but they were very effective and bit a big chunk out
of our asses. They easily have over a hundred and fifty or so planes left, spread out across ten bases. They lost about a quarter of their fleet in the initial attack, but it's not slowing them down one bit. It definitely looks like they're reloading and rearming and getting ready for another swipe—and this time they'll have an easier time of it. Their next attack could well reach every base and every government office in North America.

“Their tanker tactics are very impressive—they're using a level of organization and sophistication that equals ours,” Tagger observed. “They launch the bombers with maximum ordnance and minimal fuel, refuel them with unit tankers as they cruise-climb to altitude, then top them off with task-force tankers from Yakutsk before they begin their launch run. They're tanking all the way to feet-dry, and they have a huge reserve. By the time the bombers return to Siberia, the tankers have loaded up at Yakutsk, and they go out and meet the bombers and just repeat the whole process back to landing. Questions?”

Patrick said nothing, but he nodded slowly as he studied the satellite imagery of the bases Griffin had just briefed.

“Let's take a look at the Russian land-based missiles now,” Tagger went on. “The SS-18s at Aleysk and Uzhur are definitely warmed up and ready to go. Uzhur has the largest deployment, with four launch-control centers each controlling twelve silos. Aleysk has just two launch-control centers.

“Patrick, you asked about the composition of the launch-control centers. The Russians did away with modernizing their SS-18 LCCs in favor of improving their mobile-missile survivability. They assumed we were going to smack their LCCs hard, so they emphasized fast-reaction silo launches versus the idea of riding out an attack and then launching. So the answer is, yes, a weapon like a Longhorn with bunker-busting technology—a hardened penetrating nose cap, delayed fuze, and booster motor—along with an enhanced-yield but nonnuclear payload such as a thermium-nitrate warhead can, we believe, take out a SS-18 launch-control center. We just have to be sure that we get to them before they launch.

“The real trick has been the SS-25s,” Trevor Griffin went on. “Those bastards are road-mobile, and they've had plenty of time to deploy. We took a chance and started checking out every known garrison location for the SS-25s, and I think we've hit pay dirt.

“The largest missile wing, Kansk, has forty-six units, but all of them
relocated to their garrisons. Although they can still launch from a garrisoned position, we're hoping that's a sign of either equipment malfunctions or crew disillusionment. The smallest wing, Drovyanaya, hasn't even moved their missiles off the base yet—they're all in their security garages. Both of these wings are the most geographically isolated, so I think without a lot of adult supervision, the local commanders decide on their own whether to deploy their rovers or not. Looks like in these two cases they decided on very limited deployments.

“The other three missile wings are more difficult to surveille,” Tagger admitted. “They dispersed their units quickly, and they're not using their garrisons as much—perhaps only a quarter of the units are in garrison locations. Barnaul, Novosibirsk, and Irkutsk's missiles are likely to escape. We can get the ones in the garrisons, but that still leaves over seventy units unaccounted for.”

“We'll target the ones in the garrisons and hope we catch a break on the rest,” Patrick said.

“We've got the garrisons covered,” David said. “The SS-25s may be mobile, but in their garrisons they're detectable and stoppable, and out in the open they're still detectable and as vulnerable as a tree. StealthHawks fitted with ultrawideband sensors can look inside the garrison shelters easily, and millimeter-wave radar and imaging infrared sensors can spot transporter-erector-launchers under foliage and hidden by camouflage.”

“We definitely got a surprise here,” Tagger went on. “We weren't looking for them, but they popped up on our overflights anyway: activity at the old SS-24 garrisons at Krasnoyarsk.”

“What?”
Patrick remarked. “SS-24s on the move?” The SS-24 “Scalpel” rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile was the weapon that changed the course of arms-limitation-treaty talks in the 1990s. The SS-24 was a copy of the American Peacekeeper ICBM, a long-range missile designed to carry ten independently targeted nuclear warheads to ranges out to ten thousand miles. Like the original Peacekeeper missile, the SS-24 was designed from the outset to travel on the national railway system, mixing in with Russia's substantial train population and making targeting virtually impossible. At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia had 150 three-missile units deployed throughout the country. They could be launched anywhere with just a few minutes' warning time, and the warheads they carried were the most accurate carried by any Russian ballistic missile.

The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed between the United States and Russia was supposed to eliminate the long-range rail-mobile SS-24 and Peacekeeper missiles, and to make all land-based ICBMs carry only single rather than multiple warheads. The United States deactivated its last Peacekeeper missile in 2002 and destroyed its silos; the Russians were supposed to transfer the rail-mobile SS-24s to older SS-18 silos and make them carry single warheads only.

“Obviously the Russians have been cheating on START II,” Tagger summarized. “I think we might have as many as twelve SS-24s on the move.”

“Dave?”

“The SS-24s are the biggest threats,” Luger said. “They have the longest range, carry more warheads, and are more accurate than anything else the Russians have.” He sat back in his seat and finally shook his head. “It's not going to work, Muck,” he said. “Even before we found the SS-24s, we were pushing it—now I don't think we have a chance. Even if we gain all of the Air Force's surviving bombers, we just can't surge enough airframes to drive ten thousand miles and take all these locations at once. Some will leak through.”

Patrick remained silent for a few more moments, then turned to Luger. “I know how to surge our planes,” he said. “I need Rebecca, Daren, Hal, and the entire staff ready to do some planning—but I think I know how we can do it. I'll need to speak with General Venti in about an hour.” He nodded his thanks to Trevor Griffin, then asked, “Anything else, Tagger?”

“Sure,” Griffin said matter-of-factly. His face broke out with a sly, boyish smile. “Want to know where Anatoliy Gryzlov is now?”

“
What?
You
know
where Gryzlov is?”

“Air Intelligence Agency routinely tracks his command posts and monitors radio and data traffic from Russia's forty-seven various alternate military command centers scattered around the country,” Tagger said. “Gryzlov is crafty. He launched two sets of airborne military command posts before the attacks began, and there's a lot of confusing and conflicting radio traffic, meant as diversions. But I think we've pinpointed his actual location: Ryazan', at an underground military facility next to a deactivated military base, about a hundred forty miles southeast of Moscow. We noticed shortly after the base closed that a substantial amount of work was being done on Oksky Reserve, a game and forest preserve adjacent to the old military base; when we saw a lot of
dirt being moved but didn't see any structures being built aboveground, we suspected the Russians of building either an underground weapon-storage facility or a command center. Gryzlov also happens to be from Ryazan' Oblast.”